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Using a comparative case study design, this thesis explores the impact on the Mexican federal judiciary of steep rises in violent crime, proliferation of 
armed organised crime groups, greater involvement of the military in crime con-
trol activities and the government’s ‘war on organised crime’. The thesis develops 
‘enemy penology’ as a theoretical framework based on the observation that the 
Mexican government has increasingly conceptualised offenders as enemies and 
called for an explicitly militarised criminal justice response. Drawing on this 
theoretical framework, the thesis analyses qualitative data from two different 
sites –a ‘crime control as warfare’ scenario (highly militarised state) and an un-
changed context (less militarised state). Findings are examined within the enemy 
penology framework and also drawing on theories of judicial behaviour and ju-
dicial roles in order to explain the overarching finding that judges seem to have 
insulated themselves from the ‘enemy penology’ promulgated by the government.
Analysis of 40 written judgements in drug cases and 28 semi-structured in-
terviews with judges (drawn from a total of 56 interviews achieved during the 
fieldwork) indicated that decision making, guilt determination and sentencing 
were almost identical in the two locations despite stark differences in context. 
In both locations, the study observed an inclination to privilege police evidence, 
high conviction rates despite poor prosecutorial performance and insufficient 
evidence, and a tendency to impose minimum sentences. Interviewees discussed 
these issues as well as the impact of armed criminality, military involvement in 
crime control and judicial independence. 
Overall, the Federal judiciary appeared to be not influenced by the enemy 
penology paradigm reproduced by public officials and criminal policies. Mexi-
can judicial behaviour was found to be strongly shaped by a formalistic and le-
galistic understanding of judicial duties where accuracy in law interpretation is 
expected, disregarding other goals, including politics and policy considerations. 
This understanding is enhanced by the judiciary through strict observance of 
precedents, reversals and enhancing law-interpreter and ritualist judicial roles. 
Nonetheless, the empirical data also showed that judges’ views and opinions 
are informed by strategic goals, attitudes, motives, managerial needs and the 
pursuit of self-respect and recognition. In sum, examining court judgements 
and judges’ views about deciding cases in the light of the prevalent ‘enemy pe-
nology’ provided a rich understanding of the way decision-making in criminal 
matters is constructed by judges as well as the complex and often contradictory 
layers that comprise the image and role of the Mexican federal judge. 
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chapter 1 
Introduction: The Mexican context 
Several decades ago, many Latin American countries began a deep social, economic, political and legal transformation. The countries’ emergence 
from authoritarian regimes was one of the main engines of change. Econom-
ic and political reforms sought market liberalisation and the establishment of 
democratic governments. Economic policy headed towards neo-liberalism, and 
electoral reforms fostered competitive elections. Reform of the justice system, 
including the criminal justice system, was a less important priority. 
Authoritarian regimes may coexist with independent judiciaries for various 
reasons. Independent or otherwise empowered courts may be used, for exam-
ple, to foster trust in the government’s commitment to reinforce the legitimacy 
of the regime, to hold state officials accountable, or to pursue controversial 
reforms (Solomon, 2007). The Franco regime in Spain, for instance, had a 
relatively independent judiciary, but it lacked political significance because of 
limited jurisdictional scope (Guarnieri, Pederzoli and Thomas, 2002; Toharia, 
1975). The regime’s influence on the judiciary was possible, however, through 
two main strategies, on one hand, ordinary courts’ had limited impact on social 
and public life, while on the other, special civil, commercial and criminal tribu-
nals were created to further the regime’s policies (Toharia, 1975). In the case of 
many Latin American countries, the judiciary was relatively isolated from ex-
ternal developments and was subject to a high degree of political manipulation 
and budgetary neglect (Begné Guerra, 2007; Cavise, 2007; López-Ayllón & 
Fix-Fierro, 2003). Overall, systems of justice lacked resources, and practitioners 
were poorly paid (Pérez-Perdomo & Friedman, 2003). Reforms of the justice 
system began in the early 1980s. 
In a parallel manner, criminal justice systems across the region were held to 
be highly inefficient in identifying and trying the accused, and extremely arbi-
trary and abusive when dealing with those who were arrested and interrogat-
ed (Hammergren, 2007; Magaloni, 2012, Shirk, 2011). Most Latin American 
criminal justice systems came from an inquisitorial tradition and were charac-
terised by excessive formalism, impunity, corruption and a tendency for punish-
ment to fall heavily on the poor (Hammergren, 2007). Local jurists pressed for 
introduction: the mexican context                  2 9
change from an inquisitorial to an adversarial system, while national and in-
ternational non-governmental organisations sought human rights enforcement 
and the strengthening of democratic governance via judicial reform (Hammer-
gren, 2007). In sum, the drivers for change across Latin America included: the 
democratisation process that political systems underwent after authoritarian 
regimes; negative perception of the criminal justice system; and the reassess-
ment of human rights within the political (Pérez-Perdomo & Friedman, 2003). 
Prior to reforms initiated in the eighties, the Mexican judiciary was legally 
prevented from hearing cases on political issues and generally sanctioned the 
government’s decisions and policies. The judicial branch worked as an ap-
pendix of the government, controlled and manipulated by it (Iturralde, 2010, 
p.317). Judicial reform in Mexico began in 1987, and by 1994 a set of constitu-
tional reforms to empower the judiciary had been established (López-Ayllón & 
Fix-Fierro, 2003; Pérez-Perdomo & Friedman, 2003). These reforms expanded 
the National Supreme Court of Justice’s (scjn) jurisdiction as it was given the 
ability to limit government authority by invalidating unconstitutional acts or 
laws1 and to determine political boundaries between different entities of the 
Mexican State. The reforms increased the judiciary’s political relevance as a 
mechanism for constitutional control, largely due to jurisdictional expansion 
(Finkel, 2005). 
As Solomon (2007) argues, empowering a high court during a fading regime 
does not sit well within an authoritarian setting. The empowerment of the scjn 
in the last years of the pri’s authoritarian rule has several possible explana-
tions. Magaloni argues, for instance, that President Zedillo’s leadership was 
challenged by members of the opposition parties and later on by members of 
his own party (2003). This led Zedillo to delegate the resolution of political 
disputes and constitutional matters to a neutral arbiter (Magaloni, 2003). In 
contrast, Finkel maintains that as the president foresaw that his party would 
lose the following election and thus become the opposition party, he decided to 
empower the judiciary as a way of constraining the incoming president’s actions 
1  The 1994 reform inserted two new scjn functions: to resolve “unconstitutionality of laws” 
petitions and “constitutional controversies”. The former refers to the possibility of invali-
dating laws passed by any federal or state legislature where a law may be declared null 
and void. The latter refers to the scjn’s right to resolve conflicts between public entities 
claiming an infringement on a matter of jurisdiction. The court’s decision will have a 
generalised effect (rather than only affecting the parties to the controversy), if eight out of 
eleven justices vote in favour--or, in cases of constitutional controversies, if a higher entity 
challenges a lower one. If this majority is not reached or a lower body challenges a higher 
one, the decision only affects the parties and thus the law object of the case would continue 
in effect (Finkel, 2005).  
introduction: the mexican context                  2 10
(2005). A third explanation holds that Zedillo’s lack of legitimacy to govern 
prompted him to delegate power to the judiciary. This explanation takes into 
account that 1994 began with the uprising of the Zapatista guerrilla movement, 
the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (nafta) and the assas-
sination of a Presidential candidate (Inclán, 2009). 
Institutional arrangements within the judiciary were also modified in order 
to strengthen its independence and insulate it from political influence. These ar-
rangements concerned judges’ tenure, financial stability and appointment pro-
cedures (Finkel, 2005, p.89; Solomon, 2007, p. 124). In 1995, a non-partisan 
council, the Federal Council of the Judiciary (Consejo de la Judicatura Federal, 
cjf) was created. This council is headed by the chief justice of the scjn. The 
council’s mixed membership was designed to prevent external influences affect-
ing its decisions (Finkel, 2005, p. 96). The cjf is in charge of the professional-
ism, governance and discipline of federal judges and other court officials and 
investigates acts of corruption, incapacity and negligence (Concha et al., 2007, 
p.202; López Ayllón & Fix Fierro, 2003). 
The Mexican criminal justice system was not reformed at the same pace 
as the judiciary or other criminal justice systems in the region.2 While Chile 
began its criminal justice reform in 2001 and Colombia in 2002, Mexico did 
not reform its Constitution until 2008. The Mexican criminal justice reform 
comprised four main elements: 
1. introduction of new adversarial procedural rules, including orality, alter-
native sentencing and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms; 
2. express recognition of adversarial values related to defendants’ rights, 
including presumption of innocence, due process and adequate legal de-
fence, as well as victims’ rights; 
3. changes to police agencies dealing with training, discipline and their role 
in criminal investigations; 
4. tougher measures for combating organised crime (Shirk, 2011).   
In consequence, Mexican criminal justice system reform did not follow a sin-
gle rationale but followed various and contradictory goals. On the one hand, 
2  Chile, for example, began to introduce new procedures in two regions in 2001 and Colom-
bia reformed its Constitution in 2002 in order to include an adversarial criminal justice 
system, whilst Mexico did not begin constitutional reform until 2008 and waited five 
more years to produce a National Procedural Criminal Code. Nonetheless, several state 
congresses reformed state legislation to gradually move towards a more adversarial system 
before federal legislation was changed.
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tougher measures concerning organised crime included changes to special leg-
islation that reduced procedural safeguards and increased severity of sentences. 
On the other, the introduction of adversarial principles was intended to ensure 
that criminal proceedings would rely on due process values to achieve fairer 
outcomes and introduce further safeguards to prevent wrongful convictions 
(Carbonell & Ochoa, 2009). 
The slow pace of Mexico’s criminal justice system reform may partly be 
explained by a severe safety crisis beginning in 2001 in which violent crime in-
creased while law enforcement agencies were found to be deeply corrupt and so 
ineffective that “crime achieved high levels of efficiency and enjoyed impunity” 
(Regalado Santillán, 2002, p. 181; Shirk, 2011). This crisis was worsened by 
high-profile violent crime related to drug trafficking; the United States pres-
sured Latin American countries, including Mexico, to participate actively in the 
war on drugs and to rely on the military in this effort (Buxton, 2006, p. 62-63; 
Shirk, 2011). 
The safety crisis, described below, reached its peak during President Felipe 
Calderón’s administration (2006 – 2012). The number of violent offences grew 
exponentially, reflecting the changing dynamics within drug-trafficking or-
ganisations. The death toll by the end of the administration exceeded 120,000 
killings (inegi quoted by Robles de la Rosa, 2014). As Osorio claimed, “the 
lethality of this surge of criminal violence is comparable to the onset of 50 
civil wars in only six years” (2013, p.1). At the same time, the army’s3 inter-
vention in civil affairs focused mainly on anti-drugs efforts, which had be-
gun earlier, heightened by ineffective and corrupt law enforcement agencies. 
Former military members joined attorneys general and attorneys state offices 
as well as police forces and participated actively in training the police and in 
conducting operatives to arrest suspects and seize drugs, weaponry and other 
illicit objects. 
Safety crisis
The analysis of the ‘safety crisis’ set out below addresses three main features of 
the puzzling escalation of violence in Mexico: the steep rise in violent offences, 
the changing dynamics within drug-trafficking organisations linked to state’s 
anti-drug efforts, and the severe social issue of impunity and generalised lack of 
public trust in criminal justice institutions. 
3  The Mexican military comprises the army and the navy corps. 
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Increase in violent crime and drug trafficking
Crime rates, both state and federal offences4, declined in the late 1990s, but saw 
a sudden increase in 2006 and 2007. During President Ernesto Zedillo’s admin-
istration (1994 – 2000), the monthly average number of reported state offences 
was 116,756; during Felipe Calderón’s administration (2006 – 2012), this rose 
to 136,499 offences, an increase of 17 percent.5 During the same period, the 
monthly average number of federal offences increased from 6,308 to 13,331, a 
rise of 74 percent (México Evalúa, 2011).   
Overall crime rates increased but, more importantly, serious and violent of-
fences, such as homicide, kidnapping and extortion, also grew steeply. Similar 
to the general crime trend, homicide rates had a declining tendency that reversed 
after 2007. According to inegi,6 used by México Evalúa, the national homicide 
rate in 1990 was 16.6 deaths per 10,000 inhabitants, which dropped each year 
until 2007, when the figure was 8.1 deaths per 10,000 inhabitants (2016). In 
2008, this tendency reversed; homicides rose to 12.6 per 10,000, which meant 
that between 2007 and 2009, inegi recorded 42,064 homicides (Merino, 2011). 
The peak was reached in 2011 with 23.5 per 10,000 but dropped again the fol-
lowing year; by 2014 there were 16.4 homicides per 10,000 inhabitants (México 
Evalúa, 2016). Even though homicides dropped from 2012 onwards, they have 
not reached Mexico’s lowest rate. Kidnapping also rose significantly during the 
period of increasing homicide rates: between 2007 and 2010, the number of 
reported cases grew by 266 percent.7 Extortion cases rose by 73 percent8 from 
2007 to 2008—from 751 to 1,298 incidents—and rose a further 40 percent 
from 2008 to 2009 (icesi, 2011). 
The number of offences grew more in states receiving federal aid in the form 
of military forces acting to curb to drug trafficking. As a consequence, some 
parts of the country were affected by this crime wave much more than others; 
some territories are more valuable than others for purposes of drugs produc-
tion, distribution, wholesale and retail (cidac, 2012; Merino, 2011; Osorio, 
2011; Ríos, 2013). As a result, violence did not spread evenly across the country 
4  State offences are those found in state legislation and investigated by state authorities. By 
comparison, federal offences are those considered to have an impact on the whole country, 
such as conspiracy, terrorism or drug trafficking. Federal offences are found in federal laws 
and investigated by federal institutions. The vast majority of offences are state ones and 
represent above 90 percent of the total number of registered offences. 
5 This figure concerns mid-2010.
6 National Institute for Geography and Statistics.
7 The number of reported kidnappings increased from 229 to 608.
8 The number of reported extortions rose from 1,298 to 1,819.
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but rather became highly concentrated in a few regions. From 2006 to 2010, 
84 percent of homicides were located in only four out of 31 states and Mexico 
City (Ríos, 2013). Possibly the most disturbing situation occurred in the state 
of Chihuahua, where homicide rates grew abruptly. For instance, 12.7 deaths 
per 10,000 inhabitants were reported in 1990. In 2007 this figure increased 
to 15.3, but in the following year it shot up to 75.9 (México Evalúa, 2016). In 
2014, the homicide rate decreased, but only to 46.1 (México Evalúa, 2016). 
Homicides related to drug-trafficking organisations have distinctive charac-
teristics which foster widespread fear. (Shirk & Wallman, 2015). These charac-
teristics include the use of high-calibre battlefield weapons such as ak-47 rifles 
and grenades, use of particular tactics that include assassinations of law-en-
forcement agents and journalists, street gun battles, and extreme forms of vio-
lence such as torture, dismemberment and decapitation, all of which send overt 
messages to authorities and rival organisations (Osorio, 2013; Shirk & Wall-
man, 2015, p. 4-5). At the same time, drug-related killings are very high-profile 
and spectacular in nature, intentionally displaying evidence of their violence. 
These involves public display of decapitated heads and other body parts, hang-
ing bodies from bridges and other public spaces, open assassination of govern-
ment officials, and shootings in public spaces (Shirk & Wallman, 2015, p. 7). 
According to Osorio (2013 p. 168-69),9 one of the main strategies used by 
the federal government to respond to drug-trafficking organisations was to ar-
rest suspects for organised crime-related offences and seize illicit drugs and 
drug-related assets such as property (e.g. mansions, safe houses, storage fa-
cilities); vehicles including armoured vehicles, speed boats and aeroplanes; and 
weaponry ranging from pistols and semi-automatic weapons (e.g. ak-47 or r-15 
rifles) to explosives and rifles capable of piercing armoured vehicles (e.g. Barret 
m82 rifles) (Osorio, 2013 p. 168-69). State forces also relied, though less fre-
quently, on violent strategies, including operations where government authori-
ties attacked, wounded or killed suspected members of criminal organisations 
or repelled an attack from them (Osorio, 2013, p.168). 
As a result, federal offences, in particular those involving drugs and fire-
arms, rose sharply, including in states where levels of these offences had hither-
to remained low. As will be explained below, drugs and firearms seizures were 
a priority tactic used by the federal government to respond to drug-trafficking 
organisations. The following table shows the number of drug offences recorded 
9 From a total of 251,167 registered events of drug-related violence from 2006 to 2010, 32.6 
percent and 25.2 percent concern drug seizures and arrests respectively. Violent law-en-
forcement tactics represented only 2.4 of the total events coded in a database that recorded 
daily national media reports during that time period (Osorio, 2013, p. 169). 
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by the Attorneys General from 1997 to 2010 in states where the military inter-
vened (eight states), and also the median, in order to give an approximation of 
the rate in the remaining states (23 states). 
Table 1.1 Recorded drug offences in Mexico by state: 1997-2010
Source: Data obtained from the Executive Secretary of the National System of Public Safety 
in “Criminal incidence concerning Federal Jurisdiction 1997 – 2012”, consulted on 20th 
March 2012. 
As Table 1.1 shows, many states experienced a significant increase from 2005 
onwards. While median growth from 2005 to 2008 was 46 percent, Baja Cali-
fornia saw the greatest increase, 72 percent.   
In sum, in a relatively short period of time, several regions of the country 
became battlefields. The unprecedented rise in crime described above illustrates 
the extent to which the country was affected. Crime became one of the most 
pressing concerns within Mexican society (El Universal/Buendía & Laredo, 
2014). The growing level of violence is strongly related to the changing dynam-
ics within drug-trafficking organisations described below. 
Changes within drug- trafficking organisations 
For decades, drug-trafficking organisations conducted illegal activities in rela-
tive harmony and peace (Astorga & Shirk, 2010; Osorio, 2011; Ríos, 2013). 
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beginning of the twentieth century and large-scale smuggling to the 1950s (Os-
orio, 2011). Drug-trafficking organisations flourished in the 1970s, when the 
U.S. demand for heroin increased in the context of the counter-culture move-
ment and the breaking of the “French connection” importation route (Astorga 
& Shirk, 2010). The growing U.S. demand for cocaine was met by Colombian 
drug-trafficking organisations that moved it through Miami, the Gulf of Mexi-
co and the Caribbean (Krauze, 2012). As access by sea became more restricted, 
Colombians relied more on Mexican smuggling networks, which gained control 
over the smuggling routes into the U.S. after the disintegration of Colombian 
drug-trafficking organisations (Astorga & Shirk, 2010). Mexican involvement 
in the cocaine market in the 1970s and 1980s, together with protection from 
the state, led to higher levels of prosperity within drug-trafficking organisations 
in Mexico (Astorga, 2007; Astorga, 2012).
Mexican drug-trafficking organisations expanded in parallel with the in-
tense process of economic integration. When Mexico entered the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement (nafta) with Canada and the U.S. in 1994, new 
channels of licit but also illicit commerce opened. Just like any other, these illicit 
organisations took advantage of technological developments and new financial 
structures (Astorga & Shirk, 2010; Krauze, 2012). Mexico replaced Colombia 
as the most important supplier of drugs to the U.S., providing approximately 
70 percent of the cocaine, 80 percent of the marijuana, and 30 percent of the 
heroin consumed (Andreas 1998, quoted by Ríos, 2013).
In addition to the decline of Colombian drug-trafficking organisations and 
the opening of the borders, Mexican organisations’ blossoming was due to the 
political structure then in place (Astorga & Shirk, 2010). Although drug dealing 
was legally prohibited, its prosecution was only selectively enforced and anti-
drugs operatives were rare. The centralised power exercised by the ruling party 
in government, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario 
Institucional, [pri]) was not only permissive but also protective of organised 
criminal activities as long as the criminals paid bribes to corrupt government 
officials (Astorga, 2007). Moreover, corruption took place at high levels of gov-
ernment, which meant that immunity trickled down within the government, 
offering protection to gang members who could afford to pay (Astorga & Shirk, 
2010). Under these conditions, drug-trafficking organisations functioned with 
relative stability, unaffected by competition, in large part because of arrange-
ments with government officials, who established “plazas” or territorial zones 
of control where specific drug-trafficking organisations operated, as well as the 
rules of the game (Astorga & Shirk, 2010). Those who did not agree with these 
rules or broke them had three choices: accept them, face prison or face death 
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(Astorga L., 2012). Drug-trafficking organisations were not challenged by the 
government, and although competition and conflict between these organisa-
tions existed, these encounters did not involve as much violence as they did later 
on. These organisations, like other groups of organised criminals, resorted to 
force occasionally, either to enforce agreements or to ensure their territorial 
dominance (Gambetta, 1993 and Reuters 1998, quoted by Osorio, 2011). 
The relatively stable balance between the state and criminal organisations 
changed in the face of political pluralism, electoral democracy and decentrali-
sation, together with anti-drugs efforts. In the 1990s other political parties 
gained power at the state level, and in 1997, the ruling party, pri, lost its major-
ity in the national Congress. In 2000, pri lost the presidential election for the 
first time in 70 years. As a result, state power was redistributed, fragmented 
and weakened, which meant that arrangements once created and enforced by 
a unified government became highly contested (Astorga, 2007; Astorga, 2012). 
Power centralised in the hands of a single cohesive hegemonic party helped 
enforce arrangements with criminal groups, giving these groups an incentive to 
remain unified (Ríos, 2013). Decentralisation and pluralism changed the rules 
of corruption, allowing criminal groups to engage in criminal operations with 
different parties and also reducing the incentive to remain cohesive (Astorga & 
Shirk, 2010; Ríos, 2013). 
By the late 1990s onwards, competition and conflict among major drug-
trafficking organisations increased. These organisations engaged in violent en-
counters to gain control over “plazas” and access the lucrative U.S. market (As-
torga & Shirk, 2010 p.16). Battles for territory amongst traffickers frequently 
happen in illegal markets, where formal mechanisms as well as systematic rules 
to deal with disputes and disagreements are absent. Drug trafficking organi-
sations dislike sharing territories because sharing increases the costs of cor-
ruption, reduces their share of the local market and makes production inputs 
scarcer (Ríos, 2013). 
Although previous presidents had resorted to the army to conduct anti-drug 
efforts, President Calderón relied overtly on the military, declaring war on 
drugs and organised crime in 2007, first in one region—Michoacán—and later 
extending this war to many other regions across the country (Krauze, 2012). 
Violence erupted once state operatives were deployed. These operatives aimed 
at restoring order and maintaining the state’s legitimate monopoly of violence, 
however, they led to increases in violence (Bowling, 2011; Osorio, 2011). There 
is consensus within recent scholarship that government crackdowns substan-
tially contributed to the escalation of violence (Osorio, 2013; Osorio, 2015; 
Shirk & Wallman, 2015; Ríos, 2013). 
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Drug-trafficking organisations attacked law enforcers in order to preserve 
their organisational power structure and secure their profits (Osorio, 2011). 
These confrontations undermined the state’s capacity to provide security 
against widespread criminality. The violence triggered by these confrontations 
caused casualties within law enforcement agencies, criminal organisations and 
third parties, including journalists and civilians. At the same time, the state’s 
coercive actions weakened one criminal organisation but indirectly improved 
the position of its rivals, causing further violent encounters between criminal 
organisations (Osorio, 2015; Ríos, 2013). In addition, conflict erupted within 
drug-trafficking organisations as a consequence of both inter-organisational 
and state coercive actions, both of which disrupted operations and trust and 
generated leadership vacancies (Osorio, 2011). Violence also grew as a result of 
the proliferation of lower-level criminal networks operating at street level and 
contributing to the growing phenomenon of low-level drug dealing. Illicit ac-
tivities expanded with the increase in criminal groups. These groups diversified 
into kidnapping, extortion, collective killings and fuel theft (Astorga & Shirk, 
2010; Krauze, 2012). 
Bowling (2011) argues that anti-drugs operations, followed by encounters 
between law enforcement agents and criminal organisations and between and 
within organisations, reveal the iatrogenic effect of drugs prohibition. In clini-
cal iatrogenesis, treatments used to address particular sicknesses induce further 
harm; in social iatrogenesis, socioeconomic transformations are made neces-
sary so that these treatments can be administered. In the case of drug violence 
in Mexico, anti-drugs efforts and state agents contributed to new kind of un-
safety that spread across the country when new forms of deviance emerged. On 
the one hand, criminal offences that cause serious harm, such as kidnapping 
and extortion, expanded as smaller criminal organisations blossomed. On the 
other hand, human rights violations by the military and other state officials 
grew exponentially; reports of arbitrary detentions, illegal property searches 
and torture increased in a very short period of time, as detailed below. For 
instance, in Michoacán, where the initial battle of Calderon’s war was fought, 
torture reports increased by 300 percent in 2008 (Maldonado Aranda, 2012). 
At the same time, the militarisation of law-enforcement agencies and opera-
tives illustrates the social iatrogenic effect. The increased degree of militarisa-
tion (discussed in Chapter 4), enhanced under President Calderón’s administra-
tion, may be observed, as Kraska (2001) points out, in the following: changes in 
organisational settings that incorporated special units focused on drug traffick-
ing; greater operational use of high-calibre weaponry designed for use in war; 
and the public promotion of military values to address social issues. 
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As Mexico’s safety crisis escalated, violent crime became more organised 
and far better equipped with battlefield weapons, while the death toll increased. 
Politicians resorted to framing law enforcement actions as being both meta-
phorically and literally waging war against organised crime. “Today, more than 
ever, such unity is required to defeat an enemy who threatens to destroy the 
population’s tranquillity and its institutions”.10 
As is the case in other jurisdictions, Mexico has witnessed increasingly heav-
ily armed police, the involvement of military forces in crime control and inves-
tigation and the introduction of military values, equipment and discourse into 
law enforcement, courts, criminal justice and punishment. In this context, the 
question addressed by this thesis is: what impact, if any, has this ‘war’ had on 
judges and their judgements in ordinary criminal cases concerned with narcotic 
and psychotropic drugs?
Impunity and institutional crises
The ‘dark figure’, which represents offences left unreported and unrecorded, 
has consistently been over 80 percent, highlighting a systematic problem of un-
punished offences in Mexico, referred to as impunity (Zepeda Lecuona, 2011). 
According to the Global Index on Impunity,11 Mexico was ranked 58 out of 59 
examined countries. The net result is that perhaps one or two out of 100 crimes 
end in conviction (Shirk, 2011). Only 14.8 offences in every 100 are reported 
and only 26 pre-trial proceedings in every 100 are submitted to a court (Zepeda 
Lecuona, 2011). The fact that authorities may only react to a minor propor-
tion of crime signifies that a large number of offences are left unpunished and 
only 2.1 offenders out of 100 are likely to be arrested. This fosters a sense of 
impunity among perpetrators and within society in general (Zepeda Lecuona, 
2011). This problem is exacerbated by the fact that violent offences affect many 
people. For instance, kidnapping cases affect not only the kidnapped victim 
but also those who fall into poverty when a breadwinner is kidnapped or killed 
10 Speech given by the head of the Superior War School (Escuela Superior de Guerra) in re-
gard to President Calderón’s call for unity in response to organised crime, July 23, 2010. 
http://www.sedena.gob.mx/index.php/sala-de-prensa/discursos
11 The Global Index of Impunity was first published in 2015 and created by the Centre of 
Impunity and Justice Studies (Centro de Estudios sobre Impunidad y Justicia, cesij), hosted 
by the Universidad de las Américas in Puebla, Mexico. The impunity index analyses three 
elements: human rights, safety, and justice. This index seeks to build an index taking into 
account possible causes and conditions that foster impunity, together with those actors 
deemed responsible for impunity and the perception of society in general. The Global In-
dex examines 193 countries that are part of the United Nations, but only 59 of these had 
statistical information available to calculate the country’s impunity (cesij, 2015). 
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(México Evalúa, 2011). 
Although the type of offence and the harm produced make a significant 
difference to whether an offence is reported, victimisation surveys reveal wide-
spread distrust in the prosecution service and the police, which in part explains 
victims’ reluctance to go to the police. Also, this reluctance is explained by the 
victims’ perception that reporting a crime is a fruitless and time-consuming 
process (inegi, 2011; México Evalúa, 2011). Concerning public confidence, 
both the police and the prosecution service have consistently appeared to be 
public institutions with hardly any public trust ( (( Consulta Mitofsky, 2009; 
inegi, 2011). In fact, only one-third of the population deems the prosecution 
service’s work effective (inegi, 2011) and 38 percent of the population consider 
that helping the police in their city is dangerous (Consulta Mitofsky, MUCD, 
2015). A purge of police forces was part of the 2008 constitutional reform, 
and in 2010 the federal government created an initiative in which state police 
groups were instructed to undertake a number of tests, including polygraph, 
medical, and psychological tests, to assess their reliability.12 In some parts of 
the country, state and municipal police forces were suspected of colluding with 
criminal groups to the extent that in Nuevo León, for instance, police forces 
were purged based on possible complicity and corruption with criminal groups 
(Astorga, 2007; González Parás quoted in Birkbeck, 2013). Also, the number 
of killings, kidnappings and other forms of violence against police officers and 
other state officials grew. For instance, in a period of 17 months, 450 killings 
of police officers, prosecutors and members of the army were reported to the 
Attorney General (Notimex, 2008). 
The extreme levels of ineffectiveness, impunity and corruption, as well as the 
lack of public trust in the police, were all arguments used to support martial 
involvement, initially to fight drug trafficking and later to respond to crime in 
general (Camp, 2005; Moloeznik, 2009). In contrast to the police service, the 
army enjoy wide credibility among the population (Consulta Mitofsky, 2009; 
inegi, 2011). Nonetheless, human rights organisations have repeatedly held that 
Mexican law-enforcement agencies, including martial ones, are prone to using 
torture and other illegal practices while conducting crime investigations. For 
instance, Human Rights Watch held that the number of forced disappearances 
had increased steadily since 2007 and found clear involvement of law enforce-
ment agents in the detention and subsequent disappearance of victims (Human 
12 The initiative was formally approved by the National Council of Public Safety on Novem-
ber 28, 2008. The National Model to Evaluate and Control Reliability was ratified on 
February 4, 2010 by the Permanent Commission of Certification. 
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Rights Watch, 2013). Since 2006 more than 22,000 people have disappeared, 
but president Calderón and other high profile officials argued that the victims 
killed were involved in drug trafficking (Human Rights Watch, 2013). Amnesty 
International (2015) and Human Rights Watch (2013) sustain that most victims 
have been abducted by criminal groups, but in many cases the involvement of 
state forces was established, either directly or in collusion with criminal groups. 
In this regard, Iturralde points out that many members of the security forces 
are used to fighting crime and exercising social control in the same fashion as 
they fought political opposition under previous, more authoritarian, regimes 
(2010). In addition, it is rare that the security forces are subjected to inde-
pendent investigation (Hadden, 2000). They have come to believe that they are 
not accountable to civilian courts or other civilian authorities for their actions 
(Iturralde, 2010, p. 323). 
Contradictory reforms
The contrasting elements of the 2008 constitutional reform were a response to 
different aspects of the safety crisis. One set of changes sought to guarantee 
fairer criminal proceedings by introducing an adversarial system and trying 
to enforce due process principles and human rights more effectively. A differ-
ent set of reforms, introduced almost simultaneously, attempted to strengthen 
crime control policies by criminalising certain behaviours, thus increasing the 
catalogue of criminal offences, facilitating the conviction of particular types of 
offences such as drug trafficking and money laundering, allowing pre-emptive 
measures such as arraigo (extended detention of a suspect for the purpose of 
investigation), enabling stronger martial intervention in crime control activi-
ties, and increased severity of punishment. As a result, conflicting reforms were 
made: on one end, a wide range of due process principles were aimed at en-
suring equality of arms and presumption of innocence,13 and on the other, a 
number of rules were designed to increase efficiency in fighting organised crime 
even though they compromised fairness.
Shifting from a quasi-inquisitorial system to an adversarial one
The Mexican system has been described as a quasi-inquisitorial or mixed crimi-
nal justice system, where pre-trial proceedings are said to be mainly inquisitori-
al while trial proceedings are closer to adversarial principles (Hernández Pliego, 
13 Due process principles that already existed in criminal law were strengthened through 
their constitutional recognition. 
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2003). The way in which federal criminal proceedings are currently managed 
is described in Chapter 6. Despite the risk of oversimplifying, however, it is 
important to bear in mind the main characteristics of inquisitorial, adversarial 
and Mexican quasi-inquisitorial systems in order to understand the implica-
tions of a shift from one system to another.
Traditionally, the main goal of an inquisitorial criminal proceeding is to 
determine the truth in a legal matter (Hernández Pliego, 2003; Hammergren, 
2007; Weiden, 2009). This means establishing whether a crime was committed 
and by whom (Cavise, 2007; Hernández Pliego, 2003). This ideological stand 
shapes the roles played by prosecutor, defence and judge during proceedings. 
For example, the suspect (later, the defendant) is thought of as an object of in-
vestigation who may contribute to the investigation of the truth as opposed to a 
party in proceedings (Carbonell & Ochoa 2009; Weiden, 2009). The judge typ-
ically performed both investigatory and adjudicatory roles, but in the modern 
inquisitorial proceedings developed in continental Europe the formal investiga-
tion and trial are conducted by two different state actors (Hammergren, 2007; 
Weiden, 2009). In the earlier stage, or pre-trial proceedings, the prosecutor (or 
investigative judge) conceived traditionally as a neutral investigator, prepares a 
dossier containing a thorough report of the investigation that will be later used 
by the judge during trial. The prosecutor or investigative judge is thought of as 
an impartial actor whose main task is ensure that justice is done and society’s 
interests served by pursuing the investigation to its evidentiary conclusion be-
fore entering the trial phase (Cavise, 2007; Hammergren, 2007; Weiden, 2009). 
During trial, the role of the judge overshadows that of the other parties. The 
judge controls proceedings and, based on the written dossier, outlines the major 
legal issues and facts of the case and may request further investigation. He is in 
charge of evidence production and assessment, at times rules instruct the ways 
in which evidence is produced in court and the value or weight that evidence has 
in the final decision (Hernández Pliego, 2003). Parties to the case—prosecutor 
and defence—may not introduce evidence but must instead focus on the legal 
interpretation and implications of the legal responsibility of the suspect (Cavise, 
2007). They also may make recommendations on the verdict and sentencing 
(Hammergren, 2007). As a result, the lawyers’ input is subsidiary. In the final 
stage, the judge determines guilt or innocence and any subsequent sentence. 
Proceedings are managed mainly through the written dossier and maintained 
in secrecy (Carbonell & Ochoa 2009; Hernández Acero, 2000). 
By comparison, it is presumed in adversarial criminal proceedings that the 
truth of the matter at hand is best unravelled by the prosecution and defence. 
Evidence admissibility is wide and evidence is freely weighed by the decision-
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maker (Hernández Pliego, 2003). Hence, adversarial systems seek to safeguard 
individual rights through due process; in particular, the defendant’s personal 
freedom is only affected once the state has demonstrated beyond reasonable 
doubt that the allegations against the defendant are sustained (Weiden, 2009). 
It is the parties, not the judge, who mostly affect the course of proceedings, 
including the production of evidence used to support each party’s allegations. 
The judge acts as a neutral and often silent referee, and the participation of lay-
men in deciding innocence or guilt is common (Weiden, 2009). Proceedings are 
mainly conducted orally and in public (Hernández Acero, 2000).
Some of the main characteristics of the Mexican criminal justice system fol-
low inquisitorial principles: first, the aims pursued by criminal proceedings 
are to punish the guilty based on determining the truth of the criminal events 
submitted to the court by the prosecution. The truth of the matter is based on 
determining whether a crime was committed and if so by whom (Cavise, 2007; 
Hernández Pliego, 2003). second, the prosecutor is formally understood as a 
neutral authority entrusted with investigating crime, whose responsibility gen-
erally culminates with an indictment showing what criminal offence was com-
mitted and who was responsible for it, paired with the evidence that supports 
the indictment (García Ramírez, 1994; Hernández Acero, 2000). In practice, 
the prosecutor tends not to produce further evidence in trial or submit final al-
legations before the verdict is reached, as will be discussed in Chapter 7. 
third, the dossier formed during pre-trial provides the judge with infor-
mation on the criminal acts in question so that a trial can be conducted and 
ultimately a verdict reached (Hernández Acero, 2000). Despite the fact that 
formally the investigation is separate from the actual adjudication of the case, 
the prosecutor strongly affects the course and outcome of the trial, as pre-trial 
findings are generally confirmed in trial (Cavise, 2007; Pásara, 2006). This is 
mainly due to evidence principles that instruct judges to give evidence specific 
weight, as will also be explained in Chapters 4 and 7 (Carbonell & Ochoa, 
2009). By comparison to the prosecutor, the defence attorney and defendant are 
mainly participants in the process (Cavise, 2007). 
fourth, compulsory custodial remand (or pre-trial detention) is frequently 
used, which means that suspects’ personal freedom is affected from the outset, 
producing a high proportion of unsentenced prisoners (Hammergren, 2007). 
Fifth, proceedings are mostly managed in written form; whenever evidence is 
given live, it is usually only given before a clerk, who writes the testimony down 
in the form of a statement and later presents it, with the rest of the file, to the 
judge (Cavise, 2007). The written form implies that access to the file is only 
available to the parties involved, if at all, thus maintaining secrecy. As a result, 
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criminal proceedings are strongly guided by an inquisitorial rationale. 
As mentioned above, changes to the criminal justice system were advocated 
by local jurists, as well as international and national ngo members, on the 
grounds that inquisitorial proceedings enhanced arbitrary practices, were de-
signed to operate in an authoritarian regime with low crime rates, and were 
intended to uncover illicit practices systematically conducted by state agents 
(Magaloni, 2009; Teitel, 1993). As the country’s political system began to shift 
from a single-party regime to an electoral democracy, a shift that was followed 
by rising crime rates, the criminal justice system proved to be outdated and 
inefficient (Magaloni, 2009). The typical constitutional guarantees and human 
rights are contained in the Constitution, including presumption of innocence, 
prohibition of lengthy detentions without trial, and due process. 
However, critics argued that the Mexican criminal justice system had seri-
ous flaws to the extent that they considered it operationally broken, render-
ing many constitutional protections meaningless and void (Cavise, 2007). For 
instance, over 70 percent of proceedings are initiated by the arrest of suspects 
en flagrancia. Such cases can therefore enter the criminal justice system with-
out any preceding criminal investigation or an arrest order issued by a court 
(Zepeda Lecuona, 2011). At the same time, suspects have consistently reported 
ill-treatment, especially during arrest, including beatings, torture and other hu-
miliating practices (Azaola & Bergman, 2010; Azaola & Correa, 2012). Dur-
ing trial, judges tend to remain in their chambers studying a dossier or case file 
while witness hearings are conducted by clerks in a different office of the court 
(Cavise, 2007). This practice is so common that nine out of ten defendants mis-
took the clerk for the judge during trial proceedings (Azaola & Bergman, 2010, 
Azaola & Correa, 2012).14 Almost half the prison population is on remand; 
statistically, nine out of ten will be found guilty (México Evalúa, 2013). At the 
same time, the rate of unpunished offences was calculated to be above 90 per-
cent (Zepeda Lecuona, 2011) and victims’ needs and allegations were neglected, 
to the extent of being forbidden to access to the dossier or casefile and appear 
before court. The criminal justice system has been described as “authoritarian, 
unbalanced, irrational and with null guarantees”, ineffective and unfair, offer-
ing no satisfactory response to any of the parties involved (Carbonell & Ochoa, 
2009; Magaloni, 2009, p. 1; Zepeda Lecuona, 2011, p. 262).
14 The common practice among state and federal trial judges of not participating in hearings 
has been repeatedly documented. Surveys carried out in 2002, 2005 and 2009 of the state 
prison population report that the presence of the judge during hearings is rare; this was 
also found in the first survey carried out by the same team in federal prisons in 2011 (Aza-
ola & Bergman, 2010; Azaola & Correa, 2012). 
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To enhance equality amongst the parties, reforms were made in the early 
1990s to guarantee the defendant’s right to an adequate defence. Also, confes-
sions, once thought of as sufficient evidence to reach a verdict, were discarded 
if they were the only piece of evidence produced to sustain a case (Hernández 
Pliego, 2003). The relevance of confessions in determining the truth can be 
traced historically to religious inquisitorial proceedings. Hence, reforms began 
incorporating features attuned to adversarialism. However, a substantial shift 
did not happen until 2008, when the Mexican constitution was reformed in or-
der to establish the adversarial criminal trial, expressing guiding principles for 
all criminal proceedings as well as defendants’ and victims’ basic rights. These 
guiding principles enumerate the main aims of a criminal trial: find the legal 
truth,15 protect the innocent, convict the guilty, repair the damage done; the 
burden of proof lies with the prosecution, hence the defendant should be pre-
sumed innocent; all hearings must take place in the presence of a judge who will 
examine evidence produced in court and reach a verdict promptly; and illicitly 
obtained evidence must be disregarded.16 Many implications flow from these 
constitutional reforms, as Cavise described: “the wholesale abandonment of the 
inquisitorial model in most of the countries in Central and South America rep-
resents a seismic shift in the international legal landscape which will have im-
plications far beyond statutory reform” (2007, p. 786). For instance, a balance 
between prosecutor and defendant is pursued by imposing higher standards of 
evidence on the prosecution. This will have a direct effect on the roles played by 
each party and also on the outcome of cases. Also, openness in proceedings rep-
resent an important change, as access to proceedings will be available through 
public hearings. Easy access to proceedings conducted by the prosecutor and 
later the trial conducted by the judge enhances accountability. At the same time, 
the presence of the judge during hearings makes it impossible (or at least harder) 
to delegate decisions to courtroom staff (Carbonell & Ochoa, 2009; Hammer-
gren, 2007). Also, after the reform, the prosecutor will be entitled to decide 
whether to press charges or not—the opportunity principle—and to draw on 
alternative dispute resolution strategies to prevent cases from reaching court. By 
comparison, currently, all reported cases are prosecuted.
In addition to restructuring the criminal justice system in 2008, the Consti-
tution was reformed in 2011 to establish the superiority of international human 
15 Although pursuing the legal truth is an essential element of inquisitorial proceedings, and 
the reform sought a shift towards a more adversarial system, this aim was included in the 
constitutional reform. 
16 Article 20 of the Mexican Constitution.
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rights treaties over the Mexican legal system (known as the “human rights 
reform”). That same year, the scjn issued a decision instructing judges to disre-
gard Mexican provisions whenever human rights principles would grant great-
er protection to the parties involved, including those participating in criminal 
proceedings (Ramírez Saavedra, 2012).17 Furthermore, in cases where specific 
norms contradict human rights, judges are expected to uphold the human rights 
principle over the local rule, together with the pro homine principle, which in-
structs judges to interpret the applicable norms in a case in the most favourable 
manner to the petitioner. Prior to the Constitution’s formal recognition, some 
of these principles, including the presumption of innocence, were acknowledged 
in binding case law issued by the scjn.18 However, these were not fully em-
braced by the judiciary until they were formally inserted in the Constitution. 
As will be discussed in Chapter 9, the human rights reform has signified that 
judges are beginning to understand their role differently.
Adopting these principles was an essential part of the shift from the quasi-
inquisitorial criminal justice system towards an adversarial one. However, the 
enactment of constitutional reform requires further legislation to operationalise 
the principles set in the Constitution.19 Therefore, criminal justice proceedings 
could only begin to change once a new set of rules containing entirely new codes 
at both federal and state level were published by federal and state legislatures. 
As a result, the implementation of the new criminal justice system initially re-
quired that 32 state congresses and the Federal Congress enact a new criminal 
procedure code in addition to changes in secondary legislation. Progress across 
the country was uneven. Several states were pioneers in transforming their state 
criminal justice systems even before the constitutional reforms described above, 
17 The decision of the scjn was issued in the case varios 912/2010 published in the Judicial 
Weekly Gazette, Book I, volume 1, October 2011, in compliance with the resolution of the 
case Radilla Pacheco vs Mexico issued by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. To 
see complete directives issued by the Inter-American Court see, for instance, the ruling 
“Conventionality control. Criteria to apply it in the judicial arena, according to the resolu-
tion of the National Supreme Court of Justice issued in the file Varios 912/2010”. 
18 For example, see the binding ruling “Presumption of innocence. This principle is contained 
implicitly in the Federal Constitution.” 
19 Several implications follow from a constitutional reform such as this: first, norms estab-
lished within the Constitution embody not only rules but also principles that justify policy-
making, judicial interpretation and further legislative modification. Also, changes in the 
Constitution set a standard to which all legislation, federal and state, must adhere and fur-
ther legislative reforms must be made according to new constitutional provisions. More-
over, introducing particular concepts into the Constitution implies that the modification of 
these concepts requires a consensus from the federal Congress and the 32 state legislatures, 
including the federal district’s legislature.
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but many states, together with the Federal Congress, resisted change. In light 
of the gradual and uneven transition to adversarialism, the Federal Congress 
published the National Criminal Procedure Code in 2014. This was intended 
to replace all state criminal procedure codes and would be applicable across the 
country. Its enforcement is planned to be gradual, so, for example, proceedings 
at federal level will only begin to change in 2016. 
In parallel with drafting new legislation, further tasks had to be managed. 
These included: establishing training programmes, including orientation and 
specialised skills for different practitioners; strengthening public prosecution 
and defence; training the police in the handling of evidence; modifying infra-
structure and equipment to support public hearings and other new proceed-
ings; and setting up public education campaigns and programmes for private 
attorneys and law students (Borrego Estrada, 2010; Carbonell & Ochoa, 
2009; Cavise, 2007; Hammergren, 2007). The scope of the transformation 
is wide and requires the cultural transformation of all criminal justice prac-
titioners. “This situation represents a 180-degree turn in the way of organis-
ing and administering the work done by judges and prosecutors” (Borrego 
Estrada, 2010).
According to the former leader of the process of reform implementation, Fe-
lipe Borrego Estrada, such considerable change has faced strong resistance from 
many practitioners, including private attorneys, prosecutors and judges (2010). 
For instance, judges found the new rules and principles, in which their leading 
role in proceedings would be reduced to being a referee, difficult to accept, 
as they are accustomed to being in charge of most of aspects of proceedings 
(Cavise, 2007). In a similar way, practising attorneys are beginning to learn 
that they should undertake an investigation that is separate from that of the 
police and prosecutorial authorities. According to Cavise, attorneys have found 
this duty antithetical to the notion that the defence is not activated until the 
investigation is complete and the indictment formally submitted to the court, as 
would happen in a quasi-inquisitorial system (2007, p.805-806). Learning that 
the outcome of the trial will depend on the quality of advocacy has been dif-
ficult to accept (Cavise, 2007). The emblem of transformation has been orality 
or oral trials; transparent public trials are expected to make judicial work more 
accountable and produce a more legitimate and fairer criminal justice system 
(Cavise, 2007; Carbonell & Ochoa, 2009; Zepeda Lecuona, 2011). Whether 
orality, together with enforcement of adversarial principles and rules, will meet 
the expectations is yet to be seen. 
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Legal reforms designed to fight organised crime
In the early 1990s, legislation to investigate and punish organised crime of-
fences emerged in parallel to the wave of reforms promoting due process and 
the adversarial principles aiming to guarantee fairer proceedings and safer ver-
dicts in the Mexican legal system. National interests drove efforts to effectively 
prosecute and punish offences linked to criminal organisations. Criminal or-
ganisations appeared have a higher degree of labour specialisation and train-
ing, access to sophisticated technology and to substantial profits, with internal 
structures that fostered hierarchy and the enforcement of internal arrangements 
(Bruccet Anaya, 2007). In particular, drug-trafficking organisations had out-
stripped the state’s powers to incapacitate, prosecute and sentence this type of 
offender and the available set of laws contained in the criminal codes were seen 
as unequal to the task of dealing with these new forms of criminality (Bruccet 
Anaya, 2007). In addition, the country faced international pressure to create 
and enforce effective security programmes to intensify the fight against drug 
trafficking.20 
The legal category of organised crime was first introduced to the Constitu-
tion in 1993 and several reforms were made thereafter. The Federal Law against 
Organised Crime (floc) was enacted in 1996 and has been modified on more 
than ten occasions. The floc establishes a set of rules for investigating, pros-
ecuting and punishing what this law defines as organised crime offences.21 The 
floc sets forth (i) offences regarded as organised crime, (ii) procedural rules to 
follow when these offences are tried and (iii) aggravating factors to take into 
account when sentencing. 
Justice Silva Meza described the legislative and constitutional reforms as 
“exceptional criminal law” (Silva Meza, 2001, p.225). This exceptional regime 
is still in place today and indeed has developed further. Many of the constitu-
tional safeguards established after the 2008 reforms are not applicable to cases 
related to organised crime offences.22 For example, arraigo or detention for 
the purpose of investigation is available for cases of organised crime; similarly, 
20 In 1990 Mexico ratified the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, initially drafted in 1988, followed by the signature of 
further international conventions and agreements on transnational organised crime (Bruc-
cet Anaya, 2007).
21 This Act was published in 1996 but has been subject to continuous reform ever since. 
22 Proceedings concerning organised crime will be governed by the new National Criminal 
Procedure Code. However, the specific procedural rules established in the floc will be ap-
plicable in cases of organised crime, disregarding the conflicting rules in the national code, 
according to the Fourth Transitory article of the National Criminal Procedure Code. 
introduction: the mexican context                  2 28
custodial remand is mandatory. Also, concerning evidence procedural laws, 
evidence produced during pre-trial will be valid in court even if cannot be pro-
duced before the judge.23 As a result, both the Constitution and the floc estab-
lished specific measures that permit particular types of offenders to be treated 
in a more coercive manner. 
According to Bruccet Anaya, the purpose of the floc is to discover the truth 
of actions committed by organised criminals (2007). The discovery of the truth 
is facilitated by a distinct set of crime investigation tools designed to incapaci-
tate and prosecute members of criminal organisations. These tools include: ex-
tended periods of detention of suspects, infiltration by undercover state agents, 
and asset seizure (Bruccet Anaya, 2007). The prosecution and ultimately pun-
ishment of organised crime offences is facilitated by the criminalisation of 
preparatory and planning acts and by lowered standards on admissibility of 
evidence where protected witnesses may be used in pre-trial proceedings and 
where guilty verdicts may be issued based only on indications.24 For instance, 
legal and constitutional provisions establish that organised crime occurs once 
three or more people agree to organise to commit an offence in a permanent or 
frequent manner, so a defendant may be punished for the mere fact of agreeing 
to organise to commit a criminal offence, as opposed to actually committing 
an offence.25 In other words, defendants may be punished for their intentions, 
rather than their actions (Fondevila & Mejía Vargas, 2010). 
The fact that the legal description is vague has enabled prosecution services 
to wrongfully arrest and indict suspects for organised crime related offences. 
According to the Council of the Federal Judiciary, from 2001 to 2006, fed-
eral courts corrected the charges pressed in 24 percent of indictments. This 
indicates a high level of error in cases that involve severe restrictions to civil 
liberties (Fondevila & Mejía Vargas, 2010). This breach to civil liberties is 
aggravated by the fact that suspects can be pre-emptively detained, under an 
arraigo order issued based on mere indications (explained in Chapter 4), for 
a period of 40 days with the possibility of extending it to 80. Furthermore, 
if found guilty the defendant faces augmented sentencing tariffs where the 
maximum imprisonment period is 60 years (Bruccet Anaya, 2007; Moreno 
Hernández, 2011).26
23 Article 16, eighth paragraph, article 19, second paragraph, article 20, section B, fraction 
V, second paragraph, all of the Mexican Constitution. 
24 Articles 14, 40 and 41 of the floc. 
25 Article 16 of the Mexican Constitution and Article 2 of the floc. 
26 Articles 4 and 5 of the floc.
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As a result, the legal framework contained in the Constitution and the floc 
significantly reduces the already low procedural safeguards defendants have 
within quasi-inquisitorial proceedings. The ultimate goal is to facilitate the con-
viction of those accused of organised crime-related offences and punish them 
with great severity (Mancera Espinosa, 2007).
 
Increasing severity
During the 1990s, parallel to adversarial reforms and organised crime leg-
islation, legal reforms broadened the catalogue of criminal offences and in-
creased the punishment tariffs for many existing offences (Mancera Espinosa, 
2007; México Evalúa, 2013). Changes to the Federal Criminal Code resulted 
in more severe sentences (Islas de González, 2001). Similar reforms modified 
state criminal codes to increase maximum sentences. For instance, the sen-
tence available for aggravated kidnapping in the state of Puebla grew in 2008 
from 30 years to life imprisonment; in the same year another state, Veracruz, 
introduced life imprisonment for different variations of aggravated homicide 
(México Evalúa, 2013). 
Punishment tariffs were also increased through the re-labelling of offences 
from non-serious to serious, and parole was curtailed, particularly for reof-
fenders. These longer sentences led to a rise in the prison population (Azaola & 
Bergman, 2007; González Salas, 2001; Islas de González, 2001; México Evalúa, 
2013). The increased administrative workload affected the way in which parole 
was granted, making prison stays longer (Azaola & Bergman, 2007). Azaola 
and Bergman confirmed that 20 percent of the increase in prison population 
was due to the severity of sentences, which led to longer periods of incarcera-
tion, rejecting the idea that an increase in the crime rate was the main cause for 
the steep rise in incarceration (2007). As Islas de González argues: 
The reduction of parole, together with the increased severity of punish-
ment, notwithstanding what the offence intends to protect, produces, 
bluntly, departing from general prevention to establishing pure and sim-
ple repression, a characteristic of authoritarian regimes (2001, p.9).
The determination of punishment for criminal offences is strongly guided by 
the sentencing tariffs established in criminal codes. Bearing in mind popular 
concerns about violence and personal safety, elected officials have little incen-
tive to reduce sentencing tariffs or include different non-custodial punishments 
in legislation (México Evalúa, 2013; Ríos, 2013). Nevertheless, the judiciary 
retains an element of discretion in sentencing, as will be explained in Chapter 4. 
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Main enquiry and findings 
By the end of President Calderón’s administration in 2012, the political and 
social landscape in Mexico had become as fascinating as it was tragic. Its 
topography was characterised by exponential rises in crime, contrasting legal 
and institutional reforms aiming at toughening crime control policies and 
upholding due process principles, and security policies and operatives aim-
ing to respond to the safety crises, relying on both civil and military forces. 
The context to government policies was characterised by mass media and po-
litical discourse where terms akin to warfare were used within a generalised 
nationalistic sentiment where offenders were framed as enemies of the state 
and society.27 At the same time, opinion polls showed increasing support for 
harsher punishment of criminals and a more visible military presence across 
the country (Consulta Mitofsky, 2009). In addition, the media praised stories 
where ordinary people used private means to defend their land or property 
from criminal groups.28 
Society at this point appeared to favour stronger public and private respons-
es to crime. At the same time, the executive branch of government, while de-
monising offenders, pushed for the increased involvement of the army in crime 
control, and Congress made legal changes to facilitate military involvement in 
the investigation of crime. In such a context, the research question addressed 
here is: what role did federal judges play in Mexico’s war on organised crime? 
Was the federal judiciary, which is expected to remain impartial and objective, 
affected by the social and political context? If so, in what way or to what ex-
tent? In particular, did the federal judiciary endorse President Calderón’s ‘war 
on organised crime’ and how, if at all, did this ‘war’ shape the practice of judg-
ing criminal cases? Alternatively, have judges been able to limit the punitive 
27 Programmes and public officials’ statements are described in detail in Chapter 3. 
28 A recent case illustrates the latter point. Mr. Alejo Garza was the owner of a ranch in the 
northern state of Tamaulipas. He was visited by a group of armed men who warned him 
he and his ranch personnel would be killed if he refused to give up all his land by the next 
day. Mr. Alejo decided to dismiss all the personnel and wait for the armed group. When 
the armed group finally showed up, Mr. Alejo received them with gunfire. He killed four 
gang members and injured two before being killed with a grenade. The media and opinion 
published on the web presented this story as a heroic reaction against organised crime. 
Newspapers used headlines such as: “Defends to death his ranch from the narco” and 
statements such as: “The last hunt of his life, Mr. Alejo surprised the group of sicarios 
(hired assassins) who sought to impose the law of the jungle on the ranch, the same regime 
which not even the power of the state has been able to control”. Several music groups com-
posed corridos,folk songs narrating the story of heroes or villains, on the subject. (Cedillo, 
2010; cnn Mexico, 2010; Vanguardia, 2010). 
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ethos embedded in security programmes by safeguarding existing defendants’ 
rights within the quasi-inquisitorial criminal trial? 
This thesis analyses judicial decision-making in this period through the lens 
of ‘enemy penology’, and through theories of judicial behaviour and judicial 
roles (Jakobs, 2006; Jakobs, 2008a; Jakobs, 2008b; Krasmann, 2007). The 
three prominent traits of enemy penology are: first, a tendency towards pre-
emptive punishment in order to prevent future harm; second, a departure from 
conventional procedural protections to facilitate convictions; and third, the im-
position of disproportionate sanctions in the name of security (Zedner, 2010, p. 
391). As a result, in this paradigm, state power expands in the name of preven-
tion and security, based on risk rather than actual offending (Krasmann, 2007). 
Chapter 2 discusses this paradigm in depth. 
The state’s use of the army to fight crime is justified by politicians and crimi-
nal justice officials by the threat of violence from drug-trafficking groups and 
other criminal organisations, and by public consent for harsher responses to 
crime given increasing concerns for insecurity. It therefore fits within the en-
emy penology paradigm. Hence, this thesis aims to determine whether federal 
judges trying defendants charged for ordinary (i.e. not organised crime-related) 
offences reproduced an enemy penology approach during the so-called ‘war on 
organised crime’ during President Calderon’s administration. 
To answer the research question, enemy penology was used to collect and 
conduct initial analysis of qualitative data provided by 28 semi-structured in-
terviews with judges, along with 27 interviews with other practitioners and 
40 written judgements from two different sites. One of the sites is located in 
a region of the country that experienced sudden increases of drug-related vio-
lence and subsequent presence of the military, referred to here as the militarised 
state (otherwise referred to as the hm state). The other site had essentially an 
unchanged context despite the security crises and is referred to here as the less 
militarised state (also referred to as the lm state). I used a case study design to 
compare the perspectives held by two groups of judges located in these two 
sites, based on interview accounts and trial courts judgements. 
The short answer to the research question is: no. The judiciary was found to 
be a branch of power where consistency and legal certainty were upheld come 
rain, shine or gunfire, proving to be successfully insulated from the social and 
political context. In both locations, however, the study also found a consist-
ent inclination to privilege police evidence, allow high conviction rates despite 
poor prosecutorial performance and insufficient evidence, and impose mini-
mum sentences. Judicial behaviour in both locations was best accounted for 
by drawing on the formalistic and legalistic judicial model, which understands 
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judicial decision-making in terms of accurate law interpretation and strict ad-
herence to precedents, casting aside ideology, policy goals and personal atti-
tudes. At the same time, a predominant judicial role was found which focuses 
chiefly on deciding the case in hand based on the dossier while disregarding 
any external issues. 
Thesis contents
Following this introduction, chapter 2 discusses the enemy penology paradigm, 
examining its prominent elements as well as its implications, including how the 
state may expand its coercive response to crime. This connects directly to chap-
ter 3, which discusses different representations of enemy penology in the Mexi-
can landscape, in particular security programmes, public officials’ statements 
and criminal justice. This chapter aims to identify elements of enemy penology 
in Mexican legislation, criminal justice policies and official rhetoric, in order 
to claim that this model is advanced by the executive and legislative branches 
of power. Chapter 4 describes the structure of the courts and the prosecution 
services, as well as the way in which criminal justice proceedings are currently 
managed. Also, the differences and commonalities between the inquisitorial 
model and enemy penology are discussed here.
Chapter 5 aims to establish analytical and conceptual tools with which to 
understand judicial behaviour and judicial decision-making. Thus, the chapter 
concentrates on theories and approaches that explain judicial behaviour and 
decision-making. Judicial roles and orientations are also discussed, as well as 
the way in which precedent is formed and the politics of judicial adherence to 
precedent. In addition, it uses the differences between adversarial and inquisito-
rial criminal justice systems as conceptual frameworks within which to exam-
ine the Mexican judiciary.
Chapter 6 describes the qualitative methodology and comparative case study 
design used to answer the main research question. The selection of the embed-
ded cases or sites is described as well as the boundaries and limitations of the 
research. Here I describe the different environments of the hm state and in the 
lm state, and I explain why the federal judiciary was chosen over a local judici-
ary, as well as the reasons behind examining only drugs offences unrelated to 
organised crime. I also describe the different strategies used to collect the data 
contained in judgements and interviews, including the difficulties encountered 
during fieldwork. The strategies used to conduct the analysis of each type of 
data are described, and the chapter explains language and ethics considerations 
concerning confidentiality and anonymity. 
Chapter 7 contains analysis of judgements collected from both sites. I paid 
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special attention to arguments used by the courts to weigh evidence and reach 
a verdict, as well as to impose a sentence. In this chapter I highlight specific 
precedents frequently referenced by the courts, indicating the influence of these 
rulings on judicial decision-making. Findings from both sites are discussed in 
a single chapter to avoid unnecessary repetition, as it was found that judges in 
the hm state and the lm state tended to decide in a very similar manner. Finally, 
whether enemy penology was found in judgements is discussed, together with 
the subtle differences found in judgements.
Chapters 8 and 9 set out an analysis of the interview material. Chapter 8 
focuses on ways in which judges understand and see defendants. It contains 
accounts of effective and ineffective due process principles and comments on 
sentencing values and practices. The general findings and comparison between 
hm and lm judges are discussed, as well as several themes concerning judicial 
behaviour models, judicial roles and judges’ audiences. Chapter 9 examines 
judges’ views on the army’s participation in crime investigation and court pro-
ceedings. It examines judicial independence and impartiality in regard to sever-
al themes including insecurity and other branches of government. There is also 
a section to discussing inconsistencies traced in judicial opinions and a note on 
the judiciary’s independence in the current context.
Chapter 10 discusses whether enemy penology was traced in the analyses of 
judgements and interviews. Also, it examines whether the judiciary endorsed or 
restrained the executive branch’s policy on criminality as well as the judiciary’s 
reactions to the safety crisis and other aspects of the current context. Conclu-
sions are also contained in this last chapter, including a discussion of the thesis’s 
contribution to knowledge, implications for policy, law and practice, limita-
tions and final thoughts. 
Contribution to knowledge
Mexican socio-legal studies on the judiciary are scarce, though steadily increas-
ing. This slow growth can be traced back to the continuing transition from an 
authoritarian to a more democratic regime. During the pri regime, the Consti-
tution was modified in ad hoc ways and the president was considered to be the 
final interpreter of the constitution (Ríos-Figueroa, 2012). Studies of the scjn 
flourished in a context of initial political competition, pluralism and socioeco-
nomic changes, while the scjn gained more political relevance after the 1994 
reform (Ríos-Figueroa, 2012).
Judicial studies in Latin America has focused primarily on themes relating 
to judicial politics and to the judicial role in managing the gap between legal 
formalism and practice (Kapiszewski & Taylor, 2008, p. 755). Studies concen-
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trating on Mexican judicial politics examine a range of themes, including how 
justices are elected and how this affects the courts’ decisions, and how many 
and what type of cases the scjn decides through instruments of constitutional 
review (Bustillos, 2009; Elizondo & Magaloni, 2010; López Ayllón & Val-
ladares, 2009). 
Another type of research has focused on the scjn’s role in safeguarding civil 
liberties. Here, scholars have focused on the jurisprudential aspects of how and 
when fundamental rights are protected (Ríos-Figueroa, 2012). The topics dis-
cussed by this body of work include effective due process (Magaloni & Ibarra, 
2008), fairness of fiscal burdens (Elizondo & Pérez de Acha 2006), and gender 
perspective in the courts’ decisions (Pou Giménez, 2010). The present research 
is situated within this second area and aims to help understand the way in 
which judicial decision-making is constructed, taking into account the legal 
and social context. 
Most scholarship in Latin America, including Mexico, has focused on High 
Court decisions, ignoring the lower courts, even though these courts have been 
described as “particularly interesting candidates for additional study” (Kapisze-
wski & Taylor, 2008, p. 755; Ríos-Figueroa, 2012). One important study on 
state criminal courts was carried out by Pásara who, through a systematic anal-
ysis of case files, examined Mexico City’s courts (2006). He observed the dif-
ferent parties involved in court proceedings and the different legal arguments 
used by courts, in addition to rulings that support those legal arguments used 
to examine evidence produced by the prosecutor and by the court and to reach 
a verdict. Overall he found: that the defendant, once in court, has a low chance 
of being acquitted; that more than one third of defendants claimed to have been 
mistreated; and that the pre-trial dossier produced by the prosecutor is highly 
influential in the final verdict, making court proceedings void as well as the 
principle of presumption of innocence (Pásara, 2006). This thesis draws heav-
ily on Pásara’s findings to examine federal courts’ decisions. Initially, Pásara’s 
findings were expected to be different from those reached in this thesis, based 
on the belief that federal justice system has more qualified personnel and better 
quality decisions. Nonetheless, many of Pásara’s observations were corrobo-
rated during the analysis of federal criminal courts’ decisions located in two 
different cities across the country. This shed light on structural aspects of the 
judiciary and helped understand judges’ decisions. 
Relevant studies based on surveys and interviews of state and federal judges 
are also scarce. Caballero and Concha explored how the judicial role was or-
ganised and performed in state courts (2001). López Ayllón and Fix Fierro ex-
amined lawyers and the legal profession from the 1970s to the beginning of the 
2000s (2003). Begné focused on judges’ profiles, the way in which federal jus-
tice works in the context of reforms passed after 1994 and judges’ relationship 
with society (2007). These studies examined how judges see themselves and 
their role within court proceedings. Caballero and Concha, as well as López 
Ayllón and Fix Fierro, found that a large majority of judges maintain a legalistic 
mind set and see their duty as being to apply the law (2001 and 2003, respec-
tively). In contrast, Begné found that judges see their role as not simply applying 
the law but also being aware of politics and social needs (2007). Concha and 
Caballero’s work and Begné’s study proved useful when analysing views and 
opinions from a wide range of members of the judiciary; this analysis showed 
that the ways in which judges see themselves and their role have remained con-
stant over time.
Tracing the influence of both administrative incentives and administrative 
rules on judicial decisions is also novel within judicial studies in Mexico. One 
of the existing studies examined amparo courts,29 where many suits were dis-
carded at a preliminary stage, and concluded that this widespread practice was 
best explained as a strategy to manage caseloads and comply with completion 
rates, rather than focusing on the cases’ merits (Magaloni and Negrete, 2002). 
In a similar way, Begné and Pásara found that hierarchical relations within the 
judiciary exert significant influence on judges (2007 and 2006, respectively). 
Hence, these studies helped when examining the internal pressures judges face 
when reaching a verdict.  
Studies using political science to explain rather than describe judicial deci-
sions are less common, yet there are a few that rely on a strategic model of ju-
dicial decision-making to, for instance, highlight external constraints on judges 
when deciding cases (Ríos-Figueroa, 2007), or the Electoral High Court’s abil-
ity to redirect electoral conflict from the streets to the courtrooms (Eisendstadt, 
2007). Staton used rational choice theory to examine the use of public media by 
the Electoral High Court and the scjn to influence public opinion to reinforce 
their independence and enlarge their sphere of influence (2010).
In addition to expanding the understanding of judges from two different 
locations in the judicial hierarchy, the present research also aims to contribute 
in regard to the methodology used to explore the judiciary’s views and reac-
tions. Although a qualitative approach has previously been used to analyse the 
Mexican judiciary (Begné Guerra, 2007; Caballero & Concha, 2001; Pásara, 
2006), by relying on a case study design on the judiciary, the social and legal 
landscape is also examined. Together, these shed light on the complex image 
29 The structure of courts and amparo petitions are explained in detail in Chapter 4.
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and role of the Mexican federal judge. Enemy penology has not been used to 
guide the collection and analysis of judgements or semi-structured interviews. 
Examining court judgements and judges’ views within an enemy penology ap-
proach provides a rich understanding of the way decision-making in criminal 
matters is constructed, bearing in mind the ways in which defendants are seen, 
the application of due process values, and sentencing practices. Also, exploring 
the judiciary within an inquisitorial tradition and a heavy authoritarian legacy 
through the enemy penology lens provides a different perspective from which to 
examine the current criminal justice system and, in particular, current judicial 
decision-making. 
Along with the enemy penology theoretical framework, empirical methods 
of examining judicial behaviour were used to analyse judges’ comments and 
views, in particular normative expectations concerning the different orienta-
tions Mexican judges have in regards to the judicial role. Whether judges un-
derstand their function as law-appliers or in a more extended way to exert 
some kind of influence on public policy, is examined in the thesis. More im-
portantly, no previous research in Mexico has sought to study contemporary 
judicial decision-making and judicial behaviour in a context characterised by 
an ongoing safety crisis, harsher security programmes and profound legal and 
institutional reforms.
2
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chapter 2 
Enemy penology: principles and implications
Introduction 
Penology is defined as the study of punishment or the infliction of harm (Rey-noso Dávila, 2011). Penology unfolds in the study of the nature and goals 
sought by punishment, the different criteria and proceedings used to determine 
a punishment or sentence including the ways in which the sentence is served, 
and the ways in which the state’s duty to impose punishment seizes (Reynoso 
Dávila, 2011). Traditional penologies agree in that punishment or a sentence 
constitutes the infliction of pain, and the divide into two main strands, conse-
quentialism and retributivism, concerns what justifies and is pursued by pun-
ishment.30 Consequentialist or preventive approaches are set within a utilitarian 
framework where punishment is justified if punishing one offender contributes 
to prevent others from offending, resulting in a safer society. The preventive 
approach sustains that future crime is inhibited or deterred by the believable 
threat of punishing criminal behaviour through physical restraint. The main 
goal is to achieve a safer society. One implication that follows is that the legiti-
macy of punishment is not questioned as long as society allegedly becomes safer 
(Ashworth & Roberts, 2009; Ashworth, 2009a; Hudson, 2003; von Hirsch, 
2009). Different strands within consequentialism include rehabilitation where 
the main aim is to re-incorporate an offender to society after being treated 
and re-educated within prison facilities to reduce any inclinations to re-offend. 
Deterrence is another strand where the main concern is to persuade or deter 
others from offending through the punishment of an offender. By comparison, 
the incapacitation of offenders aims at ensuring society’s safety through the of-
fender’s imprisonment. 
Retribution, by comparison, imposes punishment based on the harm done 
and the culpability of the offender, focusing on past events. Accordingly, an 
offence is envisaged as causing a particular imbalance within society; as a re-
sult, punishment is morally justified as it restores the imbalance created by the 
30 Extensive literature covers these general approaches, and only brief mention will be made 
of it here for the purpose of identifying where in the spectrum to place enemy penology.
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offender (Hudson, 2003). Punishment’s legitimacy stems from society’s disap-
proval of the criminal behaviour (Hudson, 2003). Also, punishment is consid-
ered legitimate as long as it resulted from law-abiding proceedings. Retribution 
may be traced to Kant and Hegel who held that the punishment was inherently 
linked to the offence that was committed. Punishment could not be imposed 
based on the greater benefit that it would produce. The infliction of pain em-
bedded in the sentence restored the initial affected right caused by the offence 
(Reynoso Dávila, 2011). Recent debate arose in the 1960s and 1970s, when the 
‘just deserts’ movement shifted the emphasis from punishing outcomes to seek-
ing a fair sanction (Ashworth, 2009b; Hudson, 2003).The just deserts approach 
focuses punishment on the wrongdoing and not on the offender, and sentencing 
is decided with close reference to principles of proportionality, leaving aside is-
sues of crime reduction (Ashworth, 2009b).
Enemy penology is said to embody a special criminal law with a separate 
set of rules and theoretical assumptions that governs special type of offenders 
distancing them from traditional penology. Whether enemy penology is an acute 
version of coercive features of consequentialism or a separate model is discussed 
throughout the chapter. Enemy penology, or criminal law of the enemy, is a con-
cept coined by Günther Jakobs (2006; 2008a; 2008b) who identified three main 
traits while analysing German legislation: first, suppression of certain procedur-
al rights occurs in order to facilitate the convictions of those deemed enemies. 
So, invasive investigation tools may be used legitimately as a source of providing 
safety to the public in general and of reducing risk of dangerous offences taking 
place. Second, incapacitation of specific types of suspects or offenders who pose 
grave danger is available, despite the fact that the offence was not committed. 
Third, disproportionate sentences are imposed in the name of security (Gómez 
Jara-Díez, 2008, p. 531). Jakobs sought to avoid the “contamination” or infil-
tration of enemy penology elements into what he termed the “criminal law of 
the citizen”, by acknowledging the existence of a “criminal law of the enemy” 
or enemy penology traits in specific legislation. Such duality (criminal law of 
the citizen and criminal law of the enemy) would allow the preservation of a 
democratic state, while counting with a set of legal rules embedding draconian 
measures to respond a  particular type of offenders (Jakobs, 2006). 
Enemy penology has opened the way for considerable debate among criminal 
law scholars across jurisdictions including the German, Italian, Spanish, Ar-
gentinian and Mexican, as well as in those with a common law tradition includ-
ing the United Kingdom. (Ferrajoli, 2007; Gómez Jara-Díez, 2008; Krasmann, 
2007; Polaino-Orts, 2010; Zaffaroni, 2011; Zedner, 2010). Enemy penology’s 
thread or line of reasoning runs across criminal law categories or definitions 
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that criminalise anticipatory behaviour (i.e. agreement to commit an offence), 
criminal procedure rules that facilitate convictions (i.e. pre-emptive and surveil-
lance orders) and criminal justice policies led by risk calculations and social 
anxiety, in which security may be better guaranteed through expanding the 
coercive arm of the state.
Some debate has focused on the accuracy of enemy penology’s traits and 
whether these are found in applicable legislation and security programmes, 
such as those concerning terrorism in Spain or organised crime in Mexico (Gó-
mez Jara-Díez, 2008; Mancera Espinosa, 2007; Polaino Navarrete, 2008). For 
example, in Spain, Muñoz Conde directly opposed Jakobs’ theoretical frame-
work in light of the inherent difficulty of drawing the boundary between being 
a civilian offender from an enemy offender. In his view, this ambiguity leads to 
the lawful use of coercive measures contained in a set of rules geared to deal 
with the enemy (whoever that may be) defined conveniently by those in gov-
ernment (quoted in Reynoso Dávila, 2011). In a similar way, Reynoso Dávila 
points out with concern that the legal regime to prosecute and sentence suspects 
for organised crime offences in Mexico evokes Jakobs’ ideas which enhance 
invasive measures for the purpose of crime control, casting aside the rule of law 
and constitutional protections (2011). 
Whether the enemy penology model is merely descriptive or embodies a pre-
scriptive agenda has been widely debated also. Such discussion was driven by 
Jakobs’ inconsistency, as he has maintained at different times that enemy pe-
nology was purely descriptive, while advancing its normative utility (Ferrajoli, 
2007; Gómez Jara-Díez, 2008; Jakobs, 2008; Krasmann, 2007; Mancera Espi-
nosa, 2007; Polaino-Orts, 2010; Zaffaroni, 2011). Ferrajoli sustained (2007, p. 
10): “The birth certificate of enemy penology lies in the political legitimisation 
of punitive practices such as the policies against terrorism conducted by the 
American government”.
Various scholars have examined the effects of enemy penology. For example, 
according to Krasmann, enemy penology is more than “legal regulation on ex-
clusion” (Jakobs quoted by Krasmann, 2007: 302); it offers guiding concepts to 
develop security policies (2007, p.302). Enemy penology consists of a security 
paradigm that legitimises reacting to the prospect of dangerous or other offend-
ing behaviour, both as a means of prevention and pre-emptive crime control 
(Krasmann, 2007). An enemy penology approach enables a “general extension 
of authority in the name of prevention and security” (Krasmann, 2007, p. 302). 
In this regard, for instance, Ferrajoli (2007) argues that enemy penology fea-
tures have flourished in security programmes such as that focused on terrorism 
developed by the American government where the infliction of punishment is 
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based on who the suspect is, as opposed to what he allegedly did, and draw on 
criminal proceedings to fight terrorist criminality as opposed to seeking the 
truth of the matter or letting the parties prove their case.
According to Zaffaroni, Jakobs suggests enemy penology to be an alterna-
tive regime aimed at enemies in which the state’s response is justified by a lim-
ited idea of necessity to address these enemies (2011, p.169-174). In contrast, 
according to Krasmann, enemy penology cannot be thought of as an alterna-
tive set of rules. She sees it as a wider programme that includes policy-making, 
because its conceptualisation of offenders and crime control policies is repre-
sented not only in laws but also in policies. In addition, such conceptualisations 
are heightened by rhetoric, mass media, and social and cultural ideas. As this 
chapter’s discussion will show, Jakobs’s enemy penology model has prescrip-
tive resonance, providing those in power a justification for increasing punitive 
responses aimed at a special type of crime. Also, its resonance may be due to 
the constant overlap with particular approaches to punishment, offending and 
security. The core elements of enemy penology will be unpacked starting with 
the discussion on defining the enemy, followed by the discussion on procedural 
safeguards and punishment. Also, implications for criminal justice will be dis-
cussed, including a strong emphasis on the crucial role of the judge, in order to 
set the essential framework to be used in subsequent chapters.
Offender vs enemy 
The conceptualisation of offenders has varied through time, encompassing con-
siderable thought and research on deviance, touching upon issues of free will 
or predetermined inclinations to offend. In a similar manner, the idea of ‘the 
enemy’ is the focus of much scholarship on international laws governing armed 
conflict, including the laws of war and humanitarian intervention. The purpose 
here is to examine Jakobs’ conceptualisation of the enemy and to discuss the in-
tended and convenient ambiguity of equating offenders with enemies of society. 
Jakobs’ enemy 
Enemy penology is aimed at ‘fighting’ particular offenders linked to serious of-
fences, such as sexual offences, economic crime, terrorism, illegal drug traffick-
ing and other types of organised crime, where the distinction lies in that they 
have distanced themselves possibly in a permanent manner from a society gov-
erned by law. This assessment is based on specific attitudes (linked to sexual of-
fenders), economic life, (concerning economic delinquency) or involvement in a 
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criminal organisation (regarding organised crime offences) (Jakobs 2006, p.53-
54). “Said through an example: who continuously behaves as the devil, at least 
he cannot be treated as a person within a legal regime as in to the confidence that 
he will honour his duties” (Jakobs, 2006, p. 53). An enemy, within Jakobs’ para-
digm is someone who has forfeited his rights because of his dangerousness and 
his failure to comply with legal norms (Zedner, 2010, p.392). Enemies are per-
sistent and incorrigible criminals who not only threaten public safety but, more 
importantly, challenge the entire social and legal order (Krasmann, 2007, 303).
Jakobs advances that there are two different types of offenders: on the one 
hand, the generally law-abiding citizen who may occasionally offend and on 
the other, the enemy who has an inclination to offend as a way of life. The 
former is subject to the criminal law of the citizen, while the latter is subject to 
the criminal law of the enemy. An offence committed by an ordinary offender, 
as opposed to an enemy, is visualised as an act of disregarding the law (within 
which he usually abides), and as a symbolic message of rejecting the system. The 
rejection of the law, represented by the offence, affects society’s expectation of 
the applicability and validity of the law. Hence, the state’s imposition of punish-
ment seeks to reassert to both the offender and the rest of society its confidence 
in the applicability and validity of the law. In this dialogue, punishment focuses 
on reasserting the validity of the law (Polaino-Orts, 2010b, p.118-119). An of-
fence committed by an enemy is conceived as means of creating danger rather 
than a symbolic message of disregarding the law. The distinction lies in the fact 
that an enemy lacks the ability to act according to social norms and is indeed 
deemed disloyal to them. The enemy is considered a source of danger, neither 
sharing nor understanding social norms, and for this reason he is not to be 
communicated with but rather fought against (Jakobs, quoted in Polaino-Orts, 
2010b, p.121; Dubber 2010, p.203-211). 
The concept of the enemy may be traced to the Roman concept of hostis 
(Zaffaroni, 2011, p.23). The hostis were foreigners or those strange to a com-
munity, with whom communication and understanding was not feasible. Using 
the hostis category allowed the lawful to treat some people differently (Zaf-
faroni, 2011, p.23). Foreigners or hostis not only looked different but were 
considered inferior and deemed incapable of self-government; they could only 
be governed (Dubber, 2010, p.193-194). Furthermore, those declared by the au-
thority as hostis judicatus were political enemies, dissidents who threatened the 
Republic’s stability. Those declared hostis judicatus were left in a similar condi-
tion to slaves, subject to sanctions that were not applied to citizens (Zaffaroni, 
2011, p.24-25). The advantage of treating specific offenders as foreigners or 
enemies in Jakobs’ paradigm is the legitimacy to unleash a set of state responses 
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which are particularly aggressive and otherwise available only in a setting of a 
war waged against aliens. The enemy treatment is based on the hostis’ alleged 
lack of understanding of legal norms. Members of organised crime groups, ei-
ther nationals or foreigners, are deemed enemies not in light of their nationality 
but due to the risk they pose to society and to their rejection to legal norms. 
Zaffaroni and Dubber claim the concept of hostis has remained within penal 
thought, along with the duality of treating some offenders as “equals” and oth-
ers as strangers or enemies (2011; 2010). Similarly, Weber and Bowling point 
to the continuing impulse to exclude itinerant groups cast as outsiders or un-
wanted, not only from physical territory but also from the legal protections 
reserved for the welcome and insiders (2008, p.358-365). Based on religious, 
political or philosophical justifications, ideas such as “incorrigible offenders”, 
dissidents or dangerous classes of offenders persisted. Policy makers and gov-
ernment in general have used these labels to justify their exclusion from society 
by deportation, life imprisonment or death penalty (Pratt, 2000; Zaffaroni, 
2011, p.87-114). It is foreseeable that the enemy category advanced by Jakobs 
may be enlarged to include other types of offenders. Problems arise regarding 
the threshold for shifting from “citizen” treatment to “enemy” treatment. Is the 
threshold clear? Who is the enemy, and how is he to be identified among regular 
offenders? Scholars including Gómez Jara-Díez (2008) and Rutherford (1997) 
have argued that enemy penology rules have led to an expansion of enemy sta-
tus to encompass a wider range of offenders, due to the problem of adequately 
distinguishing ordinary offenders from dangerous or enemy ones, and also to 
the slippery and flexible labels of dangerous and risk.
Expanding criminalised behaviour
One way of dealing with enemies is to extend the scope of criminal legislation 
to include, for example, acts of preparation to allegedly offend, such as terror-
ism, or guilt by association, acts which in themselves have not caused any harm 
(Cancio Meliá, 2008; Cole, 2003, p. 58-64; Zedner, 2009, p.117). For instance, 
conspiracy merely requires evidence of an agreement to commit an offence with 
some overt action; thus it can be used as the formal basis for arresting and hold-
ing opposition movement leaders conveniently labelled as enemies (Hadden, 
2000, p. 212). Similarly in Mexico, preparatory acts and mere intentions to 
offend are sufficient grounds to process the suspect for an organised crime of-
fence.31 As a result, for example, the act of smuggling a particular drug may not 
have taken place but charges can be pressed if the prosecution considers three 
31 Article 2 of the Federal Law against Organised Crime.
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people were organising with the intentions to smuggle the drug. Whenever a 
judicial ruling has established the existence of a particular criminal organisa-
tion, the prosecution may indict a suspect for participation in organised crime 
simply by establishing a link between that person and the criminal organisa-
tion, because proving or disproving the actual agreement to offend is particu-
larly difficult (Hadden, 2000).32 As a result, the actual offence may not have 
taken place but the suspect, based on the linkage to the criminal organisation 
may be indicted and punished. The rationale, according to Jakobs, is to restore 
the imbalance created by the threat of the offence through the incapacitation of 
possible offenders (2006).
Dangerousness and risk
The “dangerous” label has been a concern examined within penal thought for 
a long time. The type of men deemed as degenerate or biologically deficient 
were on the lower end of the social scale, as men could be of better or worse 
quality. The worse type of men were thought of and labelled as dangerous by 
those in power or considered as genetically superior (Ferri quoted by Reynoso 
Dávila, 2011). The dangerous ones were labelled based on their personality 
rather than on the offence charged or that thought they might commit (Ferri 
quoted by Reynoso Dávila, 2011). The dangerous type needed to be controlled 
pre-emptively in light of their apparent non-adaptation to social life, as posed 
danger to society (Ferri quoted by Reynoso Dávila, 2011 and Zaffaroni, 1998). 
The assessment of dangerousness was necessarily linked to society’s perception 
of risk posed by individual offenders and society’s urge to defend itself from 
them (Zaffaroni, 1998). In practice, risk has proved to be difficult to predict 
and when used tends to generate non-accurate results (Zedner, 2005; Coyle & 
Halon, 2013). Nonetheless, risk has become a guiding principle of crime con-
trol policies which has led to disparate and conflicting responses to criminals, 
largely due to different understandings and calculations of risk (Zedner, 2009). 
Sentencing illustrates the tendency for the state to extend a coercive response 
when faced with vague legal categories applied to offenders associated with dan-
gerousness and risk. For example, the United Kingdom’s Criminal Justice Act 
2003 introduced extended or indeterminate sentences for sexual and violent of-
fenders (Ashworth, 2010; Hebenton & Seddon, 2009). To decide if the defendant 
merited a particularly harsh sentence33, courts were required to predict the risk 
32  Article 41, 3rd paragraph of the Federal Law against Organised Crime.
33 Dangerousness sentences could be: imprisonment for life, imprisonment for public protec-
tion or extended sentences. 
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of the offender committing further specified offences and the risk that such of-
fences would cause serious harm to members of the public. However, the courts 
appeared to apply this type of sentence extensively to both serious and minor 
offences (Ashworth, 2010, p.228-235). Although the Act was amended in 2008 
in order to restrict the wide application of this sentencing policy, courts were still 
required to assess and predict the level of risk each “dangerous” offender poses 
and despite that risk prediction has been widely described to be difficult and 
with high rates of error (Ashworth, 2010, p.233-236; Coyle & Halon, 2013).
The difficulty of distinguishing serious from minor offenders may be mir-
rored in practice when many if not all offenders are dealt with in a harsher way. 
As Hebenton and Seddon suggest, in assessing dangerousness or risk of serious 
harm to the public, the propensity to increase a coercive response is a safer choice 
made by the state when assessing danger or risk. This propensity is justified by 
holding that society is said to be safeguarded from possible risks (2009, p.348). 
Enemies and social panics
The label of dangerousness to describe enemies is conveniently flexible and eas-
ily manipulated so as to fit to social panics and public anxiety. ‘Suitable en-
emies’ has proved to be a useful term, used mainly by those in power to pursue 
a particular war against those selectively labelled and portrayed as dangerous 
(Christie, 1985). Those in power use a preventive-based discourse that high-
lights the idea that society is at high risk of harm in order to adopt tough meas-
ures against those categorised as enemies. Further, while referring to terrorists, 
sexual predators and career criminals as enemies, certain groups are demonised 
and their conduct is portrayed as evil or inhuman (Garland, 2001, p. 135). As 
a result, enemy penology is concerned with ‘enemies’ as moral wrongdoers, 
locked into an alien and threatening category (Cancio Meliá, 2011, p.116). It is 
unclear to what extent the enemy category applies to all kinds of serious offend-
ers or is limited to extreme variants such as members of violent drug trafficking 
organisations and terrorists. President Calderón, for example, described that 
enemies commit different kinds of offences as he publicly said:34 “Mexico’s en-
emy is one who extorts, robs, kidnaps, claims rights that are not deserved and 
poisons our youngsters. We do not have any reason to tolerate him.”35 
34 Chapter 4 provides a systematic analysis of speeches gave by presidential and other high 
profile characters about the war on organised crime aiming to show clearly that govern-
ment officials encourage – very explicitly – the idea that armed drug criminals should be 
seen as enemies.
35 Press conference of President Calderón on December 23, 2010 in Morelia, Michoacán, 
consulted in La Crónica: http://www.cronica.com.mx/nota.php?id_nota=551569
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It is difficult to claim that theft and drugs related offences pose the same 
kind of danger. Some criminal organisations made notorious efforts to prove 
their violence and firepower through overt messages to authorities and rivals 
shown across Mexico (Shirk & Wallman, 2015). The image of strong, vigor-
ous harm doers helped justify a response in Mexican law-enforcement agen-
cies who resorted for tougher measures to contain them (Bailey & Chabat, 
2002). Whether petty offenders also equated as enemies by President Calderón 
received the same treatment as those involved in drug violence was a main en-
quiry pursued in this Thesis.
As illustrated by Calderón’s statement, the ‘enemy’ label evokes emotional 
and ideological rejection by society, while those in power use this label typically 
against political dissidents, legitimised to create state responses which draw on 
mechanisms used to wage war (Gracia Martín, 2005). As Christie argues, these 
enemies, tailor-made for a state’s particular war are portrayed as being so dan-
gerous that those fighting them can ask their own nation for absolute loyalty 
and demand extraordinary powers (1985, p.43). Additionally, the alleged risks 
coupled with a fostered perception of society’s powerlessness by those in power 
reinforce the claims for a stronger state response (Garland, 2001, p. 135-136). 
The category of enemy at the core of the enemy penology model draws on the 
collective image of evil and inhuman offenders. Those in power resort to vigor-
ous and tough response to enemies, enabled by social anxiety and emotional 
reactions experienced by the general public. 
Diminished procedural rights
In democratic states, allocation of punishment and guilt is thought to be legiti-
mate in principle because it was not decided arbitrarily. Punishment should not 
be imposed if the suspect did not have a fair trial, including the right to a legal 
defence, the right against self-incrimination and, most importantly, the right to 
being presumed innocent until proven guilty. In addition to safeguarding due pro-
cess rights, punishment should not be meted out if the prosecution fails to prove 
its case. Such high standards and guarantees seek to avoid wrongful convictions. 
Consequentialists consider that punishing the innocent is undesirable but 
may be necessary to maintain public safety and reduce offending, while retri-
bution holds that the moral standards of criminal justice institutions must be 
maintained so that the inflicted punishment is morally legitimate (Ashworth, 
2009). This divergence is also reflected in Packer’s models of crime control and 
due process. At the risk of oversimplification, Packer’s due process model seeks 
the conviction of the guilty but holds the integrity of procedural rules that 
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govern the trial as paramount. Defendants’ individual rights are protected by 
due process principles enforced in court proceedings. Hence, the state power 
is constrained by law-abiding standards, even if compliance to these standards 
compromises conviction rates. Ultimately, law-abiding behaviour is a moral 
condition which state officials must comply with to carry out law-enforcement 
(Sanders, Young, & Burton, 2010). By comparison, Packer’s crime control mod-
el focuses on achieving a high rate of detection and conviction of offenders in 
the face of limited resources and high levels of crime (Sanders, Young, & Bur-
ton, 2010). Safeguards against miscarriages of justice are considered necessary 
to ensure confidence in the system, but protecting due process rights are sec-
ondary concerns (Sanders & Young, 2007). Ultimately, this model prioritises 
the conviction of the guilty, while accepting that a few number of innocent 
defendants may be wrongfully convicted (Sanders, Young, & Burton, 2010). 
Enemy penology overlaps with the crime control model as it argues in favour 
of lowering the standards of procedural safeguards in order to incapacitate pos-
sibly dangerous offenders. Nonetheless, while the crime control model aims at 
convicting the guilty, the ultimate aim sought by the enemy penology paradigm 
is to prevent dangerous offending. Jakobs held that enemies opt out of ordinary 
criminal procedure rules in light of their disregard to the law. A different set 
of rules is applied to those who are no longer governed by a “presumption of 
being law-abiding” (Jakobs, 2006, p.55-56; 2008b, p.36-37). As enemies are 
reduced to being mere sources of danger, their incapacitation is sought over 
enforcing procedural safeguards in trial. The high degree of risk of offending 
is determined based on both the harm that it presents to society and the likeli-
hood of the harm occurring. Incapacitation of enemies is legitimate and justi-
fied by the overarching aim of avoiding harm. Enemy penology also overlaps 
with the Mexican quasi-inquisitorial criminal justice system. These overlaps are 
addressed in Chapter 4.
Jakobs’ contention resonates with Nigel Walker’s argument that advocated 
for precautionary custodial detention. According to Walker, non-convicted peo-
ple should be presumed harmless (1994). However, when a person was convicted 
for seriously harming others, the presumption of harmlessness was waived and 
as a result, he or she could be held longer on the basis of risk posed to others. 
Also in cases where people had not yet done any harm but expressly declared 
their intentions to do so, they forfeited the protection of presumption of harm-
lessness and could be subject to preventive detention or incapacitation. Walker 
argued in favour of precautionary practices but also argued in favour of offering 
humane living conditions to the person staying in custody. After all, that person 
is being detained “not because he deserves it, or for longer than he deserves, but 
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solely for the sake of other people’s safety” (Walker, 1994, p. 190). This stands 
radically distant from Jakobs’ conception of punishment of enemies.
It appears that enemy penology may be observed in cases where rights are 
partially or fully suppressed (Gómez Jara-Díez, 2008). Organised crime sus-
pects in Mexico have diminished procedural rights becoming subject to longer 
pre-emptive detention periods, intervention of private communications and sei-
zure of assets. In trial, admissible evidence includes testimonies of unidentifiable 
witnesses, admission to accomplice evidence, and that produced by entrapment 
and other investigation tools (Bruccet Anaya, 2007). Also, evidence standards 
are lowered enabling judges to reach (guilty) verdicts based only on indications, 
namely not direct or conclusive evidence (Moreno Hernández, 2011). Validating 
a reduction in rights may be the first step towards annulling them altogether, as 
observed in the American war on terrorism. 
Some suspects of terrorism in the U.S. were labelled as “enemy combatants” 
by the American government. This enabled their transfer from civilian legal ju-
risdiction to military jurisdiction, where they could be held indefinitely, without 
charge, court appearance or access to defence counsel (Cole, 2003, p.39). The 
practice of various forms of torture on enemy combatants was openly used to 
obtain information, confessions and to generally enhance intimidation (Ferra-
joli, 2007). The term “combatants” as well as declaring war on terrorism draws 
on the laws of war. Similar to Jakobs’ enemies, prisoners of war may be impris-
oned, captured or even killed without much proof. Attacking enemies within a 
law of war regime is deemed legitimate in light of the harm they might inflict, 
even if they have not yet done anything (Luban, 2002). Enemy combatants how-
ever were not offered the rights entitled to prisoners of war who, according to 
the Third Geneva Convention have the right to not be threatened, insulted, or 
exposed in any way if they refuse to answer. A prisoner of war, once he is ren-
dered harmless through injury or surrender, cannot be punished for participat-
ing in the war (Hadden, 2000; Luban, 2002). Enemy combatants were treated 
as criminals subject to criminal proceedings where can be punished, but were 
offered no procedural rights either. Guantánamo Bay prison became a sort of 
limbo wherein suspects for terrorism, visualised and explained as sources of 
risk, were unlawfully and indefinitely detained without charge, for the sake of 
preventing future harm. According to Luban (2002, p. 10): 
By selectively combining elements of the war model and elements of the 
law model, Washington is able to maximize its own ability to mobilize 
lethal force against terrorists while eliminating most traditional rights of 
a military adversary, as well as the rights of innocent bystanders caught 
in the crossfire. 
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Conceptualisation of punishment
Is punishment within an enemy penology scope different to traditional peno-
logical strands of consequentialism and retribution? How is punishment to en-
emies different from current punitive practices? 
Jakobs’ punishment
While drawing on both preventive and retributive approaches, the duality be-
tween citizen and enemy implies, according to Jakobs, two distinct forms of 
punishments with entirely distinct sets of justifications (2006). Punishment of 
citizens, as retributive penology argues, aims to repair the imbalance created 
by those who break the law through reasserting society’s confidence in the va-
lidity of social norms (Jakobs, 2006; Reynoso Dávila, 2011).36 Punishment in 
general attempts to send a symbolic message to law-abiding society that norms 
are applicable and valid (Polaino-Orts, 2010, p.84-85). Stringent treatment of 
enemies is justified by the claim that they jeopardise the validity of the legal 
system and reduce citizens’ trust in the effective enforcement of the rules. As 
a result, punishment symbolises rejection of the non law-abiding person while 
preserving society’s trust in and compliance with the legal system. Retribution 
is also interested in emphasising that criminal behaviour is rejected and so soci-
ety’s rights are restored through the offender’s punishment. Accordingly, pun-
ishment of enemies does not involve any sort of communication with him but 
rather his mere incapacitation. Due to the risk enemies pose to society, they do 
not merit treatment as a regular person within a legal regime. The punishment 
of enemies seeks to reassert the validity of the law to society while nullifying 
any sort of communication with the enemy (Jakobs, 2006). A violent response 
from the state, either in the form of a severe sentence or pre-emptive incapacita-
tion is justified because enemies are sources of danger and society’s safety and 
elimination of risk are primary concerns (Polaino-Orts, 2010). According to 
Jakobs, the severity of the sentence does not aim to be proportional in regard to 
the actual offence, but rather aims to be proportional to the degree of present 
and future risk (2008b, p.34). 
Although Jakobs holds that enemies cannot be communicated with, it is dif-
ficult to argue that stringent punishment fails to express exclusion and segrega-
tion to those deemed enemies. At the same time, certain forms of severe punish-
ment of ordinary offenders –deemed as civilians- overlap with punishment of 
enemies. It may be argued that the exclusion and elimination of the enemy sits 
36  Vigencia de la norma in Spanish.
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easily with current regimes, in particular with incapacitation. On the one hand, 
punitive practices involve stringent imprisonment which have no rehabilitative 
or reintegration goals, given that welfare benefits for training or leisure are seen 
as better spent on the law-abiding. Incapacitation regimes amount to warehous-
ing and close surveillance of prisoners because of the risks these offenders repre-
sent to society (O’Malley, 2001, p.176-7). Practices such as solitary confinement 
and banishment, as well as extrajudicial executions and legalised torture, are 
consistent with enemy penology, where exclusion becomes ultimately elimina-
tion from social participation or even extermination (Krasmann, 2007, p.311).
 The underlying goal of stringent sentencing is a vigorous state, a paternal-
istic “preserver of order” with license over severe sanctions, including pun-
ishment and pre-emptive controls (O’Malley, 2001, p.186). Similar to severe 
forms of incapacitation, the enemy penology paradigm aims to solve problems 
by removing troublesome or disagreeable people with methods which are law-
ful and widely supported (Rutherford, 1997, p.117). Enemy penology’s distinct 
feature is that enemies, however defined, are and will not ever be treated citi-
zens and so merit no legal protection against state powers that citizens have. 
Enemies are punished with the aim of eliminating the grave risk they present 
so rehabilitation or reinsertion ideas do not apply as their re-incorporation to 
society is not sought. Punishment of enemies under Jakobs’ model has been said 
to be notoriously disproportionate (Gómez Jara-Díez, 2008; Krasmann, 2007; 
Mancera Espinosa, 2007; Zedner, 2010). Does the judiciary have any margin 
of discretion under an enemy penology regime advocated and applied by other 
powers of government? In practice, to what extent has the judiciary enacted 
enemy penology through sentencing, either to terrorists in Spain, to organised 
crime suspects in Mexico, among others? Furthermore, once an enemy penol-
ogy model is introduced in a country’s legal system, such as special legislation 
to punish organised crime offences in Mexico, to what extent if at all, has or-
dinary or civilian penology suffered any contamination? These questions form 
the underlying thread of this project.
Implications of enemy penology: within or without the rule of law
Traditional and enemy penology stand at the poles of one regime, where society 
can reasonably expect that the law will be enforced and that the state will act 
against those who disregard the law. Civilian or enemy are categories linked 
to dangerousness, rather than nationality. The scope and boundaries of enemy 
penology are set by necessity, namely, what sources or danger need to be con-
tained and incapacitated (Jakobs, 2008). According to Jakobs, enemy penology 
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does not compromise a democratic state (Polaino-Orts, 2008). Enemy penology 
exists within a rule of law regime on the basis of an exception justified by neces-
sity. However, the sustainability of this paradigm within a democratic regime 
may be highly contested due to considerations of unequal treatment and the 
authoritarian regime underpinning an exception regime, as discussed below. 
Different treatment before the law
Sustaining criminal convictions that derived from unfair proceedings raises ques-
tions of compliance with the rule of law. Under the rule of law, both the state’s 
exercise of power and citizens’ pursuit of interests are limited by the law (Nelson 
& Cabatingan, 2010). The main components of the rule of law are equal access 
to justice, equal treatment before the law, and the absence of arbitrary abuse by 
authority (Shirk & Ríos Cázares, 2007; Weingast, 2010). Treating all citizens in 
accordance with basic principles of fairness, while ensuring equal treatment, is 
integral to enforcing a rule of law regime (Carothers, 2009). Enemy penology 
fails to honour equal legal treatment as the differentiated treatment of offenders, 
some labelled as citizens and others as enemies, directly contravenes an essen-
tial component of the rule of law. The definition -and subsequent treatment- of 
enemies serves as a threshold that authorises waiving procedural protections 
against arbitrary uses of power by the government. 
The political idea of citizenship distinguishes between those within the 
state, enjoying certain privileges and immunities, and those at the border or 
outside, who do not enjoy those privileges and immunities (Dubber, 2010). The 
implications of treating some as citizens and others as non-citizens have long 
spilt over those at the border of citizenship on the basis of ethnic and economic 
marginalisation (Zedner, 2010). The dichotomy between law-abiding citizens 
and enemies overlaps with the application of a separate criminal justice system 
for non-citizens, such as immigrants and asylum seekers, who face harsher 
sentences and elimination in the form of deportation (Fekete & Webber, 2010). 
Hence, while offenders labelled as enemies are said to have waived their rights 
because they disregarded social norms, other non-citizens are required to prove 
their law-abiding behaviour or disprove their guilt, because they are likely to 
be prosecuted (Weber & Bowling, 2008; Zedner, forthcoming). Unequal le-
gal treatment for law-abiding citizens and enemies provides justification for 
“othering” certain populations, while using proactive and aggressive measures 
that maintain differentiated responses to outsiders from insiders (Cole, 2003; 
Fekete & Webber, 2010; McCullock & Carlton, 2006; Weber & Bowling, 
2008; Zaffaroni, 2011).
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Within the scope of enemy penology, the legal treatment of enemies is por-
trayed as legitimate because it allegedly protects society. To maintain trying 
and sentencing enemies based on applicable legal framework may accomplish 
a preservation of the state’s legitimacy to punish. Nevertheless, creating and 
subsequently using such an unequal legal framework raises important ques-
tions of fairness. It is difficult to sustain the notion that those who were offered 
diminished safeguards for a fair trial and had to face an initial presumption of 
guilt, were rightly convicted and punished. The attempt to apply such an un-
fair criminal process while relying on legal norms may uncover the convenient 
states’ rule with law, as opposed to the state being bound by the rule of law 
(Bowling & Sheptycki, 2011).
A state of exception
Within an enemy penology model, a state’s response to crime control is based 
on what constitutes an ‘enemy’ and the need to fight him, as determined by 
those in power. The state’s own understanding of necessity sets its own limits 
in a timely and convenient fashion, as opposed to acting within pre-established 
limits. Responding to an enemy is used as the justification to address a neces-
sity, aiming to increase the state’s coercive. When a state’s actions are justified 
in terms of necessity rather than within the limits of law, an exception regime 
or a state of exception is triggered where particularly arbitrary powers are used 
and special rules are enforced, leading to an authoritarian regime (Gracia Mar-
tín, 2005; Zaffaroni, 2011, p.169-174)
A state of exception, according to Agamben (2005), encompasses a blurred 
“zone of indifference” between actions inside or outside the legal system. The 
idea of necessity is an essential threshold in a state of exception, and at the same 
time it encompasses an opportunistic and ambiguous license to increase state’s 
power. Agamben argues that a necessity, on the one hand, has been claimed by 
others to be as important as law, making anti-juridical de facto proceedings 
pass over or become law. On the other hand, necessity justifies a single case –
the exception- of transgression of the legal system, hence, law is exceptionally 
suspended and annulled in fact (Agamben, 2005, p.25-29). Whether necessity 
creates legal grounds for the state’s actions, or justifies the state’s breach of the 
law, is both arguable and usefully ambiguous for those declaring the state of 
exception caused by the need to address enemies. Laws ruling emergency pow-
ers build on the state of exception. 
The enemy penology paradigm draws on such ambiguity and embodies a 
way of legitimizing the exception (Krasmann, 2007). The ubiquitous risk to 
public safety is claimed as the necessity legitimising state action without legal 
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grounds. While the government claims to be applying the law, it is in fact exert-
ing violence based on the declared state of exception (Agamben, 2005, p. 87). It 
is the government in power which assesses such necessity, and in consequence, 
the selection of enemies is unrestricted (Zaffaroni, 2011, p.172). As McCull-
och & Carlton argue: “Pre-crime regimes necessarily involve a high degree of 
discretion in interpretation of data and give wide latitude to law enforcement, 
security agencies and executive government” (2006, p.404).
The need to address dangerous criminality, such as that highly organised 
and equipped similar to an army, is the main justification for a differentiated 
treatment amongst offenders used by the Mexican government. A state of 
emergency has not formally been declared. Nonetheless, as the legal category 
of organised crime is ambiguous it may be wrongfully applied to a wider range 
of offenders. Hence the enemy treatment consisting of severe and dispropor-
tionate state response may be applied to an increasing number and type of en-
emies, depending on the occasion and political convenience. Ultimately, those 
in power are who determine there is a necessity to respond more coercively to 
enemies.
During emergencies there is a clear tendency for state security forces to not 
only take full advantage of any lessening of safeguards for suspects (the cat-
egory of enemy is easily adaptable to different contexts) but also to resort to 
extra-legal action to avoid any legal restraints on putting those suspected of 
anti-government activity behind bars or otherwise eliminating them (Gómez 
Jara-Díez, 2008; Hadden, 2000, p. 211). Similarly, special legal provisions 
make it difficult for members of state security forces to be tried or convicted 
for unlawful activity of this kind. As Cole claims in the context of the so called 
war on terror: “Physical liberty and habeas corpus survive only until the presi-
dent decides someone is an enemy combatant” (2003, p.18). An emergency or 
exception allows an extension of the state’s use of force, based on opportunistic 
definitions and categories.
It may be argued that, as Gracia Martín points out, enemy penology en-
compasses an exception regime, based on necessity, in order to validate the 
state’s power to wage war against those labelled as enemies (2005). Similarly, 
Krasmann has asserted that the enemy penology paradigm enables the state to 
act outside the law for the purpose of preserving security (2007, p.302). Enemy 
penology becomes a compelling argument for increasing the state’s power to 
intervene in response to an alleged risk rather than actual criminal offending 
(Krasmann, 2007, p.303-4). 
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Exploring enemy penology in practice
The enemy penology model overlaps with the continuous promise of safety said 
to be provided by public officials, politicians and private actors, despite the fact 
that it is broad and difficult to pin down (Zedner, 2009). Security’s inherent 
ambiguity becomes a form of licence for those deciding what causes insecurity 
and what measures need to be taken in response. In addition, promising security 
in the face of constant threats has the collateral effect of generating awareness 
and anxiety (Zedner, 2009, p.10). Promising security in the face of ever-present 
danger, takes advantage of popular penology (Zedner, 2010, p.390), while en-
suring legitimacy for the use of state violence (Krasmann, 2007, p.309).
Responding to ubiquitous harm
Law-enforcement agencies, when forced to distinguish ‘ordinary offenders’ 
from those defined as dangerous, appear to expand their powers of investiga-
tion and intervention (Zaffaroni, 2011). Such is the case of the framework of 
combating the financing of terrorism in places such as Australia, where bank 
accounts and property may be seized, based solely on suspicion. As a result, 
people who are linked to activities unrelated to terrorism, such as giving money 
to a charity or social cause, are investigated (McCulloch & Carlton, 2006). 
An illustration of the enlargement of powers is the expanding use of technol-
ogies and devices for crime control purposes. Bowling, Marks & Murphy iden-
tify the use of a wide range of tools with different goals, including surveillance 
and investigation (2008). For example, in order to provide security and prevent 
crime and disorder, surveillance applications were first used to observe specific 
individuals but their scope was extended until everyone was under surveillance 
(Bowling, Marks, & Murphy, 2008, p. 56; Zedner, 2009). As McCulloch and 
Carlton point out: “The shift to future crime, pre-crime or pre-emptive strike 
regimes in criminal justice necessarily involves massive levels of surveillance” 
(2006, p. 403). Surveillance is carried out through cameras, listening devices, 
chemical sensors, social networks, financial transaction monitoring and pub-
lic transport use, leading to increased intrusion (Bowling, Marks, & Murphy, 
2008, p.62-63; Hebenton & Seddon, 2009).
Investigating particular crimes has also led to expanding the use of different 
ways of intervening, both before and after an offence. Returning to the Austral-
ian example of the investigation and punishment of terrorism, it has become 
common practice to freeze and confiscate assets without conviction, charge, or 
indeed without a single piece of evidence (McCulloch & Carlton, 2006). Inter-
ventions range from property and physical search and seize practices to extend-
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ed custody detention. The powers of law-enforcement agencies have even meant 
that legal constraints are interpreted aiming to authorise further intrusion. For 
instance, in the case of Kyllo v United States,37 the court interpreted the concept 
of search in order to validate the use of thermal imaging within the suspect’s 
home, which was believed to contain high-powered marijuana-growing lamps. 
The court held that the thermal imaging did not amount to trespass because 
there was no physical intrusion. As a result, the court validated the invasion to 
the suspect’s home (Bowling, Marks, & Murphy, 2008, p.64).
At other times, enlarged powers have led to a systematic breach of laws. 
For example, the (Mexican) National Commission of Human Rights (cndh) 
has repeatedly urged police and military personnel not to carry out unlawful 
property searches, which generally include the use of physical violence against 
the occupants, under the justification of the investigation of serious organised 
crime (cndh, 2011).38 
The presence of dangerous criminality such as organised crime in Mexico, 
and terrorism in Australia or Spain, has justified different operatives and strate-
gies used by law-enforcement agents on the wider population that don’t present 
the same danger to society as those ‘dangerous ones’. The notion that harms are 
created by the very measures taken to alleviate criminal justice problems refers 
to the iatrogenic effect (Bowling, 2011). Harms may involve visible violations 
of privacy and liberty, as well as producing new kinds of unsafety and violence. 
Anti-drugs efforts carried out in Mexico as many other countries have brought 
an increase in violence and in an expansion of criminal organisations and illicit 
activities. The comparison with clinical iatrogenesis seems appropriate where 
doctors administer drugs or perform unnecessary procedures on patients, in-
flicting pain and creating greater harm (Bowling, 2011).
Precautionary logic
Enemy penology overlaps with what has been called precautionary logic, in which 
everyone must act in response to risk by following warnings, being suspicious 
and embedding security measures in everyday life (Hebenton & Seddon, 2009). 
The precautionary approach informs policymaking, which is mainly driven by 
the prevention of threatened harm, though such harm is unknown and incalcula-
ble (Zedner, 2009, p.83). The precautionary approach urges radical precautions, 
expanding from targeting and profiling individuals to placing everyone under 
37 Danny Lee Kyllo v United States 533 US 27,121 S Ct 2038, 150 L Ed 2D 94, 2001 US 
LEXIS 4487. Reference consulted in Bowling, Marks, & Murphy, 2008, p.64. 
38 The National Commission of Human Rights is a public agency in charge of promoting and 
defending human rights. The issue of unlawful property searches is discussed in Chapter 4. 
enemy penology: principles and implications                 2 55
surveillance, as all citizens are possible sources of danger or threat (Zedner, 
2009, p.84; Hebenton & Seddon, 2009, p.345). Hence, full scientific certainty 
or evidence is not required before carrying out pre-emptive measures (Zedner, 
2009, p.84). This is not to say that expert knowledge is unnecessary but, in the 
face of uncertainty and universal risk, the process of decision-making allows lit-
tle time for reflection, tending to amplify the scope of measures used, overreach-
ing people who possibly may be dangerous (Hebenton & Seddon, 2009, p.345).
The pressure on governments to act preemptively against potentially cata-
strophic, though incalculable, risks has contributed to blurring the line between 
public safety within the scope of criminal law, and security drawing emergency 
legislation and the laws of war (Zedner, 2009, p.116-117). In response to the 
emergency driven by terrorism and serious organised crime, state powers grow, 
as do budgets and resources, extending the scope of criminal legislation to in-
clude behaviour which fails to produce any harm. 
At the same time, mass violence by heavily armed offenders equipped for 
battle can only be counterbalanced with an equally violent response. When 
violent encounters between material enemies and state officials lead to an in-
crease of violence, including mass murders, how should blame be allocated? 
Furthermore, how can the preventive ethos be advanced when harm is not 
reduced but rather increased? As Chapter 3 will show, the former Mexican 
President gave a vivid example of a possible response. According to President 
Calderón, those affected by the encounters between state officials and organ-
ised criminals were most likely to have been involved in illegal activities (Hu-
man Rights Watch, 2013). 
Securitisation
The ongoing process of securitisation entails widening the scope of national 
security matters, encompassing transnational issues such as drug-trafficking, 
migration and economic instability as well as poverty and the maintenance of 
order (Bowling & Newburn, 2006, p. 11-12; Moloeznik, 2009). Also, issues 
which were previously dealt with internally by policing become part of the new 
national security agenda, involving new actors, including non-state parties such 
as transnational agencies and the private sector, as well as state actors such as 
military forces (Bowling & Newburn, 2006, p. 129). Identifying widespread 
social problems as risks and threats, and blurring internal and external security 
matters, justify and enable an invigorated criminal justice response and subse-
quently excessive use of force. 
Enemy penology and the new security agenda converge in stressing the use 
of force and threat of violence as ways to solve problems through more sophis-
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ticated and invasive means. Further, the precautionary logic draws on the use 
of national security to advance pre-emptive measures, using intelligence and 
surveillance, while taking advantage of the inherent secrecy of these measures 
and lack of oversight (McCulloch & Carlton, 2006).
Militarisation
Securitisation may happen in parallel to militarisation where the police and the 
military collaborate closely. As a result, activities such as targeting suspicious ve-
hicles or individuals who are supposed to be a security threat; raiding private res-
idences as a way of investigating crime are carried out jointly (Kraska, 2001, p.7). 
Militarisation involves collaboration at the highest level of the governmental and 
corporate worlds, between the defence and the crime control industries, where 
technology, information, and weaponry is shared, military hardware is acquired 
and military training undertaken by police forces (Dunlap, 2001; Kraska, 2001).
Enemy penology relies on society’s consent to expand the state’s use of vio-
lence as a response to social conflict. One result of this is the growth of cul-
tural acceptance of solving problems with the use of violence (Kraska, 2001). 
Militarism refers to a set of beliefs and values shared by society that supports 
and emphasises the use of force through technology, armaments, intelligence 
gathering, aggressive suppression efforts and domination to solve problems and 
gain political power (Kraska, 2001, p.15-17). 
Militarism converges with the enemy penology paradigm were language is used 
as a vehicle to spread social problems in war-like concepts such as risk or enemy 
against whom war will be waged (Alvarado & Zaverucha, 2010, p.231; Kraska 
2001). Where violence and the use of force is generally accepted as a way of deal-
ing with social conflict, it is unquestioned that the military is needed to fight 
crime, eliminate the enemy and protect those seen as law abiding. This acceptance 
extends to agreeing with curtailing or diminishing civil rights of the enemy. 
All lost? Judicial response in emergency cases 
An important component of the rule of law, linked to equal treatment under 
the law, is an independent judiciary (Shirk & Ríos Cázares, 2007; Uildriks, 
2010; Weingast, 2010). An independent, well-functioning judiciary is essential 
to constrain the state from violating fundamental civil liberties, including those 
related to access to justice and due process (Staton, 2007, p.273). Rutherford 
maintains that the role of the courts is crucial in restricting or approving of the 
reduction of due process guarantees in criminal proceedings and availing or 
limiting penal sanctions (1997). Judicial independence, according to interna-
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tional consensus, is a pre-requisite to the rule of law and a fundamental guar-
antee of a fair trial.39 A judge must be independent as he decides a case on the 
basis of his assessment of the facts and in accordance with his understanding of 
the law, free of any external influences exerted by other branches of power, as 
well as by other colleagues. At the same time, a judge must remain independ-
ent from society in general and from parties involved in the case the judge has 
to adjudicate. In similar vein a judge must decide a case impartially, in other 
words, without favour, bias or prejudice.40 
In emergency conditions where enemy penology features come into play, 
both judges and lawyers are required to operate under rules which have been 
deliberately designed to maximise the chances of a conviction and minimise the 
opportunities for organised groups to hinder and discredit the system (Hadden, 
2000, p.205). The judiciary is required on the one hand to protect liberties and 
safeguard the integrity of a fair trial in the face of increasing security powers 
to investigate crime, while on the other hand it must foster national security in 
times of emergency. 
Judicial deference to security concerns
In describing limits to adjudication during emergency circumstances such as the 
Troubles in Northern Ireland, Walker noted a general tendency in the judiciary 
“towards terse assertive judgments which are deferential to security concerns” 
(2000, p.225). Deference appeared in many guises, such as through permissive 
interpretations of police powers, conducting superficial inquiries of possible 
illegally obtained confessions, or refusing to allow judicial officers to review 
detentions (Walker, 2000). 
Scholars such as Issacharoff & Pildes, and Zedner, found a tendency of Amer-
ican and English high courts to show deference to Congress or Parliament in se-
curity issues. The justification was that courts were not democratically elected 
hence they lacked the authority to decide on matters of security, by compari-
son to elected officials’ democratic legitimacy and authorisation (Issacharoff & 
Pildes, 2004; Zedner, 2005). Similarly, Neuborne found throughout American 
history a general tendency of the courts to endorse security programmes such 
39 The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct were adopted in 2002 by a large number of 
countries, represented by members of national high courts. The right to be tried by an inde-
pendent and impartial judiciary is contained in many international conventions including 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (article 10), the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (article 14), and the American Convention of Human Rights article 8). 
40 Values 1 and 2. The following values concern principles of: integrity, propriety, equality, 
competence and diligence. 
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as censorship laws during World War I or Japanese concentration camps in the 
U.S.A. in World War II (2005). At the same time, he found systematic attempts 
by a minority of courts and judges to limit or reverse the effects of those pro-
grammes. He concluded that judicial overview of the executive branch during 
wartime was partial. Although courts endorsed security programmes, they still 
sought adherence to some basic constitutional protections (Neuborne, 2005). 
Indifference towards cases related to war 
According to Epstein, Ho, King, & Segal (2005), two main positions can be 
traced in the U.S. Supreme Court’s responses to rights and liberties during war-
time. One position shared by many commentators and scholars suggests that 
the Court privileges security concerns and opts to limit rights and liberties 
during wartime or emergency crises. In fact, these scholars argue that justices 
adopt a jurisprudential position that mirrors the position taken by the public 
and elected officials of demanding emergency powers in time of war (Epstein, 
Ho, King, & Segal, 2005, p. 20). This group also maintains that the Court’s 
endorsement is a strategic decision to avoid ineffective judgements that could 
be disregarded by other branches of government. Justices then endorse security 
policies and programmes as a means of safeguarding institutional legitimacy in 
wartime (Epstein, Ho, King, & Segal, 2005, pág. 32). 
The other position suggests that the Court’s oversight is even more rigorous 
during wartime or emergency crises. The Court builds and maintains its legiti-
macy by protecting those rights and liberties that the government attempts to 
constrain; doing the opposite would undermine the Court’s legitimacy. When 
political leaders and the general public show widespread support for emergency 
powers and curtailing rights and civil liberties, the Court becomes the guard-
ian of rights, educating the public on the relevance of preserving those rights 
(Epstein, Ho, King, & Segal, 2005, p. 28-30). 
Epstein et al. tested these positions quantitatively in order to determine the 
breadth and depth of the effect of war on effective civil liberties and rights, as 
opposed to analysing landmark decisions (Epstein, Ho, King, & Segal, 2005).41 
They examined six decades (1941-2001) of dispute outcomes submitted to the 
Court in which parties claimed a deprivation of their rights or liberties. The 
Court decided on the merits, whether in times of international urgency or not, 
41 The study carried out by Epstein et al. used a quantitative approach to test the positions 
described above. Wartime was understood as a state of urgency that included not only 
absence or presence of war but also presence or absence of major international conflict and 
presence of absence of increased public support linked to an international event such as the 
terrorist attack of September 11, 2001.
and whether directly related to a crisis or not had civil liberties and rights been 
restricted.42 This last distinction is particularly relevant; the war-related label 
was used for cases that began during wartime and where the genesis of the case 
was the war itself, such as wartime draft cases, war protest cases, among oth-
ers. They analysed a total of 134 cases (Epstein et al, 2005).43 
 After examining similar cases where the only variant was the presence or 
absence of war, Epstein et al. found that in cases unrelated to war the Court was 
much more inclined to decide against claimants in civil liberties and rights than in 
cases during wartime. At the same time, they found that in war-related cases, no 
effect of war could be traced in the Court’s decisions. In other words, they found 
that in war-related cases, the Court was equally willing to uphold rights and 
liberties in both wartime and peace (Epstein, Ho, King, & Segal, 2005, p. 72). 
In trying to make sense of this paradox, the authors examined a range of 
possible explanations. The most salient finding for the purpose of this project 
is that tracing the Court’s inclination in the liberty vs. security dilemma is 
difficult and deserves much deeper digging. In addition, it is puzzling that the 
judiciary appeared to take no stand in regard to security matters in the light of 
the finding that in war-related cases no particular preference was traced. 
The war on organised crime declared by President Calderón represents a de 
facto state of urgency or emergency lived currently in Mexico. And this thesis 
essentially attempts to examine where the Mexican judiciary falls, either into 
the first position where judges endorse security programmes, or into the second 
one where judges act as guardians of civil rights and liberties. The scope of this 
project is different, smaller, for it concerns only drug-related cases from two 
circuits or states. It supplements analyses of judgements with qualitative inter-
views with judges from different tiers who discussed due process, sentencing 
42 The chief dependent variable where outcomes of claims focused on rights and liberties 
included the following matters: criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due 
process, privacy and attorney rights. 
  If the Court decided in favour of the party claiming a deprivation of his rights, the deci-
sion was classified as liberal. They focused on the explanatory variable of the relative state 
of urgency with regard to threats of national security. This state of urgency was defined by: 
an absence or presence of war, presence of a major international conflict, presence or ab-
sence of increased public support for leaders caused by an international event. The Court’s 
decisions on civil liberties and rights were tracked in order to examine if these were decided 
in time of war or peace. The study registered the time of decision as being when oral argu-
ments were heard as opposed to when the decision was handed down, because the decision 
is typically determined by an initial vote taken shortly after oral arguments were made. 
43 The list also included courts martial for activity occurring in a war zone, deportation, 
citizenship and relocation cases resulting from the war, and war-related suits under the 
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 and the Alien Property Custodian Act. 
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and overall judicial experience during the so-called war on organised crime. 
Enemy penology is used in this thesis as a set of analytical tools to examine 
judicial decisions and judicial accounts to find out whether and to what extent 
the Mexican judiciary has endorsed security policies, including seeing defend-
ants as sources of risk who need to be tried with lessened procedural safeguards 
and eliminated when found guilty; or are judges preventing the reduction of 
due process rights in criminal proceedings and further civil liberties. On one 
hand, judgements were examined through the way in which defendants were 
seen, the effectiveness in presumption of innocence and the sentencing values 
and practices embedded. On the other, interviews are examined through those 
same themes, but also through the different theories on judicial behaviour and 
judicial roles that attempt to account for the different reasons that help explain 
judges’ uniformity in their judgements and their insulation from the environ-
ment. Hence, views and comments concerning the discussion on enemy penol-
ogy revealed different ways in which judges assume theirs or their colleagues’ 
role as judges. The theoretical frameworks on judicial behaviour and judicial 
roles are explained in Chapter 5.
Conclusion
Enemy penology originated as an analytical model to assess legislation. It ex-
amined three prominent elements which uphold the dangerousness of offenders 
as a main trigger to justify a tougher pre-emptive response from the state, in-
cluding diminishing due process rights and disproportionate punishment. 
A major issue with enemy penology is its conflict with the rule of law. This 
paradigm fosters unequal legal treatment and reduces due process standards 
directly related to presuming defendants as innocent until proved guilty and the 
right to a fair trial. It functions within an exception regime, in which the state 
uses the justification of ‘emergency’ to act outside the boundaries of the legal 
system. Other implications concern policy practices with a precautionary logic 
in which a tougher response to crime control is used, utilising securitisation and 
militarisation policies which could lead to limitless use of violence by the state. 
Overall, it is held throughout the chapter that enemy penology’s traits can be 
found in legislation, policy making, judicial decisions and rhetorical discourses, 
all of which will be discussed in regard to the Mexican context in Chapter 3. 
2
chapter 3 
Enemy penology in the Mexican 
legal and political context
Introduction
The recent Mexican criminal justice landscape is analysed here based on the prior discussion of enemy penology.44 The increasing involvement of the 
military in public safety and criminal justice affairs is examined as well as the 
enhanced use of pre-emptive mechanisms to pursue crime investigation. This 
chapter initially discusses the legal concept of national security and policy doc-
uments that show ways in which the notion of national security began including 
crime control matters. This discussion is followed by an analysis of the increas-
ing militarisation of criminal justice, examined under Kraska’s indicators. This 
includes a systematic analysis of public officials’ statements that endorse an en-
emy penology ethos. The last part includes a discussion on changes in criminal 
justice with particular emphasis on pre-emptive measures used for the purpose 
of crime investigation. These measures mirror the enemy penology paradigm 
that lawfully permits intrusive investigation strategies and coercive tactics to 
prevent allegedly dangerous offenders from committing crime. 
Attention is be paid to judicial decisions responding to policies, laws and de-
cisions which reinforce the characteristics of enemy penology. However, judicial 
responses are somewhat limited.
An underlying assumption of the legal analysis that follows is that laws arise 
from a certain political context and set of experiences and are the result of the 
actions and interests of specific actors (Speckman Guerra, 2007, p.227). Hence, 
law is not considered neutral but rather advanced by particular actors with 
their own agendas. I argue that legal documents, criminal justice practices and 
political discourse contain enemy penology’s traits and that these are advanced 
44 Legal reforms between 1931—the year in which the Federal Criminal Code was enacted—
and 1982 were relatively few. Changes to the legal framework and institutional settings, 
advancing adversarialism and also legislation aimed at prosecution and punishment of 
organised crime and other serious offences, can be traced since the end of the eighties on-
wards, however, the most relevant reforms can be traced in the nineties. 
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by different players through social constructions, namely laws, judicial inter-
pretations, crime control policies and public officials’ statements. These players 
conceptualise and advance a particular set of principles through their own con-
structions (del Olmo, 1996). Although the mass media is also a relevant player, 
it will not be dealt with here because it is an object of study that would deserve 
great attention and to this date there is insufficient systematised data that can 
provide with information to be analysed, hence an oversimplified and shallow 
account of the mass media during this period is rather avoided.
The concept of public safety and national security
The legal and political notions of public safety and national security were chal-
lenged amidst crime rates peaked in the nineties and underwent several legal 
changes, together with the governmental entities, including the police and the 
military. Public safety was initially a matter dealt with exclusively by munici-
palities (or townships), but after 1994 the Constitution made it also a federal 
matter which could then be dealt with by federal forces, paving the way for the 
increased involvement of the military.45 
The legal concept of public safety encompasses issues of crime control, in-
cluding order maintenance, crime prevention and enforcement of penal sen-
tences, with the aim of preserving freedom, order and peace.46 In contrast, 
national security comprises, in broadest terms, the defence of territorial in-
tegrity, stability and maintenance of the state and its institutions.47 However, 
its extended conceptualisation, as will be argued below, has come to include 
crime control policies. 
After public safety became a federal responsibility via a constitutional reform, 
the Law of the National Public Safety System was enacted in 1995.48 Members 
of the National Defence Secretariat and the Navy Secretariat which together 
45 Parallel to the evolution of the notion of national security and its representation in policy 
documents, the role of the military in fighting the war against drugs has also changed. The 
first participation of the military in a drugs operation can be traced to beginning of the 
twenty century. However, until the late 1990s, most presidents remained reluctant to call 
on the military (Astorga, 2007; Bergman, 2007). Previously, military forces were relegated 
to providing assistance to police officials when specifically requested, and to help with 
destroying crops that would produce illicit drugs (Astorga 2007; Bergman 2007). 
46 Article 21 of the Constitution and Article 2 of the Law of the National Public Safety System.
47 Article 2 of the Law of National Security.
48 This law established the general frame of coordination of the public safety system for anti-
crime and drug efforts.
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conform the Mexican military were legally authorised to participate in matters 
related to public safety, in addition to national security.49 Hence, both civil and 
military authorities dealt with security issues as members of the National Coun-
cil for Public Safety. In 2004, reforms to the Constitution allowed Congress to 
legislate in national security issues and also entrusted the president to “preserve 
national security”.50 As the formal head of the military, the president was indi-
rectly authorised to deploy the army to guarantee national security. A year later, 
the Law of National Security was enacted, which defined certain threats to na-
tional security, including the fight against organised crime.51 In 2009, President 
Calderón promoted the enactment of several reforms designed to increase the 
participation of military officials in public safety issues. These reforms have still 
not been passed by Congress.52 The extent to which the military may participate 
in public safety issues was initially discussed in the scjn. 
The judiciary’s response: approving of militarisation of public safety
The authorisation of the involvement of military personnel in public safety mat-
ters was brought to the scjn by several members of the opposition in Congress 
because considered it to be against the Constitution. The scjn ruled unanimously 
in 1996 that military personnel could indeed assist civil officials in public safety 
issues when required or asked to do so. The main argument was that all authori-
ties with powers directly or indirectly related to public safety must collaborate 
in order to preserve peace, freedom and order (Sánchez Cordero, 2001).53 After 
this decision, the scjn issued three more binding rulings in a private session in 
2000 which validated the intervention of the military in public safety affairs 
only where civil authorities requested their aid. And, the military’s intervention 
did not require the President’s formal declaration of the temporary suspension of 
liberties, that is, to declare a state of exception, to participate in public safety af-
fairs.54 This last binding raises interesting questions concerning the non-official 
49 Article 12 of the Law of National Security.
50 Article 89 of the Constitution.
51 Article 5 of the Law of National Security. 
52 By 2011, members of different parties within both Congress and Senate had agreed that 
organised crime, drug-trafficking and money laundering were matters which should be 
considered within the scope of national security.
53 Binding ruling titled: “Army, navy and air force. Their participation to help civilian au-
thorities is constitutional. (Interpretation of article 129 of the Constitution).” 
54 These binding rulings are titled: “Army. They can participate in civil actions in favour of 
public safety, in cases where suspension of liberties is not required, this must obey to the 
express petition of civilian authorities, under their command and bound to the Constitu-
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or rather informal state of exception or state of emergency. According to the 
Constitution, a state of emergency or suspension of liberties petitioned by the 
President only proceeds if sanctioned by Congress and the Senate, and with the 
scjn reviewing the petition’s abidance to  constitutional standards. The scjn, 
through the above mentioned binding ruling, essentially authorised the Presi-
dent’s determination to draw on the military to address any circumstances seen 
as posing danger, bypassing the constitutional safeguards to prevent the Presi-
dent from acting unilaterally.
The military’s involvement in public safety appears difficult to reverse. Ju-
dicial oversight over military improper actions was addressed by the scjn in 
2012. In that year, the scjn determined that civil courts could hear cases where 
soldiers were charged with offences against civilians.55
The executive’s response: paving the way for militarisation
As discussed above, the focus of national security began to shift from the de-
fence of sovereignty to internal affairs including crime control. Since then, the 
military began to rethink its national security functions (Camp, 1992). This 
change is reflected in national policy documents which describe guiding prin-
ciples and are issued by the president to set out the aims of his administration. 
All federal agencies must adhere to these principles.
Policy documents 
In the 1980s, according to the National Development Programmes (ndp) issued 
by the president, national security was mainly focused on sovereignty, integrity 
and independence (Lima Malvido 2011, p.13). National security was mostly 
seen as a tool to safeguard freedom, social justice and peace within the nation 
but appeared to shift when the ndp of 1983-1988 established: “In view of the 
fact that circumstances have changed, the armed forces have been transformed 
so that their strictly military original role has been recast to include growing 
activities related to the wellbeing of the community” (quoted in Herrera Lasso 
& González, 1993, p.349). 
tion and law.” “Army. Can intervene under strict orders of the President and bound to civil 
liberties when, not in circumstances that require to declare a state of suspension of civil 
liberties, there is credible fear that if the army does not intervene immediately it would 
imminently lead to serious circumstances that would force to declare a state of exception.” 
“Army. Its intervention in public safety affairs is constitutional”.
55 Amparo indirecto claim alleging that the Military Criminal Code stood against the Con-
stitution in regard to the extent of its jurisdiction, resolved by the scjn in August 2012. 
Case registered under AIR 133/2012. http://www2.scjn.gob.mx/AsuntosRelevantes/pa-
gina/SeguimientoAsuntosRelevantesPub.aspx?ID=136182&SeguimientoID=478 
enemy penology in the mexican legal and political context                2 65
By the late 1990s and early 2000s, national security encompassed issues 
related to the enforcement of the rule of law, human rights and social justice. 
A main goal of national security became the need to preserve the collective 
interest by minimising any risk to the physical integrity of the population and 
to Mexican institutions (Lima Malvido, 2011). The latest ndp (2007-2012) spe-
cifically established a series of goals aimed at combating organised crime, and 
justified the necessary use of the military:
The resources that result from drug trafficking give criminal organisa-
tions great power to acquire different forms of transport, high-power 
weaponry and advanced communication systems, as well as equipment 
which frequently supersedes that of the police force in charge of combat-
ing and preventing offences associated with drug trafficking. For that 
reason the collaboration of the armed forces is necessary in this fight. 
(Presidencia de la República, 2007, p.58).
This evolution is mirrored in policy documents issued by the National Defence 
Secretariat. By the end of the 1990s, the army included anti-drug operations 
as one of its four general sets of missions (Camp, 2005).56 The 2001 Yearly 
Development Programme established that the Mexican army played an active 
role in domestic issues ranging from civil duties (i.e. reforestation) and aiding 
the population in the event of public need to guaranteeing domestic safety, in-
cluding fighting drug trafficking, ensuring and maintaining order (Moloeznik, 
2009). Further, the Sectorial Development Programme Concerning National 
Security 2007-2012 explicitly mentioned, as one of the goals entrusted to the 
National Defence Secretariat, the need to “regain the state’s strength and secu-
rity by a frontal assault on drug trafficking and other manifestations of organ-
ised crime” (sedena, 2007, p.12). Hence, “their actions, in collaboration with 
other institutions, are aimed at regaining spaces hijacked by drug traffickers 
and other criminal organisations, in order to provide society a safe and peaceful 
environment” (sedena, 2007, p.13).
In addition to the National Defence Secretariat, the Navy Secretariat also in-
tegrated the goal of fighting drug trafficking in its policy documents. The Navy 
Secretariat explicitly mentioned the aim of responding to increased criminal 
activity led by organised crime gang members and ordinary offenders. Moreo-
ver, amongst its objectives, the naval forces aimed to “foster a safe environment 
56 The sets of missions are labelled dn-i, dn-ii, dn-iii, and dn-iv. The first includes plans 
aimed at external defence against a foreign enemy (dn-i), the second deals with internal 
security threats and with maintaining social peace (dn-ii), the third is focused on provid-
ing disaster relief (dn-iii) and the fourth organises and legitimises the military’s anti-drug 
missions (dn-iv).
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and contribute to the wellbeing of society through participating in operations 
of high impact in several coastal states of the country to fight organised crime” 
(semar, 2007, p.31). 
In parallel to changes in legal concepts and policy initiatives, the participa-
tion and influence of the military in public safety and criminal justice took 
place. The expansion of the scope of national security as to include public safety 
and crime control issues overlap with the shift towards militarisation within 
criminal justice institutions, tactics and equipment used for crime control and 
the embrace of military values.
Increased military participation 
From President Ernesto Zedillo’s (1994-2000) administration onwards, institu-
tional and policy arrangements laid the foundation for increasing the military’s 
role in fighting crime. The military’s participation in responding to organised 
crime and drug trafficking was reinforced when the military’s involvement was 
described as a national security matter (Alvarado & Zaverucha, 2010, p.235-
7). According to authors such as Astorga (2007), Benítez Manaut (2010) and 
Bergman (2007), the involvement of the military seems almost impossible to 
reverse. 
Kraska’s indicators are relevant when assessing the degree of militarisation 
of the police and other criminal justice agencies. These indicators include: or-
ganisational arrangements, including special squads focused on high-crime ar-
eas; military operatives; type of equipment used; and discourses and values 
highlighting martial terms and the effectiveness of using the military to wage 
war on social problems. 
Organisational arrangements 
Changes in organisational arrangements may be observed in the background 
or profile of high-ranking officers in the government and in martial units. 
Military officials have increased their involvement in crime control agencies 
(Alvarado & Zaverucha, 2010; Artz, 2003; Astorga, 2007). Their participa-
tion has been mainly focused on drug trafficking, but may expand to other 
types of offences in future.57 In 1995, the National Public Safety System was 
established and included high-profile civil and military authorities (Camp, 
57 This was confirmed by a former prosecutor during an informal conversation in Janu-
ary 2012.
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2005). As a result, the attorney general and the head of the National Defence 
Secretariat, together with other officials, dealt with issues of public safety 
and national security. By the mid-1990s, more than half of Mexico’s 32 states 
had military officers assigned to police command positions (Alvarado & Za-
verucha, 2010; Schulz, 1997, quoted by Astorga & Shirk, p.28) and state at-
torney general offices (Alvarado, 2010, p.228, 246-259). The presidents who 
followed after 2000 significantly deepened military participation in domestic 
public safety initiatives (Astorga & Shirk, p.28). Notably, in President Fox’s 
administration (2000-2006), the attorney general had a military background, 
as did those who held principal positions of intelligence and operations within 
the Public Safety Secretariat (Alvarado & Zaverucha, 2010, p.228, 246-259; 
Camp, 2005, p.118). 
During President Fox’s administration, special units, named Gafes (Groups 
of Aereo-mobile Special Forces) implemented the most important anti-drug 
operations (Astorga, 2007, p.89). Gafes consisted of military forces with 
American training in terrorism, hostage rescue and anti-drug initiatives (As-
torga, 2007, p.89; Camp, 2005, p.116). Gafes were responsible for capturing 
major drug cartel leaders but soon evolved to becoming the coercive arm of 
the Gulf drug trafficking organisation and afterwards became an independent 
drug trafficking organisation particularly violent called the Zetas. Accord-
ing to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, the Zetas 
from the end of 2009 onwards began using high calibre weaponry such as 
military explosives, Claymore mines C-4 and grenades (Reuters, 2011). This 
criminal organisation represents a landmark for being highly equipped and 
trained which forced private armies of other criminal groups to improve their 
military training and acquire higher calibre weaponry (Trejo, 2015). Drug 
trafficking organisations began to systematically recruit former state agents, 
such as police officers, to form private armies and use these agents to train 
new generations of gunmen to safeguard territory destined for producing or 
distributing drugs, paying off and enforcing informal networks of protection 
or other activities.
The creation of Gafes has become very controversial as the existence of the 
Zetas is directly linked to it. The formation of the Zetas may be seen as an 
explicit and crude illustration of the harms produced by a criminal justice ini-
tiative where new forms of unsafety and violence were caused after the state’s 
measures, a key example of criminal iatrogenesis discussed in the first chapter 
(Bowling, 2011).
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Operational arrangements
Intelligence collaboration has led to the investigation and detention of several 
heads of municipalities or Presidentes Municipales (Alvarado, 2010, p.228, 
258). In addition, members of the Navy Secretariat have repeatedly detained al-
leged members of organised crime groups (Alvarado, 2010, p.251). It is unclear 
to what extent police forces rely on military tactics to investigate crime. Nev-
ertheless, from the National Commission of Human Rights report mentioned 
above, it is suggested that federal police in tandem with armed forces carry out 
property searches and detentions, frequently violating civil rights. 
Material arrangements
Intelligence training and military equipment have been distributed to all crimi-
nal justice agencies. Police forces are currently trained by members of the army 
(Alvarado & Zaverucha, 2010, p.249). As a result, the presence of the mili-
tary has increased within branches of the police investigating federal offences. 
Approximately 35,000 to 45,000 soldiers (1/5 of the army) have joined police 
activities, in a context where the police force numbers 35,000 nationally. Since 
1995, the National Defence Secretariat has devoted 25 percent of its budget to 
the fight against drug trafficking, and by 1999 the air force had restructured 
its units into three broad regions (Camp, 2005, p.115). Similarly, from 2000 
to 2009 the National Defence Secretariat’s budget increased from 20,000 mil-
lion to 43,000 million pesos (Alvarado & Zaverucha, 2010, p. 249). Under 
the Mérida Initiative, approved in June 2008, the U.S. agreed to send Mexico 
weaponry, training and other assistance worth $1.6 billion pesos from 2008 to 
2012 (Astorga & Shirk, 2010, p.3; INH, 2010). 
Official statements: promoting militarism
The statements analysed here were gathered mainly from executive government 
officials during President Calderón’s administration (2006-2012), including 
the president himself. Militarism is embedded in their tone and content. The 
statements are framed in distinctly punitive terms, revealing ambiguity between 
crime control and warfare. Objectives range from incapacitating organised 
crime group members and ensuring public safety to destroying enemies of the 
state. Such discourse promotes the impression of a permanent state of insecurity 
and the urgent need to use the military to protect society from danger imposed 
by enemies, as the only instrument. Thus, the state’s criminal policies and strate-
gies are carried out by both the police and the military (Alvarado & Zaverucha, 
2010). However, the president has not legally declared a state of emergency, 
limiting civil rights and liberties (which in any case would require both Congress 
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and the scjn’s sanction). Such ambivalence paves the way for blurred, unac-
countable actions, where enemies and emergencies are determined arbitrarily. 
Ordinary offenders and drug traffickers are consistently cast as enemies of 
society. According to government officials, organised crime, particularly crime 
related to drug trafficking and related offences, represents a serious problem 
which not only affects individual and collective interests but also endangers na-
tional security and the state itself. Such threats are largely due to that drug traf-
ficking organisations and other criminal groups are violent and highly skilled, 
appearing to be out of reach from the scope of traditional criminal justice. 
Such discourse and tone may be traced in the eighties and nineties statements 
(Moreno Hernández, 2001, p.151). 
Warfare and enemies 
In his first speech to the nation, former President Zedillo claimed in 1994 that 
“Giving drug-traffickers immunity is intolerable, for this is the greatest threat 
to national security, the gravest risk to public health and the bloodiest source of 
violence.”(1994). In 1998, President Zedillo announced a set of strategies under 
the National Crusade against Crime and Delinquency (1998). This programme 
included using the military forces to combat drug trafficking. More than a dec-
ade later, President Calderón established a similar policy, the National Security 
Strategy, in which both police and military forces focused on weakening and in-
capacitating members of organised crime groups (Periodistas de México, 2011). 
In August 2008, President Calderón, together with senior state and munici-
pal officials, and with members of the executive, Legislative and the Judicial58 
branches of government signed the National Agreement for Security, Justice 
and Legality in which persistent offenders and organised criminals were re-
ferred to posing the gravest threat to society.59 The boundaries and differences 
between the military and the police are difficult to pinpoint. At the same time, 
criminal problems are equated to military missions. Policy discourse reflects 
such ambiguity. As the former Attorney General Eduardo Medina Mora clari-
fied: “It is not a war on drugs but a war on crime,” and “government has a duty 
to provide cities the right to be in peace” (2011). 
The head of the Public Safety Secretariat stated: 
Since the first day of this government, the Public Safety Secretariat has 
carried out a direct and systematic battle against organised crime, with 
the purpose of re-establishing the security and public order that society 
58  The contents that concern the Judiciary are discussed below. 
59  Published in the Federal Official Diary on 21 August 2008. 
enemy penology in the mexican legal and political context                2 70
demands. Through the Mexican Republic, we are in an offensive [strat-
egy] against delinquency and organised crime. […] . We are convinced 
that we will win the battle against crime, we have everything necessary to 
dismantle the criminal structures that seek to become entrenched in our 
country. (García Luna, 2008). 
The head of the National Defence Secretariat said: 
We live in a globalised world, in which antagonisms use instability as an 
emblematic currency in many regions. Drug trafficking and organised 
crime represent a real danger to everyone’s health and security, as well as 
to the stability of national institutions. This scenario has made it impera-
tive that armed forces, within the legal framework, carry out a decisive 
battle against the criminal organisations that threaten society and put 
national security at risk by pretending to build empires of crime. We will 
not take a step back. We will continue without rest until we have forced 
them to submit. Their interests are not greater than those of Mexico. 
(Galván Galván, 2008).
The head of the Navy Secretariat stated: 
The Mexican navy, within its legal powers, is determined to confront the 
calamity of delinquency with all the national naval power, these pursued 
actions are coordinated with other involved state institutions. Only with 
the shared goal, we have weakened the structures of delinquency. (Saynez 
Mendoza, 2010).
The quotations transcribed above were made by high profile officials, a non-
military and two military ones. The three of them used terms and ideas that 
equally draw on both a context of warfare and crime control. Health and safety 
issues are mentioned in parallel to national security and the country’s stability 
portraying them as entangled. Battles against organised crime, offensive strate-
gies and the decisive involvement of armed forces in these battles convey the 
message that only a military response could be used to respond to the ‘emperors 
of crime’ and the ‘calamity of delinquency’. The involvement of the military in 
public safety, as a joint action with civilian institutions, is continuously justi-
fied. It appears that military and non-military officials who wage a war against 
those that threaten society and the country as a whole, merit unquestionable 
loyalty and support from the nation. 
In other statements, the harms caused by drug trafficking and organised 
crime defined as enemies, are described. When addressing military forces, the 
President stated:
You have accompanied society in the war against the new enemies of 
the country: the criminal organisations that threaten the integrity and 
security of the families, the freedom of people and those who pretend to 
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kidnap our public spaces and communicate through violence. (Calderón 
Hinojosa, 2008).
The head of the National Defence Secretariat stated: 
Let us be aware that some places in the present are serious in which vio-
lations to public safety result in threats against interior security. Do not 
forget that delinquency is an enemy that mimics, moves and hides from 
within society. It is an adversary that respects no law and only responds 
to a double code: profit and death. (Galván Galván, 2010).
Similarly, the head of the Navy Secretariat claimed:
The Mexican naval soldier is alert to anything that threatens its security. 
Through joint efforts with other police and military institutions, we con-
front organised crime with every resource in our reach, organised crime 
which erodes our institutions, puts our democracy at risk, degrades so-
cieties and threatens the most fundamental of rights: the right to life. 
(Saynez Mendoza, 2011).
From the quotations above, drug trafficking and organised crime offenders 
are described as powerful to the extent of jeopardising national security and 
democracy, and causing public institutions to crumble or ‘erode’ as represent 
a real danger to everyone. According to President Calderon there is an over-
riding need to eradicate criminals and defeat them, as the rise of violent crime 
is due to the expansion of criminals (Calderón Hinojosa, 2011). As Ferrajoli 
argues, enhancing an image of dominant and forceful rivals helps justifying 
the use of a more coercive and aggressive state response (2007). At the same 
time, it is unclear whether these ‘enemies’ amount to be treated as any foreign 
military force or as offenders within the scope of criminal justice. Overall, 
these statements reveal undertones of warfare and the assumption that there 
is an urgent need for the use of military force. Also, the moral tones of these 
statements emphasise a divide between the good and the bad, the reasonable 
and law-abiding on one side, and the degraders of society on the other. As 
Birkbeck argues too much description of these enemies would render humane 
attributes and make the boundary between the good and the bad much more 
complex and even blurry (2013). 
Casualties 
President Calderón was questioned about the lack of investigation and prosecu-
tion of those responsible for the people killed, which by the end of his admin-
istration (2012) numbered 105,682 (Amnesty International, 2015). The official 
response claimed that 90 percent of those killed were involved with drug traf-
ficking, so it was not a priority to determine responsibility (Calderón Hinojosa, 
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2009). Nonetheless, this lacks any evidence or criminal investigation. Public 
messages from high-profile officials helped legitimising the removal of human 
rights of those suspected of involvement with drug-related violence (HRW 2011, 
p.15). Furthermore, this tone has permeated other official statements, such as 
those made by cabinet members or criminal justice practitioners. For instance, 
the head of the Navy Secretariat has maintained that human rights violations 
are put forward by human rights organisations and activists to undermine pub-
lic institutions (Muñoz, 2011). According to a federal prosecutor, allegations of 
torture are false because “the only one who lies is the accused criminal” (HRW, 
2011, p.15). Whether this discourse influenced the way the federal judiciary 
tried ordinary defendants—as opposed to those charged for organised crime-
related offences—was a key topic discussed with judges during the interviews 
and is a question that lies at the heart of this thesis.
Society’s openness to military involvement
In a parallel to public discourses, the general public appeared to be receptive to 
militarism. The authoritarian legacy in Latin American countries persists; ac-
cording to Uildrinks, prior to the 1990s, law enforcement agencies solved con-
flicts by force, making arbitrary decisions (2010). It is no surprise that in 2011, 
58 percent of the population thought it was more important for the government 
to maintain law and order than to protect personal freedoms (Pew Research 
Center, 2012). Social approval of and consent to the use of military or police 
violence to settle conflicts remains evident in more recent surveys. 
In 2008, 45 percent of Mexicans agreed with the military’s involvement 
in fighting drug trafficking, (Moloeznik, 2009), while in 2011, 83 percent of 
Mexicans agreed with the involvement of the military in the “war on organ-
ised crime” (Pew Research Center, 2012). It appears that in the eyes of most 
members of society, the military forces have been more effective in fighting 
drug trafficking, both in capturing drug leaders and seizing assets related to 
the production and manufacturing of drugs, than civil authorities including the 
police (Beltrán & Cruz, 2011). Mexican society exhibits high levels of trust in 
the army, which ranks just below the church and the universities.60 This confi-
dence is reinforced by the hybrid nature of the Mexican army, which not only 
is in charge of national security but also of providing aid such as disaster relief 
(Camp, 2005). Moreover, 70 percent of the population questioned in 2011 said 
to have an excellent or very good impression of the army. In contrast, criminal 
justice officials suffer from severe lack of trust. From official statistics, sensa-
60  Survey Mitofsky 2008, 2010 and 2011 consulted in http://consulta.mx/
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tionalist press and personal testimonies, Piccato concludes that the police and 
the judiciary are seen by the general population as sources of insecurity and un-
merited harassment rather than protection (2007, p.83). In the face of ineffec-
tiveness, corruption and even criminal activity by law enforcement agencies, the 
public demanded a tougher response to criminals even if that involved greater 
reliance on the military (Donnelly & Shirk, 2009, p.1). 
Criminal justice and pre-emptive measures 
In 1998, drug-trafficking was declared to be a crime against humanity by chief 
justices from more than twenty countries across Latin America, Spain and Por-
tugal including Mexico.61 They stated the need to coordinate international ef-
forts to fight drug-trafficking. Also, they noted the need for judicial specialisa-
tion on trying drugs offences and the need to provide protection mechanisms 
for judges in charge of trying drug-trafficking cases. 
Ten years later, the Mexican President, the Congress and Senate, state gover-
nors and the Federal judiciary, published a number of institutional commitments 
aiming to contribute in addressing the safety crisis. These commitments ranged 
from restructuring the police across the country, to pursuing crime prevention 
programmes, and included several actions related to judicial proceedings. 
For instance, courts designated in maximum security prisons would become 
authorised to hear cases of organised crime and drug-trafficking. Defendants 
charged for those type of offences would be concentrated in maximum security 
prisons. Also, new mechanisms were to be created to protect judges, particu-
larly those in charge of trying cases related to organised crime offences. These 
mechanisms aimed at avoiding delinquency’s power, including threats and vio-
lence, to affect judicial decision. In addition, specialised courts were created 
with the sole purpose of granting or denying pre-emptive measures including 
arraigos and property searches, discussed below. 
In sum, several administrative measures were taken within the Federal judi-
ciary to decide organised crime cases which resemble to enemy penology. Being 
sent to a maximum security prison signified to distance or even root out the 
defendant from any sort of connection with potential offenders but also from 
family and other social networks. The creation of specialised courts to examine 
and issue pre-emptive measures revealed that these were hardly exceptional but 
also that had become part of the institutional structure. 
61 Caracas Declaration was signed in 1998 in the Ibero-American Summit of Chief Justices of 
Supreme Courts and Tribunals in Caracas, Venezuela. 
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Some of these measures, particularly the enactment of special rules that 
govern criminal proceedings to investigate and prosecute organised crime re-
lated offences are, according to Hadden, common practices in states of emer-
gency (2000). Mexico has not officially declared a state of emergency, none-
theless it is worth to point out the overlaps between measures taken by the 
Mexican judiciary and those found in other jurisdictions. Hadden argues that 
in states of emergency such as experienced in Northern Ireland and Turkey, 
the legal framework of the criminal procedure tends to be modified in order to 
secure convictions of particular type of offences (2000). These legal changes 
include from relying on vaguely defined criminal offences,62 using pre-trial 
procedures for crime investigation, special evidence rules and the creation of 
special courts (Hadden, 2000, p.211-213). Pretrial procedures typically aim 
at extending grounds for arrest and periods allowed for detaining suspects. 
These measures are generally associated with improper practices, including 
ill-treatment and torture, particularly in cases where the period of detention is 
long (Hadden, 2000, p. 213). 
Hadden argues that judges’ role and decisions must be assessed bearing in 
mind the emergency settings and the subsequent modifications on the legal 
framework of criminal proceedings (2000). The way in which Mexican spe-
cialised courts try organised crime suspects is not addressed here, but the main 
focus lies on pre-emptive measures which to this day are applicable to both or-
dinary and organised crime offences.63 Whether Mexican judges endorse these 
changes is the main concern of this section, in particular, whether judges vali-
dated the use of two pre-trial procedures or pre-emptive measures deemed as 
highly intrusive and contrary to civil liberties: the detention for investigation 
order, called arraigo, and the property search warrant, called cateo. To grant 
these orders, courts need only mere indications, as opposed to solid evidence 
despite their invasiveness. These investigation mechanisms evoke Jakob’s para-
digm of pre-emptiveness for the sake of incapacitating criminals.
Arraigo
Arraigo is a measure to facilitate the investigation of any offence by detaining 
a suspect, issued considering both the nature of the offence and the particular 
characteristics of the suspect. It was first added to the Federal Criminal Proce-
62 Courts tend to reach verdicts, either convictions or acquittals, largely based on the discre-
tion due to imprecise legal elements of the offence (Hadden 2000, p. 211).
63 For an overview of criminal proceedings under the Federal Legislation on Organised 
Crime, see Bruccet Anaya, 2007.
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dural Code of in 1983, and at first it could be requested and authorised by any 
prosecutor. Currently an arraigo order must be issued by a judge after being 
requested by a prosecutor.64 
Previously, detention for the purpose of investigation could be for 30 days 
and extended to a total of 60 days. After the constitutional reform in 2008, ar-
raigo became available for a period of 40 days and could be extended to 80 days 
in total.65 This measure is enforced by prosecution personnel, accompanied by 
members of the police or army, and suspects may be kept in any premises as 
long as they are kept under surveillance. Although arraigo may be authorised 
for the purpose of investigating offences related to organised crime, according 
to the 11th Temporary Provision it may be used until 2016 by both federal and 
local prosecution agencies to investigate all serious offences.66 
Enabling arraigo orders for all serious offences means widening its applica-
tion, which increases the possibility of detention merely for investigation. ar-
raigo leads to a lack of recognition of any of due process rights concerning a fair 
trial, the right to legal defence and presumption of innocence. Because a person 
held under an arraigo order is detained only for investigation, in other words, 
no solid incriminatory evidence has been produced and the suspect has not yet 
been charged (cmdpdh et al., 2011). 67 
The judiciary’s response: attempting to contain pre-emptive detentions
In 1999 the scjn declared that arraigo violated the rights of personal freedom and 
free transit established in the Constitution. In 2006 the scjn restated that view, 
arguing that arraigo was inadequate as it breached various constitutional provi-
sions encompassing the right to a fair trial. Interestingly, this last decision was 
divided; five justices voted in favour, four voted against. The lack of consensus on 
such an essential matter underlines the importance of investigating judges’ stance 
on measures that curtail due process principles to facilitate the investigation and 
conviction of offences. 
64 The term ‘facilitate’ was used by the courts when analysing the use of arraigo. See the non 
binding ruling titled: “Criminal arraigo. Article 122 bis of the Criminal Procedure Code 
from Chihuahua established the arraigo, does not contravene the constitutional right of 
personal freedom contained in articles 16, 18, 19, 20 and 21 of the Federal Constitution.”. 
In that ruling, the Supreme Court declared that arraigo has two aims: facilitate the inves-
tigation and avoid a suspect fleeing and making a detention order void. 
65 Article 16 of the Mexican Constitution.
66 Temporary provision refers to those articles which do not form part of the Constitution but 
inform the implementation of changes made. 
67 A group of national and international ngos filed a report with the Interamerican Commission of 
Human Rights to discuss the negative effects of arraigo orders on due process and freedom rights.
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In June 2008, despite the scjn’s ruling, several reforms were passed and the 
Constitution was modified to include the possibility of ordering the arraigo of 
persons suspected of organised crime offences. As a result, the scjn could no 
longer argue that arraigo stood against the Constitution as it became expressly 
permitted by the Constitution. By the end of 2008, the federal judiciary, acting 
in accordance with the reforms, created special courts with the specific purpose 
of deciding pre-emptive measures cases concerning arraigo, cateo and phone-tap-
ping. Some courts modified their legal reasoning to issue arraigo orders, arguing 
that such detention amounted only to an act of discomfort or nuisance (acto de 
molestia) which is considered less intrusive and serious than, a restriction of free-
dom, on the basis that the aim of arraigo is not to restrict the suspect’s freedom 
but to keep him from avoiding being tried (cmdpdh et al. 2011, p.23). It is unclear 
whether all courts are following the same reasoning, but this illustrates the type 
of argument advanced by judges who favour a pre-emptive approach. 
Arguments about the lawfulness of arraigo orders remain inconclusive. In 
April 2015, the scjn determined that these orders were lawful and conformed 
with constitutional standards concerning serious offence charges. It was also 
held that the arraigo was not consistent with the new criminal justice system that 
will come into full operation by 2016. A preliminary result of the constitutional 
reform concerning arraigo seems to be that the judiciary shifted its criteria away 
from protecting the right to fair trial and principles of personal freedom towards 
crime control. Whether that shift was forced upon the judiciary or embraced 
freely is difficult to determine, particularly given the lack of consensus within 
the scjn. However, judicial decisions reached elsewhere indicates that judges may 
prefer to endorse security policies to avoid other branches of government to dis-
regard the court’s decisions (Epstein, Ho, King et Segal, 2005). 
Arraigo practices
In 2010, the Federal Attorney General (head of Federal Prosecution Services) 
maintained before the Senate that the use of arraigo orders were of great value 
to the process of justice and essential to the collection of evidence.68 Further, 
the Mexican government argued before the Interamerican Commission’s hear-
ing in 2011 that arraigo was of paramount importance in the fight against 
organised crime.69 Whether arraigo orders have meant an increase in convic-
tions, heightening the efficiency of crime control is difficult to ascertain be-
cause cases that begin with an arraigo order do not necessarily end in a convic-
68 Hearing related to the 2010 Year Report. Quoted by cmdpdh et al. 2011. 
69 Press release on the hearing held, consulted in cmdpdh et al., 2011. 
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tion. Based on news reports, the cmpdpdh et al., held that between June 2008 
and May 2010, 1,051 arraigo orders had been issued, but only in 20 percent of 
cases was the offender convicted (2011, p.26). Although official documents, as 
opposed to news reports, would deliver more precise and reliable information, 
these levels of inefficiency raise serious questions about the reasonableness of 
restraining personal freedom under arraigo if it seems to be of such little help 
in increasing the conviction rate. 
In practice, suspects under arraigo orders are mainly detained on the prem-
ises of the prosecution services.70 Several suspects, such as local police officers 
who allegedly had links with criminal organisations, have been kept in military 
premises, based on a collaboration agreement between the National Defence 
Secretariat and the Attorney General’s office (cmpdpdh et al., 2011, p. 11). In 
practice, being held under an arraigo order seems equivalent to being held in-
communicado by state forces. Furthermore, the number of arraigo orders issued 
in 2010 seems to be higher in states where army forces are actively involved in 
fighting organised crime than in states where army forces are not actively par-
ticipating (cmpdpdh et al., 2011, p.14). 
According to cmpdpdh et al., 94 percent (123 in total) of all arraigo orders 
issued in 2010 by federal judges authorised the maximum period of deten-
tion consisting of 40 days (2011, p. 15).71 They found a similar trend in local 
courts where 92 percent of all arraigo orders granted by Mexico City courts 
authorised the suspects’ detention for the maximum period (cmpdpdh et al., 
2011, p.28). This suggests that federal and local judges grant the great major-
ity of detention orders for the maximum allowable period. Also, the use of 
the maximum detention period in the great majority of arraigo orders may 
indicate support for demands for stronger security measures advocated by the 
executive branch of government. 
Nevertheless, a judge specialising in issuing arraigo and cateo orders de-
scribed different techniques used by prosecutors to pressure judges to issue ar-
raigo orders.72 For example, prosecutors tended to overburden courts which did 
not find in favour of the prosecution submitting lengthy files. This meant that 
70 Such practice was approved of by the courts in the binding ruling which stated that the 
detention of the suspect could also be carried out in premises other than his home. Amparo 
en revisión 81/2009, juicio de amparo indirecto: 326/2009-1 Fourth Constitutional Tribu-
nal in Criminal Matters of the First Circuit. Quoted by cmdpdh et al., 2011.
71 cmdpdh et al. used mass media records as a source of information, which is useful only for 
giving an approximate idea of the most common periods of detention rather than a solid 
notion of these.
72 Mexico City first instance judge 1.
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judges were forced to decide whether to issue the arraigo order or not within the 
regular time frame (24 hours) while studying complex and tedious files. This re-
sulted in judges issuing arraigo orders almost by default because it seemed easi-
er to rule in favour of the prosecution and consequently issue the arraigo order 
than arguing that, after having studied carefully all the documents contained 
in the file, there was insufficient evidence to grant the arraigo order petitioned 
by the prosecution. Another technique described by this judge involved that 
prosecutors held suspects detained because once an arraigo order was lifted, 
they petitioned for another to a different court. In consequence, suspects were 
detained for indefinite periods of time under subsequent arraigo orders. 
Cateo 
Property searches are a means of investigation in which officers enter private 
premises in search of evidence relating to or resulting from an offence. Entry 
must be authorised by a judge and may be granted when there is sufficient evi-
dence pointing towards the existence of objects or people related to an offence. 
The property search must comply with a series of requirements designed to 
prevent arbitrary and illegal searches (cndh, 2011).73 For example, the officials 
conducting the property search have to appoint independent witnesses to en-
sure that any actions considered illegal would be reported (cndh, 2011). 
Despite the requirements established in the Constitution, several state laws 
and the Military Code of Justice applicable to armed forces enables law-en-
forcement agents to conduct a property search without the authorisation of a 
judge under exceptional circumstances. According to military law, a property 
search may be conducted without a judge’s authorisation when the inhabitant 
of the premises requires that the search is conducted or expresses approval for 
the search to be carried out.74 
The judiciary’s response: approving of spontaneous searches 
The judiciary has maintained through different rulings that property searches 
must be carried out in strict compliance with legal requirements; non-compliant 
searches become void, making the evidence collected invalid.75 These rulings 
73 The search warrant must be in written form and specify the places and people to be searched, 
the purpose of the search and the way in which the search will be conducted. After the 
search has taken place, a report signed by two witnesses must be submitted to the judge. 
Article 14 of the Mexican Constitution; article 61 of the Federal Code of Criminal Process.
74 Article 482 of the Military Code of Justice.
75 Non binding ruling titled: “Inspection carried out by the prosecutor practiced in a com-
mercial premises open to the public (private address). To confiscate objects linked to a pos-
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include the requirement that people appearing as witnesses should be different 
from those who act as assisting members of the prosecution or police.76 None-
theless, the scjn validated property searches without judicial authorisation in 
cases of flagrant offences, that is, in cases where a state official witnessed the 
actual commission of an offence. The scjn argued the police does not necessar-
ily require a property search order to enter a private residence if that if delay 
may cause a void investigation, and evidence resulting from the entry of an au-
thority into a residence without a search warrant, motivated by the commission 
of a flagrant offence, has full validity.77 
This excerpt shows that legitimate property searches may be conducted 
without a judicial order. This may be with a reason for the rise in complaints 
about breaches of privacy and illegal detentions derived from property searches. 
Furthermore, the legal category of flagrancy has historically been used to fa-
cilitate the detention of suspects or possible offenders. In fact, over 90 percent 
of investigations brought before a court begin with the detention of possible 
offenders, on the basis that a flagrant offence was being committed, instead of 
beginning with an investigation which leads to arresting a suspect. 
Property search practices: searching without judicial authorisation 
Similar to arraigo, prosecution authorities are in charge of carrying out proper-
ty searches and are most frequently accompanied by police or military officials. 
After the scjn’s ruling, property searches without a judicial order rose steeply. 
Based on complaints of human rights violations received, the cndh reported 
that from 2006 to 2011 the police and military often carry out property search-
es without proof of illegal activity taking place (2011, p.2-3). Further, the cndh 
found that police and military officials falsify the existence of flagrant offences 
to justify the searches by planting illegal objects in the searched premises, such 
as drugs or weapons (2011, p.20). As it will be shown in the following chapters, 
soldiers have drawn heavily on conducting property searches without judicial 
order to investigate crime, claiming a flagrant offence was committed. 
From an overview of the pre-emptive measures discussed, it would ap-
pear that prosecutors, police and military officials, being part of the execu-
sible offence found due to an illegal property search which after practiced without comply-
ing with article 16 of the Constitution, the collected evidence are consequently invalid and 
legally inexistent.” 
76 Non binding ruling titled: “Property search. Lacks validity if those appointed as witnesses 
of the property search are the same that appeared as attending witnesses.” 
77 Binding ruling titled: “Interference by the authority in a premise without a judicial war-
rant. Effectiveness of the carried out doings and of the collected evidence, when motivated 
by a flagrant offence”.
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tive branch of government, seem to carry out pre-emptive measures habitually 
rather than exceptionally. Also, it appears that the legally established limits are 
often stretched to facilitate criminal investigations. 
The judiciary before the constitutional reform in 2008 attempted to limit the 
pre-emptive ethos of crime investigation, but its efforts were disregarded by the 
other branches of power and so it modified its legal reasoning to conform with 
the reformed constitutional provisions. However, the endorsement of flagrant 
property searches contrasts severely to the initial effort to limit the use of ar-
raigo, as it forfeited the need to conduct a property search authorised by a judi-
cial authority. In practice this has meant to authorise law-enforcement agents to 
break into properties while obviating judicial intervention. Neuborne’s finding 
(2005) of mixed results comes to mind, particularly given the apparently oppos-
ing underlying positions of trying to uphold civil rights and liberties while, in 
the other hand, enabling state forces to trespass into private property. 
Conclusion
I argued here that legal constructions contained in legislation, policy docu-
ments and judicial rulings endorse elements of enemy penology. The Mexican 
context illustrates enemy penology’s criticisms. The coercive arm of the Mexi-
can state has expanded, based on necessity to deal with all criminals. Crime has 
become a matter dealt by both civil and military state agents where a continu-
ous process of militarisation is observed across organisational and operational 
settings, in the equipment and tactics used by state agents. At the same time, 
public officials’ statements reinforced militarism ideas where society’s anxieties 
and urge for safety may only be satisfied drawing on military intervention to 
eliminate enemies. Those who reject or disapprove of the current policy are seen 
as rejecting the nation itself. In a reciprocal manner, public attitudes appear to 
support a punitive response to conflicts, which may be explained by the high 
level of distrust in criminal justice officials. The Mexican society trusts in the 
military’s involvement in crime control, even if that involvement relies on the 
reduction of civil liberties. 
The judiciary endorsed military’s involvement in public safety and crime 
control matters in 1996 and later on in 2000; this trend seems difficult to re-
vert. At the same time, the scjn validated the practice of property searches 
without a warrant or in flagrancy which facilitated the investigation of crime in 
private property. In practice, after the scjn authorised the use of flagrant prop-
erty searches, reports on violations of civil liberties increased. In contrast, the 
scjn argued against the arraigo orders though did not prevent law-enforcement 
enemy penology in the mexican legal and political context                2 81
agents from relying overtly on these to pursue crime investigations. The ques-
tion remains, to what extent militarism has affected judicial behaviour and 
decision-making and whether this can be traced in judgements and interviews. 
In particular, the extent to which society’s sentiments on the military are shared 
by members of the judiciary, and whether criminal proceedings have changed 
after the heightened military involvement. These are the main questions ad-
dressed in Chapter 9.
2
chapter 4 
The Mexican criminal justice system: 
actors and proceedings 
Introduction
Every relevant player within the Mexican criminal justice system, from po-lice and public defence attorneys to prosecutors and judges, are entities 
undergoing reform. The main purpose of this research was to examine the judi-
ciary, so this chapter gives background information that provides a context for 
the investigation of judgements and the interviews data set out in later chapters. 
This chapter will focus on the current situation. It will investigate the courts 
and the prosecution service, the rules applicable to criminal proceedings and 
sentencing, and other current practices, showing the background against which 
the views of judges were shared and illustrating the locations where written 
judgments were produced. 
Structure of the Mexican courts
The highest body within Mexico’s federal judicial branch is the Supreme Court 
(scjn), comprised of 11 appointed justices including the chief justice.78 The fed-
eral judiciary is organised in 32 circuits across the country.79 There are three 
main tiers or ranks of courts within the federal judicial system: the first instance 
or trial courts (398 courts), the courts of appeal (88 courts) and constitutional 
tribunals (221 courts).80 In addition, specialised courts decide particular issues 
such as pre-emptive measures (seven courts) and other courts are established 
temporarily in particular areas of the country (79 courts).81
78 Mexico is a federal republic, divided into 31 states and the federal district of Mexico City. 
The federation is ruled by three branches of government: the executive branch, headed by 
the president, the legislative branch, formed by Congress and the Senate, and the judiciary, 
headed by the Supreme Court of Justice.
79 The designation process of the 11 justices involves the candidates’ nomination by the presi-
dent and approval by two thirds of the Senate. (Article 96 of the Constitution)
80 There are several federal judicial bodies that are not part of the regular structure, including 
the military courts which are organised and structured according to their own organic law.
81 This information was retrieved from: http://www.dgepj.cjf.gob.mx/organosjurisdicciona-
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First instance courts and courts of appeal at the federal level are headed by 
a single judge, whereas constitutional tribunals are comprised of three judg-
es. Court of appeal and constitutional tribunal judges are called magistrates. 
Judges are first instance or trial judges, whereas the term magistrate is used to 
refer to judges further up the hierarchy within the judiciary; all have legal pro-
fessional backgrounds. The Mexican system has no jury, so the judge rules on 
both matters of fact and of law. The judge determines the defendant’s guilt or 
innocence and the applicable sentence. 
First instance courts are organised by “desks,” which are headed by a clerk 
called secretary who is normally assisted by two officials. Each desk handles 
a particular set of cases and is in charge of all procedural issues derived from 
those cases. The secretary traditionally conducts hearings, receives documen-
tary evidence and drafts a judgment. This is later submitted to the judge for 
revision and approval. For example, more than half (52 percent) the federal 
convicts interviewed in 2012 said that the judge did not attend the initial hear-
ing, and 38 percent of the interviewees thought it was the secretary was who 
had control over the hearings (Azaola & Correa, 2012). 
Trial courts may specialise in a particular type of dispute, such as criminal, 
civil or administrative. This is the case in the hm state, whereas in courts in the 
lm state hear all types of cases. First instance courts also may review state deci-
sions, submitted in the form of amparo proceedings which embed a legal action 
filed on the basis of purported constitutional violations. Constitutional tribu-
nals decide other types of amparo than those resolved by first instance courts. 
Traditionally in Mexico there have been two different types of amparo ac-
tions that, while based on a purported constitutional violation, pursue different 
outcomes and are aimed at different things. Amparo indirecto may be raised 
against all kind of administrative acts that are deemed unlawful, for example 
against tax laws, when those laws violate constitutional principles of taxation 
in Mexico; or against an illegal detention. Amparo indirecto is similar to the 
habeas corpus action. This amparo indirecto is filed before a federal first in-
stance court, whereas amparo directo may only be filed, in general, against a 
final resolution issued within a procedure that followed the pattern of a trial 
before constitutional tribunals. 
Courts of appeal in both lm and hm states hear all types of cases, includ-
ing criminal appeals and review first instance judgments. In contrast, consti-
tutional tribunals in both states specialise in criminal, administrative and civil 
matters. These tribunals analyse whether the last judgment (the one issued by 
les/numeroorganos/numorganoscir.asp September 14, 2015. 
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the court of appeal) may have interpreted the law in a way that conflicts with 
constitutional norms. This legal action is an amparo directo. This amparo seeks 
a confirmation that the resolution in question did not violate the Constitution 
and constitute a review of the correctness of a prior resolution.
Constitutional tribunals may decide that constitutional protection or amparo 
should be granted because of procedural violations or error in law and send the 
case back to the lower court to correct the judgment. Also, the constitutional 
tribunal may decide that the defendant is innocent, contrary to the view of the 
prior judges, and acquit the defendant; this is known as awarding constitutional 
protection. Or it may simply confirm the lower court’s decision. This remedy 
is not available to the prosecution. Constitutional tribunals have the highest 
position within the federal judiciary below the Supreme Court (scjn). Their 
position has two main implications: first, they act as a final instance, so their 
decisions are irreversible. Second, they can issue binding rulings which should 
be followed by all other courts, both courts of appeal and first instance ones. 
Appointments to these courts are based on examination. However, both circuit 
and district judges are appointed by the Supreme Court (Concha et al, 2007). 
The federal judiciary has an administrative body, the Council of the Fed-
eral Judiciary (cjf), as explained in Chapter 1. The cjf became was entrusted 
with the career judiciary system installed in 1995. The career judicial system 
improved administrative working conditions (Guerrero, 1998). For instance, 
judges’ selection and career advancement decisions began depending on merit 
evaluations rather than on connections or political ties. Also, discipline deci-
sions and ratification of lower level judges, allowed judges to decide cases dis-
regarding political powers of social influences and without fear of retribution. 
In addition, the cjf through the Judiciary Institute (Instituto de la Judicatura), 
became in charge of training candidates to occupy the different types of posts 
within the judiciary (Guerrero, 1998). 
The reform sought better trained judges who would issue consistent and 
high quality decisions, having established a judicial career path and specialised 
curriculum under the cjf (Begné, 2007; Finkel, 2005, p.96). At the same time, 
granting these powers to the governing judicial institution set different incen-
tives concerning career advancement, tenure and discipline. These persuaded 
judges to decide cases and issue resolutions in accordance with institutionally 
accepted values and based on what is thought to be sound legal reasoning with-
in the judiciary (Finkel, 2005). 
The judiciary’s external independence was safeguarded through reforms in 
order to isolate it from political influence. Prior to the existence of the cjf, judges 
were suggested or recommended by a higher judge to decide a case in a par-
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ticular manner, in other words, lacked internal independence to issue a decision 
(Begné, 2007; Finkel, 2005). Although the cjf remains distant from the judicial 
task, Begné found that judges are not fully independent from the cjf as incen-
tives and sanctions from the cjf exert influence on judges’ decisions (2007). 
Similar to other federal countries, each Mexican state has its own prosecu-
tion office and judiciary, formed of two tiers or ranks: first instance specialised 
courts headed by a single judge and courts of appeal presided over by three 
magistrates. The courts of appeal review first instance decisions, and parties 
may still challenge the judgment issued by the courts of appeal and file for a 
third review or amparo directo before a constitutional tribunal. 
The main interactions between the two systems take place through amparo 
proceedings. Federal first instance courts review amparo indirecto proceed-
ings against a state authority’s decision, including issues of illegal detention. 
In contrast, constitutional tribunals review final judgments via amparo directo 
proceedings issued by both state and federal courts. The review of state judg-
ments by federal judges is historically explained by a lack of confidence in local 
courts due to political influence and interference from the state government 
(Fix-Zamudio, 1976). 
Federal courts are bound by federal legislation, but they are required to ap-
ply state rules during proceedings in which a state decision is being reviewed. 
During the transition period from a quasi-inquistorial system to an adversar-
ial one, the interaction between the federal and the state system became more 
complex as some federal judges, such as those in the hm state, had to apply 
adversarial rules and principles to review state criminal judgments but exam-
ine federal judgments through a quasi-inquisitorial lens. This was not the case 
where a state Congress, for example in the lm state, had not reformed the state’s 
criminal legislation. 
Structure of the Attorney General’s office
The office of the Attorney General is part of the executive branch of govern-
ment. Although its central offices are located in the capital, Mexico City, there 
are delegations located across the country. These delegations are run by pros-
ecution agencies in charge of crime investigation and its prosecution during 
pre-trial and court proceedings.82 
Prosecutors rely on auxiliary entities to carry out their duties, including of-
ficial experts who provide reports on matters such as chemistry, toxicology 
82 Article 11 Organic Law of the Attorney General Office. 
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and ballistics.83 These experts are based in the delegations and form part of the 
attorney general office, but their autonomy are expected to be objective and 
produce examinations despite being part of the prosecution.84 Prosecutors tend 
to base their indictment on expert evidence produced by this auxiliary entity. 
Nevertheless, defendants may also rely on the same pool of experts if they re-
quire a particular report to be produced to make their case. Prosecutors also 
rely on the federal police force as another auxiliary entity to conduct investiga-
tions. Police officers are bound by prosecutors’ instructions and authority.85 
In practice, however, it has been found that supervision of the police by the 
prosecutor tends to be minimal. This means that, in general, police findings are 
automatically signed off by the prosecutor, despite routine violations of rules 
on treatment of suspects and collection of evidence (Hammergren, 2007, p.32). 
For instance, 54 percent of federal convicts interviewed in 2012 stated that 
they were threatened at the moment of their arrest; 65 percent said they had 
lost belongings during the arrest; and 57 percent stated that they were beaten, 
most commonly kicked (80 percent), punched (80 percent) and slapped (78 per-
cent) (Azaola & Correa, 2012, p.62-63). Military personnel who participate in 
criminal investigations have a similar role to the police and have begun develop-
ing similar practices (Azaola & Correa, 2012).86
Federal criminal proceedings 
From pre-trial to final judgement
Criminal proceedings are formally initiated at the prosecution agency when 
an offence is reported, either by the victim or by the police after arresting a 
suspect. This means the pre-trial investigation begins far from the courts of 
law. In general terms, a case reported by a victim or any other party requires 
the collection of enough evidence to allow the prosecutor to apply to a court 
for a warrant to arrest the suspect. These cases represent the minority of those 
that conclude with a final judgment. This is due to police ineffectiveness in ar-
resting suspects and to weak and defective investigations (Pérez Correa, 2012). 
In contrast, the vast majority of cases that reach court and conclude with a fi-
nal judgment began with the suspect’s arrest. Police appear to routinely detain 
83 Article 22 Organic Law of the Attorney General Office.
84 Article 25 Organic Law of the Attorney General Office.
85 Article 21 of the Mexican Constitution; Article 24 of the Organic Law of the Attorney Gen-
eral Office.
86 hm Magistrate 1.
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without a warrant, relying on the exception provided for criminals apprehended 
in flagranti (Hammergren, 2007, p.34). For this reason, I will devote more time 
to this type of proceeding.
Police officers, as well as any person with the nerve to do it, may arrest a 
suspect without a warrant, but only in cases of flagrancy, that is, if the suspect 
is caught in the act of committing the offence or while fleeing from the scene 
of the crime. Suspects may also be arrested based on a warrant issued by a 
prosecutor, as opposed to a judge, but only in cases of urgency, where there 
is reasonable grounds to believe that the suspect may abscond, put the victim 
or anybody else at risk, or destroy evidence.87 In any event, the police must 
bring the suspect directly and immediately to the prosecution agency, where 
the suspect may only be detained for 48 hours, by which time the prosecution 
must either file the indictment and bring the suspect to court or release him and 
continue the investigation.88 
The prosecutor is the leading authority during the pre-trial phase. S/he is 
in charge of collecting evidence aimed at “discovering the factual truth”, i.e., 
which is, whether the suspect is responsible for the offence reported to or by 
the police. In practice, the prosecutor tends to produce only incriminatory evi-
dence, which includes the police report (parte informativo) describing how both 
the arrest and the alleged offence took place as well as the testimony of officers 
and other witnesses. The suspect generally gives an initial testimony which is 
used by the prosecutor. Other types of evidence include, in drugs cases for ex-
ample, the official pharmacology report on the type and quantity of drug found 
and a toxicology report on the suspect. Nevertheless, the prosecutor must also 
take into account any exculpatory evidence. 
The final document produced during pre-trial is the indictment dossier or 
case file containing both legal arguments and evidence produced. It is intend-
ed to convince the court there are sufficient grounds to claim the defendant 
should be tried for the charged offence (this document is called pliego de con-
signación). Pretrial investigation concludes either with the indictment’s sub-
mission or the decision not to press charges against the suspect. The prosecu-
tor’s authority is significantly reduced when the case reaches the court as s/he 
ceases to act as a decision-maker, directing the procedure, and becomes one of 
two competing parties. 
As first steps, the court asserts its jurisdiction to rule on the case and verifies 
whether the defendant was lawfully arrested and detained by the prosecutor. 
87 Article 16 of the Mexican Constitution. 
88 Article 16 of the Mexican Constitution.
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Then the court takes the suspect’s initial statement (declaración preparatoria). 
In this initial hearing, the judge or court officials meet the defendant and read 
him his rights and notify him of the charges being brought and the existing 
incriminatory evidence. The court has 72 hours from the moment the prosecu-
tion files the indictment to decide whether there is sufficient evidence to try the 
defendant through intermediate resolution.89 
The intermediate resolution contains an initial assessment of the evidence 
produced during pre-trial by the court. The pieces of evidence produced clos-
er to the criminal event are granted greater evidentiary weight based on the 
“principio de inmediatez”. As a result, judges apply this rule and therefore 
give greater relevance to that evidence produced closer to when the offence 
happened than the evidence produced later. Given that most cases are initiated 
with a police arrest, the police account of the facts plays a central role in the 
prosecution’s case and ultimately in the outcome of the trial. Guilt or innocence 
is ultimately determined by the police who commonly arrested those deemed 
habitual criminals, regardless of whether they were actually responsible for the 
crime in question (Hammergren, 2007). The court is forced to release the de-
fendant if the intermediate resolution is not issued within this period of time, 
and the judge might be subject to administrative or even criminal sanctions.
Another problem resolved by intermediate resolution relates to keeping the 
defendant in custodial remand. Once the judge determines which offences will 
be tried during court proceedings, custody is either ratified or reversed based on 
the seriousness of the offence. Trial judges are legally bound to ratify custodial 
remand of every defendant who is tried for a serious offence.90 
If the judge decides the defendant will face trial in intermediate resolution, 
proceedings generally continue to evidence production, which may include con-
frontation hearings91, witness testimony, expert reports and documentation. 
89 This period may duplicate in case the defence requires it. Article 19, Mexican Constitution.
90 Custodial remand is a subject of study in its own right, particularly because 41 percent the 
Mexican prison population is on remand, in other words, awaiting trial or a verdict (Méxi-
co Evalúa, 2013). The abuse of custodial remand contravenes international human rights 
treaties and produces negative effects on defendants, their families and their communities, 
all of which have been raised and documented by many ngos and scholars. Some of the ngos 
are: México Evalúa, AsiLegal, Instituto de Justicia Procesal Penal Presunción de Inocencia, 
among many others. Scholars include Magaloni, 2009 and Zepeda Lecuona, 2009. 
91 A confrontations hearing is held with the aim of clearing up any contradictions found by 
any of the parties –the prosecution or the defence-, concerning the defendant’s statement 
and a witness’ or co-defendant’s statement. This is a hearing solicited by any of the par-
ties or the court where those participating in the hearing are put face to face and directly 
confront the nature or content of the alleged contradictions. For example, if there are dif-
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After all pieces of evidence have been brought before the court, prosecution and 
defence make their closing arguments, generally in writing. Finally, the judge 
issues a verdict concerning both the defendant’s guilt or innocence and the ap-
plicable sentence. 
Trial courts must handle cases within strict periods of time. Not only must 
the intermediate resolution be issued within 72 hours but trials should conclude 
within the following four months if the prison sentence would be below two 
years; or within a year, if the potential sentence would be longer. Nonetheless, 
proceedings may be postponed for reasons such as further evidence collection 
or a pending appeal. In any case, the workload within first instance courts is 
handled within rigorous time frames, affecting the way proceedings are man-
aged and the quality of the final decisions.
Both the defendant and the prosecutor may file an appeal against the verdict. 
The court of appeal reviews the first instance judgment and may confirm, modi-
fy or revoke it. If the defendant is unsatisfied with the appeals judgment, he may 
file for a further review by a constitutional tribunal through the amparo directo 
proceedings. Courts of appeal and constitutional tribunals examine the suit 
based on the dossier or case file created during the pre-trial investigation and 
the one prepared before the first instance judge. These high court judges rarely 
hold hearings or receive further evidence except for legal arguments made by 
the prosecutor and defence, generally submitted in written form. Hence, they 
have barely any contact with the parties involved, as opposed to trial judges. 
Another important difference lies in the fact that courts of appeal and con-
stitutional tribunals examine cases without legally established deadlines, so they 
tend not to face any time pressure to issue their resolutions; this does not neces-
sarily lead to better decisions, however, as judges continue to be evaluated in 
terms of statistics and not necessarily in terms of the quality of their judgments.
 
Written files and judgments
Case files in the Mexican judicial system contain all documents produced dur-
ing the proceedings. A judicial case file is opened by the court assigned to the 
case. It includes all documents produced during the trial as well as those gener-
ated by the prosecution during pre-trial, such as the hearing transcripts, expert 
reports and all interim orders issued by the court. The case file attempts to 
contain the case in a fashion that will allow a completely different judge, un-
connected to the original proceedings, to issue a verdict. 
ferent versions of how the arrest occurred, the defendant can confront the police officer 
who participated in his arrest.
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The written case file facilitates secrecy as access is only permitted to those 
recognised parties involved in proceedings. As mentioned in Chapter 1, vic-
tims were not recognised until recently to have a place and role in proceed-
ings so they were not allowed to access the file. Another feature of the written 
form of proceedings touches upon the fact that evidentiary weight is granted 
to whatever was documented by the parties, most likely the prosecutor. As a 
result, only what is paper-based is taken into account by the court even if was 
produced during pre-trial without any judicial oversight. Ultimately, any al-
legation is only significant if has written support (Carbonell & Ochoa, 2009). 
Consequently, whoever decides what it is included in the casefile has enormous 
power over the way proceedings are conducted and ultimately on what can be 
demonstrated in trial. 
A written judgment, the source of the archival analysis in this project, gener-
ally includes a transcript of oral evidence produced during all proceedings, or 
at the least the relevant sections of these, together with the judge’s analysis of 
the evidence and final decision. Such a detailed judgment follows the same logic 
as the case file: it can be examined by any other court or judge who was not 
present during the proceedings, such as the magistrates in the higher courts. 
Sentencing guidelines
Initially, the Mexican Constitution established that the main sentencing value 
was to “regenerate” those who were convicted (Sarre, 2011).92 Addressing the 
sentenced ones as morally degenerated or depraved beings changed in the sixties 
as the new purpose of sentencing became to “readapt” sentenced people on the 
basis that they needed psychological treatment. In 2008, the Constitution was 
reformed again and changed the sentencing aim from the readaptation ideal 
to the reinsertion (or reintegration) of interns to society. The reform sought to 
leave behind moral and psychological labels and focus on that the sentenced 
ones were not simply inserted in society. At the same time, the purpose of re-
insertion of those in prison was to incorporate into prison facilities access to 
education, training and labour opportunities, access to medical attention and 
to cultural and sports activities, leaving behind the premise of treating them 
therapeutically (Sarre, 2011). 
An underlying purpose of the reform was to shift penitentiary laws from 
punishing the offender to punishing the offence (Sarre, 2011).93 As a result, 
92 Article 18 of the Mexican Constitution. 
93 In Spanish, Derecho penal de autor and Derecho penal del acto. 
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judges are instructed to disregard the defendant’s personality or their alleged 
dangerousness.94 However, this shift has not been fully completed as sentencing 
rules established in criminal legislation instruct judges to bear in mind ways in 
which the offence took place and also the defendant’s personal characteristics.
Sentencing general rules
Criminal legislation establishes general rules that must be followed by judges 
when determining the severity of the sentence.95 The same legislation details 
each offence and the applicable sentencing tariff, which may include different 
types of penalties such as custodial or financial. Judges deciding the length of 
the sentence must take into account the seriousness of the offence, the victim’s 
character and the defendant’s degree of culpability. They must also bear in 
mind aspects related to both the offence and the offender. Aspects relating to 
the offence include the degree to which the protected rights were damaged or 
the degree to which those rights were imperilled by the offence, the nature of 
the action and the means used to offend, and the manner, including time and 
place, in which the offence happened. The judge also takes into consideration 
offenders’ personal aspects, such as the extent to which he participated in the 
offence, his literacy level, age, habits or customs, socioeconomic background, 
motivation to offend and behaviour after committing the offence. 
In cases of recidivism, the sentence may be increased and parole benefits de-
nied. Recidivism should only be considered when determining the quantum or 
length of the sentence, and not taken into account when examining offenders’ 
culpability.96 Habitual offenders may also be punished more severely if they are 
convicted for several occasions for the same type or nature of offence.97
Judges tend to go over these guidelines explicitly in their decisions. Nonethe-
less, after the case file analyses, it was found that most judges do not go into 
examining each of these aspects in depth but rather consider the defendant’s 
characteristics together with the type of offence. Hence, their reasoning of what 
motivated a particular sentence tends to be absent, or superficial at best. Only a 
few judges described the way specific aspects, such as a vulnerable background 
or recidivism, had led to a more lenient or harsher sentence. 
94 hm Magistrate 3.
95 General sentencing rules are established in Articles 51 and 52 of the Federal Criminal 
Code.
96 The offender is deemed recidivist if the new offence was committed within a short period 
of time after the last conviction. Articles 20 and 65 of the Federal Criminal Code.
97 Article 22 of the Federal Criminal Code.
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In parallel to the general sentencing guidelines, some offences require judges 
to consider aggravating or mitigating factors. For instance, in drug-related of-
fences, if the offender is a public servant or if drugs are supplied in schools, the 
sentence is significantly increased.98 In contrast, for instance, if the offender is 
a farmer, functionally illiterate and from a vulnerable economic background, 
and is charged for growing a particular type of drug, his sentence is lower than 
that imposed on any other farmer.99 
Sentencing guidelines on drug offences
Sentencing tariffs on drug offences have become harsher over the last 50 years. 
In the 1950s and 1960s the sentence for drug dealing was between six months 
and seven years in prison. The tariff began to increase in the 1970s, and by the 
1990s, the minimum punishment had increased to between 10 and 25 years 
(Uprimny Yepes, Guzmán, & Parra Norato, 2012). In contrast to the general 
trend, sentencing tariffs on certain drug offences were significantly modified 
in 2009. The change in sentencing was part of a new set of rules that sought 
to distinguish drug users and small-scale drug dealers from large-scale drug 
traffickers, based on the quantity and type of drug (Zamudio Angles, 2011).100 
Prior to the reform, both small-scale and large-scale drug traffickers were pun-
ished alike. For example, the applicable sentence before the reform for posses-
sion with intent to supply ranged from five to 15 years, whereas afterwards, the 
tariff ranged from three to six years for small-scale dealers and five to 15 years 
for large-scale traffickers.101 
The quantity and type of drug were decisive elements used to distinguish 
drug users from drug traffickers. Based on the quantity, it was determined by 
law whether the drug was intended to be supplied to others or used by the of-
fender. If the amount of drug, as determined by the toxicology report, could 
be used on a single occasion and exclusively by the offender, the defendant was 
guilty of simple possession. If the toxicology report stated that the confiscated 
drug exceeded this amount, the drug was intended for supply, whether the of-
98 Article 196 of the Federal Criminal Code.
99 Article 198 of the Federal Criminal Code. 
100 Other important changes were made, such as allowing local criminal justice personnel-
-police, prosecutors, courts--to investigate and eventually hear minor drug cases, rather 
than restricting case to federal institutions. The context of this reform was a national 
agreement to fight low-scale drug trafficking widely referred to as narcomenudeo. (Zamu-
dio Angles, 2011) 
101 See Tables 4.1 and 4.2. 
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fender was a ‘street peddler’ or high-profile drug trafficker.102 
After the reform, a judge could distinguish between drug users, low-scale 
dealers and large-scale traffickers. Quantities were modified so that the thresh-
old between drug users and small-scale dealers changed, as well as that between 
small-scale and large-scale dealers. For example, the sentence of possession 
with intent to supply lowered if the quantity remained below a specific thresh-
old which was the basis to presume the defendant was a low-scale supplier. By 
comparison, if the quantity exceeded such a threshold, the applicable sentence 
was the five to 15 years as the defendant was deemed a large-scale trafficker. 
One of the effects was that a greater number of defendants were charged for 
possession with intent to supply, as opposed to simple possession, because the 
quantities presumed to be for personal consumption were reduced (Pérez Cor-
rea, 2012). Another effect was that sentences were significantly reduced. This 
meant both a shorter stay in prison and being offered parole benefits, which 
became available because the custodial sentence was below four years.103 
Overlaps between the Mexican quasi-inquisitorial system 
and enemy penology
Up until now, several overlaps between the Mexican quasi-inquisitorial system 
and enemy penology may be identified. In an attempt of pinning down some 
similarities and differences, I will need to make no distinction between princi-
ples and practices as the distinction between these is blurred by the significant 
divide between the written law and documented practice.
First, enemy penology is largely sustained on pre-emptiveness. To incapaci-
tate possibly dangerous offenders is justified in an enemy penology paradigm 
based on that they might commit a serious offence. The ultimate aim is to 
prevent dangerous offences from taking place   so the restriction of allegedly 
dangerous offenders’ freedom is needed. Mexican laws establish that any re-
102 Several binding rulings instructed the judge to rely solely on the medical report to decide 
whether intent had been demonstrated, for example, the ruling titled: “Drugs offence. 
Possession, non-application of article 199 of the Federal Criminal Code”. However, in 
1996 another binding ruling was issued by the First Chamber of the scjn, which indicated 
the judge had to consider other aspects, such as the amount and nature of the drug, way 
in which it had been acquired or supplied, and the suspect’s or defendant’s degree of ad-
diction. This binding ruling is titled: “Possession of drugs destined to the immediate and 
exclusive use of the drug addict. The excusable established in article 199 of the Federal 
Criminal Code, it is not subject to any temporary conditions”. 
103 Article 90 of the Federal Criminal Code. 
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striction to civil liberties should be exceptional and for the least possible length. 
However, a strongly preventive ethos persists in the frequent use of arraigo 
orders discussed in Chapter 3 and the generalised use of custodial remand. The 
underlying goal seems to be to detain suspects first and try them afterwards or, 
worse, try them first and incapacitate them just in case they are indeed found 
guilty. In 2006, 43 percent of the prison population across the country was fac-
ing criminal proceedings (amnu, 2007). This percentage has remained roughly 
constant: by 2013, those incarcerated waiting for their verdict represented 41.3 
percent of the total population (México Evalúa, 2011). Many scholars, such as 
Zepeda Lecuona, have concluded that custodial remand is an expensive, highly 
pervasive and ineffective measure that nonetheless is overtly used by Mexican 
criminal justice practitioners (2009). As a result, enemy penology overlaps with 
Mexican practices of affecting suspects’ liberty before are tried. 
Second, in the enemy penology model, convictions of alleged dangerous 
offenders are facilitated by reducing procedural safeguards which otherwise 
would be enforced. The ordinary Mexican criminal justice system –not the spe-
cial regime that governs organised crime proceedings- does not formally limit 
the scope of the defence’s rights or any procedural safeguards during proceed-
ings. However, the defendants’ possibilities of being acquitted are reduced by 
legislation and rulings which altogether facilitate convicting them. For instance, 
procedural rules and precedents instruct judges to give preponderant eviden-
tiary weight to sources of evidence produced closer to the criminal event, as in-
structed by the principle of inmediatez. This principle guarantees that evidence 
produced by the police, who tends to eye-witness the offence taking place, is 
granted greater relevance in trial, facilitate convictions. In consequence, these 
rules and principles indirectly convert police testimonies in the version of the 
facts courts rely to decide the case (Pásara, 2006). In addition, the conviction 
rate of nine out of ten verdicts is difficult to match with that prosecution ser-
vices are described to be systematically ineffective.104 To unravel this puzzle, 
if you like, one must bears in mind the following pieces: pre-trial proceedings 
are conducted by the prosecutor without any judicial oversight; evidence pro-
duced in earlier stages (i.e. pre-trial) of proceedings have greater weight than 
that produced later on in trial; essentially no further incriminatory evidence 
is produced during trial, and the vast majority of cases end up in convictions. 
By putting these pieces together, it follows that procedural rules are geared to 
facilitate convictions. These themes are discussed in detail in the next chapters. 
104 By scholars such as Magaloni, 2009, and by the vast majority of interviewees, as discussed in 
Chapter 7.
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However, for the purpose of this discussion, it could be argued that enemy 
penology and the Mexican criminal justice system are similar in that in both 
models convictions are facilitated, the Mexican in a permanent basis whilst 
enemy penology in an extraordinary or exceptional basis. 
In regards to sentencing, Jakobs argues that sentencing dangerous offenders 
deemed enemies pursues their elimination through particularly severe punish-
ment as a way of eliminating risk and reinstating the validity of the law to other 
members of society. By comparison, Mexican sentencing aims are expressly fo-
cused on the reinsertion, previously rehabilitation of interns. At the same time, 
although sentencing tariffs have become more severe in general terms the sen-
tencing tariffs that apply to drugs offences were significantly reduced in 2009. 
It may be argued that this change does not endorse enemy penology because 
punishment to defendants who could arguably fit into the enemy description –
charged for drugs related offences-, was lowered significantly but only for drugs 
users and low-scale drug dealers. Still, sentencing tariffs for high-scale drug 
traffickers remained unchanged. It could then be argued that Mexican sentenc-
ing is attuned to traditional penology and thus distant from enemy penology. 
Otherwise, sentencing drug trafficking offences, according to enemy penology, 
given the urgent need to respond to such offences, would involve high sentenc-
ing tariffs, but in reality the law changed to offer more lenient sentences for 
different types of drug traffickers.
In sum, some essential pieces of the current criminal justice legal framework 
resemble enemy penology, such as the general trend of initiating trials without 
prior investigation; enforcing rules and precedents that pave way to convicting 
defendants; and the overt abuse of custodial remand. Although facilitating con-
victions and enforcing prevention strategies to incapacitate suspects are enemy 
penology’s essential traits, it is difficult to argue that these characteristics fos-
ter treating defendants as enemies in the Mexican context. These practices are 
hardly exceptional and have long been in place, to the extent of being part of 
the legal fabric. In this regard Zaffaroni argued that enemy penology was a use-
ful analytical device in cases where civil liberties were normally enforced, as op-
posed to places such as Latin America, where any suspect is treated as harshly 
as an enemy and his civil liberties systematically curtailed through mechanisms 
such as custodial remand (2011). 
I contend that the theoretical framework of enemy penology is helpful in 
examining judicial decision-making and judicial behaviour, including practices 
that embed ways in which convictions are facilitated and pre-emptive meas-
ures overtly used, even if these practices are systematic and not exceptional. 
Ultimately, defendants may not be thought of as enemies but perhaps they are 
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systematically treated as such which altogether enhance arbitrariness and give 
the state the upper hand over suspects or defendants. In addition, enemy penol-
ogy is useful in learning about the judiciary, while taking notice of context in 
which judges are immersed in. As argued in Chapter 3, policies and practices 
carried out by the other two branches of government show a heightened use of 
coercive and militarised measures to respond to crime, akin to the enemy penol-
ogy paradigm which may affect judicial decision making. 
Conclusion
This chapter aimed at presenting an overview of the most relevant aspects in 
criminal trial proceedings. The structure of the courts was described in order 
explain the hierarchy within the judiciary which acquires significance through-
out the empirical discussion, particularly because judges from different ranks 
were interviewed. The specific role and duties entrusted to each type of judge’s 
rank were explained because these, together with their daily workload and past 
experiences inform each interviewees’ commentaries. Also, the Attorney Gen-
eral’s office structure was briefly explained in order to explain the relationship 
between prosecutors, police officers and military members, and experts, all of 
whom produce relevant evidence during proceedings, as will be illustrated in 
Chapter 7. 
In addition to explaining judicial and prosecution structures, the main stag-
es of criminal proceedings were described, since an offence is reported to the 
stage where a final judgement is issued. Sentencing guidelines were briefly dis-
cussed, particularly those that govern drugs related cases. This overview aims 
to present the backdrop of the discussion of empirical findings contained in the 
following chapters. Also, a rough overview of general trends of (mal)practices is 
useful before zooming in to examining 40 judgements from two different loca-
tions, and the voices and views of several judges. 
A final note reviewed the overlaps between enemy penology and the Mexi-
can quasi-inquisitorial system. Several commonalities were found such as both 
systems’ proclivity to incapacitate suspects, and the existence of rules and prec-
edents geared towards issuing a convictions. 
2
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Table 4.1 Maximum drug doses legally authorised
Before reform After reform
Drug Allowed quantity 
of drug presumed 


















be sold by 
large-scale 
traffickers 
Marijuana 250 g. * 50 mg Above 50 mg and 
less than 50 kg 
Above 50 kg 
Cocaine 25 g (Clorhidrate of 
cocaine)
250 mg (Sulfate of 
cocaine)
* 500 mg Above 500 mg and 
less than 50 kg 




1 g * 50 mg Above 50 mg and 
less than 50 kg 
Above 50 kg 
* The criterion followed by the courts was that the intent 
of selling or distributing drug was presumed if the quan-
tity of drug could not be consumed exclusively by the de-
fendant on one single occasion. It was supported by the 
toxicology expert’s report is produced in court aiming 
to determine whether it exceeded what the defendant 
could consume immediately and by himself.
* Based on Table 1, Appendix 1 of the Federal Criminal Code. 
** Based on Article 479 of the Public Health Law.
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Table 4.2 Sentencing tariffs before and after August 2009
Offence before reform Offence after reform
There was no distinction be-
tween small retailers and larger 
drug traffickers
Small retailers (presumed, 
based on quantity, i.e. 
greater than 5 mg but lower 
than 50 kg)
Large-scale traffickers (pre-
sumed, based on quantity)
Offence: Simple possession
The prosecutor will not press 
charges against the drug user 
who carries an amount allowed 
for his immediate and personal 
consumption (art. 195 FCC)
Ten months to four years three 
months, and 50 to 150 days of 
fine1, when intent cannot be 
proved and no organised crime 
can be associated. Sentence 
depends on the quantity and 
the type of drug (art. 195 bis 
FCC)
The prosecutor will not 
press charges against the 
drug user who carries an 
amount allowed for his 
immediate and personal 
consumption (art. 478 PHL)
Ten months to three years, 
and 80 days fine, if quan-
tity exceeds the minimum 
amount for immediate con-
sumption and intent cannot 
be proved (art. 477 PHL)
Four years to seven and a 
half years, and 50 to 150 
days of fine, when intent 
cannot be proved (art. 195 
bis FCC)
Offence: Possession with intent to supply
Five to 15 years in prison and 
100 to 300 days of fine (art. 195 
FCC)
Three to six years in prison, 
80 to 300 days of fine (art. 
475 PHL)
Five to 15 years and 100 to 
300 days of fine (art. 195 
FCC)
Offence: Commerce
Ten to 25 years in prison, and 
100 to 500 days of fine (art. 194 
FCC)
Four to eight years in 
prison, 200 to 400 days of 
fine (art. 476 PHL)
Ten to 25 years in prison 
and 100 to 500 days of fine 
(art. 194 FCC)
*  Offences committed by small retailers are established in the Public Health Law (phl), 
whilst those committed by other offenders (carrying greater amounts of drugs) are written 
in the Federal Criminal Code (fcc). 
chapter 5
Tools for examining judicial behaviour
Introduction 
The question of how judges adjudicate ordinary criminal cases while si-multaneously responding to an emergency context—the ‘safety crisis’ de-
scribed above—lies at the core of this enquiry. The aim of the study is to in-
vestigate whether judges endorse security policies underscored by the idea of a 
‘war on organised crime’ or limit the effects of these policies on suspects’ due 
process rights. The analysis of judgements and first-hand accounts given by 
judges from different courts and tiers can be better understood through the 
different approaches developed to explain judicial decision-making and judicial 
roles. These approaches form the subject-matter of this chapter and encompass 
a variety of theories that attempt to explain and predict judicial decision-mak-
ing, judicial role conceptions, how precedents are formed and adhered to, ways 
in which inquisitorial and adversarial approaches account for judicial decision-
making. The chapter then addresses the links between these theories and the 
theory of enemy penology discussed in the previous chapter. 
Empirical theories of judicial behaviour
Chief Justice Marshall stated in the nineteenth century: 
Courts are the mere instruments of the law and can will nothing. When they 
are said to exercise discretion, it is a mere legal discretion. […] Judicial pow-
er is never exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the judge; 
always for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the legislature….105 
This view resonates with legal formalism, which sees law as a rational, seamless 
and complete system of norms within a consistent hierarchical structure (Bix, 
2005; Tumonis, 2012). Legal formalism drew on the school of thought known 
as legal positivism, which was developed in the nineteenth century in Europe, 
105 Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. 9 Wheat. 738 738 (1824) Quoted in Spaeth 
& Segal, 2002, p. 10.
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principally by philosophers Hans Kelsen, John Austin and H.L.A. Hart. These 
legal philosophers developed a conceptual theory of law analytically isolated 
from disciplines and considerations of morality or justice (Bix, 2005). In a con-
text where the legal system is deemed to be complete, judges do not make law, 
because there is no need (Tumonis, 2012). Rather, judges apply a general rule 
to the facts of the case in a rational and deductive manner, and their duty is 
limited to discovering and announcing the law by consulting primary and sec-
ondary rules of the legal system (Tumonis, 2012). 
In contrast to Chief Justice Marshall’s assertion, Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes held: “the life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience” 
(1881). Legal realism was a movement that emerged in the U.S. in the twentieth 
century in which legal practitioners, as opposed to philosophers, reacted against 
the dominant school of thought of legal formalism (Leiter, 2005; Tumonis, 2012). 
These legal practitioners argued that the rational application of legal rules 
does not fully explain judicial decisions, particularly those issued at the appel-
late level (Leiter, 2005). Accordingly, the law is indeterminate, as more than 
one legal conclusion may be drawn from one principle. Also, the law is thought 
of as indeterminate given the existence of conflicting but equally legitimate 
canons of interpretation for precedents and statutes that may be applied to one 
case (Leiter, 2005, p.51). Realists held that legal reasons fell short in explaining 
what actually accounts for judicial decisions. What explains rulings is beyond 
the law; considerations of fairness, as well as psychological, political and social 
factors, exert influence on the final decisions (Leiter, 2005).
 Realists viewed natural science as the paradigm of all genuine knowledge. 
They therefore emulated the methods of natural science, testing hypotheses 
against observation of the world (Leiter, 2005, p.50). Although realists initially 
lacked evidence and methods to test their hypotheses, judicial empirical stud-
ies developed from realism. According to Heise, the legal realism movement 
provided the first significant forum for the intersection of applied social science 
and legal scholarship (2002, p.822). 
The predominant scholarship on judicial behaviour developed in the United 
States (Thea, 2012), arguably due to the rise of the realism movement but also 
possibly due to judges forming law embedded in precedents, which is rooted in 
the common law tradition. Most studies have focused on the Supreme Court 
of Justice and to a lesser extent on federal courts of appeal and state supreme 
courts (Epstein and King, 2000; Epstein, Landes and Posner, 2013; Heise, 
2002). Recently, many scholars have begun examining the federal appellate 
judiciary within the American justice system, as it is the most likely source for 
Supreme Court appointments (Cross and Lindquist, 2009). 
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Prior to the 1940s, many American scholars believed that justices were moti-
vated to follow precedent, disregarding their personal views (Epstein & Knight, 
1998). Judicial studies were sparked by C. Herman Pritchett’s inquiry on Amer-
ican justices’ dissents, concurrences and block votes. Pritchett questioned the 
legalistic assumption of judges aiming only at reaching a correct decision. His 
work led the way to suggest that justices are motivated by goals other than 
applying the law accurately, such as their own preferences (Epstein & Knight, 
1998; Segal & Cover, 1989). 
Several models emerged to explain what ‘real’ factors explain judicial deci-
sion-making; those which dominated judicial decision-making scholarship were 
behaviouralism and attitudinalism (Heise, 2002, p.833). Other models, such 
as the strategic, the managerial or the legalistic, gained relevance later on. The 
question of whether judges decide solely on the basis of the law or make deci-
sions based on their personal background or ideology, to further particular 
policies or to reduce their workloads, is at the core of the different models de-
veloped within judicial studies. These attempt to understand, examine and even 
predict judicial decision-making. 
Behavioural models
Behavioural models emphasise the relevance of the following aspects on judi-
cial behaviour: personal attributes or social backgrounds, policy-oriented val-
ues and attitudes, roles and small group influences (Epstein and King, 2000, p. 
630; Heise, 2002). The first refers to a range of political, socioeconomic, family 
and professional background characteristics that help explain the formation 
of particular attitudes. The second involves political attitudes towards issues 
raised in cases. The third perspective suggests that normative beliefs held by 
judges about what they are expected to do limit judicial attitudes or directly 
affect judicial behaviour. The different roles judges may play is examined more 
closely in a separate section of this chapter. Finally, the fourth determinant 
holds that the behaviour of judges on collegial courts is affected in some way by 
face-to-face interaction (Epstein and King, 2000, p.630). 
Behaviouralist scholarship conceptualised the votes of judges as responses 
to stimuli provided by cases presented to them, where the determinants de-
scribed above could allegedly be traced in the stimuli (Grossman and Tanen-
haus quoted by Epstein and King, 2000, p. 630-631). Even if behaviouralism 
models viewed judges as policy seekers, judges were thought to further their 
goals with reference to their own normative and policy-based attitudes rather 
than referencing other relevant actors’ actions and institutional settings (Ep-
stein and King, 2000). 
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Attitudinal theory
This approach claims that judges’ decisions are best explained by their ideology. 
Studies focusing on this theory examine judicial decisions through the lens of 
the politics of appointment and confirmation of judges by the president and of 
partisanship (Friedman, 2005; Heise, 2002). So, for instance, affiliation with 
the Democratic party or being appointed by a Democratic president may pre-
dict liberal patterns of voting behaviour by a specific justice. 
One main difference between behavioural and attitudinal models is that 
the former uses socioeconomic background characteristics to explain judi-
cial behaviour, while the latter believes judges’ socioeconomic background 
informs their ideology but that it is ideology that exerts influence on their 
votes (Heise, 2002). Accordingly, attitudinalists hold that judges act directly 
on their policy preferences where law does not constrain judicial behaviour 
(Friedman, 2005) and without much thought of the consequences of their 
choices (Baum, 2006, p.7).
The attitudinal approach received wide acceptance and was conventionally 
followed by scholars before the strategic model was developed. Nevertheless, 
the predictive capability of attitudinalism was weak due to the circularity of 
measuring judicial attitudes in votes that had been already issued. In this re-
gard, Segal and Cover sought to trace justices’ values through external materi-
als such as newspaper editorials and correlate this with their votes in civil rights 
cases (1989). This method was adopted by several scholars; for instance, Segal 
et al. used it in order to include other types of cases, such as economic regula-
tion, and a larger group of justices from earlier periods (Segal, Epstein, Cam-
eron & Spaeth, 1994). Although they found the attitudinal model had strong 
predictive power for more recent judgements, they noted the limitations of the 
model when analysing previous court judgements and suggested including other 
potential determinants of the justices’ decisions to redefine ideological vari-
ables. They also noted the need to bear in mind changes in the legal, political 
and social landscape (Segal, Epstein, Cameron & Spaeth, 1994). 
The attitudinal and behavioural models neglected important political and 
institutional features and actors which also exert influence on judges; these 
factors included the president, legislatures, interest groups, lower courts, and 
judicial institutions (Friedman, 2005). In particular, the attitudinal approach 
falls short when examining collegial courts as it focuses on individual judges. 
Understanding judges as strategic actors, as opposed to actors deciding purely 
on ideological grounds, was the approach that replaced the attitudinal model 
(Epstein & Knight, 1998). 
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Strategic model 
A strategic approach to examine and predict judicial decision-making emerged 
with Pritchett’s study, but this model flourished many years later (Epstein & 
Knight, 2000). Pritchett’s approach highlights the relevance of interdependent 
relations between judges and other actors including Congress, the president, 
other judges within a collegial court and those in lower and high courts (Ep-
stein & Knight, 2000). At the same time, this model considers that the institu-
tional context plays a part in explaining judicial choices.  
Explaining judicial decision-making with a strategic model relies on three 
basic assumptions: first, justices’ actions are directed towards the attainment 
of goals and interests, so alternative courses of action are examined in terms of 
the outcomes they will produce (Epstein & Knight, 1998). Second, judges bear 
in mind others’ preferences and possible courses of action in order to maxim-
ise their own preferences and ultimately attain their goals. An example of this 
would be whether court of appeal judges modify their rulings to avoid rever-
sals from the Supreme Court (Barnes & Songer, 2009).  In other words, they 
act strategically, which may or may not reflect their immediate preferences, in 
order to advance their views or to avoid results that depart even further from 
their preferences (Epstein & Knight, 1998, p.12-17; Robbennolt, MacCoun & 
Darley, 2008, p.3). Third, judges, like any other strategic actors, make deci-
sions within a set of institutional rules (Epstein & Knight, 1998, p.17).
The initial advocates of this approach, Epstein and Knight, assume that a 
major goal pursued by justices is to see their preferred policy positions reflected 
in law, so their actions will advance such an objective (1998, p. 11-12). In con-
trast, other scholars, such as Baum, suggest that the variety of goals pursued 
by judges acting strategically is diverse, ranging from enacting good policy on 
particular issues, enhancing political preferences and institutional legitimacy, 
to personal career advancement and self-respect (Baum, 2006, p. 6-7). Further, 
Robbennolt, MacCoun and Darley argue that judges pursue diverse, disparate 
and often conflicting goals simultaneously (2008, p.2-3).
Strategically oriented judges consider the effects of their choices on collec-
tive outcomes, both in their own courts and in the broader judicial and policy 
arenas. They therefore bear in mind not only the case at hand but also possible 
consequences, such as guaranteeing consensus on a different case or preventing 
Congress from enacting legislation that will reverse or limit the desired policy 
(Baum, 2006, p.6-7). For example, collegial court judges need to moderate their 
views to achieve consensus even to the extent of voting contrary to their per-
sonal views in order to further their preferred policy (Friedman, 2005, p.282). 
Multiple actors are taken into account, including colleagues and peers within 
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the judiciary as well as other branches of government, such as Congress, the 
general public and interest groups. As a result, a strategic judge is subject to 
influence from a variety of sources (Baum, 2006, p.6-7). 
In sum, this model conceives justices to be strategic actors who realise that 
their ability to achieve goals is dependent on the preferences of others, the 
choices they expect others to make, and the institutional context in which they 
interact (Epstein & Knight, 1998, p.xii). 
Traditional or legalistic
The traditional or legalistic model assumes that judges aim to interpret the law 
accurately or reach the correct decision according to precedent (Robbennolt, 
MacCoun & Darley, 2008). It assumes that judicial decisions are determined 
by “the law”, conceived of as a body of pre-existing rules established in con-
stitutional and statutory texts and previous decisions of the same or a higher 
court (Posner, 2008). Ideally, judicial decisions are the product of a syllogistic 
endeavour in which written law supplies the major premise, the facts of the case 
supply the minor one and the decision is the result or conclusion that follows 
(Posner, 2008). Disputes are thought to be decided based on the facts submitted 
before a court (Segal & Spaeth, 2002). At the same time, legalists expect that 
legal decisions made by judges do not depend on their personality or on politics 
but rather on the case file (Friedman, 2005; Heise, 2002).
Taruffo argues that syllogistic reasoning such as this helped to disguise the 
judge’s responsibility, making him or her a passive actor who merely executes 
guidelines set by a different, more empowered actor (2003). As a result, as Pos-
ner claims, those who internalise the “official” line need not explain their deci-
sions (2008). “Interpretation, based on a set of rules of interpretation, becomes 
a rule-bound activity purging judicial discretion” (Posner, 2008, p. 40-41).
In the middle ground, scholars who support this model give policy consider-
ations a place but note that legal considerations come into play, because judges 
decide cases within a legal framework (Baum, 2006).
Managerial model
The managerial model emphasises the impact of increasing workloads in judg-
es’ behaviour at all levels (Robbennolt, MacCoun, & Darley, 2008). Manage-
rial judges are thought to be concerned with saving time, reducing delays and 
improving efficiency as a response to increasing workloads that hamper judicial 
legitimacy and credibility (Resnik, 1982-1983; Robbennolt, MacCoun & Dar-
ley, 2008). At the same time, managerial judges contend that procedural chang-
es, including discovery issues and incentives to reach settlement, together with 
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new rights and remedies, have enhanced pre-trial and post-trial judicial super-
vision (Resnik, 1982-1983). In sum, this model contends that judges devote 
substantial amounts of time to case management (Resnik, 1982-1983, p.403).
Managerial judges concern about efficiency, together with institutional in-
centives related to judicial performance. Judges as case managers strive to limit 
their workloads, despite the fact that their tasks and demands may vary across 
different types of courts and different jurisdictions (Robbennolt, MacCoun & 
Darley, 2008).
Using a combination 
These four models attempt to examine judicial behaviour and give a coherent 
account of judicial decision-making. Baum, along with practising judges such as 
Kozinski and Posner, believes that these models ignore a premise often left un-
questioned: judges are not solely focused on furthering good policy or good law 
but are also motivated by personal interests. These interests include self-respect 
and recognition within the judiciary and amongst those audiences significant to 
them (Baum, 2006; Kozinski, 1993; Posner, 2008). “Judges exercise their powers 
subject to very significant constraints… the first, and to my mind the most signifi-
cant, is internal: the judge’s own self-respect” (Kozinski, 1993, p.72). Posner also 
believes judges exercise discretion in such a way as to be recognised by themselves 
and others as good judges rather than lazy or wilful ones (Posner, 2008, p.174). 
Other scholars, such as Robbennolt, MacCoun and Darley, claim that judi-
cial behaviour cannot be understood from a single perspective, for this would 
oversimplify the many constraints or incentives that judges face at the mo-
ment of deciding (2008). Judges and courts vary amongst themselves and have 
different goals and objectives that they attempt to achieve within a range of 
constraints specific to each judge and court (Robbennolt, MacCoun & Dar-
ley, 2008). To hold that certain policy goals, ideological views or managerial 
objectives are more valid than others is to show only partial understanding 
of judicial decision-making (2008, p.2-3). Robbennolt, MacCoun and Darley 
rather suggest that different types of goals and actions come into play at the 
same time, which if portrayed in a parallel constraint satisfaction model may 
be examined more clearly, observing both the advantages and disadvantages 
each judge faces in specific circumstances. Links between goals and actions 
need also to be considered (Robbennolt, MacCoun & Darley, 2008). This thesis 
draws on all these approaches, because, as will be discussed in the empirical 
chapters, the interview material reveals that many different concerns and inter-
ests affect judges, ranging from contributing to reducing impunity to avoiding 
reversals and lightening workloads. 
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Judicial role 
Attitudes and policy preferences (i.e. liberal/conservative attitudes; pro-defend-
ant/pro-public attitudes; personal sense of justice) were examined as predictors 
of decisions issued by judges by scholars. However, a new strand of research 
unfolded once scholars such as Becker (1966), Vines (1969), Glick (1971), Glick 
and Vines (1969), Gibson (1978) and Scheb, Ungs and Hayes (1989) found that 
attitudes were meaningful in predicting decisions only if role expectations or 
orientations were also taken into account. For instance, Gibson argued that 
judges’ attitudes were meaningful in predicting a particular decision only when 
those judges felt that drawing on their personal values was acceptable, based on 
their conception of what constituted proper judicial behaviour and what was 
expected from them (1978).
Role expectations are defined by what constitutes ‘proper’ behaviour for a 
role occupant, based on conceptions each one may have (Gibson, 1978, p.917). 
Role expectations exert particular influence on actors in positions subject to rela-
tively unambiguous institutionalised role expectations, such as judges (Gibson, 
1978, p. 917). Role orientations are normative expectations shared by judges and 
related actors regarding how a given judicial office should be performed (How-
ard, 1977 quoted in Scheb, Ungs & Hayes, 1989, p.427); or what judges think 
they ought to do (Gibson, 1983 quoted in Scheb, Ungs & Hayes, 1989, p.427). 
At the same time, roles may differ between judges, and even when norms 
are widely accepted, the actual behaviour of a judge may not conform to them 
(Becker, 1966; Ungs & Baas 1972). Thus, ‘purposive role’ refers to the expecta-
tions a judge has in regards to his own particular position or function (Ungs & 
Baas, 1972; Vines, 1969). These include: a judge’s characterisation of his job; 
the purpose or goal he pursues as a judge; and the major criteria he considers in 
reaching his decision (Ungs & Baas, 1972, p. 345).
Purposive roles
Based on interviews with state court judges from four different states, Glick 
and Vines (1969) distinguished four purposive roles: the ritualist, the adjudica-
tor, the policy-maker and the administrator. Subsequent studies, such as those 
conducted by Ungs and Baas (1972) or by Flango, Wenner and Wenner (1975) 
built upon these purposive roles. 
1. The ritualist refers to judges preoccupied with the everyday routine of the 
judicial process, including settling cases and managing workloads. Ritu-
alist judges avoid policy involvement or concerning themselves with the 
problems of the political system (Vines, 1969, p. 468). 
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2. The adjudicator judge concentrates on the function of settling disputes 
and coming to a decision through proceedings in court, including hearing 
the parties and studying the briefs (Vines, 1969, p. 468). The adjudicator 
sees his function as a mediator, balancing contending principles to bring 
order and fairness to society (Ungs & Baas, 1972, p. 346).  The judicial 
role is seen more broadly, as it encompasses the search for peaceful solu-
tions, determining each party’s rights. The judge is a key actor in the judi-
cial process. The law is used as a tool to achieve objectivity and creativity, 
allowing broader social issues to be settled (Ungs & Baas, 1972, p. 356).
3. Policy-maker refers to judges who see policy-making functions embedded 
in the process of controlling the activities of lower courts. In their view, 
their role is more than simply following precedent; they establish policies 
which are enforced on lower courts and the litigants involved (Vines, 
1969, p. 469). The policy-maker perceives himself as balancing larger 
social issues rather than settling individual disputes (Flango, Wenner & 
Wenner, 1975).
4. The administrator judge sees the role of the court as supervising the devel-
opment of law as well as other lower courts by providing guidance and es-
tablishing rules of practice and procedure that must be followed by those 
courts (Vines, 1969, p.469). For the administrator, judicial procedure is 
very important; the way in which a case is decided is as relevant as the ac-
tual decision made. Administrators see precedent as a means of assuring 
the reliability of the justice administered to litigants as opposed to the re-
quired criterion for decisions (Ungs & Baas, 1972, p.347). Administering 
justice also involves maintaining a clear docket or trial list and avoiding 
delays in deciding cases (Ungs & Baas, 1972, p.357).
The most common orientation found was the ritualist, followed by the adjudi-
cator (Vines, 1969, p. 473). This finding is consistent with what Ungs and Baas 
(1972) and Flango, Wenner and Wenner (1975) found. 
One of the most controversial aspects of the judicial role was whether judg-
es could apply the law without being influenced by their personal values, or 
whether they inevitably fell back on their own values (Vines, 1969, p. 473). A 
similar query was pursued by Becker, who examined how judges handled prec-
edents to learn about individual perceptions of judicial roles (1966). He found 
that judges who viewed precedent as an extremely important factor in judicial 
decision-making could exhibit a degree of objectivity when confronted by a 
clear precedent (Becker, 1966, p.680). On the other hand, a judge’s perception 
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that precedent was not very influential in the final decision might lead to a 
more subjective decision (Becker, 1966, p.680).  
Decision-making roles
Glick and Vines (1969) developed three categories of decision-making role when 
looking at whether judges conceive their role as being limited to interpreting the 
law or extended to making law. These roles are: the law interpreter, the law 
maker and the pragmatist, which have also been enriched by further studies (for 
instance, Flango, Wenner & Wenner, 1975 and Ungs & Baas, 1972).
1. The law interpreter is a pure interpreter of the law. Legal precedents com-
prise the major criteria in the interpreter’s decisions; precedent, therefore, 
is a major constraint of personal predilection (Ungs & Baas, 1972, p. 
345). Law interpreters’ goals are expressed in terms of preserving the 
existing law as an institution. To step outside the law, either by interpret-
ing the constitution in line with a judge’s own values or by performing 
a policy-making activity, would mean contravening the constitution and 
the separation of powers doctrine (Vines, 1969; Ungs & Baas, 1972). 
2. The law maker believes that judges make law when they decide cases 
(Vines, 1969, p. 475-6). The law maker considers that his or her personal 
attitudes and experiences are important factors when making decisions. 
His goal is to pursue what he thinks is just or right when deciding a case 
and for this purpose may shape precedent to fit with public policy. Hence, 
the judges as law makers include policy-making functions (Flango, Wen-
ner & Wenner, 1975; Ungs & Baas, 1972). A judge in this category may 
also suggest to the legislature a course of action it may adopt or send a 
copy of relevant opinions with the expectation that the legislature might 
act on the recommendations (Vines, 1969, p. 483).
3. The pragmatist agrees with both law interpreter and law maker but be-
lieves a judge must be flexible and match the settlement of the case to the 
specific circumstances and issues (Glick & Vines, 1969, p. 146; Vines, 
1969, p. 476). For Flango, Wenner and Wenner, the pragmatist resem-
bles what they call “the mediator”, who places less confidence in relevant 
precedents and relies much more on his own common sense and under-
standing of the meaning of justice to reach his decisions, rather than pub-
lic needs or desires (1975, p. 284). 
The law-interpreter orientation received strong support from a large propor-
tion of judges (Flango, Wenner & Wenner, 1975; Ungs & Baas, 1972; Vines, 
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1969). This tendency was also found by Flango et al. in two civil law countries, 
Austria and Switzerland (Flango, Wenner & Wenner, 1975). Vines (1969) and 
Glick & Vines (1969) found that this orientation was much more common in 
Louisiana, where the state legal system is based on the French legal tradition. 
Initially they considered that this legal tradition explained the general accept-
ance of the law-interpreter orientation. However, they discarded the influence 
of their legal tradition because they found that the civil law tradition is no 
longer shaping court decisions; they observed that respondents made no refer-
ence at all to their legal tradition. They concluded instead that Louisiana’s con-
servative state politics and environment, which do not encourage changing the 
status quo, accounted for this orientation (Glick & Vines, 1969; Vines, 1969). 
Similarly, they found that state politics in New Jersey, where judicial activism 
had been encouraged, accounted for judges accepting the law-maker orienta-
tion (Glick & Vines, 1969; Vines, 1969).  
Ungs and Baas examined whether the level or tier of court was associated 
with judges’ role orientation. They initially expected trial judges to be aligned 
with the administrator orientation, interested in procedure and clean dockets or 
trial lists (1972). By comparison, they expected appellate judges to align more 
with the law-maker orientation, in which creative decisions are more common 
(Ungs & Baas, 1972). They found no conclusive relationship between the per-
ception of roles and the tier of court (Ungs & Baas, 1972, p. 362-3). 
Whether judges make law or are limited to interpreting the law is an ongoing 
discussion. Scholars such as Segal and Spaeth suggest that claiming that judges 
are restrained from deciding the law is self-deceptive at best (2002). Judges, 
whether at the highest or lowest court, make law: they allocate resources, ei-
ther to the parties involved in the case at hand or to a larger group of people 
affected by the decision (Segal & Spaeth, 2002). These authors claim there to 
be a “panoply of mythology” surrounding judicial decisions, in which judges 
and their decisions are objective, impartial and dispassionate (2002, p.10). In 
a similar vein, Zaffaroni—former justice of the Argentinian Supreme Court—
held in an interview in 2015: 
The judge is a human being and citizen who has the same interests and 
wants to participate as any other. Impartiality is the main attribute of 
independent justice. Impartiality is not the idealisation of a judge, like 
a sort of superman, apolitical, non-ideological, and asexual. If within 
justice there is someone who pretends to be as such, he ought to go to the 
Himalayas.106 
106 Interview published in newspaper La Jornada on April 28th, 2015. 
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The Mexican judiciary has traditionally embraced the legalistic model, in 
which judges are considered mere appliers and interpreters of the law (Cabal-
lero & Concha, 2001). The legalistic model is reinforced by a limited margin of 
discretion; judges are bound not only by strict norms but also by rulings issued 
by higher courts that constrain decision-making, as will be explained below. 
Nevertheless, the 2011 human rights reform led judges to question their law-
interpreter role, because the reform allowed judges to disregard norms if they 
considered that these norms contravened human rights treaties. The extent to 
which this reform will modify the way in which judges perceive their orienta-
tion and role remains to be seen. 
Precedent
Becker argues that judges’ preference for strict or flexible adherence to prec-
edent sheds light on their perceived role (1966). At the same time, the way in 
which judges understand their role involves normative expectations that also 
inform institutional behaviours despite the diversity of judicial orientation and 
performance. This section describes precedent doctrines and precedent forma-
tion in common law systems and in Mexico (a civil law system) and discusses 
precedent adherence.  
Precedent doctrines
Precedent can be broadly defined as a decided case that furnishes the basis 
for deciding future cases involving similar facts or issues (Lindquist & Cross, 
2005). There are two main doctrines of precedent: stare decis, developed in 
common law jurisdictions, and jurisprudence constante, developed in civil law 
(Fon & Parisi, 2006). The stare decis system developed in England. A key as-
pect was the extraction of a rule from prior cases of principle, defined as gen-
eral doctrine, to guide future decisions (Lindquist & Cross, 2005). As these 
principles guide a court to reach a resolution in similar cases, the presence of 
several cases recognising the same legal principle increased the persuasive force 
of judicial Findings (Lindquist & Cross, 2005). Precedents became more au-
thoritative when they were reaffirmed by a sequence of consistent decisions over 
time, until they became a primary source of law (Fon & Parisi, 2006, p.521). 
By comparison, civil law countries thought of case law as secondary to writ-
ten codes and special legislation, which were deemed primary sources of law 
(Fon & Parisi, 2006, p.522). In 19th-century continental Europe, the doctrine 
of the separation of powers was thought to imply that courts should solve dis-
putes brought before them, not make laws or regulations. This historical re-
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striction is explained by the monarchy’s distrust of empowered courts during 
the French Revolution. The ideals of certainty and completeness in law implied 
that legislative provisions had to be established as mathematical canons, leav-
ing no room for discretion or arbitrary decisions made by the judiciary (Fon & 
Parisi, 2006, p.522). 
Civil law jurisdictions gradually began to develop an informal precedent 
system, where a sequence of comparable cases acquired persuasive force as a 
source of law. This system sought to promote the certainty, consistency and 
stability in the legal system that codifications had failed to achieve. This led to 
the doctrine of jurisprudence constante, under which a court is required to take 
past decisions into account only if there is sufficient uniformity and repetition 
in previous case law. As a result, considerable precedential authoritative force 
stems from a consolidated trend of decisions on any legal issue (Fon & Parisi, 
2006, p.522; Posner, 2008, p.144-5).
Forming Mexican precedent
Mexican rulings or precedents may be authoritative or binding, which is called 
jurisprudencia, or only persuasive or indicative. Mexican jurisprudencia may 
concern an interpretation of a written norm or the content of a principle embed-
ded in legislation or the Constitution. Binding rulings are mainly formed in two 
ways: by contradiction or by repetition. Contradictions are addressed by circuit 
panels (formed by constitutional tribunal magistrates in the circuit) or by the 
National Supreme Court of Justice (scjn) when contradictions arise between 
constitutional tribunals or within the scjn’s chambers on a legal issue.107 If a 
decision is reached by eight out of 11 justices of the scjn, it becomes binding 
on all courts in the country. By comparison, if consensus is not reached, the 
authoritative character of the decision is lessened and held to be only persua-
sive. Repetition relates to consolidating a trend of decisions. An authoritative 
precedent is formed after five rulings ratify a particular reasoning in the same 
direction. These rulings can be issued by constitutional tribunals, circuit panels 
or the scjn. Initially, the scjn had the exclusive duty of forming jurisprudencia, 
but after 1968, constitutional tribunals were also allowed to form jurispruden-
cia (Ovalle Favela, 1999). The fact that a wide range of constitutional tribunals 
can form binding precedents helps explain the current diversity of jurispruden-
cia (Ovalle Favela, 1999).
Mexican jurisprudencia can be terminated by interruption, elimination or 
107 Rules contained in the new Ley de Amparo published in the Federal Official Diary on 2 
April 2013. 
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substitution. A jurisprudencia is interrupted after a legal reasoning explaining 
why it should no longer be applicable is accepted by the scjn. Elimination hap-
pens when the written norm from which the judicial interpretation stemmed 
has been derogated or eliminated; and substitution happens when a higher 
court decides a jurisprudencia is substituted once a lower court produces suffi-
cient legal argument asking to replace a particular ruling with different judicial 
criteria (Alvarado Esquivel, 2013). 
Rules on the scope of binding rulings or jurisprudencia foster verticality, 
uniformity, legal certainty, continuity and control over lower-tier courts (Al-
varado Esquivel, 2011). At the same time, the fact that parties may file for 
an appeal and have their case heard by Constitutional Tribunals or the scjn 
represents an opportunity for these high courts to control lower courts and 
thus ensure consistency in decision-making (Guarnieri, Pederzoli, & Thomas, 
2002). For instance, a primary rule dictates that all jurisprudencia must be 
followed by all lower courts, which illustrates the extent of vertical power and 
control from higher courts to the lower ones (Taruffo, 2003). If a particular rul-
ing was issued by a constitutional tribunal, all courts below it, including courts 
of appeal and trial courts from both state and federal systems, are required to 
follow it. Those exempt from this binding force are courts from the same tier 
or hierarchy or from other circuits if the precedent is issued by a circuit panel 
(Alvarado Esquivel, 2013). Unless a binding ruling has been substituted, lower 
courts are bound to apply jurisprudencia and cannot disregard them even if 
extensive legal arguments are produced (Alvarado Esquivel, 2011). A different 
rule states that all jurisprudencia since June 1917 are binding if applicable to 
the case at hand, despite having been issued in a completely different era (Alva-
rado Esquivel, 2011).
Adherence to precedent
Despite the fact that precedent traditions have different origins, scholars such as 
Taruffo maintain that differences based on judicial adherence to rulings, both 
binding and non-binding, have dissolved (2003, p.35-6). In this regard, it seems 
helpful to draw on both traditions to explore judicial behaviour concerning ad-
herence to previous rulings or adherence to consensus within collegiate courts.
Dissent within collegiate courts was discouraged amongst U.S. justices in 
the nineteenth century, based on the assumption that the Constitution’s mean-
ing was already established (Friedman, 2005). Nowadays, justices are free to 
express their own views either in concurrent opinions or dissents; nonetheless, 
there is substantial pressure to obtain an opinion that speaks for “the Court” 
(Friedman, 2005, p.282). 
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Different explanations for why judges follow precedents have been ad-
vanced over time. The judiciary has traditionally fostered reliance and con-
firmation of precedents because it enhances coherence in interpretation of the 
law (Alvarado Esquivel, 2011; Lindquist & Cross, 2005). Adherence to prec-
edent has been pursued because it fosters legal stability and continuity (Heise, 
2002; Lindquist & Cross, 2005). Following precedents also encourages legal 
certainty and equal treatment of all parties (Alvarado Esquivel, 2011; Taruffo, 
2003). In addition, precedent adherence shapes judicial decision-making and 
constrains judicial discretion (Lindquist & Cross, 2005; Alvarado Esquivel, 
2011). As Heise points out, choosing not to follow precedent would undermine 
the practice of deciding by precedent and thus undermine the value of judges’ 
own decisions (2002, p.840).
Epstein and Knight suggest that a general norm favouring precedent exists, 
and that justices who seek to establish legal rules that will engender compli-
ance in the community will give priority to rules that are consistent with a 
norm respecting precedent (1998). Apparent or truthful reliance on precedent 
maintains the judiciary’s authority and legitimacy (Lindquist and Cross, 2005). 
Lindquist and Cross suggest that following precedent is best explained in terms 
of path dependence, which describes a system where an initial decision influ-
ences subsequent decisions to the extent of an earlier ruling dictating the out-
come of a later decision (2005). Repeated reliance on precedent reinforces the 
precedents’ own significance and makes change burdensome, even if the content 
of the precedent is less likely to produce stability and predictability (Lindquist 
and Cross, 2005). In fact, Lindquist and Cross claim that path dependence may 
become pathological, perpetuating precedents and producing adverse societal 
consequences for no other reason than adhering to precedent (2005, p.1172). 
Even if a precedent is not binding, if it is deeply woven into the fabric of the law, 
judges may apply it, making it difficult to overrule (Lindquist & Cross, 2005; 
Posner, 2008; Taruffo, 2003).
At the same time, adherence to precedent embodies a strategy to limit work-
loads, as it avoids revisiting resolved legal questions (Lindquist & Cross, 2005; 
Posner, 2008; Taruffo, 2003). Posner claims that adherence not only reduces 
the amount of fresh analysis that judges have to perform but also lowers the 
chance of reversal (2008, p.144-5). 
A common critique of the Mexican system of creating jurisprudencia is 
the wide and often conflicting range of rulings that result (Alvarado Esquivel, 
2013). Posner holds that judges are reluctant to overrule decisions in order to 
preserve the appearance of continuity and stability, even if this means selec-
tively using certain precedents and ignoring others (2008). In consequence, case 
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law is littered with inconsistent precedents from which judges can pick and 
choose. This may explain why the more precedents there are in an area of law, 
the greater role ideology plays in judicial decision-making (Posner, 2008, p. 45). 
Bureaucratic or career judicial systems such as the Mexican enhance consist-
ency through different mechanisms. Appointments and promotions are based 
on examinations, work experience and performance within the judiciary (Guer-
rero, 1998). Having good knowledge of jurisprudencia plays a significant role 
in this. Current and future judges are also trained in a specialised institute 
(Instituto de la Judicatura) focusing on providing skills in weighing evidence, 
developing legal arguments and drafting judgments (Guerrero, 1998). 
Verticality and uniformity are stressed within the judiciary; lower courts 
are expected to follow existing precedents to the extent of explicitly reproduc-
ing them, inhibiting any kind of creative or innovative legal reasoning. Publicly 
fostering the following of rules, a lack of creativity and low variance, according 
to Posner, will typically be found in a career judiciary system such as Mexico’s, 
where promotion largely depends on conforming to higher-rank courts’ criteria 
(2008). In a career judiciary the quality of a judge’s rulings is evaluated by his 
superiors to determine when, if at all, he is promoted (Posner, 2008, p. 131). 
Such a system is unlikely to see supervisors benefiting from having bold, intel-
lectually challenging and experimentally inclined subordinates (Posner, 2008). 
As a renowned justice claimed: “jurisprudencia translates practically into a 
format or ‘template’ for lower tier court resolutions; [judges] only need to adjust 
their decisions to the format and that’s it!” (Alvarado Esquivel, 2011, p.32). 
Inquisitorial vs adversarial approaches
An analytical approach to understanding the role of judges and their political 
significance suggested by Guarnieri, Pederzoli and Thomas is by examining 
the division of tasks and powers among the various trial participants (2002). 
Procedural rules shape the ways in which proceedings are conducted and at 
the same time shed light on the resources allocated to each of the participants 
involved and the extent to which each of them influences the development of a 
case (Guarnieri, Pederzoli & Thomas, 2002, p.121). 
For instance, judges within an adversarial criminal procedure are expected 
to act as passive arbiters whose main functions are focused on ensuring a fair 
trial. The attorneys, by comparison, are leading actors; they prepare and pre-
sent the case, define factual and legal issues, interrogate witnesses before and 
during trial. In contrast, within inquisitorial settings, the judge has control over 
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the entire process, including in some cases controlling preliminary or pre-trial 
proceedings and interrogating parties and witnesses. The attorneys hardly ever 
intervene (Guarnieri, Pederzoli & Thomas, 2002, p. 122). 
The legal process may also help analyse the roles performed by the parties 
involved if it is examined as an instrument used by the state to establish or 
reaffirm general values, principles and objectives beyond individual disputes 
(Guarnieri, Pederzoli & Thomas, 2002, p. 123). Adversarial proceedings mir-
ror the conception of a liberal state concerned with individuals’ rights and their 
autonomy, where parties are relatively equal contenders and the judge a neutral 
third party. Conversely, inquisitorial proceedings mirror an interventionist state 
where a public official, such as a judge, takes over a private dispute and reaches 
a decision bearing in mind the interests of the whole community (Guarnieri, 
Pederzoli & Thomas, 2002, p.123).
Judicial decision-making is also affected by the relationship between judges 
and other key actors such as the public prosecutor or the police (Guarnieri, 
Pederzoli, & Thomas, 2002). For instance, if judges and prosecutors are part of 
the same professional body, public prosecutors are more influential than their 
counterparts—defence lawyers—who lack connections to the judge. Also, the 
relationship is shaped by legal proceedings and practices, such as those within 
criminal proceedings where the prosecutor plays a prominent role during the 
pre-trial stage (Guarnieri, Pederzoli, & Thomas, 2002). Or, if prosecutors are 
subordinated to the executive, as they are in the Mexican system, the judicial 
system is potentially influenced by the executive. In sum, the scope of judicial 
power varies in accordance with the way in which proceedings are structured, 
bearing in mind the underlying ideology of proceedings and relationships be-
tween judges and other actors. 
The Mexican criminal justice system, as explained in previous chapters, is 
mainly inquisitorial; the prosecutor plays a determining role in pre-trial and trial 
proceedings. The prosecutor’s relevance is shown by aspects such as the weight 
incriminating evidence collected during pre-trial has in the final outcome of the 
case or in the fact that the charges pressed by the prosecutor generally shape 
the subsequent course of the trial. Based on Guarnieri et al., the salience of the 
prosecutor reflects both the reduced scope of judicial power in adjudicating guilt 
and the ability of the executive to exert influence on judicial decision-making. 
Mexico’s authoritarian heritage is mirrored in its current criminal justice 
system. Disputes are addressed by state officials, by the prosecutor who repre-
sents society and since recently also victims, and by the judge, who is in charge 
of proceedings. Nonetheless, the criminal justice reform attempts to modify 
these settings. On one hand, the prosecutor and the defence attorney are ex-
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pected to have equal opportunities to present and defend their case before a 
judge. And, on the other, the judge is expected to have a less active role in pro-
ceedings while having a stronger oversight over the parties’ doings. Ultimately, 
the state’s influence in proceedings is expected to be lessened by, on one hand, 
levelling the field between the defence and the prosecutor, and by reducing the 
judge’s active involvement in proceedings. 
Conclusion
This chapter explored the image of judges as purely objective, impartial and de-
tached decision-makers. To claim that these qualities characterise everyone who 
performs judicial tasks disregards personal interests such as one’s own ideology 
or attempts to further good policy. Moreover, to neglect the importance of 
everyday life, such as managing workloads and seeking recognition and respect 
from peers and other salient audiences, would render a partial and short-sighted 
understanding of judicial behaviour. This thesis does not subscribe to a particu-
lar theoretical model but rather bears in mind, as Robbennolt, MacCoun and 
Darley suggest, that many goals and interests come into play simultaneously. 
As interviews will show, accounts shared by judges shed light on this diversity, 
despite the fact that Mexican judges are traditionally conceived within the tra-
ditional or legalistic model. 
The politics of precedent highlights the relevance of institutional goals such 
as continuity, coherence and legal certainty. The underlying agenda of enhanc-
ing vertical control within the judiciary and furthering particular rulings or 
precedents, even if outdated or simply wrong, reduces lower-tier judges’ dis-
cretion and is an effective means of ensuring coherence. Also, strict precedent 
adherence prevents a particular ideology or policy being furthered. 
The Mexican judiciary is a hierarchical bureaucracy formed within a civil 
law tradition. Like similar systems elsewhere, uniform decisions are rewarded 
and creativity discouraged. Traditionally, judges have been considered to be 
law interpreters within a formalist legalistic approach. Nonetheless, there may 
well be differences amongst judges’ personal role orientations, and their judicial 
performance may vary despite the wide acceptance of institutional norms, as 
suggested by Ungs and Baas (1972). 
At the same time, the criminal justice reform, which seeks to modify the 
roles and practices of the actors involved in court proceedings, will necessarily 
alter the way in which resources and powers are distributed. The human rights 
reform pursued in recent years arguably represents a turning-point; judges will 
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need to adapt to a new decision-making function that involves not only inter-
preting and applying but also making law.
The current landscape, as described in previous chapters, is characterised 
by a safety crisis of impunity and crude violence, a landscape in which enemy 
penology values are shared and promoted by the federal government. In this 
context, it is interesting to examine what purposive roles are shared by judges; 
for instance, whether they see themselves as not involved with the social context 
or rather committed to settling particular disputes, or whether they perceive 
themselves as key actors in providing order or peace. 
At the same time, the context as it is begs an analysis of what decision-
making functions are shared and perceived by judges who are currently settling 
cases from the trenches. In particular, it will be interesting to learn to the extent 
to which Mexican judges have embraced the notion that during emergency con-
ditions judges endorse the government’s intrusive policies, or to the contrary, 
whether judges protect rights and liberties with even greater rigour. 
Prior to discussing the empirical material consisting of judgments and inter-
viewing materials, the next chapter describes the methodology used in order to 
explain and clarify the methodology design, the different strategies to collect 




Initial hypotheses and research questions
Enemy penology embodies a particularly punitive and pre-emptive approach to criminality. Its main elements are to define offenders (and potential of-
fenders) as enemies, to deploy pre-emptive strategies to incapacitate them; to 
suppress certain procedural rights in the hope of facilitating convictions; and to 
impose disproportionate sentences in order to exclude offenders from society as 
long as possible. I have argued throughout the previous chapters that the enemy 
penology paradigm is found in the Mexican legal regime that governs organ-
ised crime related offences including drug-trafficking; validated by the legisla-
tive and executive branches of power. At the same time, the on-going process 
of militarisation reveals a more coercive treatment to offenders publicly char-
acterised as enemies. In sum, I have argued that the legislative and executive 
branches of government have advanced an enemy penology model, so the ques-
tion of whether the judiciary, through decision making and behaviour validates 
and reproduces enemy penology is the question that this thesis seeks to answer.
To detect changes in judicial decision making and behaviour, I relied on 
enemy penology’s theoretical framework to compare two sets of judges, one 
set located in an unchanged environment, and another in a war-like context. 
Enemy penology guided a large part of the data collection and initial analysis of 
the data. The main research questions were: is the federal judiciary applying an 
enemy penology model when deciding ordinary criminal cases? If so, which ele-
ments of the model and under what circumstances? Addressing these questions 
involved asking whether judges saw defendants as enemies, whether they were 
curtailing procedural rights in judicial proceedings or imposing disproportion-
ate sentences. At the same time, the main research questions opened up several 
underlying questions including: is judicial behaviour and judicial decision-mak-
ing affected by the environment? Are the judiciary influenced by public state-
ments and security policies? If so, in what ways?
To answer these general questions, I used a comparative case study analysis. 
The goal was to compare judges located in a relatively unchanged environ-
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ment where militarisation had hardly occurred (referred to as having a low 
degree of militarisation) with those in a part of Mexico which was affected 
by violent offending, that had become heavily militarised in a short period of 
time and where soldiers participated in crime investigation and encountered 
violent criminal groups in a frequent basis (referred to as having experienced 
high militarisation). These judges were immersed in a political context in which 
the president and senior officials claimed that war was being waged against 
criminals, akin to a warfare context, hence I initially expected that this influ-
enced judicial decision-making and judicial behaviour. The hypothesis was that 
judicial decision-making in the highly militarised (hm) environment would be 
more affected by enemy penology than the less militarised (lm) environment. 
This was not sustained by the evidence, consisting of a systematic analysis of 
trial courts’ judgements and semi-structured interviews, as will be discussed in 
Chapters 7, 8 and 9. However, the conceptual frameworks on judicial behaviour 
and judicial roles were used to examine judges’ accounts in depth. The meth-
odology chosen and the research design are explained here. Also, the selection 
of the states or embedded cases of study are described here. The data collection 
process and analysis strategies used for each type of data are the main themes 
addressed in this chapter. A final note on language and ethics is included at the 
end of the chapter.  
Methodology
Doctrinal analysis vs. socio-legal tradition
Legal scholarship may be understood as an interpretative discipline in which 
argumentative, logical, normative and empirical elements may overlap (Van 
Hoecke, 2011). Doctrinal analysis may take the form of examining the law’s 
content and scope in reference to other bodies of law, judicial practice or prin-
ciples, focusing on issues of legal coherence (McCrudden, 2006). The contrast-
ing approach investigates how the law works in its real context, rather than its 
place within the broader legal system. Socio-legal studies engages with other 
disciplines, such as sociology, psychology or economics, and often draws on 
methodologies from these disciplines (McCrudden, 2006). This research is dis-
tant from the doctrinal tradition because the main inquiry is concerned with 
legal practice rather than the law itself. In addition, context is highly relevant in 
this study, because the study’s guiding interest is to explore both judicial behav-
iour and judicial decision-making in criminal cases within the current Mexican 
context, aiming to understand the influence the context exerts, if at all, on the 
way criminal cases are decided. 
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Positivist vs. qualitative approach
The positivist tradition advocates the application of natural science methods 
to the study of social phenomena, relying on hypotheses and variables, test-
ing knowledge and verifying it through evidence (O’Leary, 2010). Positivism 
claims that science, including social science, can be conducted in a way that 
is value-free (Bryman, 2008). In contrast to positivism, understanding social 
phenomena through interpretation, rather than testing, stems from a qualita-
tive tradition (O’Leary, 2010). Social reality, as opposed to objects of study 
examined by natural science, is considered to embody constructed meanings; 
therefore, human behaviour is studied as a product of how people interpret 
and understand their reality (Bryman, 2008). Social phenomena together with 
its meanings are constructed and advanced by social actors, shaped by social 
interaction (Bryman, 2008). The qualitative approach is mainly concerned with 
the way in which social meanings, discourses, and others, are interpreted, ex-
perienced and (Mason, 2002). 
The present research relies on a qualitative approach with social interaction 
and social interpretation of reality at the core of the enquiry. The meaning that 
social actors, particularly judges, give to laws and policies in Mexico is the 
main interest of this research. Analysing formulated and recorded judgements 
as objective units of analysis, and viewing judges as neutral actors insulated 
from personal interest, political ideology, or the current context, would only 
render a simplistic and superficial understanding. In addition, diversity of per-
spective is covered and alternative or negative cases are also considered (Lewis 
& Ritchie, 2010, Sarantakos, 2005). 
Qualitative research is a contested research approach compared to social 
research conducted with a scientific method rationale (Snape & Spencer, 2010). 
Positivist studies are considered rigorous when their findings prove to be valid, 
reliable and replicable. Research is valid when the data analysed relates to the 
concepts examined; it is considered reliable when methods and techniques are 
used accurately enough that the results can be replicated. Findings that are val-
id, reliable and replicable may permit generalisations which allows comprehen-
sive explanations, on the basis of the research (Mason, 2002). Whether these 
concepts can be applied to qualitative research is a topic of on-going debate.108
For the purpose of this research, the limitations inherent in qualitative re-
search were addressed through describing in detail all strategies, decisions and 
difficulties encountered during the data collection and data analysis. This al-
108 For an overview of main claims see: “Generalising from Qualitative Research” by Jane 
Lewis and Jane Ritchie in Qualitative Research Practice, edited by Ritchie, Jane; Lewis, 
Jane, Sage, 2010, London. 
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lows the reader to assess the evidence and the conclusions (Sarantakos, 2005, 
p. 86) in an attempt to produce a quasi-replicable study. ‘Good practice’ is 
sought through transparency and the continuous revision that the categories 
used to analyse the data have been consistently and rigorously applied (Lewis 
& Ritchie, 2010). I aimed to guarantee that the fieldwork was consistent and 
the analysis systematic by carrying out regular checks on the way in which data 
was collected and analysed (Lewis & Ritchie, 2010, p. 272).
Research design: a case study
This research used human experience to answer the research question. The 
core aim was to gain an in-depth understanding of the judiciary through a case 
study drawing on qualitative methods of data collection and analysis.
Case study method
‘Case study’ refers to a research method in which a unit of analysis—here, the 
judiciary—is studied in depth and informed strongly by its context (Yin, 2009). 
The case study is preferred as a method for assessing contemporary events. This 
research is mainly focused on present events: current judicial behaviour and ju-
dicial decision-making. Context is paramount to the core of the study because, 
on the one hand, the judges are part of a bureaucratic institution which at the 
same time is part of government, and is affected to some extent by the judici-
ary’s administrative settings as well as by other branches of the government; on 
the other hand, judges live and work in a social context informed by mass me-
dia messages, social attitudes and their own experience. As a result, their role 
and decisions may be influenced by different sets of pressures. The case study 
allows in-depth analysis of the judiciary, while taking notice of the context in 
which they interact. 
The case study method is useful when the context and the object of study 
overlap or are not easily distinguishable (Flyvbjerg, 2011; Yin, 2009). This over-
lap implies that a range of variables are present together with multiple sources 
of evidence (Yin, 2009). This research draws on views and experiences shared 
by judges and other interviewees that concern both present and past experi-
ences lived in various locations, views on the political and legal landscape, and 
perceptions of peers’ behaviour, which at times shed light on the object of study 
and at others to the context. 
A common criticism of the case study method is generalisation: that ana-
lysing a case limits the scope of the findings to a general or broader context 
(Bryman, 2008; Flyvbjerg, 2011). This study suffers from this shortcoming, as 
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the number of judgements that were examined, and the states or circuits that 
composed the comparative case study, are not a representative sample, which 
means that generalisability is limited. I attempt to compensate for this by ana-
lysing judgements and interviews in depth and also drawing on findings from 
other studies that have examined the judiciary 
A case study design may be single-case or multiple-case (Yin, 2009). The 
type of case selection relates directly to the aims of the research. For instance, 
if the objective is to acquire the greatest amount of detail of a given phenom-
enon, atypical or extreme cases may reveal more information than average or 
representative cases. In contrast, random samples of cases may help to avoid 
systematic biases and allow generalisation (Flyvbjerg, 2011). The selection of 
“variation cases” allows for obtaining information about the significance of dif-
ferences in circumstances for both case process and outcome (Flyvbjerg, 2011). 
A multiple-case study does not require a unique type of case, such as an 
extreme or representative case, but rather uses contrasting data from different 
cases in order to reach more compelling findings. Multiple-case studies may 
also vary from having embedded cases to analyse to engaging in assessing 
cases in a comprehensive way (Yin, 2009). Hence, the case study allows focus-
ing on a unit of analysis in depth, while allowing embedded cases within the 
research as a whole. 
This research will use an embedded multiple-case design with two “varia-
tion cases”. In both cases, the embedded units of analysis—federal judges in 
two different locations—share important commonalities: they belong to the 
same judicial institution (the federal judiciary), follow the same sets of rules 
(federal criminal law and federal criminal procedural law) and are bound by 
the same body of precedents, both binding and persuasive, so that the cases 
brought before these courts are decided using the same norms. Though each 
and every judge may differ from each other, the variable element within the 
case study design is that one set or unit of judges is physically located in an 
unsafe environment, as opposed to the set of judges located in a safer place. 
In addition to these sets of judges, other members of the judiciary, other court 
officials, academics and ngo members were interviewed in order to gather 
further insights. 
Selection of embedded cases
The selection of embedded cases followed a theoretical sampling rationale, 
which refers to selecting a sample of particular characteristics relevant to the 
research enquiry and the theoretical model used (Mason, 1996, quoted in Sil-
verman, 2010, p.144). In this case, the active involvement of the army in crime 
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investigation is strongly related to the enemy penology model, because it is 
through militarisation that this paradigm is advanced. 
Military bases are spread across the country in many if not all states. This 
research is not concerned with the permanent presence of the army but with 
the operatives deployed to assist civil authorities, mainly police forces, in crime 
control initiatives. By the end of 2011, military forces had been sent to assist 
civil forces in eight states: Baja California, Chihuahua, Durango, Guerrero, 
Michoacán, Sinaloa, Tamaulipas and Nuevo León. One of these was used as 
the unsafe case otherwise referred to the highly militarised (hm) state. The state 
with the relatively unchanged environment, where the growth of militarisation 
and a steep rise in violence and criminality were not experienced so directly is 
referred to as the low militarised (lm) state. In addition to using theory to se-
lect the embedded units of analysis (judges in the hm state and judges in the lm 
state), considerations relating to access and comparability were also relevant. 
Access 
I had several connections in the chosen states which facilitated interviewing 
judges, members of ngos and academics. On the one hand, I grew up and lived 
in the lm state until 2003, which meant that access was initially negotiated 
through existing personal and professional contacts. On the other, I had ac-
quaintances in the selected hm state, including ngo members dedicated to crimi-
nal justice reform, and also personal networks that helped in providing a safe 
space in which to negotiate access. My strong social and professional networks 
in both capital cities provided receptive settings from which to embark on suc-
cessful fieldwork; these connections influenced my selection of states. 
Gaining access to judges seemed feasible because members of the judiciary in 
Mexico are frequently involved in academic activities, participate in lectures and 
seminars or teach at universities. In this context, judges are not required to gain 
permission from an administrative body (the Federal Judiciary Council) to give a 
lecture or participate in an academic project such as this one. I negotiated access 
to judges in the lm state while still in the stage of planning the thesis (in London). 
I also gained access through a snowballing strategy which involved building the 
sample through referrals from previous interviewees (O’Leary, 2010). 
State selection and comparability 
Mexico is a large and diverse country, politically divided into 32 states (includ-
ing the federal district where Mexico City is located). The selection of the states 
needed to fulfil two different goals: on the one hand, to compare a state that 
experienced the army’s sudden involvement with one that did not; on the other, 
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to find two states that were not too different in regards to their crime rates. 
Drug trafficking organisations distribute different drugs through specific re-
gions of the country and operate in delimited areas. Table 6.2 shows that the 
hm state experienced changing patterns of reported drug offences after 2004, 
but before then its offending rates laid below the mean. It also shows that the 
lm state’s rates have remained low, in contrast to both the national mean and 
the hm state, and that the lm state has been consistently similar to the majority 
of states, in other words, closer to the median. 
Table 6.2 Drug-related offences 1997-2010
 
Source: Data obtained from the Executive Secretary of the National System of Public Safe-
ty in “Criminal rates concerning federal jurisdiction 1997 – 2012”, consulted on 20th 
March 2012.
Despite the differences between the selected states, it is important to highlight 
that the great majority of drug-related offences were concentrated in a small 
number of states. For instance, in 2010, over 70 percent of reported drugs of-
fences took place in only four out of 31 states and the federal district (not in-
cluding any of the examined states). The lm state concentrated 1 percent and 
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Similar to drug offences, general crime rates vary widely across the country, 
and despite abrupt increases in specific violent offences in the hm state, the se-
lected states were not too distinct in regard to their general offending rates. By 
2012, 50 percent of reported crime took place in only 6 out of 31 states. The 
lm state’s reported crime represented 5 percent of reported crime nationwide, 
and the hm state represented 3 percent (inegi, 2014). In sum, the lm and the 
hm states do not have much variation in offending rates, by comparison to the 
way in which crime rates concentrate in a few areas of the country. However, 
eruptions of drug violence in the hm state fostered abysmal differences in each 
state’s context. 
Highly militarised state 
As described in the first chapter, after 2005 a sharp increase in violent crime 
affected the whole country, in particular, those regions where drug-trafficking 
organisations struggled for control and the army intervened. This includes the 
hm state where many judges and other criminal justice practitioners were in-
terviewed. 
Since the late 1990s, the hm state faced a security crisis, allegedly due to the 
lack of agreement between drug-trafficking organisations concerning which or-
ganisation should control the state and the arrests of key leaders of these organ-
isations (Astorga, 2007; Conger, 2014). Violence was sparked by the arrest of a 
member of a powerful drug-trafficking organisation and the subsequent bloody 
territorial struggle between cartels (Astorga, 2007; Conger, 2014).109 This led 
to several changes. First, it became obvious that drug traffickers lived in the 
state; second, the way in which executions linked to drug gangs were carried 
out changed. These executions had traditionally been performed in rural areas 
but began to take place in urban zones. Also, bodies used to be dumped in the 
middle of the night in deserted places, but began appearing in daylight and in 
public spaces such as in front of a school or hanging from a pedestrian bridge.110 
In sum, the type of offences and the way in which these occurred revealed that 
ordinary violence had evolved to drug violence (Shirk & Wallman, 2015). The 
cycle of experiencing a wave of violence preceded by the arrest of an important 
member of a drug-trafficking group was repeated several times during the first 
decade of the 21st century. 
These manifestations of violence, together with a rise in violent offences such 
as homicides, aggravated theft and extortion, proved that a war between drug 
109  Interview with academic. 
110  Interview with academic.
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trafficking organisations was taking place in the state. For example, between 
2009 and 2011, homicides rates increased 700 percent; in 2009, 7.4 deaths were 
reported and by 2011, homicides grew to 44.8 (México Evalúa, 2016).  The ex-
ecuted victims included allegedly members of criminal groups, attorneys, public 
servants, police officers, as well as other citizens.  
The increase in serious offences was significant. For instance, homicides re-
lated to organised crime increased above 300 percent from 2007 to 2010 (cidac, 
2012). Reports of kidnapping increased exponentially, above 1,600 percent, as 
well reports of vehicle theft, above 2,300 percent and of extortion, above 30 
percent (cidac, 2012). The obvious consequence of rising crime was an increase 
in the daily workload of criminal justice institutions. Whereas petty theft and 
white-collar crime, such as money laundering and smuggling goods, were typi-
cal offences until the early 2000s, violent homicides (executions), kidnappings, 
disappearances and extortions, together with serious drug trafficking and or-
ganised crime offences became the main focus.111 
The type of offenders changed as criminal groups involved in drug traffick-
ing began recruiting younger people, including children.112 This was a national 
phenomenon, and at least 25,000 teenagers and young adults (up to the age 
of 25) were recruited by drug-trafficking criminal organisations from 2006 to 
2010, according to the Congressional Public Safety Commission (Martínez, 
2012). A potential interviewee from the high militarisation state commented 
that children and women were recruited by criminal groups because the young 
men had already been killed.113 
In response, civil society carried out many protests demanding that the state 
government increase safety measures (Ley, 2014). In addition, many companies 
and business owners left the state or put their investments on hold (Reuters, 
2011). By 2006, a once prosperous state was crumbling to pieces. According to 
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, the capital city had 
become a strategic place of the country for drug trafficking (Reuters, 2011). 
However, local politicians barely acknowledged that the state was an important 
location from which to coordinate drug trafficking operations or that aid was 
desperately needed (Astorga, 2007).
This violent environment was visible across the capital city and spread to 
other parts of the state. It also became evident that criminal groups were now 
using high-calibre firearms. For example, in a local bar several hitmen riddled 
111  hm magistrate 1; hm academic interviewee; hm ngo member 2.
112  Informal conversation with potential interviewee from a first instance court.
113  Informal conversation with potential interviewee from a first instance court.
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four men with bullets and let off two grenades, killing those four men and in-
juring 20 other people (Astorga, 2007). 
The military became involved in 2006 and in 2009, enhanced assistance was 
received  (Mendoza Márquez & Montero Bagatella, 2015). The army patrolled 
the streets, established checkpoints across the state and became embroiled in 
confrontations with drug-trafficking gangs. In particular, the army began to 
intervene in specific neighbourhoods of the capital city where allegedly the 
Zetas, a bloody and highly armed drug trafficking organisation, had settled 
in. Not even the police dared to enter these neighbourhoods. In response to 
the army’s intervention, members of a specific neighbourhood blocked main 
roads to protest publicly that the army was committing human rights viola-
tions. However, it became common knowledge that the protestors were on 
the ‘side’ of the Zetas and sought to show explicit resistance to the army (El 
Economista, 2009).114 Members of the Zetas became widely known as malitos 
(baddies). This term became popularly used by local newspapers and by the 
general public, as it allowed them to refer to members of the Zetas without 
directly naming them.115 Blocking roads with people, burned-out vehicles or 
cargo lorries became a common practice of this drug trafficking organisation. 
For instance, after an important leader was arrested in 2010, 42 highways and 
roads were blocked across the capital city. The head of the State Public Secu-
rity Secretariat declared that these roadblocks (referred to as narco-bloqueos) 
seemed intended to create a confrontation between civil society and the au-
thorities (El Informador, 2010). 
The presence and active participation of the military was due, according 
to most interviewees, to the fact that the hm state was left essentially with no 
municipal and state police force because either police officers were detained for 
corruption or killed. Since the end of 2006, many police officers have been shot, 
including senior officials, and many others resigned (Astorga, 2007). Though 
there is no systematised database concerning police officers’ deaths, in 2010, 
for instance, there were 87 cases of police officers’ homicides, and by September 
2011, 94 police officers’ killings were registered. The polarisation of opinion 
concerning the military’s involvement that is visible in polls was also mirrored 
in interviews held with judges (Beltrán & Cruz, 2011). Military convoys were 
seen across the city all day long. Some judges expressed approval of the mili-
114 Interview with hm academic.
115 I held many informal conversations with locals such as taxi drivers or cleaning assistants 
who were willing to talk about this with me. 
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tary’s participation in “providing safety”116, while others disagreed with the 
“military’s distorted duties”.117 
The lack of safety was easily sensed across the city and confirmed by its 
residents, including criminal justice practitioners. The police were completely 
unreliable and replaced by soldiers who were heavily armed and often involved 
in gunfights with drug gangs and other criminal groups. The capital city of the 
hm state was essentially in a state of war, where inspections and checkpoints 
were operated by the army and informal curfews made nightlife vanish. Peo-
ple’s ordinary routines adapted to the daily violence to the extent of adjusting 
schedules, traffic routes and family dynamics. 
Court buildings were guarded by the military and the criminal justice prac-
titioners’ workload shifted from mainly financial and tax offences to large-
scale drug trafficking, firearm possession and other offences relating to organ-
ised crime. Reports of abuses and human rights violations committed by all 
law enforcement agents also increased. Public officials’ statements encouraged 
and justified waging war against these enemies in the light of increased risk 
and unsafety.118 
Conducting fieldwork gave me an opportunity to feel the stress myself. The 
minute one arrived at the low-tier courts in the hm state (all located in one large 
building), one entered a military environment. Military convoys were usually 
parked outside and the building’s entrance was guarded by soldiers with high 
calibre weapons in hand. The defendants who appear in these courts, in con-
trast to the lm state and other parts of the country, are linked to organised crime 
offences including violent homicides and unlawful storage of firearms, and re-
manded in high security prisons. Private lawyers began rejecting these cases 
when their colleagues began to disappear or be found killed, so they now form 
the bulk of public defenders’ workloads.119 Although there is no sufficiently sys-
tematised evidence to corroborate this claim, many press releases describe the 
violent death of attorneys whose clients allegedly belonged to criminal groups 
and drug trafficking organisations.120 
116 hm magistrate 4. 
117 hm appeals court magistrate.
118 The head of Public Security State Secretariat, explained in an interview that the enemy of 
the state, given the presence of several drug trafficking organisations was everyone who 
threatens society’s safety and its integrity. 
119 Informal conversation held with a public defence attorney’s secretary, 2013. 
120 One widely-covered execution was of a barrister known as the “narco attorney” (la abo-
gada de los narcos), killed in the centre of the capital in August 2009 after surviving four 
homicide attempts (El Informador, 2014; El Siglo de Torreón, 2014). This attorney was 
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Less militarised state
By comparison, several states, including the lm one, remained largely unaf-
fected by the wave of violence. One possible explanation is that this state is 
not on drug trafficking routes, so large quantities of drugs are not transported 
through this state. However, several leaders of major drug trafficking organisa-
tions were detained by the army in luxurious residential developments in this 
state’s capital city. Press releases confirm that the state government tends to 
look the other way so that drug leaders’ families can live quietly and safely. 
Drug offences in the lm state increased but not significantly. Rates remained 
below the national average and behaved similar to the median, namely, the 
majority of states. The highest point, which was reached in 2007, amounted to 
barely one fifth of the highest number reached in the hm state. Relevant offenc-
es, such as homicide, kidnapping, extortion, violent theft and car theft, started 
increasing from 2005 onwards but also stayed below the national average. In 
contrast to other parts of the country, such as the hm state, the army hardly 
operated in the lm state. Streets were patrolled by state police officers and crime 
investigations were conducted by the civil police force. The military intervened 
and participated only exceptionally.
In sum, the comparison between a relatively safe state –the lm state- and an 
affected state by drug violence –hm state-, together with the possibility of access-
ing members of the federal judiciary and other members of society in the states, 
made it feasible to pursue a comparative case study of the federal judiciary.
Drawing the boundaries of the research
This research focuses on the federal judiciary, setting aside state judiciaries and 
state politics. Different type of reasons explain this selection. 
First, I sought to examine a set of judges who have a certain level of inde-
pendence from the executive and legislative branches of power. The federal 
judiciary has relatively greater independence than state judiciaries. State judici-
aries’ independence is strongly compromised by regional politics (Ovalle Favela, 
1999). For instance, the state governor is entrusted with appointing state jus-
tices which paves the way to affecting judicial performance, in particular, in 
cases where law-enforcement agents act unlawfully or where state policies con-
travene constitutional provisions (Concha, Magaloni, & Schatz, 2007, p.204). 
Second, I chose the federal judiciary over state ones due to the strength federal 
shopping in a local market with her daughter when she was shot to death by at least three 
people, just a few blocks from the federal police headquarters and first instance courts 
building.
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rulings have. State justices’ decisions do not establish precedent. As a result, 
state rulings are not regarded as authoritative and, in general terms, do not 
guide judicial decision making and judicial behaviour as federal rulings. Third, 
this research aims to examine the way in which a highly militarised and violent 
context informs judicial decision-making and judicial behaviour. I sought to do 
this through the comparison of two sets of judges where the main variant was 
their specific context. By comparison, examining state judiciaries would involve 
a wider set of variables, many linked to state politics and local idiosyncrasies, 
which would hinder deeper understanding of the main enquiry. fourth, to ex-
amine federal judges as opposed to state ones offered wider access possibilities. 
Negotiating access was much more feasible with federal officials because, on 
the one hand, transparency laws are more effectively enforced at the federal 
level than at the local level, so examining public versions of judgements was 
possible. On the other hand, because of my past professional experience I had 
more chances to accessing federal judges than state ones, even though they were 
located in different parts of the country. 
One pitfall of this choice was that the vast majority of registered offences, 
more than 93 percent, are state offences, while federal offences represent only 
7 percent (inegi, 2013). In addition, state offences include serious offences such 
as kidnapping, homicide or extortion, as well as common ones such as theft or 
battery. Therefore, to learn whether judges see the vast majority of offenders, 
including murderers or kidnappers, as enemies of society is beyond the scope 
of this research. By comparison, the offences that are the main interest of this 
research concern drugs, because they represent the most common offence at the 
federal level and have a direct linkage to law enforcement efforts to the presi-
dent’s war on organised crime.
Another boundary concerned the time frame. This project examines judicial 
behaviour and judicial decision making during the immediate past President’s 
administration, from 2006 to 2012. This was pursued for several reasons: 
first, I was mainly interested in the current context. second, judgements are 
more easily accessed if they were recently issued because digital versions are a 
relative novelty and also because judicial guidelines call for the destruction of 
case files a few years after the judgement was issued and became res judicata. 
third, interviewing judges who have retired or changed professions, as opposed 
to those currently in post, would provide a different picture to what is currently 
experienced in court. In sum, conducting comparative research was much more 
feasible when contrasting two different locations during the same time frame. 
A final boundary was that the comparison focused on the variant of geo-
graphical location, discarding inherent differences that concerned gender, age, 
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rank or any other. Gender was discarded from the outset in light of the imbal-
ance of women against men within the judiciary. Age was not recorded and so 
only rank was used to find further comparisons. From this exercise no trend 
could be traced to produce significant observations.121 In addition, the compari-
son was methodologically weak because the number of trial or first instance 
judges in the lm state is significantly larger than that in the hm state which 
produced weak comparisons. 
Successes and complications during fieldwork naturally created additional 
boundaries, particularly concerning effective access, all of which are explained 
in the next section. 
Data collection: experiences in the field
The two main sources of information that I used were semi-structured inter-
views and trial court judgements. An underlying aim pursued was to step into 
judges’ shoes and learn as much as I could from their own perspective about 
judicial decision making. In pursuing this aim I learnt to build rapport and 
confidence with the interviewees. Also, I encountered different experiences. At 
times, I felt genuine empathy towards judges and the views they shared. For 
instance, several judges seemed to express frustration about the prosecution 
service who failed to indict dangerous or high profile offenders, “people say 
that our state is very calm and safe but everybody knows that our state is Ze-
tas’ territory, that highways are used at night as heliports and that the leader is 
located just behind the military base, how can anyone make sense of that?”122 
Frustration also was expressed against legislation that left judges a low margin 
of discretion to decide, for instance, upon custodial remand which is compulso-
ry for most offences or being unable to impose a sentence below the minimum 
length established in the sentencing tariff. 
At other times, I felt fear. For instance, when planning my way to the courts 
in the hm state, a few people told me “you don’t want to walk back from the 
courts on that road because many kidnappings have taken place there” or “that 
121 For example, interviewees from all ranks agreed that defendants are not evil but rather or-
dinary people. Only a high ranking interviewee from the high militarisation state held that 
there are malicious defendants which also matched a first instance judge and a high rank 
judge from the low militarisation state. Conceiving defendants as victims of the criminal 
justice system was mentioned by both first instance and high rank interviewees from the 
hm state. 
122 Interview with Magistrate 1 in a different state.
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morning a grenade was found outside the courts building”123. Feeling fearful 
made me think about the difficulty of trying high profile offenders, while re-
maining impartial and objective. One judge told me about a case where he found 
a man guilty of possession with a firearm without a licence. This is classified as 
a non-serious offence so the sentencing tariff is low so most of the sentence is 
served on parole. The convicted man appeared before the court every Monday 
to sign the parole registry, complying with the parole conditions. Nonetheless, 
the judge found it difficult to impose him the sentence based on the sentencing 
tariff because the firearm was coated with diamonds saying ‘Cártel del Golfo’. 
Carrying out fieldwork was in itself an enriching and challenging experi-
ence which, I hope, gave voice to the many views, opinions and experiences 
interviewees shared with me. My overall sense was that judges were prone to 
describe their views, perhaps because the interview represented a chance for 
them to express themselves on an individual basis while taking a bit of distance 
from the institutional discourse.
Plans for carrying out semi-structured interviews
Interviews are considered to be main source of information for qualitative 
methodologies (Mason, 2002; Perakyla & Ruusuvuori, 2011; Silverman, 2010). 
Research using qualitative methodology allows an examination of interviewees’ 
own perspectives in depth, experiences and concerns, which would otherwise 
remain inaccessible (Perakyla & Ruusuvuori, 2011). Semi-structured interviews 
were used in this project because they follow an interviewing schedule, which is 
closely linked to the research questions, but allows rich and detailed data to be 
gathered while minimising control or bias (Mason, 2002). 
For the purpose of the present research, the use of semi-structured interviews 
was preferred because the research questions could be better answered through 
what respondents, primarily judges, described to be their way of understanding 
and thinking about defendants or the main sentencing goals pursued when im-
posing a sentence, for instance. Throughout fieldwork, I relied on an interview 
schedule which was a helpful strategy to spark the conversation.124 Stepping out 
of it also brought many interesting accounts which were only made possible 
through using a flexible semi-structured design. 
Interview methods also involve systematic observation of the interviewee’s 
demeanour, non-verbal behaviour and use of space, among other factors (Ma-
123 Interview with public attorney, hm state. 
124 The interview schedule is contained in Appendix 1, together with the ethics form and infor-
mation sheet approved by King’s College Ethics Committee, all of which is explained below. 
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son, 2002). As interviews were most likely held in court premises, informal 
observation was also used and was recorded in the form of field notes. In 
addition to interviewing members of the judiciary, I also sought the views 
of other relevant practitioners, including defence attorneys, members of non-
governmental organisations and academics. Before travelling to Mexico and 
beginning fieldwork King’s College Ethics Committee granted me approval to 
conduct empirical research as it involved human participants. This is described 
in the Ethics section below. 
Experiences while conducting interviews
The fieldwork as initially planned was fulfilled to a large extent. By the end of 
the fieldwork, I managed to conduct 56 interviews. I interviewed 28 members 
of the judiciary –including a former court clerk-, 20 defence attorneys, one for-
mer Attorney General, three ngo members, a member of the state police, and 
three academics. Most interviews were concentrated in the lm and hm states, 
but I also conducted interviews with judges and experts on criminal justice 
reform in Mexico City, Hidalgo and Morelos, partially as a result of the snow-
balling strategy. 
I conducted fieldwork from September 2012 to July 2013. During this period 
I travelled to the lm state more than ten times as it involved a two-hour drive; 
some of these trips only entailed negotiating access and scheduling an inter-
view. In comparison, to get to the hm state I had to take a one-hour flight which 
meant additional costs, so I travelled there on fewer occasions. 
There are 19 federal judges in the lm state. Of these, 14 agreed to be in-
terviewed: eight first instance or trial judges (8 out of 11), two appeals magis-
trates (2 out of 2) and four constitutional magistrates (4 out of 6). The sample 
contained 73 percent of the population. In addition, I interviewed an auxiliary 
magistrate and 11 public defence attorneys. By comparison, there are 14 federal 
judges in the hm state. At the end, eight of them agreed to be interviewed: two 
first instance judges (2 out of 6), one appeals magistrate (1 out of 2) and five 
constitutional magistrates (5 out of 6). The sample represented 57 percent of 
the available judges. In addition, I interviewed two ngo members, an academic, 
seven public defence attorneys and one private attorney. 
Most of the interviews were recorded using a Dictaphone, though a few were 
only documented through hand-written notes. I personally transcribed all the 
interviews, as was promised to all interviewees so that I was the only person 
who accessed the interviewing material in order to guarantee complete confi-
dentiality. At times the interviewee asked to have a transcript of the interview, 
so this was delivered several days later; only one judge, one defence attorney 
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and one ngo member asked to edit the interview transcript and the edited ver-
sions were the ones analysed in this thesis. 
For the initial interviews, gatekeepers played an essential role in both lo-
cations. After their referrals were exhausted, I negotiated access myself. The 
strategy was to visit all judges and ask for a quick three-minute meeting in 
order to invite them to participate in this project. This involved giving a short 
description of the project, the methodology used and confidentiality and ano-
nymity guarantees. At the same time, I provided a detailed information sheet, 
previously approved by King’s College, explaining the aims and motivations 
of the research, the financial institution supporting the research and the main 
themes of the interview, together with the interview schedule. During these 
informal meetings I held interesting conversations with most of them, despite 
the fact that not all of them agreed to be interviewed. Only on a few occasions 
the judge did not grant me the meeting but rather asked somebody else to meet 
with me. 
Sometimes a judge would immediately agree to be interviewed during the 
meeting; an appointment was then scheduled. Other judges needed time to 
think and asked me to contact them several days or weeks later. This meant I 
had to wait on the phone or outside their chambers, but waiting did not guar-
antee an interview. Occasionally potential interviewees asked for my résumé, 
birth certificate, and professional credentials such as a copy of my law degree 
certificate or master’s degree certificate. 
Accessing judges in the hm state was generally easier than in the lm one, 
but accessing low-tier judges in the hm state became more complicated towards 
the end of the fieldwork. The only low-tier judge I interviewed told me that in 
a meeting all judges present had talked about my research and about me per-
sonally. Apparently, they expressed fear of having their names printed in the 
final draft and were also irritated about being examined through the written 
judgments I had requested several months before. The interviewed judge said 
he disagreed, together with one other judge (the other one agreed to have an 
interview), but the other four openly expressed their decision not to participate 
in the project. I could even sense a change of attitude from two judges who at 
the beginning expressed interest in participating.
Reflecting on their change of attitude, I concluded that the fact that they 
were aware of the judgement analysis made them feel observed and held ac-
countable by someone outside the judiciary. Access to interviews is easier to 
deny than access to written judgments for judges are legally bound to permit 
access to judgements because they are public documents. 
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Gathering archival material
Archival materials consist mainly of official documents, such as crime statistics, 
case files and historical records and non-governmental organisations’ records, 
as well as diaries and mass media (Bryman, 2008). Using documents may be 
useful in projects which include interviews to verify or contextualise personal 
accounts (Mason, 2002; Perakyla & Ruusuvuori, 2011). 
Mexican court judgements are traditionally lengthy because they contain a 
description of the main trial proceedings and all arguments made by the court 
that led to the verdict. Trial proceedings generally include a summary or full 
transcripts of witness and defendant statements as well as expert testimony, 
such as the chemical analysis of confiscated drugs in drug related cases. Judge-
ments also contain the way in which each piece of evidence previously described 
was considered by the judge and whether it was used to support the final verdict 
or was discarded. As sentences are decided by the trial judge, judgements also 
include the court’s explanation for imposing a particularly severe or lenient 
punishment. These arguments are accompanied by the legal rules that sustain 
the judge’s decision, derived from both legislation and precedents; this material 
tends to be transcribed or at least referenced in detail. 
The fact that judgements contain such detail allowed in depth qualitative 
analysis. In particular, it was possible to look for any trace of enemy penol-
ogy, either in a reduction of particular procedural rights, the way in which 
evidence had been assessed and used, or harshness in sentencing. This analysis 
also helped understand what conditions led to applying an enemy penology 
paradigm. In sum, examining judicial decisions was essential in order to answer 
the research questions. At the same time, judgements were hardly useful to ex-
amine judicial behaviour and judicial roles, conversely to interviewing material. 
Only first instance or trial court judgements were examined, so appeals deci-
sions or those made by constitutional tribunals were not included in the analy-
sis. The methodological reason for this was that this project sought to investi-
gate the effect of a particular policy in trial courts, where there is less room to 
manoeuvre than in higher courts. Also, first instance courts have direct contact 
with defendants as well as witnesses and experts so, as I looked for enemy treat-
ment in resolutions, I aimed at learning about judges’ experiences when meet-
ing defendants face to face, as opposed to deciding an appeal based mainly on 
the paper submission. Additionally, not every convicted defendant appeals the 
court’s decision, so the scope of cases was more limited. 
Judges are bound by transparency laws that allow any regular petitioner 
to consult issued judgements. Gathering 40 judgements from two states solely 
on drug-related offences was not straightforward for two main reasons: first, 
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judgements are traced by the number of case file in which they were issued, so 
the number of the case file is essential to access a single judgement. second, 
case file numbers are allocated by each court as the case is submitted before the 
court, so the numbers are not assigned on the basis of the type of offence. So, 
to access 40 judgements from two states, concerning specific type of offences 
implied taking several steps. 
The first step was to learn the total number of cases initiated in one year, 
from 2006 to 2012, in every first instance court in the two examined states. 
The second step was to make a random selection of cases, using a simple tool 
in Excel which gave a selection of 63 case files from the lm state and 66 case 
files from the hm state, so I formally requested the final judgements issued in 
those 129 case files. Not all of the judgements were sent to me but from those 
that I received I then discarded judgements that dealt with offences unrelated to 
drugs. The final sample comprised 40 judgements. 
The sample of judgements is small, which limits the generalisability of the 
analysis and findings. Forty judgements were analysed in detail from both the 
lm and hm state, but the sample was far from representative. For instance, in 
2010 in the lm state, 852 criminal cases were opened, covering all types of of-
fences. From this universe, 12 were randomly selected and requested; out of this 
sample, only three concerned drug offences and were thus examined. Similarly, 
in the same year, 1,190 cases were initiated in the hm state, from which 16 were 
solicited and following the same rationale, only three were analysed. 
The sample of judgements thus became more limited as it grew more spe-
cific. It is noteworthy that there are no systematic statistics within the judici-
ary on the total number of cases per type of offence. Therefore, the examined 
judgements were gathered by soliciting a wider number of cases, knowing that 
only a small minority would match the criteria. The sample was limited, but the 
selection was genuinely random which sought to guarantee its validity. Also, 
validity was enhanced by the fact that the judgements I examined were issued 
by all courts in the hm state and eight out of 11 courts in the lm state. This 
meant that the examined judgements were issued by a variety of courts, which 
strengthen the claims made here. 
Data analysis
The analysis of official texts may be approached with a different set of meth-
ods, which include content analysis, discourse analysis and membership cat-
egorisation analysis. The first involves thematic analysis and quantification of 
recurrent words and concepts (O’Leary, 2010). The second focuses on the way 
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in which texts of different kinds reproduce power and inequalities in socie-
ty (Perakyla & Ruusuvuori, 2011). Discourse analysis assumes that language 
constitutes a socio-historic context strongly related to power and knowledge 
(O’Leary, 2010). The third relates to analysing the ways in which particular 
categories, built on descriptions of concepts and the actions related to these 
concepts, are used and interpreted. The adoption and use of specific categories 
in social situations as well as in texts—the mere naming of a member as belong-
ing to a certain category— simultaneously attributes to these social situations 
specific moral qualities, obligations and refutations (Perakyla & Ruusuvuori, 
2011). This project relied mostly on a thematic analysis. 
Initially, data analysis of judgements and interviews followed the same logic 
of coding themes relevant to enemy penology; categories were informed by con-
tents of judgements and interviews, and also by relevant literature. Throughout 
the analysis stage, new coding themes were created and the initial ones were 
constantly developed, enriched by literature and other theories (O’Leary, 2010). 
The theoretical framework of enemy penology initially guided the data analysis 
process in order to ascertain whether the judiciary had endorsed the enemy pe-
nology paradigm in deciding cases. This analysis strategy refers to what Yin calls 
the strategy of relying on theoretical propositions because elements of enemy pe-
nology informed the way in which data was both collected and analysed (2009, 
p.130). Hence, interview and case file analyses focused on the following issues: 
•	 Ways in which the defendant is conceived (e.g. as an ordinary person, as 
an enemy, as a victim of circumstance, etc.).
•	 Effective or ineffectiveness of due process principles, in particular con-
cerning presumption of innocence. 
•	 Possible effects or changes of trial proceedings in cases where the military 
participated.
•	 Sentencing values and aims pursued by the judiciary, such as rehabilita-
tion, selective incapacitation, retribution, elimination.
•	 The severity of punishment. 
•	 Possible effects or influence on the judiciary stemming from the presi-
dent’s war on organised crime. 
After conducting the analysis based on enemy penology, I examined the in-
terview data with reference to the theoretical framework concerning judicial 
behaviour and judicial roles in order to further the understanding on the judges’ 
accounts. 
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Interview analysis
Interview analysis involved transcribing all the material gathered from inter-
views held only with judges. The interviews I conducted with other actors, ex-
cept in specific circumstances,125 were used as a secondary source so were not 
transcribed. Once I had the transcripts I systematically categorised the mate-
rial under themes, sub-themes and sub-sub-themes. The main thread of these 
themes was enemy penology, but these threads developed and grew as the con-
tent touched on opinions about other themes such as the military’s performance 
in crime control activities or views on the prison system. The coding tree also 
developed as I began drawing on additional theories that concern judicial be-
haviour, judicial roles, denial theory and cognitive dissonance. 
The coding tree evolved as a single theme developed into further ramifi-
cations. For instance, due process was a theme that clearly derived from the 
model used, and presumption of innocence was used as yardstick. As interview-
ees explained their views on effective or ineffective presumption of innocence, 
many of them touched on the prosecution’s performance, and in this sub-theme, 
interviewees described practices in proceedings and also tendencies towards 
corruption. As a result, from one theme (due process or presumption of inno-
cence), I developed the sub-theme of the prosecution and also sub-sub-themes 
on practices and performance. The coding frame grew in number of themes and 
also in the ramifications of each theme.126 
Findings were presented in one report per state and a final section discussing 
similarities and differences. A follow-up analysis was made in order to present 
the discussion on the findings from both states in one chapter. This aimed at 
presenting similar voices together and also at facilitating comparisons between 
the two states. A secondary analysis of interviews relied heavily on theories on 
judicial behaviour and judicial decision-making, as well as on denial theory and 
cognitive dissonance theory which are discussed in those chapters.
Throughout the analysis, I found that judges and also other interviewees 
used different tones during the interviews which needed to be discussed in or-
der to fully grasp what interviewees expressed. Another methodological theme 
concerned the fact that the vast majority of judges, despite being located in a 
125 One defence attorney agreed to be interviewed as long as he could read the transcript. This 
became a high priority because he had previous experience in the high militarisation state 
and kindly introduced me to his colleagues there. I also transcribed several interviews held 
with another defence attorney and with a ngo member, because they agreed to have the 
interview with no tape recorder, so to transcribe them soon after the interviews was the 
only strategy that would not omit any relevant information. 
126 Appendix 2 contains a detailed account of the coding tree. 
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particular state had worked in several other locations so several implications 
unfolded from this. first, their views and commentaries were enriched and 
informed by many professional experiences held in different locations. As one 
magistrate, he had worked in places where drugs are grown and others where 
these are distributed. second, some judges seemed comfortable to speak about 
previous experiences. third, the comparison between locations became blurred 
by the fact that the interviewees’ accounts were informed by experiences held 
in various places that may not have direct linkages to the lm and hm states’ 
environments. 
Differences of tone and meaning 
Commentaries and opinions expressed by judges during the interviews were 
phrased in different ways. At times they talked in terms of what ought to be 
with expressions like “we should be…” thinking about what ought to happen 
or what was expected. At others, they explained their views in terms of what 
actually took place, such as, “we safeguard due process” or discussed what 
sources of pressure might push the judge to rule against defendants on a regular 
basis. These two types of speech were clearly present in the commentaries and 
views expressed. However, the study also found that, at times, interviewees 
were rather indirect or cautious in the way they approached particular topics. 
In other words, a difference in tone, understood as general character of attitude 
revealed in the way they spoke, marked the difference between what was de-
scribed to be happening as opposed to what ought to happen. These variations 
in tone and form of speech were present in all interviews, and judges constantly 
switched from one to another. This suggests that the views expressed do much 
more than simply state factual information. Their opinions are a combination 
of facts, ideas, perceptions and sentiments grounded in their personal and pro-
fessional experience. 
To separate positive or descriptive opinions from normative ones is a difficult 
task, particularly for those who hold the opinion in question. As Posner states, 
Positive and normative analysis cannot easily be separated when one is 
dealing with people’s deliberate actions, for unless they are evil or cynical 
people, the best explanation for their actions is unlikely to be that they 
are deliberately flouting the norms of their society (2008, p. 6).
At the same time, judges’ opinions may be understood as rationalisations in 
the form of justifications or excuses, drawing on denial theory, which defines 
these opinions as accounts.127 Accordingly, accounts are learnt by ordinary 
127 Justifications are accounts in which one accepts responsibility for the act in question but 
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cultural transmission and adopted within a group due to their public accept-
ability (Cohen, 2012, p. 58-59). This is not to say that judges expressed genu-
ine guilt or shame; rather, certain responses appeared to reveal some sort of 
denial, either of the consequences of judicial decision-making, of the restrictive 
legal scope to which they are tied, or the complicated environment in which 
they are immersed. 
At the same time, expressing opinions in terms of what ought to be touches 
upon the fact that judges are expected to act according to socially accepted 
values, such as impartiality, objectivity, fairness and prudence. Judges are ex-
pected to live up to the highest standards, to “decide a case solely studying the 
file, isolated from everything else”.128 However, in the words of a magistrate, 
“Judges are human beings like you, like me”.129 Hence, judges are constantly 
attempting to achieve and honour these values and standards to the extent that 
their views mirror a normative ethos. 
Most accounts portrayed court proceedings and judicial decision–making 
as being unaffected by the environment, largely based on an ideal judge who 
is fully committed to impartiality, unbiased, insulated from outside events and 
considering only what is documented in the case file. Some of the interviewees 
revealed subtly the tension of keeping themselves and their work unaffected by 
context, while taking note of the conflictive environment where the military 
participated in crime investigation and where false positives occurred. At times, 
this tension appeared to be almost non-existent. 
I cannot claim to have discovered the underlying meaning in judges’ com-
ments. Instead, I have sought to portray the comments as literally and precisely 
as they were stated in the interviews. At certain points I have attempted to make 
a judgement about whether the interviewee is telling me about what he or she 
thinks should happen or what does happen, but this distinction was not always 
clear to me. I hope, however, that this approach will demonstrate that these ac-
counts are not isolated or serendipitous but are confirmed by relevant literature 
on the subject. My overall goal is to use both primary and secondary data to 
develop a deeper understanding of the judiciary and of judicial decision-making 
in contemporary Mexico. 
denies the negative quality associated with it. In contrast, excuses are accounts in which 
one admits that the act in question is wrong or inappropriate but denies full responsibility 
(Cohen, 2012, p.59).
128 Interview with expert on criminal justice issues in Mexico. 
129 hm magistrate 5. 
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Carrying prior judicial experiences 
Judges’ views are shaped by their daily workload. For example, judges from 
the lm state dealt with hardly any cases in which the military participated, 
and the amounts of money or drugs involved were significantly lower than 
those in the hm state. Judges are also influenced by past experiences in differ-
ent regions of the country where they carried out judicial work. For example, 
several interviewees from the lm state made references to prior experiences 
where they had to deal with large-scale drug trafficking and military involve-
ment in crime control. 
As a result of judges’ different experiences, the views expressed did not nec-
essarily only reflect their current situation but rather expressed a blend of dif-
ferent professional experiences. Methodologically, this blend complicated the 
comparison, which sought to contrast judicial experiences from two different 
sites without taking into account how previous experiences gained in other lo-
cations informed their answers. However, the blend made the analysis far more 
interesting. For instance, it appeared that judges in the lm state who had pre-
viously worked in an unstable or dangerous environment would more openly 
express opinions about trying dangerous offenders and working in dangerous 
contexts than those interviewed in the hm state. Also, it appeared that judicial 
decision-making may be strongly informed by experiences gained in particular 
locations, to the extent of carrying legal reasonings to other environments. 
Local or federal judges?
The research is framed and focused only on the federal judiciary and federal 
legislation. However, the attempt to isolate the subject of study from other ac-
tors and factors, such as state politics, state judges and state laws, was difficult 
to fully accomplish, for several reasons. Federal judges not only try federal of-
fences but can also examine state judgments via the constitutional protection 
proceedings as explained in Chapter 4.130 For example, constitutional magis-
trates hear both federal and state cases and examine federal and state authori-
ties’ decisions. Methodologically, then, it is important to bear in mind that 
views and comments may be informed by the experience of hearing not only 
federal cases and dealing with fellow federal judges but also by contact with 
local entities and individuals.
Second, both federal and state judges live and work within the same geo-
graphical location. This enables interaction with fellow judges and also with 
other professionals. For example, during an informal meeting, an interviewee 
130 Organic Law of the Federal Judiciary. 
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mentioned having talked with those in charge of the local prison system, where 
federal prisoners served their sentence, about daily practices within the prison.131 
Judgement analysis
The analysis of judicial decision-making using court judgement was also car-
ried out in several stages. Initially, I developed a detailed spreadsheet in which 
all data from the judgments could be organised. This sheet was used to record 
information from the 40 different judgements, which ranged from general data 
such as number, date of events and date of verdict to type of arguments used 
by the court to verify intent to supply.132 Having categorised the contents, I 
presented the results in the form of reports per state and a final section where 
comparisons and contrasts were discussed. A secondary stage of analysis in-
volved another writing up of the findings, aiming to discard detailed informa-
tion from the judgements I deemed irrelevant and highlight certain patterns 
and tendencies. 
Interviews and cases in tandem
I answered the research question using mainly judgements and interviews, 
which together provide a better understanding of the judiciary. On the one 
hand, judgements encompassed the actual judicial performance, while on the 
other, interviews accounted for different motivations that explained judicial 
performance outside the judgement or even outside the case. 
To rely only on judgements would have provided only an institutional de-
scription of judicial activities, leading to a rather superficial understanding. 
Similarly, to base observations and findings solely on interviews would present 
a very different picture from what was found through the analysis of judge-
ments, as will be discussed in the corresponding chapters. Using judgements 
and interviews in tandem helped to answer questions about how judges hear 
cases and what may explain the way in which cases are tried. Gathering voices 
from the judiciary, through interviews and through case file analysis, allowed 
me to corroborate observations and to raise further questions. 
Moreover, once the data from both judgements and interviews was analysed, 
the secondary analysis and discussion of findings from judgements and inter-
views separately but also in tandem, was enriched by drawing on judicial roles 
and theories on judicial behaviour. In this regard, theories on judicial behaviour 
131 lm appeals magistrate 1.
132 Appendix 3 contains a detailed account of the different spreadsheet categories and what 
type of contents were included. 
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and on judicial roles were not used to collect the data or guide the analysis 
of the empirical data. Instead, once initial findings were pinned down, these 
theories helped to answer further questions and gather deeper understanding of 
judges’ individual accounts and also of the Mexican judiciary as a whole.
Triangulation
Triangulation, examining where data drawn from different methods intersect, 
is a way of ensuring valid findings (Bryman, 2008). However, overlaying infor-
mation derived from different perspectives and obtained by different methods 
has been held to be problematic (Silverman, 2010). Triangulation will be used 
cautiously, focused on adding breadth and depth to the study (Ritchie, 2010).
Language
The research required me to draw on Spanish (my mother tongue) and Eng-
lish (my second language). Both languages were used to prepare the theoretical 
chapters as I used bibliography from many countries published in English or 
Spanish. In particular, I consulted Günter Jakobs’ work in Spanish which has 
been published in several countries across Latin America. Also, many scholars 
who have commented on Jakob’s enemy penology model have published their 
work in Spanish in Latin America and Spain. Similarly, I drew on bibliography 
published in English which also discussed enemy penology, as well as many 
other themes which helped me build the theoretical framework. In particular, 
I relied heavily on American bibliography to examine theories on judicial be-
haviour and judicial decision making. I consulted different sources published in 
both English and Spanish about Latin American criminal justice systems and 
also about the Mexican one. 
In regards to the empirical chapters, the data that I collected was in Spanish 
–interview material and judgements- therefore the material was coded in Span-
ish, using both Nvivo and Excel spread sheets. I drafted findings reports which 
evolved into the empirical chapters of the research in English. This meant that 
I was fully in charge of translating all of the material that is presented in these 
chapters, including direct quotations from judgements, public statements and 
interviews. Also, legislation and rulings –both binding and persuasive ones- 
were translated during the course of the research by myself. 
To translate certain concepts such as insecurity or impunity ask the reader to 
bear in mind that the Mexican and perhaps Latin American context have given 
these concepts particular meanings. For instance, Birkbeck noted (2013, p. 20) 
that insecurity is a term widely used in Latin America that “alludes to a lack of 
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safety”, referring both to crime and violence, as opposed to referring to a lack 
of personal confidence. Similarly, impunity is defined by the Oxford Dictionary 
as “exemption from punishment or freedom from injurious consequences of an 
action” but in Mexico, it is also used to refer to a generalised lack of punish-
ment to crime where law-enforcement agencies and criminal justice institutions’ 
performance is deficient. 
Ethics
Interviews are social encounters, not simplified and passive means of collecting 
information (May, 2011). Interviews were conducted in accordance with eth-
ics guidelines established by the Socio-Legal Studies Association.133 Fieldwork 
commenced once ethics approval was granted by King’s College Ethics Com-
mittee.134 For this, I submitted an application for ethical approval which con-
cerned different sorts of information including details on: whether any risk to 
participants or to myself were involved; the aims, objectives and nature of the 
study; the methodology used including data collection and analysis; the way in 
which I would recruit participants and location where interviews were going 
to be held, as well as the different strategies used to ensure confidentiality and 
anonymity. Additionally to the form, I submitted an Information Sheet and a 
Consent Form which were also approved. 
Prior to conducting any interview, I gave the Information Sheet to all pos-
sible interviewees where the main aims of the project were described, together 
with the funding agency that financed my studies and the themes that would 
be covered during the interview. Also, confidentiality and anonymity protec-
tions were described where all data would remain concealed so that only my 
supervisor and I accessed the data, and any details of the interviewees would 
remain closed. All participants’ names and identities were kept anonymous, 
as expressed in the Information Sheet. If a personal characteristic such as age 
or gender allowed indirect identification of the interviewee, that information 
was not used in order to guarantee anonymity. For instance, because not many 
woman hold higher posts within the judiciary, gender is not mentioned, so all 
judges are referred to as if they were men. In addition, to specify the rank or 
court of a particular interviewee might facilitate their identification, so this was 
133 slsa Statement of Principles of Ethical Research Practice. Consulted at: http://www.slsa.
ac.uk/ethics-statement 13 May 2012.
134 The Ethics form which was submitted and the Information Sheet (in English and Spanish) 
are contained in Appendix 1.
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not mentioned in the analysis except for those occasions where the post or rank 
helped the understanding of the comments made by the interviewee. The data 
presented here ensures that respondents remain unlinked to the views, accounts 
and commentaries they shared. In addition to anonymity and confidentiality, 
I drew on further security measures such as encrypted documents and record-
ings to safeguard the confidentiality of the collected data.135 Throughout the 
entire process of this study, the researcher maintained the confidentiality of all 
participant responses. For this purpose also I decided not to include the name of 
the states but rather use the labels of hm and lm states to prevent the identifica-
tion of interviewees. 
The Consent form, though approved was not used, in light of the way in 
which access was negotiated, as already described. Consent was not registered 
in a written form but was clearly stated by interviewees by accepting or deny-
ing to participate in an interview. Interviewees were also made aware of their 
right to withdraw from the interview at the moment of conducting the inter-
view or afterwards. If respondents wished to withdraw any information, that 
data was not used in the analysis. Happily, no interviewee asked to withdraw 
any information.
Ethics considerations concerned interviews and not judgements because I 
accessed only public versions of judgements. Under the Law of Personal Data 
Protection, the names, addresses and other personal information concerning 
defendants are eliminated in public versions by the courts who issue the judge-
ments. In addition, names of the judges sometimes were removed from the 
public versions of the judgements. The name of the judges or the number of 
the courts were not referred to at all in the research in order to eliminate any 
chance of identifying the judge who issued a particular judgement. 
Conclusion
This research is a case study of the federal judiciary in the current Mexican 
context, in which federal judgements in two different states (so called lm and 
hm states) were analysed in depth. A qualitative approach was used to address 
the research questions using semi-structured interviews, primarily with judges, 
135 I only conducted one serendipitous interview before submitting the ethics form to the Re-
search Ethics Office at King’s College. This interview was an opportunity that arose dur-
ing the initial stage of the research, many months before the fieldwork began. I contacted 
my supervisor and the Ethics Officers in advance and became registered as a signatory to 
the Code of Conduct for Serendipitous Research in order to be able to use the interviewing 
material. 
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and archival material concerning specific criminal cases. Data collection and 
data analysis was strongly guided by the enemy penology paradigm, in line 
with other theories on judicial behaviour and judicial decision making, as well 
as denial theory and cognitive dissonance. The comparability of these states 
was possible as their crime rates are not so different, particularly in light of 
the wide variations in crime rates across the country. At the same time, the 
possibility of accessing members of the federal judiciary and other members of 
society in these states made it feasible to pursue a comparative case study of 
the federal judiciary.
Plans and actual experiences were described above in detail in order to pro-
vide a thorough overview of the way in which the data was collected and exam-
ined. This aims to transparent the way in which the different building blocks 





A judgement is the concluding document issued by a trial court, in which the verdict and the sentence are decided. Mexican judgements tend to include 
a description of the evidence produced during pre-trial and trial proceedings, 
the arguments advanced by the judge over how much weight to give each piece 
of evidence, and the arguments that led him or her to acquit or convict. The 
judge also gives the reason for imposing a particular sentence. Most judgements 
are lengthy,136 because they often include testimony transcripts, legal provisions 
and precedents expressively transcribed. In consequence, judgements are rich 
sources of information because they give an approximation of what actually 
happened during the trial and explain how the verdict was reached. 
The guiding question pursued in this thesis was to find out whether judges 
embraced and reproduced an enemy penology paradigm, reflected in their per-
formance and their views; and to know if judges located in an unsafe and mili-
tarised environment decided differently than those located in a relatively safer 
environment. This chapter focuses on their performance mirrored in judgements 
issued by first instance judges. Enemy penology was sought in ways in which 
judges described defendants, for instance when determining the quantum of 
the sentence bearing in mind the offences charged and the ways in which those 
offences occurred. Also, enemy penology was initially expected to be found in 
ways of curtailing procedural rights during proceedings, for instance, reduc-
ing chances to produce evidence or in ways in which evidence was pondered. 
Custodial remand was not examined as this is generally ratified by judges in a 
compulsory manner. Finally, sentencing, which is also contained in judgments, 
seemed to be the ideal place to look for any kind of enemy penology value. 
Overall, enemy penology was not present in judgements from both locations, 
as will be discussed throughout the chapter. Also, decisions were found to be 
distinctively uniform across the studied states. 
136  A rough average of judgements’ length is approximately 80 pages per judgement. 
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The chapter’s main interest is to present ways in which judges respond to 
or address several themes during proceedings such as circumstantial evidence, 
evidence produced by the defence and by the prosecution, drugs’ illicit market 
and violence or sentencing. However, the chapter also includes a description of 
particularities of cases in order to contextualise judges’ decisions, such as main 
characteristics of defendants or the type of circumstances in which offences 
occurred. This discussion does not intend to review judicial determinations of 
guilt or innocence.
The chapter is divided into the following sections: defendants; indictments; 
parties; circumstantial evidence; police in judicial proceedings; judicial over-
view of police testimony; the illicit drug market and violence; and sentencing 
and appeals. The conclusion contains remarks on the similarities and differ-
ences, as well as themes concerning the context, enemy penology in decision 
making and uniformity and consistency in judicial decision making. 
In total, 40 judgements of drug-related offences were analysed, 17 from the 
lm state and 23 from the hm state. All cases but one were initiated between 
2007 and 2012. This sample of judgements is not and does not attempt to 
be representative, nevertheless, the observations and analyses of these are pre-
sented in a more quantitatively manner to give the reader a sense of proportion. 
The judgements analysed here were issued by many different judges; not only 
were the judgements issued in 14 diverse courts, but throughout this time pe-
riod some courts were headed by different judges, some having been assigned to 
different locations or promoted. Cases from the lm state are referred to by lmc 
and the number I assigned to it, those from the hm state are referred to by hmc 
followed by the subsequent number.
Table 7.1. Overall number of cases and courts
 LM state HM state
Number of cases 17 23
Number of defendants 20 25
Convictions 17 19
Acquittals 0 4
Number of courts 11 6
* The examined judgments from the lm state were issued by 8 of the 11 courts; 
whereas those from the hm state were issued by all courts.  
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Defendants
Much personal data related to the defendant is collected during trial but hardly 
any of this information is available in public versions of judgements. The avail-
able data concerns gender, income and criminal record, which tend to be men-
tioned in the judgment when the sentence is decided. 
Table 7.2. Defendants’ characteristics
LM state* HM state**
Number 20 25
Gender Male Male
Income per week 350 to 2000 pesos*
(17 to 1000 pounds) 
850 to 5,000 pesos*
(42 to 250 pounds)
Previous convictions 3 2
Addiction 17 14
* 2 defendants stated to have no income and this data was not available in 5 cases; addiction 
information was not available in 1 case. 
** 3 defendants stated to be unemployed and income information was not available in 11 
cases; previous convictions and addiction information was not available in 2 cases, re-
spectively. 
The cells coloured in grey highlight commonalities between states; the white cells highlight 
differences found.
As Table 7.2 show, there were 45 defendants involved in the examined judge-
ments; 20 from the lm state and 25 from the hm state. In both areas, all defen-
dants were male and most were being tried for the first time. In the lm state, 
three defendants had previous convictions, two of which were for drug-related 
offences (lmc4 and lmc12), while the third defendant (lmc11) had committed 
aggravated battery and aggravated theft. Drug addiction is examined by a toxi-
cology expert once proceedings begin in the prosecution agency.137 The propor-
tion of drug addicts was larger in the lm state, where 85 percent of defendants 
were reported to have some kind of drug addiction (17 out of 20) as opposed 
to 56 percent from the hm state. This aspect is particularly relevant, as some 
courts relied on this fact to argue in favour of finding the defendant guilty for a 
non-serious offence. Information on addictions was available in 37 judgements. 
137 Defendants in lmc4 and lmc7 appeared not to use drugs; in lmc5 this information was not 
available. This information was not available in lmc5 and lmc21.
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Indictments
Charges
The type and frequency of offences charged were similar in both locations. The 
most common offence was possession with intent to supply, followed by simple 
possession. Cases of supply appeared to be the least frequent in both places, and 
cases that involved charges concerning firearms were only found in the hm state 
though these cases were only five, as Table 7.3 show.
TAbLE 7.3. OFFENCES AND DRuGS INvOLvED
  
lm state hm state
Offence* Simple possession 9 7
 Possession with 
intent to supply
10 14
 Supply 3 5









Marijuana 9 cases 
(total amount: 2.7 kgs; 
average: 300 grs)
14 cases 
(total amount: 11.5kgs; 
average: 833 grs)
Cocaine 5 cases 
(total amount: 33 grs; 
average: 6.6 grs)
9 cases 
(total amount: 330 grs; 
average: 36.5 grs)
Several types 0 5
Other 3 2
* Data based on the final verdict.
** The sum and average of marijuana and cocaine are taken from all cases in which these 
drugs were involved. 
The most common type of drug involved was marijuana, followed by cocaine 
in both locations. However, as Table 7.3 shows, the amounts of drugs involved 
were much higher in the hm state than those found in the lm state. 
The number of suspects involved tended to be only one in the vast majority of 
cases. In four cases in the lm state, defendants faced more than one charge for 
drug-related offences. In three of the four cases, defendants were charged with 
possession with intent to supply, and supply; the fourth case involved simple pos-
session along with possession with intent to supply. By comparison, nine defen-
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dants in the hm state were indicted for several drugs offences. In five cases, from 
that state, defendants were additionally indicted for firearms-related offences, 
and in the other four, defendants faced several charges of possession with intent 
to supply, supply, and drugs cultivation but this last was dismissed by the court.
Circumstances of the cases
The circumstances in which the alleged crimes were carried out varied, and in 
some cases these circumstances were contested by the defence. The spectrum 
included petty offenders who were arrested incidentally and drugs were found 
on them; cases where defendants maintained that drugs had been planted on 
them; and defendants who were under police investigation for systematic supply 
of drugs or where defendants’ homes were searched. Within that same spectrum 
police and army participation mainly in the hm state were also important.138 
Almost half the defendants in the lm state confessed to possession of the 
drugs and said the drugs were for their own personal use, as opposed to for 
supplying them.139 For example, the defendant in lmc2 admitted possessing the 
marijuana, which he used to alleviate back pain. In two cases, defendants were 
stopped by the police for making too much noise. The police then found they 
were carrying drugs. The defendant in lmc3 had 26 clonazepam pills in his 
possession, while the defendant in lmc17 was carrying 99 grams of marijuana. 
In the hm state, eight defendants confessed to possessing the drugs found.140 
For instance, two suspects in detention were searched by law enforcement 
agents, one in prison and the other in the police station, and in each case small 
amounts of cocaine were found on them.141
In many cases, defendants were arrested because the police, after following 
and searching them, found drugs on them or the suspects were allegedly sell-
ing them. Not all defendants admitted owning the drugs they were allegedly 
holding when arrested. In several cases, defendants alleged the drugs had been 
planted on them.142 Others claimed to have no knowledge of some of the drugs 
found; for example, the defendant in lmc8 confessed that the marijuana in his 
possession was his, whereas he had no knowledge of the diazepam pills that 
were also found on him.143 
138 The military participated in nine cases in the hm while only one case in the lm state. 
139 lmc2, lmc3, lmc7 though not all defendants, lmc8, lmc9, lmc10, lmc16 and c17. 
140 hmc1, hmc4, hmc5, hmc8, hmc10, hmc12, hmc20 and hmc21.
141 hmc3, hmc4.
142 lmc4, lmc6, lmc5 from the lm state.
143 This was also the case for the defendant in lmc12 who acknowledged owning marijuana 
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Another type of case concerned police investigations in particular locations 
where drugs were reported to be sold. According to the police in hmc6 for in-
stance, once they witnessed people buying drugs they detained the buyers, who 
later testified against the defendant for having supplied them the drug. In some 
of these cases a property search was conducted after the police witnessed drugs 
being sold which led them to look for drugs inside the defendant’s premises.144 
In the hm state, I traced several types of law enforcement operatives. Some 
cases were initiated when the police or army received an anonymous report 
about a person having drugs or storing a firearm at a particular address.145 
In response, the police or army went to that address and stopped suspects, 
searched and found illegal objects such as drugs or firearms, together with 
other items such as mobile phones or money. Also in the hm state, several ar-
rests resulted from checkpoints established across the state as part of the federal 
program to fight drug trafficking.146 In hmc5 for example, the defendant was 
arrested at a checkpoint after the police found 249.5 grams of cocaine, together 
with American and Mexican currencies and three mobile phones. 
Cases in which soldiers participated seemed to have common practices in 
which they declared they had searched the defendant who was found inside a 
vehicle and finding drugs and other objects.147 In both of these cases, defend-
ants testified to having been inside their homes when soldiers broke in.
A case from the hm state dealt with a raid on a house used for growing 
marijuana plants, where methamphetamines and dehydrated fungi were also 
found.148 Three people, allegedly university students, were arrested; two of 
them were on the front porch and the other one was, allegedly, in the house. 
In this case, despite the quantity and variety of drugs found, only the person 
inside the house was tried and he was found not guilty because of insufficient 
evidence; the property search was poorly conducted, which meant that most of 
the evidence had to be discarded. 
The military only participated in one case in the lm state whilst the involve-
ment of the military in crime investigation was much more patent in the hm 
state as participated in 9 cases. In particular, the military appeared to conduct 
specific type of operatives including stop and search of suspects in checkpoints 
and solvents but not cocaine, all of which were found in his possession.
144  hmc9, hmc17, hmc20 and lmc1, lmc4.
145  hmc1, hmc15, hmc18, hmc21.
146  hmc5, hmc13, hmc14, hmc19.
147  hmc12 and hmc8.
148  hmc7. 
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across the state and practicing property searches without a search warrant. 
Overall, police (and military) intervention in a case is crucial to the verdict 
reached, as will be explained later in this chapter. Also, the circumstances in 
which offences occurred were very significant, because courts relied heavily on 
circumstantial evidence to reach verdicts, particularly in cases of aggravated 
possession. The circumstances of the cases examined, as described in judge-
ments except for hmc15 did not show defendants to pose grave risk to society’s 
safety so as to merit being considered enemies of society or a particularly vio-
lent or threatening context.149 
Parties
Prosecution
Across all cases a trend was observed in which the prosecution’s case relied on 
evidence produced solely during the pre-trial stage and failed to produce any 
evidence during trial. This generally included police officers’ arrest reports and 
further testimony given at the prosecution agency; expert evidence regarding 
chemical report of the confiscated drugs that determined the type and quantity 
of the drug and toxicology tests made on the defendant; visual inspections of 
the drugs found by the prosecutor; and the defendant’s statement. All this evi-
dence is produced during pre-trial, where the prosecutor has wide discretion be-
cause he or she is in charge of the investigation and of preparing the indictment 
file. The court relies heavily on the indictment to begin proceedings. Evidence 
collected during property searches was also brought to court; one every four 
cases involved a property search. 
Sometimes the pre-trial prosecutor produced further evidence, such as visual 
inspections of the premises where the drug was allegedly sold and witness state-
ments on whether the defendant was or was not selling drugs. From the total 
number of eight cases that used witness statements to support the prosecution’s 
case,150 the court heard their statements directly only in two cases.151 Nonethe-
less, the courts granted evidentiary weight to witness statements produced dur-
149 It is important to point out that it was found only in one case that the military faced mem-
bers of a criminal group who appeared to be heavily armed, shot a soldier and a couple 
of members managed to run away through the rooftop. The judge included none of this 
information in the judgement. All of this is discussed in the section Drugs’ illicit market 
and violence. 
150 hmc2, hmc6, hmc9, hmc17 and hmc20; lmc1, lmc5, and lmc6. 
151 hmc9 and lmc6. The witness deemed decisive did not appear before the court in lmc5. 
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ing pre-trial in four cases152 despite the fact that the court never actually met 
those witnesses. In only two cases the judge refused to grant evidentiary weight 
to the witnesses’ statements.153 
For instance, in hmc2 the judge granted evidentiary weight to a statement 
made by a witness who failed to be identified by the prosecution and to appear 
before the court to participate in a confrontation hearing. The judge held: 
When the prosecutor leads the investigation, he does so in compliance 
with the Constitution, and it would be illegal to deny weight to the wit-
nesses’ statements (provided by the prosecution) based on the fact that 
the witnesses were not found, because it would make the purpose of the 
investigation void (hmc2, p.40).
As a result, based on the fact that the sources of evidence produced during pre-
trial essentially constituted the prosecutor’s case, and that the prosecutor pro-
duced hardly any additional evidence, it could be suggested that the outcome of 
the cases was strongly shaped by what was produced and gathered during the 
pre-trial process. A common feature across most judgments (35 out of 40) was 
the reference to binding rulings which authorised granting evidentiary value 
to sources of evidence produced during pre-trial, particularly visual inspec-
tions and expert reports. Hence, these sources of evidence could be used by the 
courts despite the fact that they were not reproduced in front of the judge.154 
Exceptions to this general trend were observed where the courts dismissed 
witness statements for lacking truthfulness or clarity concerning the events 
and for the witness not appearing in court. The witnesses that generally were 
involved in proceedings had allegedly bought drugs from the defendant, so 
their statements were relevant for corroborating either the intent to supply 
or actual supply. As will be discussed below, the evidence that courts used to 
reach a verdict relied mainly on police and military accounts paired with cir-
cumstantial evidence. 
In sum, the prosecution’s case generally relied on the limited sources of evi-
dence that were produced during the pre-trial stage. Despite this, the courts 
convicted in 90 per cent of the cases and subsequently held in only three cases 
that the prosecution produced insufficient evidence. 
152 hmc2, hmc6, hmc17 and hmc20.
153 lmc1 and lmc5.
154 Non-binding rulings titled: “Prosecutor, constitutional faculties, in pretrial proceedings, 
ocular inspection.”; and “Prosecutor. Pretrial. Evidentiary weight assigned to his proce-
dural doings in this stage. It does not contravene constitutional rights.”
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Defence
Unlike the prosecution, evidence provided by the defence was generally pro-
duced during trial proceedings. All defendants have the constitutional right to be 
defended during both pre-trial and court proceedings. Defendants may have ei-
ther private or public legal support. Public legal support pays for one barrister at 
the prosecution agency during the pre-trial process and another at the trial itself. 
Evidence produced by the defence may seek two main purposes: to disprove 
the prosecution’s case by sustaining an alternate version of the facts or to re-
ceive a lenient sentence. The defence produced evidence in all but five cases; 
155 from those 35, the evidence was intended to sustain the defence’s case in 
29 cases. In more than half the cases, witness evidence was produced, which 
included police testimony and cross-examination as well as other eye-witness-
es (22 cases). Another common piece of evidence produced was confrontation 
hearings156 generally held between police and eye witnesses and the defendant 
(18 cases), as well as expert reports on subjects including drug addiction, foren-
sic medicine, and engineering. Visual inspections and documentary evidence 
were less common. Documents varied from land registry records, reference let-
ters from employees, to character references from anyone who could speak on 
behalf of the defendant.157 
A trend observed across the vast majority of cases was the courts’ readi-
ness to dismiss evidence provided by the defence. From the 29 cases where the 
defence produced evidence to support its version of the facts, only in two cases 
(from the hm state) upheld it and it was disregarded in the rest. In the judge-
ments’ contents, evidence produced by the defence occupied much less space 
and attention than the prosecution’s case and was given a few pages at best. The 
courts used different arguments to dismiss defence evidence, depending on the 
type of evidence. 
The most frequently used arguments can be grouped as follows: first, courts 
dismissed defence statements, including the defendant’s, on the basis that these 
claims embodied only a defensive strategy (11 cases) and also maintained that 
allowing the defence to deny all facts without offering any evidence would in-
validate all that had been produced during proceedings which would foster im-
punity (10 cases). second, courts discarded defence statements because there was 
no corroborating evidence (10 cases). third, courts dismissed claims that de-
155 lmc8, lmc10, lmc13 and c16; lmc21.
156 For a brief definition, see Chapter 4.
157 Character letters on behalf of the defendant are intended to persuade the judge to impose 
a lenient sentence on the defendant.
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rived from confrontation hearings because no relevant or new information was 
provided and participants only repeated their previous allegations (eight cases). 
The outcome of the cases cannot be associated with the type of attorney; 70 
percent of defendants had a public attorney, and the low proportion of acquit-
tals were distributed among private (2 cases) and public (1 case) attorneys, as 
well as distributed equally in those cases where the defence failed to produce 
any evidence.
In sum, the decisive evidence was either circumstantial or that produced 
by law enforcement agencies such as the police or the army during the first 
stage of proceedings. Defence evidence was examined as secondary and wit-
ness’ testimonies appeared to be easily disregarded. This trend was also found 
by Pásara (2006) when examining 82 judgments issued by criminal courts in 
Mexico City, in particular that judges failed to explain on what grounds was 
defence evidence discarded. 
Circumstantial evidence
Circumstantial evidence refers to different characteristics linked to the offence 
and the defendant, including quantity of the drug, the way and place in which 
the offence occurred as well as the time of day. The offence of possession of 
drugs with intent to supply is an example of a risk-related offence, where actual 
harm does not occur but circumstances suggest harm was probable (Aguilar 
López, 2008). In this type of cases circumstantial evidence plays an impor-
tant role in demonstrating the offence. Defendants charged with this offence 
are found guilty when circumstances suggest that the harm, i.e. the supply-
ing of drugs, was going to happen. Relevant circumstances concerning simple 
possession and possession with intent to supply are primarily: the quantity of 
drug found, the way in which it was packed —distributed in small packages or 
wrapped in a single one— the place and time of the arrest. The time of the ar-
rest and the money found on the defendant were important only in a few cases. 
Type and quantity of drugs
The most common drug found in both locations was marijuana, followed by 
cocaine. Other drugs, such as heroin, methamphetamines, clonazepam and di-
azepam, as well as fungi, were involved but in lesser proportions than mari-
juana and cocaine. The quantity of drug found was significant in most cases, 
especially to determine whether the charge should be aggravated, i.e. with in-
tent to supply, or simple possession. The amount was an essential argument to 
convict defendants charged for possession with intent to supply, where in all 
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cases courts stressed that the amount found indicated intent to supply. Leg-
islation on drugs offences explained in Chapter 4 establishes the threshold to 
determine the seriousness of the offence, based on the quantity of the drug. 
Hence, according to the law, the quantity of the drug is decisive to determine 
the charge of, either simple possession, possession with intent to supply in a 
low-scale or possession with intent to supply on a large-scale. However, legisla-
tion leaves the door open for judges to consider other circumstances of the case 
such as the type of drug involved. Nevertheless, no consistent relationship was 
observed between the amount of confiscated drug and the convicted offence, 
as Tables 7.4 to 7.7 show. Cases in which several types of drug and drugs other 
than marijuana and cocaine are not presented in these tables. 
Table 7.4 LM state marijuana cases: quantity and charge









13.7 g 38.7 g 45.8 g
52.03 
g




SP SP SP AP SP AP SP AP SP AP AP
*sp stands for Simple Possession and ap stands for Aggravated Possession.
Table 7.5 HM state marijuana cases: quantity and charge
 HMC18 NC17 NC2 NC23 NC20 NC1* NC12 NC16 NC19* NC10
14.9 g 25.88 g 28.5 g 62.8 g 72.2 g 108.6 g 177.6 g 2,953 g 3,338.6 
g
4,193 g




AP AP and 
supply
SP SP SP SP SP
* Cases where defendants were also charged for possessing firearms were involved. 
*sp stands for Simple Possession and ap stands for Aggravated Possession.
Table 7.6 LM state cocaine cases: quantity and charge
LMC16 LMC12 LMC6 Def 1 LMC6 Def 2 LMC8 LMC10
1.1 g 3.5 g 4.4 g 5.8 g 7.9 g 10.4 g
SP SP AP AP AP AP
*sp stands for Simple Possession and ap stands for Aggravated Possession.
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Table 7.7 HM state cocaine cases: quantity and charge
NC6 NC21* NC3 NC13* NC8 NC5
0.115 g 1.1 g 9.7 g 23.5 g 33.8 g 249.5 g
Supply SP SP AP SP AP
* Cases where defendants were also charged for possessing firearms were involved. 
* sp stands for Simple Possession and ap stands for Aggravated Possession.
As Tables 7.4 and 7.6 indicate, cases from the lm state involved smaller quanti-
ties of drugs than in the hm state. For example, the smallest amount of marijua-
na was 38.7 grams (lmc11) while the largest was 1.2 kilograms (lmc1). Similarly, 
the smallest amount of cocaine found was 1.1 grams (lmc16) whilst the largest 
was 10.4 grams (lmc10). Nonetheless, no link was observed between the quan-
tity of drugs involved and the seriousness of the indicted offence. For instance, 
the defendant in lmc17 was carrying almost double the amount of marijuana the 
defendant in lmc5 carried but was charged with a less serious offence. 
Similarly, in the hm state the quantity of drugs found did not match the seri-
ousness of the charged offences. For example, hmc18 was the case that involved 
the lowest amount of marijuana (14.8 grams) but the defendant was tried for 
aggravated possession. By comparison, defendants that were carrying 2.9 ki-
lograms (nc16) and 3.3 kilograms (nc19) of marijuana were charged for a less 
serious offences. 
In fact, it was observed that cases in the hm state generally involved larger 
amounts of drugs than those from the lm state but this did not result in more 
convictions for serious offences. It is also noteworthy that the quantities of co-
caine in cases in the hm state were much larger than those found in cases from 
the lm state. However, half of the cocaine cases in the hm state were indicted 
for simple possession whereas all but one cocaine cases in the lm state were 
indicted for aggravated possession. 
In sum, even though legislation determines that quantities trigger different 
legal consequences—larger quantities escalate the level of seriousness of the 
indictment—in practice quantity does not predict or even indicate what charges 
will be pressed. It would therefore appear that factors other than quantity of 
drugs affect the final decision.
Level of addiction and quantity of drugs
The severity of defendants’ drug addiction, as given in toxicology reports, was 
taken into account by many judges in cases of simple possession. In these cases, 
defendants were carrying amounts of drugs above that were legally permitted 
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but judges argued that their drug addiction helped explain defendants were 
possessing excessive amounts of drugs.158 
For instance, nearly all defendants convicted for simple possession from 
both the lm (nine out of nine) and the hm (six out of seven) states were drug 
addicts. In the vast majority of cases (six out nine cases from the lm state and 
five out of six of the hm state) the judge used this fact to argue that the drug 
was intended for their personal use, even if the amount was higher than permit-
ted. In fact, in half the cases of simple possession from the lm state,159 judges 
stressed that the defendant’s addiction proved that the drugs were destined for 
their personal consumption, and the purpose or intent of selling could not be 
deduced solely from the drug quantity found. As a result, defendants charged 
for simple possession, although carrying amounts of drugs that corresponded 
to a more serious offence, were sentenced for simple possession because judges 
took into account the defendants’ drug addiction.
The case lmc15 illustrates that judicial decision-making consider quantity 
along with the other circumstances of the case. The defendant was smoking 
marijuana when the police searched him and found 13.7 grams. He was charged 
and convicted for simple possession. The judge argued that drug addicts tend 
to acquire drugs that will last several days due to the risk of acquiring it. The 
fact that the defendant had suffered from a drug addiction for over seven years 
and that the police did not notice any illegal behaviour, or find any evidence to 
suggest intent to supply, showed there was no intent.
The case hmc12 is also illustrative. The defendant acknowledged possession 
of 177.6 grams of marijuana and said he was arrested in his home by soldiers 
who broke in. The judge held that although the amount of drug exceeded the 
allowed quantity for individual consumption, the way the drug was packed was 
typical of small consumers, and no other evidence suggested the defendant had 
the intention to supply the drug. 
A striking difference was observed in cases tried for aggravated possession. 
In the lm state, the courts argued in six160 out of eight aggravated possession 
158 Results from Toxicology reports were sometimes described in judgements where they point-
ed out indications of a defendant’s level of addiction such as the amount of drug found, his 
behaviour during the examination or whether any substance was found in his bloodstream 
or urine. Pre-determined amounts of drugs may not be sufficient to establish directly the 
existence or severity of drug addiction. The legal framework, however, establishes specific 
amounts of particular drugs were presumably destined for personal consumption, and the 
threshold that helps presume drugs were possessed with intent to supply, distribute, trans-
port, or other activities. See Table. 4.1 Maximum drug doses legally authorised. 
159 lmc2, lmc3, lmc12, lmc15, lmc17. 
160 lmc1, lmc4, lmc5, lmc7, lmc9 and lmc16.
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cases that the amount of drug carried by the defendant was decisive in demon-
strating intent to supply, either marijuana, cocaine or heroin. In the hm state, 
the quantity of drugs found was decisive in nine161 out of 13 cases. 
In cases where defendants were reported to have a drugs addiction that were 
charged for aggravated possession, courts from the lm state systematically ig-
nored their drugs addictions. By comparison, in the two cases where defend-
ants appeared not to be addicts, judges emphasised that the toxicology reports 
helped demonstrate an intent to supply. This was not as visible in the hm state, 
because not all defendants charged for aggravated possession were reported to 
have an addiction problem. However, in five cases162 the court used the lack of 
addiction to argue that possession of the drug could not be presumed to be for 
the defendant’s personal use but rather for distribution. For example, in hmc17 
the judge said: 
The toxicology exam found he is currently not using any drug, which 
reinforces even more what is held in this judgment, as it is illogical that 
one person carries a drug if he is not addicted to it, and one would feel 
inclined to think that he had it to obtain an economic benefit from its 
distribution (hmc17, p.13).
It is clear that the relevance of addictions reported during proceedings depends 
on the offence charged in the indictment. This raises questions about the valid-
ity of arguments that support circumstantial aspects of a case, particularly the 
relevance of quantity of drugs and addictions. 
Drug packaging and place of arrest
Another important aspect considered by the courts to verify intent to supply 
was the way the drug was packed. In most cases, the drug was divided and 
wrapped in several small packages, which, according to judges, was a strong 
indication of intent. This was stressed in eight of the nine cases in the lm state 
where defendants were found guilty of possession with intent to supply, and in 
half of such cases in the hm state. However, in several cases of simple posses-
sion, drugs were also packed in separate wrappers, in three, 37 or even 175 dif-
ferent packages. 163 Hence, the way in which the drug is packed is not a decisive 
or relevant circumstantial data to demonstrate the intent to supply because in 
161 hmc2, hmc5, hmc6, hmc13, hmc14, hmc15, hmc16, hmc17, hmc18, hmc19, hmc20, hmc22 
and hmc23. 
162 hmc14, hmc15, hmc17, hmc18, hmc19. 
163 lmc2, lmc11, lmc12 and lmc13; hmc1, hmc3, hmc4, hmc8, hmc10, hmc12 and hmc21. 
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most cases drugs were found in separate packages, dealing with indictments for 
both simple and aggravated possession.
In addition, the place where defendants were arrested, either in a public 
space, such as the street or a public festival, was deemed relevant by courts, 
because being in a public space facilitates drug supply. In six out of eight cases 
from the lm state, the court relied on this argument to convict the defendant 
for aggravated possession, while the hm courts convicted only six out of 13 de-
fendants, which indicates that courts in the hm state were less likely to use this 
argument to convict.
 The following tables show the overt similarities concerning circumstances 
across cases whilst diverging in the way in which these concluded: 
Table 7.8 Circumstances of LM cases for simple possession
LMC15 LMC11 LMC13 LMC9 
Def 3























































* Marij. stands for marijuana; pack. stands for packages and unpack. stands for unpackaged. 
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Table 7.9 Circumstances of LM cases for aggravated possession
From Tables 7.8 and 7.9, which concern cases from the lm state, it can be seen 
that circumstances are very similar. For instance many defendants convicted for 
the two types of offence were reported to have a drug addiction; most of them 
were arrested in a public space; and the vast majority carried the drug in more 
than one package. 
Outcomes in lmc12 and lmc16 were strikingly different, despite many com-
monalities. The judge in lmc12 took the defendant’s drug addiction into ac-
count, which led him to assume that the carried drug, 3.5 grams of cocaine, 
was for the defendant’s personal consumption. By comparison, the judge in 
lmc16 disregarded the defendant’s addiction, despite its corroboration by sev-
eral expert examinations produced during trial, and argued that the defend-
ant’s intent to supply 1.1 grams of cocaine was demonstrated by the fact that 
he was in a public space—a fair or festival—which facilitates the distribution 
of drugs. It is worth noting that both defendants were arrested in public spac-
es, and the drugs involved in both cases were packed in separate bags, both of 
which factors are deemed to facilitate drug dealing. Nonetheless, lmc12 was 
sentenced to 16 months in prison, while lmc16, convicted of a more serious 
offence, received three years. 
What can help understand these inconsistent (or at least contrasting) out-
comes? Both of these cases were tried initially for simple possession, and the 
verdicts, contained in the intermediate resolutions, were appealed. An appeal 

































































































* Marij. stands for marijuana; coca. stands for cocaine; pack. stands for packages and unpack. 
stands for unpackaged.
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judge to modify the charge and continue proceedings for aggravated posses-
sion; the appeal in lmc12 was not granted. The contrasting results of these 
cases sheds light on the strength of the higher courts shaping judicial decisions 
of the lower courts. 
Cases from the hm state, except those where defendants were found not 
guilty, are contained in the following tables.
Table 7.10 HM cases of simple possession





























In prison In police station
In his 
residence
On the street In his car 
In his 
residence
Table 7.11 HM cases of aggravated possession
C2 ** C5 C6 * C13 C14 C15 C16 C17 
**




















































































































* Cases where the offence was supply.
** Cases where defendants were convicted for possession with intent and for supply. 
*** Marij. stands for marijuana; coca. stands for cocaine; pack. stands for packages and unpack. stands 
for unpackaged.
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As Tables 7.10 and 7.11 show, in most cases drugs were divided into several 
packages. However, the place of arrest varied widely because operations car-
ried out in the hm state focused on searching premises and suspicious vehicles 
at checkpoints across the state. It is noteworthy that despite this, several de-
fendants were convicted for aggravated possession while being in their homes 
when arrested. 
Judicial approval to rely on circumstantial evidence
The use of circumstantial evidence appears to be widely accepted within ju-
dicial decision-making. In more than half of the examined judgements,164 
circumstantial evidence sustained both serious and lenient charges. In cases 
dealing with charges of possession with intent to supply, all courts except one 
(lmc1) from the lm state and two-thirds of courts from the hm state referred 
to binding rulings issued by constitutional tribunals permitting reliance on 
circumstantial evidence. For example, one of the most commonly quoted prec-
edents in both locations establishes that intent to supply can be verified by 
indirect or circumstantial evidence.165 Another precedent holds that courts 
may rely on the specific circumstances of the case, such as drug quantity or 
packaging. According to that precedent, once the quantity or packaging was 
demonstrated, inferences could be drawn to confirm he defendant was guilty 
or that the charged offence did occur.166 
An illustration of the inclination to rely on circumstantial evidence can be 
seen in lmc4, where the judge argued that using circumstantial evidence was es-
sential to prove the intent to supply. If circumstantial evidence was not consid-
ered, the defendant would justify his criminal behaviour by claiming the drug 
was for his personal use rather than for its supply: 
On occasions only based on this (circumstantial evidence), the trial can be 
held satisfactorily; not understanding it this way, the drug dealer tends to 
justify himself with the excuse that the drug was for his personal use or 
by not acknowledging the drug’s existence (lmc4, p.144).
A possible reason to rely heavily on circumstantial evidence to reach a ver-
dict may entail a genuine reluctance to acquit defendants based on insufficient 
evidence, particularly if the judge feels convinced of the defendant’s guilt, and 
164 9 judgements out of 17 from the lm and 14 judgements out of 23 from the hm state. 
165 Binding ruling titled: “Drug related offence. The intent or purpose of possessing the drugs, 
constitute an essential element of the offence’s legal description established in article 195 
of the Federal Criminal Code that can be demonstrated with circumstantial evidence.” 
166 Binding ruling tiled: “Circumstantial evidence, its assessment.”
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bearing in mind that many precedents support this. Another interpretation may 
be that judges have a sincere concern for impunity. 
Concern for impunity is embedded in popular and frequently quoted prec-
edents. For instance, in 13 different cases the court quoted a binding ruling 
that holds: 
When a presumption/suspicion against the defendant can be derived from 
the set of circumstances, it is the defendant who should demonstrate his 
case against (the prosecution’s incriminations) and not try to prove facts 
by giving an uncorroborated explanation. Admitting his unilateral state-
ment as valid would destroy circumstantial evidence’s mechanism and 
facilitate the impunity of the defendant, making ineffective the chain 
of (incriminating) presumptions by the sole statement of the defendant, 
which is inadmissible.167 
In a similar tone to this precedent, two judgments from the lm state stated: 
To not use circumstantial evidence, would occasionally lead to the impu-
nity of several offences: in particular, those cunningly committed would 
provoke a state of serious social defencelessness (lmc4 and lmc14). 
Several judges from the hm state dismissed the defendant’s statement, saying 
that to take his uncorroborated statement as valid would facilitate impunity 
(nc17, hmc18), notably similar to the content of the precedent quoted above.
The fact that these arguments are taken from precedent reveals that they are 
deeply embedded in the legal fabric to the extent that trial judges use them as 
their own. The fact that quoted rulings are both binding and not binding sug-
gest that, as Lindquist & Cross held, arguing against them is far too burden-
some (2005). Equally, an inclination to decide cases based on circumstantial 
evidence reveals a systematic way of deciding cases, illustrating the reinforced 
practice to use templates to issue judgements and, thus, manage workloads and 
at the same time avoid reversals. 
The type of defendants and circumstances of the cases from the both states 
do not mirror what was lived in the hm state; defendants do not appear to pose 
particular risk or danger. At the same time, judges’ determinations on evidence 
do not mirror a particular concern to rule against defendants with the greatest 
amounts of drugs. Hence, to this point an enemy penology environment is not 
observed in the cases examined but more importantly, judges do not appear to be 
reproducing this paradigm’s traits. Knowingly, these cases do not involve organ-
ised crime offences which arguably would be the place to look for enemy penol-
ogy mirrored in judgements. However, the main interest of this thesis is to look 
167 Binding ruling titled: “Confession, lack of it.” 
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for enemy penology in ordinary cases –arguably, a spill over effect- which to this 
point has not been found. What then accounts for this brings us back to strict 
precedent adherence of trial courts to both binding and non binding rulings. 
Police in judicial proceedings
In criminal proceedings, evidence provided by law enforcement agents, such as 
police officers and soldiers, is essential for pursuing convictions, and the cases 
investigated for this research were no exception. Police and army evidence con-
sists of reports describing the events, such as the arrest and how the offence oc-
curred; statements rendered in front of the public prosecutor; and confirmation 
of these statements before the court. 
Soldiers participated in the arrest of defendants in 10 cases, nine of which 
were in the hm state. Throughout the analysis, no difference was observed be-
tween evidence provided by the police and evidence provided by the military. 
The circumstances of the arrests of the cases examined varied; soldiers detained 
suspects in checkpoints or in their homes during a cateo or property search 
without a warrant. By comparison, police officers arrested suspects allegedly 
walking on the street or after interrogating witnesses. Despite the fact that cir-
cumstances were different, the report produced to describe the arrest and the 
way in which the offence was taking place was similar. Judicial argumentation 
remained uniform in considering evidence and reaching a verdict, regardless of 
the type of law enforcement agent involved. According to one public defence at-
torney from the hm state, judges viewed police and soldiers as equal and treated 
them as such during court proceedings. 
Evidence provided by the police and army was crucial in the vast majority of 
cases. Only in three cases from the lm state168 and five from the hm state169, did 
other witnesses form part of the prosecution case. Law enforcement agents are 
crucial actors in criminal proceedings, because they are responsible for arrest-
ing and bringing suspects before the public prosecutor. They are also relevant 
because they tend to catch defendants red-handed, thus becoming primary wit-
nesses. Evidence provided by the police and army automatically complies with 
the primary evidence principle (principio de inmediatez described in Chapter 4). 
Evidence produced closer to the crime is presumed to have greater validity than 
that produced later, because the initially produced evidence is presumed to be 
truthful and undistorted. 
168  lmc1, lmc4 and lmc5. 
169  hmc2, hmc6, hmc9, hmc17 and hmc20.
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Versions of the arrest and versions of the offence
Police and army evidence attempts to prove two things: the way in which the 
arrest took place and the way in which the offence occurred. The description of 
the “facts” by law enforcement agents did not always coincide with that of the 
defendants’. Similar versions were observed in several cases, such as in LMC3, 
where both the defendant and police officers agreed that the defendant was 
stopped while walking along the street with his wife and that he was carrying 
the drug when searched. 
In contrast, in some cases the reports of the events were entirely different. 
For example, in lmc13, police alleged that they saw the defendant with a plastic 
bag containing seven packages of marijuana outside a place of entertainment. 
When the defendant saw the police he tried to escape and was arrested. The 
defendant, on the other hand, alleged that he was in a different location, and 
that an unknown person walked by, saw the police and dropped a bag. One of 
the police officers ran after the unknown person and the other stood beside the 
defendant. The officer was unable to catch the unknown person, so the officers 
arrested the defendant instead.170 
In five cases from the lm state171 and six cases from the hm state172 the ver-
sions of the police and the defendants coincided. Differences were found in 24 
cases in total. There were differing versions of the way in which the arrest took 
place. For example, the only difference in the account of the events in lmc3 
was that the defendant alleged he was beaten up by the police and by the shop-
owners when he was arrested. 
There were important differences concerning the origin and ownership of 
the drugs in eight cases from the lm state173 and nine from the hm state174. For 
instance, in lmc5, the defendant held that he was carrying only some of the 
drug and the rest belonged to his landlady, who had extorted him to sell it. The 
landlady was released, so the defendant claimed that the drugs found on her 
had been placed on him by the police. In hmc18, soldiers received an anony-
mous report and when they saw the defendant whose characteristics coincided 
170 The defence in this case failed to produce statements of witnesses who were present when 
the defendant was arrested. The defence’s insufficient evidence was highlighted by the 
court in the judgment and illustrated by the fact that the judge himself ordered a confronta-
tion hearing between the police and the defendant to resolve several contradictions.
171 lmc2, lmc3, lmc11, lmc15 and lmc17. 
172 hmc1, hmc4, hmc5, hmc10, hmc12 and hmc21.
173 lmc1, lmc4, lmc5, lmc6, lmc7, lmc12, lmc13 and v14. 
174  hmc2, hmc6, hmc8, hmc14, hmc15, hmc16, hmc18, hmc22 and hmc23.
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with the report, started following him and when stopped and searched found 
the drug on his right pocket. In contrast, the defendant testified that he was 
in the described location by the soldiers because was waiting for a friend, and 
he was stopped and arrested by soldiers who blind folded him and drove him 
around. According to him, the drug was not his.
Differences linked to the intent to supply them were also found in ten cases 
from the lm state175 and twelve cases from the hm state176. In lmc14, the defend-
ant alleged consistently that he not only did not own the drugs but also that 
the police broke into his home and planted the drug on him. A similar pattern 
appeared in lmc4, where the defendant alleged the drug found during the prop-
erty search was planted by the police. In hmc12, soldiers found a car parked 
with the driver in, so searched the person inside the vehicle and found the drugs 
and two scales. According to him he was not in his vehicle when arrested but 
in his home when the soldiers broke in and found the drug; he agreed the drug 
was his but for his own personal use.
As already mentioned, the prosecution tended to build their case on evidence 
produced exclusively during the pre-trial stage, principally the police state-
ments. The fact that divergence in the accounts of the events was found in the 
majority of cases did not undermine the influence exerted by police evidence on 
the outcome of the cases. 
Judicial overview of police statements 
Police officers are bound by witness evidence rules. According to article 289 of 
the Federal Criminal Proceedings Code, statements are valid and presumed to 
be truthful if witnesses meet several requisites. These are: witness’s age, train-
ing, unbiased judgment, maturity to understand the nature of the facts which 
were appreciated through the witness’ senses and that the statement is expressed 
with clarity. In consequence, courts are required to assess whether witnesses, 
including police officers, comply with these requisites so that their testimony is 
granted appropriate evidentiary weight. In other words, courts treated police 
officers as regular witnesses despite holding public positions. 
In 37 out of 40 cases,177 courts accepted that police officers complied with 
all the requirements established in article 289, including those in which torture 
175 lmc1, lmc4, lmc6, lmc7, lmc8, lmc9, lmc10, lmc13, lmc14 and lmc16. 
176 hmc2, hmc6, hmc8, hmc11, hmc13, hmc14, hmc15, hmc16, hmc18, hmc20, hmc22 and 
hmc23.
177  Except for lmc1; lmc3 and lmc7.
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and mistreatment practices were alleged by defendants, with no further discus-
sion or evidence required to corroborate this. Courts gave police statements 
strong evidentiary value based on several precedents discussed below. 
Impartiality
A clear tendency was observed for judges to presume that law enforcement 
agents were impartial. This seems to stem from precedents. A non-binding rul-
ing issued in the 1970s was quoted in 28 of the 40 judgements. The ruling 
states that police statements, far from being deemed partial because the officers 
concerned were involved in the arrest of the defendant, ought to have decisive 
weight because they were present during the commission of the crime.178 
Presuming police officers to be impartial stems from the 1970s ruling and 
is reproduced in judges’ decisions examined here. For instance, the judge in 
lmc6 held: 
As public servants, they have complete impartiality based on the fact that 
there is no evidence that suggest the opposite (lmc6, p. 95). 
Furthermore, in lmc4 the judge asserted: 
Police officers, based on the duties with which they are entrusted, deserve 
credibility, and it is not probable that they planted the drug on the defend-
ant (lmc4, p. 181). 
In addition, several judges from the hm state made remarks concerning law en-
forcement agents’ role in crime prevention.179 For instance, in hmc5 the judge 
stressed: 
There is no indication that [police officers] testified falsely or had the 
intention to unfairly involve the defendant, as the duty that they perform 
is independent and its only purpose is crime prevention (hmc5, p. 13-14). 
Similarly, the judge in hmc18 argued that soldiers’ statements should be upheld 
because they act as social safety guardians. As a consequence, the judge rejected 
the defence’s allegations.
Corroboration
In ten out of the 40 cases,180 the courts held police statements to be reliable, 
because all officers participating in the investigation corroborated the facts. 
Corroboration made police statements irrefutable because their statements 
178  Non binding ruling titled: “Police officers, evidentiary weight of their statements.” 
179  hmc5, hmc11, hmc14, hmc18 and hmc22.
180 lmc4, lmc12, lmc13 and lmc15, and hmc8, hmc13, hmc19, hmc21, hmc22, hmc23.
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throughout the pre-trial and trial proceedings were consistent, not because 
there was a third source of evidence validating their statements. In this con-
text, corroboration seems to be equivalent to confirming a particular version of 
events repeatedly without an alternate source of evidence. 
These arguments are embedded in precedents which were observed in sev-
eral judgements from the hm state. These reveal that, on the one hand, suspicion 
about identical statements does not arise where police statements, as opposed to 
other type of witnesses, are concerned, because the officers all participated in 
the same operation and could reasonably be expected to remember the events 
in similar terms. Hence, as a ruling establishes, it is “imperative to consider 
these as effective evidence”.181 This ruling appears to reflect judges’ general at-
titudes towards police evidence. On one hand, it was observed across cases that 
the core evidence used to convict is law enforcement agents’ statements, and on 
the other, that these statements are considered valid almost by default. Further-
more, it appears that evidence produced by the defence, if any, does not succeed 
in proving its case or undermining police’s version of the facts. 
Exceptions
Police evidence was discarded in a minority of cases. In the hm state, this mainly 
occurred in cases where property searches were conducted, either irregularly or 
where the information gathered did not match with the defendant’s description 
of his address and physical appearance.182 In the lm state, it was found that when 
courts examined supply charges, three of the courts that dismissed these charges 
pointed out that police officers had contradicted themselves (lmc4) and that 
their statements were not corroborated (lmc5) by any other source of evidence. 
Property searches
Property searches were carried out in a quarter of the cases but were more 
commonly carried out in the hm state than in the lm state.183 In most cases the 
property search played a decisive part in their outcome, even those in which de-
fendants were acquitted.184 In the majority of property searches, a court issued 
an order before it was carried out, but in three cases, law enforcement agents 
181 Non binding rulings titled: “Witness statement, has full effectiveness when police officers 
coincide about the way in which the arrest and the confiscation of the drug took place.” 
and “Police arrest report. Its validity when ratified before the prosecution.”
182 hmc7 and hmc9.
183 8 cases from the hm state and 2 from the lm state. 
184 hmc7 and hmc9.
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broke into the premises without a court order, because an alleged offence was 
in process. In these cases evidence was assumed to be valid, relying on a binding 
ruling issued by the scjn185 which authorises the use of evidence collected in a 
property search if an offence was occurring. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the National Commission of Human Rights has 
received an increased number of complaints about abusive practices by soldiers 
and police officers during property searches, including beatings and theft. Al-
legations of this kind were observed in half of the cases where property searches 
were carried out. For example, in hmc6 a property search was conducted in a 
place which, according to the defence, was not the defendant’s home, because 
he lives in the u.s.a. The defendant’s sister was a witness to the property search 
and, according to the official report, she had stated that her brother lived there. 
In stark contrast, the defendant’s sister claimed before the court that her alleged 
statement produced during the property search was false because her brother 
lived in the u.s.a. The defendant’s residence was the core of the defence case 
but, according to the court, the defence failed to produce sufficient evidence to 
sustain it. The defendant was convicted of supplying 115 milligrams of cocaine 
and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment. 
Police mistreatment
Police mistreatment was alleged by defendants in 11 cases involving both po-
lice and soldiers.186 These practices included beating up the defendant, stealing 
money, threatening to arrest the defendant’s family, blindfolding him and driv-
ing him around before presenting him to the prosecution agency, all of which is 
described in Table 7.12. 
Forensic examination results were available in most judgements from the lm 
state, and these results described the defendants’ injuries. By comparison, the 
vast majority of judgements from the hm state mentioned that medical examina-
tions were carried out but failed to include the results. In fact, the medical ex-
amination results were only included in three out of 23 judgements.187 The lack 
of results recorded in the hm state makes it difficult to verify whether defend-
ants’ allegations of mistreatment had any kind of documentary backup. Omit-
ting these results raises questions of police and army accountability and, more 
185 Binding ruling titled: “An authority’s interference in a premise without judicial warrant. 
Effective official doings and effectively produced evidence when it is based on a flagrant 
offence”. 
186 lmc3, lmc4, lmc10, lmc12, lmc13 and lmc14; hmc8, hmc12, hmc18, hmc22, hmc23. 
187 hmc9, hmc10 and hmc19.
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importantly, of the possibility that the courts are concealing mistreatment.
The courts’ reaction to mistreatment allegations, if existent, essentially fa-
voured the police. Reactions varied widely, ranging from making no comment 
on the defendants’ statements and examination results, to acknowledging the 
defendants’ injuries without any holding anyone accountable or initiating any 
further enquiries, to suggesting that the physical evidence of mistreatment 
were possibly due to the defendant. These comments are further described in 
the table below. 




















LMC1   x    Made no comment or 
reference
LMC3  x     Acknowledged the 
defendant’s injuries 
LMC4 x  x x   Money’s ownership 
was not demonstrat-
ed, possibly resulted 
from drug dealing
LMC10  x     Mistreatment marks 
do not signify torture 
but probably resis-
tance to be arrested
LMC12  x     Acknowledged the 
defendants’ injuries 
LMC14  x     No evidence to sug-
gest the police were 
perpetrators
NC8 x x   x  Made no comment or 
reference
NC12 x      The defendant did 




     x Made no comment or 
reference
NC16  x      Acknowledged the 
defendants’ injuries
NC18     x  Made no comment or 
reference
NC23 x      Made no comment or 
reference
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Several courts made remarks such as: 
It is observed that the defendant had wounds at the time he was exam-
ined, but this does not mean he was tortured or forced to testify in one 
way or another, especially because he denied the allegations made by the 
police, and taking into account also that those wounds may have resulted 
from his resistance to being arrested which cannot be affirmed complete-
ly, in this moment the existence of the injuries would open the possibility 
to a report against who produced them so the defendant has the right to 
do this if he desires (lmc10, p. 4). 
Case lmc14 illustrates the strength of evidence provided by police, as well as 
alleged police mistreatment and the resulting judicial responses. The police’s 
and defendant’s accounts of the arrest and offence were radically different, 
including the infliction of pain. According to the police, they stopped and 
searched the defendant because he acted suspiciously while walking down the 
street in the lm’s state city centre. The police found cocaine in a backpack the 
defendant was carrying, so he was brought to the prosecution agency. In con-
trast, according to the defendant, several police officers broke into his home 
while he was smoking marijuana with his wife and had no other drugs on him. 
He was asked for money to avoid being arrested. When he replied he had no 
money, the police beat him. After failing to obtain money from relatives, he 
was taken to the prosecution agency. He presented several pieces of evidence 
to support his case, including his wife’s testimony, the judicial inspection of 
his home which mentioned a damaged door, the forensic report on his physi-
cal injuries and his daughter’s statement that she refused to lend him money to 
bribe the police not to arrest him. 
Despite all this evidence, the judge said there was insufficient evidence from 
the defence to invalidate the prosecution’s case. In regard to the physical inju-
ries, the judge stated that there was no evidence that suggested the police had 
caused them. The judge only mentioned that in any case the defendant had the 
right to press charges but all the allegations on mistreatment made by the de-
fendant had no effect in the way evidence produced by the police was assessed. 
Systematic bias
Judges presume police statements and reports to be truthful and impartial, and 
that these were produced spontaneously. Hence, judges give police produced 
evidence strong evidentiary weight based on several rulings discussed above 
which are constantly quoted and referred to in their judgements. Also, the 
arguments that judges express in their decisions to explain why police state-
ments are valid and relevant evidence are strongly influenced by those rulings 
as expressions and exact phrases in the judgements are almost identical to 
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those arguments contained in the rulings. The tendencies of granting strong 
evidentiary weight to police produced evidence, and to use specific rulings to 
sustain such a preponderant importance was also found by Pásara (2006). He 
pointed out that police’s testimonies are not confined to being mere deposi-
tions concerning what the officer saw, but rather convert into a version of the 
facts (2006, p.13).
The fact that judges rely heavily on these rulings to the extent of adopting 
their contents provides strong indications on the way in which the judiciary 
visualises the police and also the way in which courts assess police evidence. 
Also, the fact that police statements and reports are an essential part of the 
indictments and subsequently of the prosecutions’ cases, and that the large 
majority of cases result in guilty verdicts, suggest a systematic judicial bias in 
favour of the prosecution reinforced by rulings. At the same time, the judicial 
seal of approval supported by precedents extends not only to police statements 
but also to confidence in the probity of police actions to the extent of discard-
ing allegations of abusive and illegal practices even when well-documented in 
the case file. 
The extent to which judges appear to back up or favour the prosecution 
by taking police evidence valid almost by default seems to be unrelated to a 
particular context since judges decided in similar ways in both locations. Fur-
ther, siding by the prosecution by upholding police and military’s produced 
evidence seems also to be unrelated to re-enacting enemy penology –by by-
passing procedural safeguards to facilitate convictions-. Instead, this tendency 
most likely mirrors entrenched judicial practices enhanced by rulings which 
facilitate convictions. 
Drugs’ illicit market and violence 
Only courts in the hm state made reference to the illicit market and violence in 
the state.188 Judges stressed different arguments that described different charac-
teristics of the illicit market which included the cost of drugs, profits from drug 
sales, and distribution practices. For example, in hmc14 the police stopped a ve-
hicle whose driver attempted to abscond after a property search. In the vehicle, 
police found drugs (203.69 grams of marijuana in 37 packages, and 3.2 grams 
of cocaine in 20 packages), four mobile phones, and a list with different pseu-
donyms. The court held that there were many indications that demonstrated 
intent: the way the drug was carried, the fact that two different types of drugs 
188 hmc5, hmc7*, hmc13, hmc14, hmc16, hmc18, hmc19 and hmc22.
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were present and that the quantity of drugs found indicated it was going to be 
distributed. The judge also maintained that the 450 pesos found on the defend-
ant could possibly be his profits from drug sales. 
In hmc7 the judge asserted that that the amount of investment put into the 
warehouse, which was equipped with electricity and irrigation and contained 
many marijuana plants and fungi, could only be explained by profits from drug 
sales. In hmc13 the defendant faced charges for possession with intent to supply 
23.5 grams of cocaine in 95 small bags. He was also found to be in possession 
of a firearm. According to the judge, intent to supply was supported by the fact 
that those involved in drug dealing tend to carry a firearm to protect the drugs 
or the money earned, or even to resist arrest. Similarly, the court mentioned in 
hmc19 that the fact that the defendant was carrying a firearm suggested it was 
to conceal any activities related to drug dealing.
A striking contrast was found in hmc15, where the judge made no reference 
to the violent context in which the offence occurred despite the fact that the 
media covered it widely. The events took place during the evening of May 19, 
2009.189 According to the soldiers who participated in the arrest, they received 
an anonymous call about armed people at a particular address. They went to 
the address and saw a person outside the house with a firearm. When the sus-
pect saw them, he went into the premises but left the door open, which allowed 
the soldiers to enter. Inside, soldiers found two high-range firearms, 163 car-
tridges, and a quantity of methamphetamine, all of which was confiscated and 
brought to court, together with the suspect. 
One soldier mentioned that he saw two or three people escape across the 
roof during the arrest. He described events to be slightly different from the ver-
sion narrated above. He said he saw people escaping, so he fired his weapon at 
the house’s fence and told the defendant to come out. The last part of his testi-
mony raises the question of whether the defendant was chased into the house 
or rather forced to come out. This difference was left unexamined by the court, 
as was the defendant’s account of the facts, which stated that he was on the 
premises to commit theft.
According to several media reports, there was a gunfight after the defendant 
was arrested; people in two vehicles shot at soldiers, leaving one of them injured 
(Agencias, 2009; Milenio, 2009; Plasencia, Talavera & Castro, 2009; Vélez, 
2009). The people in the vehicles tried to rescue the defendant. In addition 
to injuring a soldier, many vehicles parked in the street were damaged by the 
gunfire. According to these media reports, other items found on the premises 
189 The judgment was delivered on March 26, 2010.
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included bullet-proof vests and a list of municipal police officers who allegedly 
were in the payroll of a criminal group. 
Despite the fact that the gunfight appeared in many local newspapers, the 
court did not mention it in the judgement. The only link between the raid and the 
proceedings described in the judgement was the list of evidence produced by the 
prosecutor, which included the medical examination of one soldier taken to the 
army hospital (possibly the soldier who was shot), his testimony in court, several 
visual inspections of the house and of a car, and forensic reports on the premises. 
The judgment completely ignored the circumstances of the arrest, including 
the fact that the defendant was about to be rescued by an armed convoy, which 
shot at members of the army. The judge noted that the soldiers did not produce 
any evidence concerning the circumstances in which the firearms and drugs 
were confiscated. Similarly, the judge did not address in his judgement the fact 
that a soldier was wounded during the arrest. 
The judge found the defendant guilty of aggravated possession of drugs and 
illicit possession of firearms. He imposed the minimum sentence, taking into 
account the fact that the defendant had no previous criminal record, his age 
(22, according to the media), that he had limited literacy and his behaviour 
after the offence was committed. The judge noted that public safety and public 
health had been placed at risk based solely on the fact of carrying firearms and 
drugs but made no comment on the risk to neighbours during the shooting. 
The prosecutor filed for a sentence between the medium and maximum, but 
this was dismissed by the court, which used the defendant’s personal character-
istics (age, literacy level, socio economic situation) to justify a lenient sentence. 
The final sentence was eight years of imprisonment which by default denied 
parole benefits. The judge completely ignored the possibility that the defend-
ant was linked to a violent criminal group which shot at members of the army. 
Furthermore, the judge deemed the defendant not dangerous and imposed the 
minimum sentence possible. The refusal to link the defendant to the context 
in which the arrest took place raises several questions. The most pressing one 
is: why did the defendant, who could be framed as an ‘enemy’ from the enemy 
penology approach, receive such lenient treatment? Does this case illustrate a 
serious attempt to decide a case without reference to its context? Were the lack 
of details a strategy used by the judge to keep the judgement low-profile and 
thus protect himself from any possible retaliation?190 It is difficult to see how 
190 During an informal conversation held with a ngo member, he mentioned that hmc15 was 
not surprising. In fact, it was not unheard of that courts intendedly avoid mentioning any 
features or context of a case that could make it a high profile case for being related to or-
ganised crime. Nonetheless, this has not been fully documented.
judgement analysis                    2 177
else to explain the leniency in this case. Noteworthy are the striking contrasts 
between judgements: several judgements commented on the illicit market for 
drugs and possible violence connected to it, whereas in the one case where vio-
lence had occurred and was linked directly to the defendant, the circumstances 
of the case were completely ignored. 
As will be discussed in Chapter 9, interviewees from the hm state, in contrast 
to those from the lm state, appeared less open to discuss the effects of context 
in decision-making as well as feeling fearful of or threatened by defendants or 
by the general environment of violence. This may indicate the employment of 
strategies to shield themselves from context, to the extent of turning a blind eye 
to a series of violent events clearly connected to the defendant. 
Sentencing 
In the vast majority of judgements, the minimum sentence was imposed. Jus-
tification for imposing higher sentences differed between courts (five cases).191 
In most cases, courts granted or denied parole according to legal requirements. 
These included that the potential custodial sentence was less than four years 
or that the defendant had no previous convictions. In three cases courts deter-
mined parole based on defendants’ particular characteristics such as literacy 
and age, or whether a defendant exhibited good behaviour before and after 
committing the offence. 
As explained in Chapter 4, based on legal reforms passed in 2009, sentenc-
ing tariffs for drugs offences dropped between 2007 and 2012. Hence, the peri-
ods of imprisonment imposed in judgements before 2009 are higher compared 
to those handed down after the reform. A further result of the reform was that 
non-custodial sentences became available for many defendants who were sen-
tenced for four years of imprisonment or below. Despite the fact that sentencing 
rules changed, the way in which courts determined punishment remained the 
same across judgments. 
For instance, two defendants convicted for the same offence (possession of 
cocaine with intent to supply) received the minimum sentence but experienced 
the punishment differently because one was tried before the reform and the 
other after the reform.192 The defendant who was sentenced before the reform 
received five years in prison, whereas the other defendant received three years. 
191  hmc14, hmc22 and hmc23; lmc4 and lmc12.
192 In lmc8 the defendant that carried 7.9 grams of cocaine received 5 years of prison while the 
defendant in lmc10 carried 10.4 grams of cocaine but was sentenced with 3 years of prison. 
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The reform did not only reduce the length of his sentence but allowed him to 
serve part of the sentence on parole. Courts imposed more severe punishment 
whenever this was based on specific aspects linked to the way in which the of-
fence occurred, and to the defendant’s personal factors. Also, courts imposed 
higher sentences in cases where the defendant committed more than one of-
fence; these are explained below. 
Aspects related to the offence and defendant 
When deciding the length of the sentence, courts are required to take into ac-
count several factors related to both the offence and the defendant. This in-
cludes circumstances such as the way in which the offence occurred, the harm 
done, and the extent of the risk it caused to society. Drug offences are held to 
put public health at risk and thus deemed dangerous to society, and in all cases 
except one the courts endorsed this argument. The defendant’s personal factors 
include age, literacy, socio-economic circumstances, among others.193 
In most cases courts used template explanations to examine the different 
circumstances related to how the offence happened. For example, in regard to 
the harm done, they argued that drug offences put public health at risk, mak-
ing them dangerous by default without requiring actual harm to take place. 
Only in three cases the courts held that different amounts and types of drugs 
implied greater danger (nc14 and hmc22), and that being on the street, where 
drugs distribution is facilitated, put public health at greater risk nc23). It is 
noteworthy that these cases did not involve the largest quantity of drugs ob-
served in the sample; in fact in the cases above mentioned, courts imposed the 
minimum sentence, which confirms a general preference for low sentences. 
In regard to defendants’ personal factors, courts tended to describe each of 
these in the judgement such as mentioning the defendant’s previous convictions, 
his exact age or his literacy background. After having described all of these 
factors, the judge attempted to weigh them together in order to determine the 
punishment. Courts concluded in almost all cases that the defendant deserved 
the minimum sentence. 
Previous convictions were taken into account by many courts but only re-
sulted in an increase in two cases (lmc4 and lmc12). Also, in the vast majority 
of judgements, courts drew attention to age and literacy. Some courts consid-
ered an adult defendant should be aware of the consequences of offending and 
so considered age to be an aggravating factor. Similarly, a couple of courts held 
that defendants’ young age meant they were unable to control their impulses. 
193 Articles 51 and 52 of the Federal Criminal Code.
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Courts used literacy as both an aggravating and mitigating factor. For in-
stance, the judge in lmc14 argued that society could reproach the defendant 
with greater justification because he had a high level of literacy (he was in the 
first year of high school when arrested), as opposed to those with fewer op-
portunities. Other courts argued that defendants’ low literacy levels indicated 
limited opportunities to succeed in life, so society could not reproach them as 
harshly; other courts held that low literacy made defendants more susceptible to 
external influences and were easily led into commit an offence. 
Some judges also took into account defendants’ low income. For example, 
one judge pointed out that the defendant had to maintain himself and his par-
ents with his low income and this could have influenced his decision to offend. 
Another aspect mentioned in some cases was the defendant’s good behaviour 
before and after the arrest. For example, one judge felt the defendant deserved 
lenient treatment because he had not resisted arrest and had conducted himself 
well in prison during proceedings, including showing remorse. 
More than one offence 
According to general sentencing guidelines, the final sentence is increased if 
more than one offence is committed. In cases where defendants faced more 
than one charge, they received a harsher sentence as all offences need to be 
considered when determining the length of the sentence. The final sentence is 
determined based on the most serious offence and may be increased by up to 
half of the other offence’s sentence. In eight cases from the hm state, defend-
ants were convicted for more than one charge; three cases194 involved several 
drug offences and the other five195 involved drugs and firearms. 
For example, in hmc1 the defendant was convicted of simple possession of 
marijuana and for possession of a low-range firearm. The most serious offence 
between these two was the firearm charge which is punishable with two to 
seven years of prison and a fine approximately of 350 to 1,400 pesos.196 In con-
trast, the sentencing tariff for simple possession of drugs ranged from 10 to 16 
months in prison. The judge decided to increase the sentence by adding three 
days of prison and 70 pesos. The final sentence was 2 years, 3 days of prison 
and a fine of 420 pesos, being essentially the minimum punishment possible. 
194 hmc14, hmc17, hmc20. 
195 hmc1, hmc13, v15, hmc19 and hmc21
196 Sentencing guidelines, as explained in Chapter 4 determine fines based on the minimum 
wage. Sentencing tariffs establish how many days -50 to 200 days in this case- are multi-
plied by the minimum wage to calculate the fine. 
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In most cases judges imposed the minimum possible sentence. However, 
exceptions were observed in three cases where courts justified a more severe 
punishment based on the fact that the defendant had committed two different 
offences, or that the defendant put society at greater risk by carrying drugs (3.3 
kg of marijuana) and a firearm.197 
Uniformity in sentencing
The general inclination to impose minimum sentences was a clear trend across 
all judgements. Several interviewees, as will be discussed in the following chap-
ter, pointed to precedents issued by the scjn that allow judges to impose min-
imum sentences without further justification, while higher sentences require 
wider explanation. Only a few courts quoted these precedents. In contrast to 
their constant referral to rulings on circumstantial evidence or police state-
ments, the fact that judges did not refer to these rulings may suggest that they 
do not share them or that their contents have become part of judicial practice 
to the extent of being reproduced by judges. 
Different hypotheses may help understand the overt preference for minimum 
punishment. first, bearing in mind a managerial theory approach, it could be 
that courts opt for minimum punishment because it alleviates workloads, reliev-
ing judges from having to explain in detail what led them to impose a particular 
sentence. second, taking into account a strategic approach, imposing minimum 
sentences signifies reducing opportunities for reversal, based on the highest 
court’s precedent. Judges perhaps weigh reversals inevitably linked to career ad-
vancement, as well as managing workloads, when determining punishment in a 
sentence. Last, as will be discussed in the following chapter, judges seemed to be 
aware of current prison’s deplorable living conditions in the country. Whether 
any of these hypothesis helps explain the tendency to impose low sentences will 
be examined in Chapter 8 where views on sentencing are analysed. 
Appeals 
Many decisions made by low-tier courts may be challenged by the parties involved. 
The most common decision appealed by parties during proceedings is the inter-
mediate resolution. As mentioned elsewhere, this resolution is issued by the trial 
judge within 72 hours of the indictment being filed by the pre-trial prosecutor. 
During this period, the court takes the defendant’s initial testimony and receives 
any additional evidence which may be produced in that short period of time. 
197 hmc17, hmc19 and hmc21.
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The intermediate decision is of major relevance because it determines the 
course the proceedings will follow. In particular, it establishes the charge the 
defendant will face, which generally coincides with that filed by the prosecutor. 
It is possible, though rare, that judges establish one charge on the intermediate 
resolution and modify it when they reach a final verdict. The judge modified 
the charge only in one case (lmc12). In practice, the intermediate resolution an-
ticipates the way in which the judge will decide the case because, as described 
in previous sections, it is the evidence produced during pre-trial that constitutes 
the prosecution’s case. According to an interviewed magistrate, low-tier judges 
feel bound by their initial understanding of the case. This will be thoroughly 
discussed in the next chapter. 
In the hm state, more than half the intermediate resolutions were challenged, 
while only one-third were appealed in the lm state. In the majority of cases the 
courts of appeals in both locations sustained the low-tier court’s resolution. In 
the lm state, only one appeal (out of four) was granted; the appeals magistrate 
modified the charge from simple possession to possession with intent to supply. 
By comparison, in the four cases from the hm state where appeals were granted, 
defendants benefited, because the appeals magistrate modified the charges from 
aggravated possession to simple possession.
Final judgments may be appealed by both parties. In the lm state, only three 
judgements were challenged, while in the hm state almost half of them were 
appealed. Access to information on who filed the appeal and subsequent deci-
sions made by higher courts was very limited. Nonetheless, it is interesting to 
see that all examined cases from the lm state ended in conviction, but only a 
low number of defendants appealed. One possible reading of this may be that 
defendants who were paroled preferred not to appeal because the effects of 
parole are suspended. In other words, they would have to remain remanded 
in custody until the appeal was decided. However, there may be many other 
reasons for this tendency.
 
Conclusion
This chapter has set out the empirical findings based on an analysis of case file 
judgements. The analysis sought to compare judicial decisions on federal drug 
offences in hm and lm states of Mexico. The evidence suggests that the type and 
frequency of charges were similar in both locations. Possession with intent to 
supply was the most common charge, followed by simple possession. The type 
of drugs involved were similar: marijuana and cocaine were the most common 
drugs involved. An important difference observed was that greater quantities 
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of drugs were involved in cases from the hm state. The quantity of drugs was 
deemed a relevant piece of circumstantial evidence in judgements in both sites. 
But it was also observed that courts from the lm state were more inclined to 
grant quantity a decisive importance than those in the hm state, even though 
quantities in the lm state were much lower than those in the hm state. 
The fact that quantity was not as relevant for courts in the hm state is inter-
esting given the fact that these courts deal with more cases involving traffick-
ing routes and large-scale drug trafficking organisations than courts in the lm 
state. This counterintuitive observation resonates with a magistrate’s view that 
courts located in trafficking areas and hearing cases involving large quantities 
of drugs are much more lenient towards petty drug dealers. By comparison, 
courts located in the lm state were described by this magistrate as much more 
conservative and tend to see all cases as involving large-scale drug traffickers, 
including those concerning petty criminals carrying small quantities of drugs. 
This commentary was only made by one interviewee. Nonetheless it indicates 
the possibility that judges were affected by the ambience where the President 
and other high profile officials emphasised the need to address crime as a na-
tional security problem in light of the general threat to the country’s and soci-
ety’s safety and tranquillity, in addition to seeing the military being deployed 
to different parts of the country to wage war on the enemy. After all, one main 
critique against Jakobs’ model was the possible spill-over effect of enemy penol-
ogy on traditional penology. 
The context, in terms of patterns of crime and the degree of militarisation 
in the lm state and the hm state during 2006 to 2012 were strikingly differ-
ent. Cases in the hm state more frequently than in the lm state involved other 
offences, either drugs or firearms offences, as well as the army’s participation 
in the arrest of suspects, which reflects the differences in context. In the hm 
state, street shootings once a novelty too soon became commonplace, together 
with the increasing participation of the army in law and order activities, such 
as patrolling the streets and investigating crime. As these changes became part 
of daily life society—including judges198—was forced to adapt. By comparison, 
the lm state experienced few changes, crime rates remained constant and the 
military rarely participated in public safety matters. 
The hm state’s context showed subtle effects on the cases examined, as de-
scribed in judgements. The first effect was the involvement of the army in the 
arrest of suspects. Many of these arrests took place at checkpoints established 
198 An interviewed magistrate explained how he had encountered two street shootings and 
how he was managing fear and anxiety with his family. 
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across the state by soldiers, after conducting property searches or as a result 
of their patrolling the streets. The second aspect was the quantity of drugs in-
volved, because cases in the hm state involved greater quantities than those in 
the lm state; the case of raiding the marijuana warehouse is most illustrative. 
The third touched on the fact that many suspects in the hm state were appre-
hended with firearms in their possession which, according to several judges, 
were used by criminals to protect the criminals themselves as well as their prof-
its from drug sales. 
The differences in context naturally influenced the circumstances of the 
cases. However, judicial decision-making did not mirror these differences, ei-
ther in conviction rates or sentencing. Judges’ explanations of their reasoning 
process and the legal arguments stressed remained similar in both case study 
locations. Perhaps the greatest difference, found only in a few judgements 
from the hm state, as where courts argued that the way in which the illicit 
drugs market operated helped to prove the offence. Case hmc15 illustrates the 
extreme of these observations. On the one hand, the level of insecurity and 
violence experienced in the hm state was exemplified by the shooting that took 
place between a criminal group and members of the military where a soldier 
was wounded in an attempt to rescue the suspect. On the other hand, the 
court’s deliberation process was not affected by this to the extent of imposing 
minimum punishment because the court did not consider the defendant to be 
dangerous. 
On the whole, there is little evidence from the case judgements that ‘en-
emy penology’ has shaped judicial decision-making in Mexico. The working 
hypothesis was that the context in the hm state would be an arena where 
an enemy penology model would flourish, given the violence and insecuri-
ty, paired to the militarisation of crime control activities and the subsequent 
abrupt changes in social life. Yet within the warlike context of that state, 
judicial decision-making appeared to be very similar to that in the relatively 
peaceful environment of the lm state. The conclusion drawn is that judicial 
decision-making has been not been affected by the militarisation that has oc-
curred in the broader context. This conclusion is based on several indications: 
first, offenders appeared to be treated equally in both locations, as opposed 
to courts in the hm state treating defendants as enemies and thus in a more 
severe manner. second, it was observed that procedural safeguards were simi-
larly applied, and these safeguards were not reduced to facilitate convictions 
for more serious offences or in the hm state. third, lenient sentences – based 
on sentencing guidelines – were a common practice in both locations, so it was 
not found that defendants were punished disproportionally aiming at their 
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elimination. Therefore, one of the main findings of this research is that, con-
trary to expectations, the enemy penology paradigm clearly present in the 
statements of government officials was not reproduced by courts, both located 
in the hm state and in the lm state. 
Judgments from the hm and the lm states appeared to be consistent and uni-
form. As one interviewee put it, “Judges are cut with the same scissors”199 They 
are trained in the same academy and provided with practical tools to draw dur-
ing proceedings (Guerrero, 2008). For instance, judgements are organised and 
constructed in similar ways. Circumstantial and police evidence are weighed 
equally, which tends to guide judges to similar verdicts. In addition, sentencing 
practices were also found to be homogenous. 
More importantly, the constant referral to and citation of specific rulings in 
judgements in both locations suggests that this homogeneity stems from these 
rulings. This claim is reinforced by the fact that courts frequently use argu-
ments and even some simple expressions embedded in these rulings and present 
them as their own. Also, the use of ‘templates’ promoted by high-ranking mag-
istrates enhances uniformity in judgements and downplay any sort of creative 
reasonings. As Guarnieri, Pederzoli, and Thomas (2002) argue, lower courts 
are controled and assessed by higher courts in a permant basis which on one 
hand reduces judicial discretion, while on the other fosters uniformity. Ulti-
mately, to disregard a binding ruling issued by the Supreme Court would no 
doubt get judges into trouble.200 It is interesting to note that many of the quoted 
and referred rulings by judges are not authoritative and are even outdated. As 
Posner (2008) and Lindquist & Cross (2005) mention, particular precedents 
may become part of the legal fabric to the extent of being repeatedly referred to 
even if are they not authoritative or are inherently wrong. 
At the same time, the effort to draft judgements casting aside the context 
–including a gunfight between a criminal group and the army, a violent and 
threatening environment, public officials urging to wage war on delinquency, 
among others- mirror a legalistic ethos. Judicial behaviour, explained within 
a legalistic model holds that judges apply the law and precedents accurately to 
the case in hand while unattached from many other factors, including the Presi-
dent’s criminal justice policy of declaring the war on organised crime embed-
ding an enemy penology model. Essentially, the judiciary in the two locations 
examined did not take into account the general environment in their judge-
199 According to an interviewed magistrate in the hm state. November 2012. The equivalent 
saying in English would be ‘judges are cut from the same cloth’.
200 hm first instance judge 2. 
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ments with exception of a few of them from the hm state which mentioned the 
drugs’ illicit market. The insulation from the context, including from politics, 
appears to be achieved through the use of templates and the constant referrals 
to rulings which at the same time enhance the judiciary’s independence from 
the government’s criminal justice policies. 
2
chapter 8
 Judicial voices on understanding the defendant, 
presumption of innocence and sentencing
Introduction 
As discussed earlier in this thesis, there has been some concern in recent years that the Mexican criminal justice system has become more milita-
rised. The rise of drug violence and other violent crime, the increasing use of 
battlefield weapons by criminal groups together with the involvement of the 
military in crime control have all placed pressure on the system. In addition, 
high-profile officials, including the president, have publicly stated that crimi-
nals, or particular members of criminal groups, are Mexico’s enemies; they 
deserve no tolerance but rather need to be eliminated.201 The overall questions 
are: to what extent are judges expressing views akin to an enemy penology 
paradigm? Can any difference be traced between judges’ views located in the 
hm state and lm state? One key question for this thesis, therefore, is to what 
extent judges and magistrates think of offenders as dangerous or even ‘enemies’ 
to society, people who deserve segregation or even elimination from society, 
as the president claimed. A second key question was whether judges perceived 
or said that procedural safeguards were restricted when trying defendants or 
they being upheld with greater rigour, and to what extent. A third key ques-
tion pursued was whether and to what extent judges embraced the elimination 
sentencing goal. 
In regard to the first key question, slight indications of enemy penology 
treatment were only found in the lm state, where it was thought a certain type 
of offender should be treated with a separate set of rules, or that the president’s 
discourse had expanded the label of large-scale drug trafficker to include minor 
drug offenders. Only judges from that location distinguished ordinary offenders 
from dangerous and highly organised ones. Conversely, only one interviewee in 
201 Public statements made by high-profile officials are examined in detail in the section ‘war-
fare and enemies’ in Chapter 3. 
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the hm state described defendants as enemies.202 This alone, however, is not suf-
ficient to suggest that judges see some defendants as enemies and that therefore 
an enemy penology paradigm is not reproduced by the judiciary. Also, there 
was no significant difference found across locations in how defendants are seen.
Concerning the second key issue, judges addressed the question of whether 
defendants are presumed innocent during proceedings in various ways. This ap-
peared to be unrelated to the enemy penology model promoted by the govern-
ment and the so-called war on organised crime. Rather, ineffective presumption 
of innocence was described as being linked to judicial practices and rules, as 
well as concerns about impunity and unpopular judicial decisions. Only one 
interviewee presumed all drug dealers to be high-profile drug traffickers due to 
the government’s criminal policy.203 
At the same time, no link could be found between interviewees’ locations 
and their views on presumption of innocence. Some judges from both the lm 
and the hm states agreed that this principle is fully enforced, while other inter-
viewees from both places said it was ineffective. There was significant disagree-
ment, however, about what hampers its enforcement.
The discussion on the third key issue, sentencing, was mostly homogenous 
across locations and interviewees. Only a single judge204 voiced the desire to 
eliminate offenders, similar to what enemy penology prescribes for enemies, 
hence the elimination ideal was found almost nowhere. The great majority of 
interviewees from both locations held that sentencing should focus on the de-
fendant’s rehabilitation and reintegration into society, allowing him or her to 
gather supportive tools and training in prison. Judges from both locations men-
tioned that the defendant’s personal characteristics were relevant. At the same 
time, the vast majority of interviewees from both locations claimed that the way 
in which the offence had taken place was very significant. In sum, no difference 
was found between the hm and the lm state judges concerning sentencing.
Judges’ views and accounts on these issues are described in detail below. 
Throughout this and the next chapter, it is important to bear in mind sev-
eral issues discussed in previous chapters including: the structure of the courts 
(chapter 4), the different models that help explain judicial decision-making and 
the different judicial purposive and decision-making roles (chapter 5) and the 
political and social context of both the states examined in this thesis (chapter 
6). At the same time, several methodological themes need to be considered, 
202 hm magistrate 1. 
203 lm magistrate 4.
204 hm magistrate 1.
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such as the way in which opinions are presented by interviewees, past experi-
ences of judges in the different locations, and the fact that their accounts may 
result from being in contact, to some degree, with local politicians and legal 
practitioners (chapter 6). Judges’ comments on military involvement in court 
proceedings and judicial independence are examined in Chapter 9. 
Conceptualising the offender 
The initial question205 I asked was: “how do you conceptualise or think about 
the defendant when he is brought to court?” Judges mainly engaged with this 
question from two different angles: defendants’ personal characteristics and 
defendants within the setting of criminal proceedings.
Personal characteristics
Some judges from the lm state agreed that defendants are pushed into criminal 
activity because they lacked basic needs and care. Defendants were seen as ordi-
nary people who may have offended.206 Some interviewees agreed that defend-
ants were not evil people,207 and that most of them came from vulnerable back-
grounds, where a lack of opportunities could foster the propensity to offend.208 
Similarly, interviewees from the hm state held the view that defendants were 
human beings and ordinary people, not despicable beings just because they 
have been charged and brought to court. An interviewee described how he con-
ceptualised the defendant based on the offence he or she was charged with. In 
his view, it is society itself that produces offenders who in turn put society at 
risk; criminality has increased because of social inequality and the lack of op-
portunities for young people.
A judge from the hm state also thought the need to take the defendant’s per-
sonality into account was relevant. He noted that defendants are human, and 
one has to analyse aspects related to their personality, education, and the way 
in which they participated in the offence.209 
205 The interview schedule is contained in Appendix 1.
206 lm first instance judge 5, lm first instance judge 7, lm first instance judge 2, lm first in-
stance judge 3, lm appeals magistrate 1, lm appeals magistrate 2, lm magistrate 2, lm 
magistrate 3. 
207 lm appeals magistrate 1.
208 lm first instance judge 5, lm first instance judge 2, lm first instance judge 3, lm appeals 
magistrate 2, lm magistrate 3, lm magistrate 5.
209 hm appeals magistrate.
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Several interviewees pointed out that criminals have changed; for example, 
offenders used to fear authority but now they fire back at it.210 As one interview-
ee put it: “Now they have no values, no ideology… now they are more sadistic, 
more savage… now they are full of vices, full of excesses”.211 
Defendants within a criminal proceedings setting
Conceiving the defendant based on criminal proceedings was widespread. In-
terviewees from the lm state mentioned that their understanding of the defend-
ant relied solely on the case file,212 or at least, that ought to be what happened.213 
According to an interviewee from the hm state, the nature of the offence and 
the general delinquency situation determines whether the defendant is thought 
of as an enemy or a danger to society rather than making this assessment on 
the basis of the defendant’s individual characteristics.214 A judge from the lm 
state noted that despite a defendant’s vulnerable background, judges had to 
apply the law, which meant prosecuting the defendant and sentencing him if 
found guilty.215 
Several interviewees said that their assessment of the defendant depended on 
the charges he faced, whether he was a recidivist, and the way in which the of-
fence was committed.216 A peasant with a shotgun carrying a couple of rabbits 
faced the charge of carrying a firearm without a licence; yet that same charge 
was pressed against another defendant who was also involved in kidnapping 
and shooting at the police. Although the criminal offence was the same, the 
different circumstances led the judge to develop a specific conceptualisation of 
each defendant.217 “All the data contained in the case file led me to have an idea 
of the defendant, either as a danger to society or as a victim.”218
While this judge’s understanding was derived directly from the case file, 
another interviewee said that meeting defendants and observing them during 
court proceedings helped him to build an idea of them. For instance, he men-
210 lm magistrate 5, lm magistrate 1, lm magistrate 2, lm magistrate 4, lm first instance judge 2.
211 lm magistrate 2.
212 lm appeals magistrate 1, lm first instance judge 7.
213 lm first instance judge 2.
214 hm magistrate 5.
215 lm appeals magistrate 2.
216 lm first instance judge 7, lm appeals magistrate 2.
217 lm first instance judge 7.
218 lm first instance judge 7.
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tioned that he got a sense of who might be lying based on the way the defendant 
looked at him, either with a defiant glance or evading eye contact.219
By comparison, judges from the hm state described the defendant as some-
one innocent until proven guilty220 or someone who cannot be conceptualised 
as a criminal despite the fact that people already see him as guilty because he 
is being tried.221 Defendants are, according to another judge, victims of the 
legal system, because once they are brought to court they face the burden of 
incriminating evidence.222 The defendant’s disadvantage may be exacerbated by 
the prosecution’s inefficient investigation and the increasingly violent environ-
ment.223 “The defendant tries to fight the evidence produced against him during 
the whole proceedings with very low possibilities [of winning]”.224 
Interviewees from the hm state described the ways in which defendants face 
proceedings from a disadvantaged position.225 According to one, this disadvan-
tage consists not only of incriminating evidence but also the fact that the court’s 
final verdict is strongly shaped by its initial impression of the case, contained in 
the intermediate resolution, before the trial actually begins. He held that this is 
not merely an inclination to rule against the defendant but rather the result of 
procedural rules such as the evidence principle of inmediatez, which subtly push 
the judge to convict. In practice, he said, the first evidence collected is the police 
version of the facts, so this evidence is given greater weight than any produced 
by the defendant during trial.226 
According to this interviewee, most intermediate resolutions are based on 
evidence produced during pre-trial and conclude that the defendant is guilty; 
this tends to be reflected in the final verdict. 227 Accordingly, judges who change 
their mind during trial are seen negatively for contradicting their own assess-
ment of the case, so most of them maintain their initial judgment until the final 
guilty verdict.228
219 lm first instance judge 3.
220 hm first instance judge 2. 
221 hm magistrate 3.
222  hm magistrate 4.
223 hm first instance judge 1.
224 hm magistrate 4.
225  hm magistrate 4, hm first instance judge 1.
226 hm magistrate 4.
227 hm magistrate 4.
228 hm magistrate 4.
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Interviewees from the hm state agreed that first instance judges tend to con-
ceptualise defendants in a biased or unfavourable manner.229 “There are judges 
who from the moment defendants are brought to court consider them guilty”.230 
It would appear from these accounts that upholding the defendant’s inno-
cence at the beginning of proceedings is difficult if not impossible. This may be 
due to current procedural rules and to incentives that pressure judges to main-
tain their initial understanding of the case, which tends to be against the defen-
dant. Or, as another interviewee held, judges are pressured by deadlines, media 
and the parties involved to the extent that issuing a guilty verdict is safer.231 Be 
that as it may, several accounts discussed the limited scope of the presumption 
of innocence in practice and what could explain its ineffectiveness. 
Defendants as enemies
The judges who made comments that framed defendants as enemies were main-
ly from the lm state but were often referring to experience gained elsewhere. 
These interviewees distinguished between ordinary criminals and a particular 
type of offender, described as dangerous, threatening or highly organised.232 
For instance, members of drug-trafficking organisations were described as ap-
pearing like normal people while being high-profile criminals: “They seem to 
have a double life”.233 These defendants, according to this judge, are not im-
pulsive, will not rob for small amounts of money, are difficult to trick, tend 
to understand proceedings and are well educated. In consequence, the way to 
conceptualise them has to be different from the ways used to conceptualise the 
majority of defendants, who are low-profile criminals. 
Another judge held that perhaps defendants were not seen as enemies but, 
based on the way they committed the offence and the way they were arrest-
ed, their dangerousness was noticed so an idea begins to build in the judge’s 
mind.234 In regard to defendants charged for organised crime offences or for 
being members of a criminal organisation, another judge held: 
[They] are a danger to society, they rule as if they were in a parallel state, 
hence to face them the use of force is needed. However, trying them is 
229 hm magistrate 4, hm magistrate 5, hm first instance judge 1.
230 First instance judge 1.
231 hm magistrate 5.
232 lm first instance judge 2, lm first instance judge 6, lm first instance judge 3, lm appeals 
magistrate 2, hm magistrate 1. 
233 lm first instance judge 2.
234 lm first instance judge 3.
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difficult because basic safeguards, such as the right to a defence or hav-
ing the prosecutor produce sufficient evidence, are not enforced, leaving  
them unprotected.235 
Another judge reacted to criminal organisations who were falsifying judicial 
warrants and using them to extort and kidnap victims in the following terms:
We need a specific way to try organised crime…to those people, different 
rules should indeed be applied, those who act in groups and are part of 
organised crime.236
Interviewees agreed that dangerous offenders should be treated differently, ei-
ther with a separate set of procedural rules or sent to specific prison facilities to 
ensure the community’s safety.237 One interviewee mentioned that even violent 
or dangerous offenders lacked basic necessities and care, the absence of which 
helped explain their behaviour.238
An interviewee from the hm state pointed out that minor drug dealers may 
not be dangerous by comparison with other offenders, such as hired assassins, 
who do not deserve lenient treatment because they are a danger to society. Ac-
cording to this judge, some offenders have no ethical values, no morals, and 
show disdain for life because of the ways in which they kill, kidnap and harm 
for no other purpose than obtaining money.239 
They are people who show disdain for life, leaving a feeling of ‘what 
are these people doing here? How can they be rehabilitated?’ They ought 
to be kicked out of society because society is in danger. Sometimes you 
think, those ‘hired assassins who kill for a living should better be outside 
society’. 240
The view that defendants should be excluded from society was a great contrast 
to the views of the vast majority of the judges I interviewed. It may be simply 
an exception, an extraordinary way of thinking about defendants. However, it 
may also be the case that this judge was expressing a genuine reaction towards 
naked violence, trying to find a way of coping with a changing reality, while 
rejecting the dutiful “ought to” tone. 
Whether judges treat defendants differently based on their understanding 
or perception of dangerousness cannot be known for certain, particularly after 
235  lm magistrate 2.
236  lm first instance judge 6.
237  lm first instance judge 1, lm first instance judge 6, lm magistrate 5.
238  lm first instance judge 5.
239  hm appeals magistrate.
240  hm appeals magistrate.
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examining judgements. A few indications were found in interviews, but overall 
judges appeared not to hold an enemy penology view in either locations. The 
idea that some types of offenders deserve to be tried using special legislation 
resonates with the enemy penology paradigm, which advocates for applying an 
exceptional legal regime to enemies. It is noteworthy that only a single inter-
viewee from the hm state talked about particular types of dangerous offenders. 
He did not suggest they deserved to be treated with a separate set of rules but 
rather that they should be excluded from society. 
Presumption of innocence
The second theme discussed was presumption of innocence, understood in this 
thesis as a yardstick to measure effective procedural safeguards in trial. Hence, 
I asked interviewees: “is the principle of presumption of innocence applied ef-
fectively during court proceedings?” In general terms, judges’ opinions about 
the presumption of innocence fell into three groups. The first group articu-
lated the formal, official, institutional discourse that defendants are indeed pre-
sumed innocent. In the second group, judges acknowledged that the principle 
was partially enforced, while the third group included opinions about the lack 
of enforcement of this principle. The discussion of presumption of innocence 
touched upon different themes, such as concerns about impunity, the effect of 
the press, the judiciary’s self-perception, its awareness of the judiciary’s social 
acceptance and the divide within the judiciary about the reforms on due pro-
cess and adversarialism. Also, judges talked about related topics throughout the 
conversation including prosecution, evidence and custodial remand.
Formally, defendants are presumed innocent
Interviewees from both locations answered that presumption of innocence for-
mally exists in the legal system.241 They pointed out that the scjn has issued 
several binding rulings stating that presumption of innocence is contained in 
various constitutional articles. For example, the fact that the government has 
to comply with several requirements to justify a suspect’s arrest shows that the 
government has the burden of proof and that suspects are initially presumed in-
nocent.242 Further, in 2008, this principle was explicitly inserted into the Con-
stitution, so it is false to maintain that defendants must prove their innocence. 
241 hm magistrate 2, hm magistrate 4, hm magistrate 5, hm appeals magistrate, lm appeals 
magistrate 1, lm appeals magistrate 2, lm magistrate 5.
242 hm magistrate 4. 
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Presumption of innocence is effectively applied
Interviewees in both states explained that the principle of presumption of inno-
cence is enforced at the moment in which the court examines evidence, whether 
the defendant is in custodial remand or released on bail. Presumption of inno-
cence means that the defendant has the opportunity to produce evidence to be 
analysed by the judge.243 Ultimately, verdicts must rely on the evidentiary mate-
rial contained in the case file.244 If the state failed to produce evidence and prove 
its case, defendants are released, thus the presumption of innocence  upheld.245
Judges from the lm state highlighted that presumption of innocence is ef-
fectively applied, even though this may imply that in some cases victims are left 
completely defenceless because the prosecutor failed to present a solid case.246 
For instance, a judge from the lm state described a case in which he had to acquit 
a defendant of a prostitution charge even though there was sufficient evidence, 
including a list of clients, inspection of the rooms where the sexual services were 
provided, contraceptives and witness statements. The evidence, though compel-
ling, had resulted from an illegal property search, so all of it was nullified. 
We recognise that there is a lot of prostitution and exploitation of minors, 
but the prosecutor’s absurd and illegal way of conducting himself forced 
me to decide in that direction.247
Another judge from the hm state explained that in his experience, constitutional 
protection or amparo was granted to defendants based on insufficient incrimi-
nating evidence. This showed that the principle of presumption of innocence 
was effectively applied.248 “The presumption of innocence prevails because the 
evidentiary material produced by the prosecution may be insufficient to find 
[the defendant] guilty”.249
From the accounts above it would appear that defendants are presumed in-
nocent during trial, because evidence is examined by the court and the verdict 
is then reached. However, bearing in mind that the ratio of convictions to ac-
quittals is nine to one, questions arise concerning the effective application of 
this principle. 
243 lm magistrate 5. hm first instance judge 1. 
244 lm first instance judge 7.
245 hm first instance judge 2. lm first instance judge 4, lm first instance judge 1, lm first in-
stance judge 2, lm first instance judge 7, lm magistrate 5.
246 lm first instance judge 1, lm first instance judge 7.
247 lm first instance judge 7.
248 hm magistrate 5.
249 hm appeals magistrate.
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A different interviewee from the lm state pointed out that the relevant issue 
was that the defendant must not be treated as criminally responsible during 
the trial, even though he was probably guilty, given the initial incriminatory 
evidence produced against him.250 The effort to remain impartial until the final 
verdict was described by another judge from the hm state in the following terms: 
One must not decide beforehand, one does not have certainty that an of-
fence was committed or that a sentence must be imposed until the verdict. 
Bearing this in mind helps one to see and understand the facts of the case 
with impartiality. There might be cases where one feels anger but no, one 
must preserve impartiality.251 
From the above comment it would appear an effort is made to presume the de-
fendant innocent despite incriminatory evidence. This sheds light on the current 
habit of presuming defendants guilty embedded in the legal framework. It also 
reveals a more realistic approach to judicial decision-making in cases where a 
vast amount of information suggests someone is guilty. 
In practice, presumption of innocence is not applied
Interviewees from both states said that defendants were not presumed inno-
cent during trial.252 Some agreed that in practice defendants have to prove their 
innocence,253 or that they cannot be presented as innocent before the court 
because they carry into the trial the burden of incriminatory evidence produced 
by the prosecutor during pre-trial.254 
According to an interviewee from the hm state, when a defendant is brought 
before a judge with sufficient incriminatory evidence produced during the pre-
trial phase, the defendant is already seen as potentially guilty. The legal system 
is geared to giving the defence barely any chance to produce evidence right from 
the start of pre-trial, so in practice, the defence only can controvert the evidence 
produced during pre-trial and present new evidence to prove the defendant’s in-
nocence. According to this interviewee, the system makes it difficult to see the 
defendant as innocent and treats him as guilty from the outset; he is, after all, 
already facing a large amount of evidence against him.255 At times, the initial 
250  lm magistrate 5. 
251 hm magistrate 3.
252 hm magistrate 4, hm appeals magistrate.
253 hm magistrate 1, hm magistrate 4, hm appeals magistrate, hm magistrate 4, hm appeals 
magistrate.
254 lm first instance judge 7.
255 hm magistrate 4.
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evidence produced by the prosecutor suffices to issue a guilty verdict.256
Judgements analysed from both locations corroborate this last account. It 
was consistently found that the prosecutor hardly produced any evidence dur-
ing court proceedings, and the evidence produced during the pre-trial stage was 
used by the judge to reach a verdict.
According to interviewees from the lm state, binding rulings instruct judges 
to shift the burden of proof from the prosecution to the defence, which facili-
tates convictions. For example, according to case law, the defendant must dem-
onstrate having no prior knowledge of the drug he was caught with.257 A judge 
described a case in which a truck driver was asked to prove he did not know the 
drugs were in his truck. He was stopped by the police on the highway, and af-
ter seeing the trunk was sealed with silicon they scanned it and found cocaine. 
Once the truck driver realised this, he tried to run away. The prosecutor’s case 
relied solely on the fact that the driver tried to escape, which showed he feared 
something and consequently knew about the drugs. In the judge’s view, infer-
ring prior knowledge from the fact that the driver ran away was far from solid 
evidence, but even though he knew he had insufficient evidence, he convicted 
the defendant relying on the binding ruling explained above.258
Judges from the lm state mentioned that the defendant has to prove his in-
nocence, although they approached this claim from different perspectives.259 
One interviewee claimed that legally binding rulings establish that the defend-
ant should prove his allegations, aiming to relieve the prosecutor from proving 
his case beyond reasonable doubt.260 A judge described as dangerous the prac-
tice of not following binding rulings issued by the scjn.261 Others maintained 
that defendants often contradicted police testimony but failed to prove their 
allegations, especially about the way in which they were arrested.262 Claiming 
that defendants are compelled to prove their version of the facts implies that 
the police’s version is taken as valid and that defendants are far from being pre-
sumed innocent from the outset. Interviewees held that judges tend to privilege 
police statements even when, in their view, they no longer deserved as much 
256 lm first instance judge 7.
257 lm first instance judge 5, lm magistrate 4.
258 lm first instance judge 5.
259 lm magistrate 4, lm magistrate 2, lm first instance judge 5, lm first instance judge 7.
260 lm magistrate 4.
261 hm first instance judge 2.
262 lm first instance judge 7, lm appeals magistrate 1. 
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credibility263 and that Mexican judges tend to be stricter on the defence than 
on the prosecution.264
These commentaries are particularly interesting in the light of the fact that, 
in many of the judgements analysed, defendants contradicted the police’s ver-
sion of the facts relating to how they were arrested and to how the offence took 
place. The propensity to give law enforcement agents greater credibility casts 
doubt on the effectiveness of the equality of arms principle in proceedings and 
illustrates the disadvantages defendants face in criminal proceedings. 
The chance of rearresting a defendant who had been found innocent was 
relevant to interviewees in the lm state. 265 A judge held that he preferred the 
appeals magistrate to acquit the defendant rather than acquitting the defendant 
himself and subsequently facing a reversal that would be difficult to enforce.266 
It would be equally difficult to trace and rearrest an acquitted defendant if the 
upper court found him guilty and overturned the acquittal.267 In this judge’s 
view, if the procedure were different (i.e. if the defendant were released from 
custodial remand until the appeal was decided), many more defendants would 
be acquitted.268 
Another interviewee from the hm state, describing his initial experience as 
a low-tier judge, said: “I acknowledge too that in my first years I had an initial 
unfavourable view of the defendant, but years make you evolve”. He explained 
that the defendant had several legal remedies: “Well, he can appeal…”.269 
From these commentaries, it would seem that the fact that defendants have 
the chance to have a higher court overturn a guilty verdict balances the possi-
bility of being wrongfully convicted by a lower court. It would even appear that 
the harm caused by a possible wrongful conviction is minimised by the fact that 
defendants still have a chance of being acquitted by a higher court, described in 
terms of: “Sorry for the inconvenience”.270
A judge from the lm state addressed presumption of innocence together 
263 lm first instance judge 2.
264 lm magistrate 2.
265 lm first instance judge 5, lm first instance judge 7.
266 lm first instance judge 5.
267  lm first instance judge 5, lm first instance judge 7.
268 lm first instance judge 5.
269 hm magistrate 5. 
270 hm magistrate 5. 
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with policies concerning deterrence.271 Accordingly, judges seek to deter par-
ticular types of conduct by presuming defendants guilty and remanding them 
in custody. In this commentary, the judge described custodial remand as a 
form of incapacitation prior to trial proceedings. This resonates with enemy 
penology’s pre-emptive approach, in which proceedings follow once the sus-
pect has been detained. 272 
Another interviewee confirmed that ‘presumption of guilt’ is still assumed 
by some members of the judiciary where defendants are initially deemed re-
sponsible for an offence because they were indicted, granting the prosecution 
greater credibility from the start. 273 For example, he mentioned: 
There are magistrates whose position is to punish, who have the view that 
if they [defendants] have been brought to court it is because they really 
have committed an offence.274
In this judge’s experience, upholding presumption of innocence based on inter-
national human rights treaties (before the presumption was embedded in the 
Constitution) led to dismissals by higher courts, which maintained that these 
arguments lacked any legal basis and were plainly subjective.275 
The lack of enforcement of this principle is deeply rooted in the Mexican 
legal tradition and judicial decision-making, said one interviewee from the lm 
state.276 The transition towards adversarialism has forced upon judges a new 
way of weighing evidence and deciding cases, but judges are simply not used to 
applying the presumption of innocence principle.277 Some believe that presump-
tion of innocence will be enforced once the adversarial system is applied.278 
Another judge from the hm state summed this up:
All that is said by the prosecutor during the pre-trial stage is sufficient to 
dictate a guilty intermediate resolution and even a guilty verdict with the 
same evidence… this will change with the new system, in which we will 
have to presume the innocence of the defendant…279
271 lm appeals magistrate 1. 
272 lm appeals magistrate 1. 
273 lm first instance judge 2.
274 lm first instance judge 2.
275 lm first instance judge 1.
276 lm appeals magistrate 2.
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judicial voices on understanding the defendant                                           2 199
The role of the judge, according to an interviewee, is to reconstruct the truth 
or at least come as near as possible to discovering what really happened.280 
The inquisitorial role of judges as truth seekers is mirrored in this commentary 
and links back to the common practice of supplementing insufficient eviden-
tiary material. It also appeared that a judge’s need to establish the legal truth 
is reason enough to step into the prosecutor’s shoes and ameliorate the lack of 
evidence and/or rigour of the prosecution’s case. 
The changing role of judges in light of the so-called human rights constitu-
tional reform established in June 2011 was mentioned by interviewees in both 
locations. Based on the changes made to the Constitution and a ruling issued by 
the scjn, judges are now expected to consider human rights issues and rely on 
human rights law. According to one interviewee: “We have to protect human 
rights to comply with our judicial role”.281According to another: “Judges will 
live another era as the human rights paradigm challenges the notion of being 
limited to applying the letter of the law and instead allows them to act as freer 
interpreters”.282 A third interviewee said:
There are differences within the judiciary. It is important to bear in mind 
that we need to enforce human rights. Judges need to realise that we need 
to stop being accomplices of the denial of justice.283
From these accounts, judges seemed to see themselves as ritualists and law-
interpreters, their duties limited to applying the law to a case. Interestingly, the 
reform that authorises judges to disregard legislation that contravenes human 
rights was meant to liberate judges from legislation and become free interpret-
ers, which currently they are not. Also, linking judges’ current role to a denial 
of justice highlights that to the judge quoted above, applying the law accurately 
while disregarding, for instance, a sense of justice, common sense, ideology or 
policy goals, results in unfairness. 
The extent to which judges’ performance will change alongside their roles is 
still unclear. The hierarchical structure of the Mexican federal judiciary paired 
with the control that higher courts exert over lower courts suggest that changes 
will happen to the extent that the upper courts agree with these changes. In-
terviewees mentioned that judges are attentive to reversals and to coinciding 
rulings from upper courts when deciding a case. This indicates ways in which 
higher courts exert control over lower ones and shape their judgements. Inter-
280 lm magistrate 1.
281  hm first instance judge 1. 
282  lm appeals magistrate 2.
283  lm first instance judge 1.
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viewees, particularly low-tier judges from the lm state, commented on the rel-
evance of the way in which the appeals and constitutional magistrates decide.284 
For example, interviewees noted that they explained their arguments as clearly 
and persuasively as possible so that upper courts would be convinced by their 
decisions and consequently ratify their judgements.285 “I try to step into the 
shoes of those who may overturn the judgement; I look for weak points and try 
to strengthen them”.286
Also, reversals hamper career advancement, particularly in cases where uni-
formity, continuity and legal certainty are enhanced institutional values but 
creative and innovative legal interpretations are not welcome. Ultimately, rever-
sals, according to Baum, are seen as signs of poor judging (2006, p.111), so the 
issue of whether upper courts will confirm or overturn trial courts’ decisions is 
openly considered by judges when issuing a judgement.  
As described in the Introduction, the transition from a quasi-inquisitorial 
system to an adversarial one demands a profound transformation in rules and 
practices. Whether the change in rules will bring a change in behaviour, par-
ticularly judicial behaviour, is difficult to predict. Most of the time during in-
terviews, discussing the new criminal justice system seemed a way to deflect 
attention from current issues such as the quality of evidence produced by pros-
ecutors, which was barely mentioned.287
The enemy penology paradigm, mirrored in the link between the war on or-
ganised crime and the effective enforcement of presumption of innocence, was 
traced only in one commentary. A judge from the lm state held: 
The existence of words such as drug offence or organised crime are suf-
ficient to make the judge and the prosecutor be predisposed [to treating 
all defendants as drug traffickers or as linked to organised crime] and 
assert that this person poses great danger; we are setting the principle of 
presumption of innocence aside… this conceptualisation or stigmatisa-
tion based on the fact that the offence was committed, disregarding the 
defendant’s participation, is indeed present, and it is ruining the principle 
of presumption of innocence, because we are predisposed to expect some-
body to be dangerous and to punish him accordingly.288
284 lm first instance judge 7, lm first instance judge 1, lm first instance judge 2, lm first in-
stance judge 3, hm first instance judge 1.
285  lm first instance judge 1, lm first instance judge 3.
286  lm first instance judge 3.
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This commentary was an exception, however, so it can be held that the enemy 
penology trait of reducing defendants’ procedural rights in trial was not widely 
found. At the same time, the commentary points out the difficulty of presum-
ing someone innocent in a context where violent criminal groups and drug-
trafficking organisations operate on such a wide scale that they jeopardise the 
state’s stability. 
Press, public opinion, impunity and unpopular acquittals
Interviewees, mostly from the lm state, mentioned the difficulties judges face 
in declaring someone innocent once the press has portrayed them as guilty.289 
According to a judge, prosecutors sometimes deliberately bring flawed investi-
gations before the court to force the judge to be the one to release the defend-
ant, rather than the prosecutor.290 Another judge mentioned that in high-profile 
cases, such as drug trafficking, even if there is insufficient evidence, more than 
one judge would hesitate to declare a defendant not guilty.291 “Many times we 
may think that if we acquit due to insufficient evidence, we might be sending 
negative signs”.292 
At times they [dangerous offenders] are released because there is no evi-
dence and society does not understand, does not distinguish between the 
prosecutor’s duty to investigate and indict and the judge’s; if a defendant 
is released, it is because the judge is corrupt.293
The perception that judges are aware of their lack of public support is con-
firmed by Begné Guerra, who also found that the judiciary desire greater social 
acceptance and credibility (2007, p. 93). The confusion about the roles played 
by the prosecutor and the judge, together with the press depicting defendants 
who are still facing proceedings as already guilty, contributes to social mis-
trust (Begné Guerra, 2007; Concha Cantú & Caballero Juárez, 2001). As an 
interviewee pointed out, people do not understand because they are misled by 
the press who portray defendants as already guilty. He tried a case in which a 
defendant could not return to his community because people there still believed 
he was guilty even though he was acquitted.294 
289 lm magistrate 1, lm first instance judge 5, lm first instance judge 2, lm magistrate 5, lm 
magistrate 3, hm magistrate 5.
290 lm appeals magistrate 2.
291 lm first instance judge 5.
292 lm first instance judge 5.
293 lm first instance judge 4.
294 lm magistrate 1.
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According to a judge from the lm state, if defendants are presumed innocent, 
the work of the prosecutor and police is cast aside and impunity is consequently 
enhanced.295 He continued: 
Because only a few crimes are reported, and from those, only a few are 
indicted, and from those, only a very small proportion end in convictions. 
And then, with this idea [of presumption of innocence], guilty defendants 
are let go. This is known but not acknowledged.296 
A different judge from the lm state held:
There is a concern that with the adversarial system there will be a growth 
in impunity because police officers torture, they break into houses with-
out complying with legal requirements; with those flaws in the arrest, 
impunity will increase.297
According to this interviewee, it seems that fighting impunity is a much more 
pressing issue than holding law-enforcement agents accountable for illegal ac-
tions such as torture. Also, the illegal practices used to produce evidence ap-
pear not to conflict with the validity and truthfulness of the evidence presented 
to the court. 
Concerns about impunity were mentioned by other judges too. Judges men-
tioned that the shift to adversarialism will cause a rise in impunity.298 For in-
stance, one interviewee held that by enforcing presumption of innocence, im-
punity will rise, and this means that the number of cases that are reported and 
end up in convictions will be even less.299 Another claimed:
In the new adversarial proceedings, the most worrying part is that noth-
ing will ever be proved because there is no training to investigate thor-
oughly …there will be a lot of impunity; let’s see if the state and citizens 
can take it.300
Another interviewee held that this was the worst moment to enforce presump-
tion of innocence and human rights:
What we need now is an iron fist, to create order; we could safeguard hu-
man rights once we have made progress. We have weak institutions and if 
we add the human rights theme to the mix, they will become weaker. 301
295 lm appeals magistrate 1. 
296 lm appeals magistrate 1. 
297 lm first instance judge 1.
298 lm appeals magistrate 1, lm first instance judge 1, lm magistrate 2, lm first instance judge 2.
299 lm appeals magistrate 1.
300  lm magistrate 2.
301  lm first instance judge 5.
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Other judges commented on the inconvenience of enforcing presumption of in-
nocence, taking into account the rise of rampant violence and the need for an 
iron fist to respond to violence.302 
Different views on acquittals were also found. An interviewee held that 
Mexican judges are very tough as a result of incentives and sanctions within the 
judiciary. He explained that acquittals are much more scrutinised than convic-
tions: “Whenever an acquittal is issued, suspicion or perception of corruption 
inevitably follows… this is the criterion to which we have grown used”.303
Another interviewee described a case where the governor of a neighbouring 
state publicly accused two magistrates of wrongly acquitting a defendant in a 
case of human trafficking. The interviewee had tried several cases on human 
trafficking and held that in this type of case the defendant does not act alone; 
rather, the whole family is involved in the offence. The judge, in support of the 
governor’s claim, added: “Surely there was some kind of link [between the mag-
istrates and the defendant] or something that explains the acquittal”.304 
Not only are acquittals badly thought of, but they are also distrusted within 
the judiciary, which fosters further suspicion concerning judges’ decisions. Pres-
sure from inside the judiciary was corroborated. Interviewees acknowledged that 
acquittals are badly thought of by judicial auditors.305 This was also observed in 
state judiciaries, where to have one’s acquittals reversed by higher courts ham-
pers one’s career advancement (Concha et Caballero 2001; Pásara, 2006). 
In my view, a genuine concern about public confidence in the judiciary and 
impunity can be seen in the accounts quoted above, all of which were made by 
judges from the lm location. The desire to tackle impunity can be explained by 
bearing in mind several issues. first and foremost, the difference between the 
prosecutor’s role and the judge’s role is unclear; judges are expected to focus 
on ensuring fair trials without concern for crime and conviction rates. By com-
parison, the prosecution’s primary goal is to tackle impunity through indicting 
guilty offenders. The inquisitorial legacy may fuel the confusion; but also, as 
extensively discussed in the previous chapter, a concern for impunity is em-
bedded in frequently quoted rulings, and this concern is reproduced by judges 
in their verdicts. second, judges are forced to release defendants who may be 
guilty but against whom there is no solid evidence. Judges may experience frus-
tration when acquitting those who, in their view, are guilty. They may also feel 
302  lm appeals magistrate 1, lm first instance judge 5.
303  lm magistrate 2.
304  lm appeals magistrate 1.
305  lm magistrate 2. 
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compelled to convict in the face of increased criminality. This was reported in 
both locations. As a judge claimed: 
We cannot disregard the situation we are immersed in right now; none-
theless we are being asked to decide considering human rights, [the] pre-
sumption of innocence [and] adequate defence.306
third, judges are blamed, both within the judiciary and by society, for releas-
ing defendants, even though this may be the result of poor prosecution work, 
as will be discussed below. 
The divide within the judiciary over presumption of innocence is evident 
in many accounts. As pointed out in Chapter 1, the aims pursued by criminal 
proceedings within the Mexican quasi-inquisitorial system is to determine the 
truth of the matter as opposed to requiring parties to prove their case. At the 
same time, the prosecution is legally presumed to be an independent state inves-
tigator who acts in good faith. Meanwhile, the defendant is tried largely based 
on how he is characterised in the case file. He is mainly treated as an object of 
proceedings rather than a subject with rights to enforce during proceedings. To 
shift towards an adversarial system, where the prosecution is required to prove 
its case beyond reasonable doubt and empower the defence, requires judges to 
cast aside their quasi-inquisitorial assumptions. 
The judiciary is divided: on one end, judges with long and renowned careers 
seem reluctant to modify their way of weighing evidence and deciding cases. 
Further, they commented on the burden of having to acquit defendants who are 
presumed guilty even though they cannot be lawfully convicted. At the other 
end, judges seemed open for change, proud of their modern and internationally 
accepted way of thinking, and eager to enforce due process principles. 
This bifurcation within the judiciary is mirrored in the social acceptance of 
the guilt. Judges, according to Baum (2006), value social acceptance and rec-
ognition from fellow judges, both those sitting in upper courts and their peers. 
Judges who are bold enough to present novel interpretations of the law and 
advocate new legal doctrines do so for several reasons: they seek to push good 
policy forward, but also to attract favourable attention and develop their repu-
tation. “Judges who are innovators have the best chance to become well-known 
and widely respected within the legal community” (2006, p.108). Although 
Baum’s claims are based on an examination of the American judiciary, these 
claims are applicable to the Mexican judiciary in the present context, in which 
judges are being asked to evolve and some of them are already on their way 
while others remain reluctant.  
306 lm first instance judge 3.
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Some judges are acknowledged pioneers of adversarial principles. In the lm 
state, interviewees (judges and also public defence attorneys) noted that a col-
league had the ‘trousers’ to acquit a defendant and dismiss evidence produced 
by the police in a property search. As a trend develops on an issue such as 
upholding adversarial principles, which is distant from or even foreign to tradi-
tional Mexican judicial decision-making, some may feel pressured to follow the 
trend rather than be left behind (Baum, 2006, p.110).
Evidence
Judges from both states addressed questions of evidence from a variety of an-
gles.307 Several interviewees from the lm state held that both parties, prosecu-
tion and defence, have the right to produce evidence, even if police or military 
officers are reluctant to appear before the court to be cross-examined by the 
defence.308 Whether evidence produced by the prosecution and the defence re-
ceives equal consideration was discussed by several judges from the hm state. 
While one interviewee believed that evidence from both parties is weighed 
equally,309 a few others felt that prosecution evidence tends to receive greater 
weight than defence evidence.310 One explained that, in practice, the judge who 
analyses initial evidentiary material in order to issue a warrant at the beginning 
of the case or an intermediate resolution may use the same evidence to justify 
the final verdict. 311 This interviewee explained that ruling the case differently 
would imply the judge is being contradictory. Hence, the way rules are inter-
preted leads the judge to make an initial decision which most likely will stand 
until the end of the trial, most probably finding the defendant guilty, relying on 
the same evidentiary material since the very beginning. 
Pásara, based on an analysis of 82 judgments issued by Mexico City courts, 
found a general concordance between what judges decided in the intermediate 
resolution and what they decided in the final judgment (2006). In retrospect, he 
argued, the final verdict contains the legal reasoning of the intermediate resolu-
tion, and at the same time reproduces what the prosecutor alleged in the initial 
accusation (Pásara, 2006, p.20). In practice, the indictment is not the initial 
point of the proceedings but is instead the foreseeable final outcome of the trial 
307 lm  first instance judge 2, lm first instance judge 3, lm first instance judge 4, lm magistrate 
5, lm first instance judge 7, hm magistrate 4, hm first instance judge 2.
308 lm first instance judge 2, lm first instance judge 4.
309 hm first instance judge 2.
310 hm magistrate 4, hm appeals magistrate, lm first instance judge 5.
311 hm magistrate 4.
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(Pásara, 2006, p.40). Although within inquisitorial systems, the pre-trial stage 
is the critical one, the mixed or quasi-inquisitorial system in Mexico attempts 
to be governed by adversarial principles during court proceedings.
The fact that evidence produced by the prosecutor need not be produced 
again in court constitutes an enormous disadvantage for the defence.312 Case 
hmc6 was particularly illuminating in this regard. The police detained two 
people who testified in the public prosecutor’s office that they had bought co-
caine from the defendant, and, allegedly, the defendant was found in possession 
of 115 milligrams of the drug. These statements, together with police reports, 
amounted to a guilty verdict, even though one witness retracted in court and 
the other died during the course of proceedings. The defendant was sentenced 
with the minimum penalty of 10 years’ imprisonment despite the fact that the 
verdict lacked corroboration from key witnesses and was sustained only by the 
police’s corroborated testimony. 
Evidence brought by the military was reported to have similar weight to that 
brought by the police. An interviewee from the hm state mentioned that cases 
where the military had produced evidence led to convictions almost by default, 
with the exception of cases based solely on confessions. He explained:
Soldiers produce evidence and the prosecutor provides additional evi-
dence to corroborate [the case], but at times one thinks, soldiers have 
no reason to lie while the [defendant’s witnesses] do have a reason to lie, 
because [the witness] is a friend, a relative who wants to exonerate the 
defendant.313 
The benefit of the doubt granted to the military, as opposed to the defen-
dant’s witnesses, was only mentioned by one interviewee. However, it is far 
from exceptional. It was observed throughout judgement analysis that judges 
constantly gave law enforcement agents’ evidence greater validity, notwith-
standing allegations that contradicted their statements or any claims of mis-
treatment. Judges rather argued, without reference to any evidence, that these 
agents complied with legal requirements, which included being impartial. In 
support of this assertion, judges quoted rulings that presumed police officers 
to be impartial and independent in their judgements. 314 This finding is con-
sistent with evidence found by Pásara’s analysis of Mexico City judgments 
(2006). Pásara found that local judges also apply these rulings, which are not 
binding but appear to be compulsory. At the same time, judgement analysis 
312 hm magistrate 4.
313 hm magistrate 1.
314 Non-binding ruling titled: “Police officers, evidentiary weight of their statements.” 
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showed that defence evidence was systematically discarded. This same attitude 
was found by Pásara throughout the judgement analysis; he concluded that 
defence witnesses were granted less evidentiary value than prosecution wit-
nesses (2006, p.13). Also, different binding and non-binding rulings issued by 
the scjn indicate that judges should, for instance, disregard evidence given by 
defendants’ relatives because they are presumed to be partial, based on their 
genuine interest in securing the defendant’s release.315 
Judges from the lm state shared their opinions about how to decide a case 
where sufficient evidence was lacking. Several judges felt that doubts about the 
defendant’s involvement in the offence may not necessarily lead to acquittal.316 
For instance, one interviewee mentioned that judges supplement existing in-
formation with further evidence in order to issue a verdict based on sufficient 
evidence. This, according to interviewees, does not diminish their impartiali-
ty.317 Other interviewees confirmed this by describing different strategies used 
to gather further information. They said that whenever they were in doubt 
concerning the facts of the case they would seek further evidence, such as by 
holding a follow-up hearing with the defendant or witnesses,318 or closely ob-
serving the way the defendant behaved in court.319 Another judge held that he 
had to be certain that the defendant was not responsible for the offence; oth-
erwise he was more minded to convict.320 Indications that judges supplement 
evidence reveals the inquisitorial feature of judges being responsible for most 
aspects of proceedings, including producing evidence whenever they felt it was 
needed for the final verdict. 
The prosecution 
The prosecution’s burden of proving its case beyond reasonable doubt is the oth-
er side of the presumption of innocence. Many interviewees discussed whether 
the reasonable doubt threshold was effectively exceeded, focusing particularly 
on the question of whether the prosecution’s investigations and performance 
were effective. Other judges discussed the prosecution’s unlimited power.
315 Non-binding ruling titled: “Witnesses in court proceedings (defendant’s relatives).” 
316 lm magistrate 5, lm first instance judge 7, lm first instance judge 5, lm first instance judge 3. 
317 lm magistrate 5.
318 lm first instance judge 7.
319 lm first instance judge 3.
320 lm first instance judge 5.
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Prosecution’s inefficiency and ineptitude 
Interviewees from the hm state mentioned that the prosecutor often filed indict-
ments incorrectly.321 Also, interviewees agreed that the prosecution’s investiga-
tion is mostly poor and that indictments are weak and lack solid evidence.322As 
one said: “There is no investigation, everything is by coincidence”.323
Another practice which judges said was frequent was that prosecutors charge 
defendants incorrectly. At times they submit indictments for a more serious of-
fence despite lacking sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment. At others, 
the prosecution wrongfully pressed charges for minor offences.324 For example, 
a judge noted that in drug cases, defendants are regularly charged for posses-
sion with intent to supply instead of simple possession. A first instance judge 
may correct the indictment, so that the defendant is tried for the correct of-
fence. Nonetheless, the prosecutor may file an appeal and have the court of 
appeal reassert the initial indictment.325
A different judge described a case where an indictment for possession of a 
low-range firearm was filed. In this case, according to soldiers who participated 
in the arrest, the defendant began shooting at them from a light aircraft; when 
he was brought down they found not only the firearm but also cocaine and 
American, Mexican and Colombian currency. The soldiers even approached the 
judge and asked why he had not tried the defendant for the other offences; he 
replied that he could do nothing, as the prosecutor had not pressed any further 
charges. He pointed out that:
As a judge, you confront a dilemma if the prosecution did not do its job: 
how will I let [the defendant] go? You see the soldiers, the victims, so you 
rely on the slightest indications to hold the defendant responsible and 
increase his culpability.326
Poorly conducted investigations are suffered by defendants but also by victims. 
The prosecutor is legally required to take victims’ views into account during 
proceedings. However, victim surveys have consistently shown that 78 percent 
of victims choose not to report an offence, mostly because they distrust the 
321 hm appeals magistrate, hm first instance judge 1, hm magistrate 3.
322 lm first instance judge 6, lm first instance judge 7, lm first instance judge 1, lm magistrate 2.
323 lm magistrate 2.
324 lm first instance judge 1, lm first instance judge 2.
325 lm first instance judge 2.
326 lm first instance judge 1.
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authorities and because they believe it is a waste of time. Hence, an atmosphere 
of impunity prevails (icesi, 2011).327
Interviewees referred to deficient investigations in conjunction with negli-
gence and malpractice. Several mentioned that prosecutors find it easy to frame 
innocent people and fabricate evidence.328 For instance, one said:
As a judge, one must also bear in mind that the prosecutor has pending 
files and at times includes the names of suspects [in the indictment], and 
one wonders, did [the suspects] really do it? Or were they framed?329
Another judge said:
The prosecutor’s duty to investigate is negligently performed. He does 
not care who he indicts, we see it is deficient, we are more interested in 
protecting the defendants’ rights, conscious that the investigation is defi-
cient… we always think [the defendants] can be victims of circumstance, 
as opposed to the prosecutor, [who thinks] a person who is detained is 
already guilty.330 
To describe prosecutors by flagging the differences between them and judges 
is interesting in the context of existing links between prosecutors and judges. 
In this regard, an interviewee mentioned that many judges are initially trained 
as prosecutors, which affects their understanding of constitutional rights and 
their relevance to due process.331 The frequent career moves from prosecution 
to judiciary and vice versa were observed by Concha and Caballero in the 
context of local criminal justice practitioners (2001). This situation permits 
special knowledge of the way the other party may work and react, but also 
paves the way for personal ties between judges and prosecutors (2001, p.137-
138). Though I did not register this information from federal judges, Concha 
and Caballero found that many state judges have prior professional experience 
as state prosecutors (2001). 
The prosecutor’s lack of investigation and deficiencies during the trial may 
be rectified by the judge. This amelioration may take the form of upholding evi-
dence principles which give greater weight to initial evidence collected during 
327 The icesi, Citizen Institute for Studies on Insecurity, pioneered victimisation surveys in 
Mexico. The first survey was published in 2004 and surveying continued until 2010. At the 
end of 2011, President Calderón nationalised the victim survey and from that year onward, 
public institutions conducted the victimisation surveys. 
328 lm magistrate 5, lm appeals magistrate 2. hm first instance judge 1, hm magistrate 3.
329 hm magistrate 3.
330 hm first instance judge 1.
331 hm first instance judge 1.
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pre-trial,332 supplementing the prosecution’s evidence,333 or trying to discover 
what actually happened in the case by close observation of the evidence pro-
duced as well as the defendant’s conduct during hearings.334 
The instances of malpractice highlighted by interviewees raise questions 
about the judiciary’s role in limiting prosecutors’ inappropriate behaviour. 
Magaloni (2009) argues that, historically, binding rulings issued by the scjn 
have led judges to endorse the prosecution’s investigation and indictment in 
different ways. One example of this is the fact that the defendant’s confession 
is valid if corroborated by other evidence, even when physical marks of mis-
treatment are shown. And the fact that the defendant’s evidence has secondary 
weight, because it is produced later on in court proceedings, illustrates that the 
judiciary “gave the prosecution a blank cheque” to file false indictments rather 
than holding prosecutors accountable (2009, p.5). 
Prosecution’s lack of limits
Abuses of power by the prosecution were frequently mentioned by interview-
ees.335 According to one judge, the prosecution tends to file indictments based 
on weak evidence or on arbitrary and fabricated detentions.336 Another judge 
noted that defendants who were mistreated in the public prosecutor’s office 
were particularly reluctant to testify in court. A different interviewee said that 
when he noticed defendants had been mistreated by the police, he gave notice of 
mistreatment allegations to the prosecutor.337 Another interviewee mentioned 
that if the defendant claimed he had been forced to testify, that would affect the 
weight the interviewee gave to that testimony. But if the defendant was beaten 
up without being forced to confess, the case was not affected by the mistreat-
ment.338 Another judge described cases of torture and arbitrary detention by 
the military on which the prosecutor failed to impose limits, but no comment 
was made in regard to any response from the judge to, for example, disregard 
evidence which had been produced illegally.339 
332 lm magistrate 2.
333 lm magistrate 5.
334 lm first instance judge 3.
335 hm appeals magistrate, hm magistrate 1, lm first instance judge 1, lm first instance judge 
4, lm magistrate 2, lm magistrate 5. lm first instance judge 7 mentioned that defendants at 
times presented with bruises but he thought this did not amount to torture. 
336 hm appeals magistrate.
337 lm first instance judge 4.
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A dismissive attitude was found in some of the examined judgements, such 
as the one discussed in the previous chapter, where the judge made no com-
ment in eight out of 13 cases where the defendant made allegations of mis-
treatment.
Like the judiciary, the prosecution holds the power to file criminal lawsuits 
against anyone, including court officials. The prosecution’s privileged stand 
in front of the judiciary was mentioned by several interviewees and corrobo-
rated by Pásara (2006); among Mexico City judges, for instance, there is a 
credible fear of being indicted. The prosecution’s lack of counterweight is well 
described by Wright: 
In general, Mexican prosecutors face less competition from other institu-
tions than do prosecutors in other systems in the Western Hemisphere 
[…] Compared to other Latin American prosecutors, the prosecutors in 
Mexico do not defer to judges in the overall conduct of investigations 
(2009-2010, p.372). 
The interviewees’ comments reveal a series of strategies judges use to amend 
the prosecution’s negligent or corrupt work, including stepping into the pros-
ecutor’s role of building a solid case against the defendant. Judges’ propensity 
to straighten out the prosecution’s work may also help explain the high con-
viction rate and the interviewees’ contrasting views on the prosecution’s poor 
performance. At the same time, these practices described as common bring 
out a persistent quasi-inquisitorial ethos where the aim of determining the 
truth of the case takes priority over ensuring equal treatment to all parties 
involved. 
In the new criminal justice system, the prosecutor will need to present the 
evidence collected in a public hearing, in front of the judge as well as the de-
fence. One consequence will be that the practice currently displayed by judges 
to ameliorate or improve the prosecutor’s work will be inhibited or, with luck, 
eliminated. As an interviewee noted, this change represents an enormous chal-
lenge in its own right.340 General awareness of the prosecution’s lack of rigour 
in proving its case, and the impunity that follows, collides with enforcing a 
new and imported principle—the presumption of innocence—because this new 
principle demands the release of defendants when there is insufficient evidence, 
even when defendants are most likely guilty and/or dangerous. 
340 lm magistrate 5.
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Custodial remand
Several judges, mostly from the hm state, talked about custodial remand in 
the context of the presumption of innocence.341 Comments were diverse: some 
judges defended its use, while others voiced open disagreement. In favour, 
judges argued that custodial remand ensures that the defendant is present dur-
ing his trial, not tried in absentia. Also, it was held that though the defendant 
is detained, this does not mean he has been found guilty, because the final 
verdict has not yet been issued.342 In contrast, those against custodial remand 
claimed it should be used exceptionally, which is not how it is currently used. 
According to one judge, this measure has caused mass incarceration, because 
so many offences are considered serious enough to make custodial remand 
compulsory. Even in cases where the sentences have been reduced, such as for 
minor drug cases, custodial remand is used if intent to sell or distribute can be 
demonstrated.343 
To be tried while in custodial remand was also described as a sort of an-
ticipated punishment, since the defendant has not been found guilty. Custodial 
remand therefore contradicts the presumption of innocence. It is only justified 
in cases, according to an interviewee, where there is reasonable fear that the 
defendant may escape or may hamper proceedings if left at large.344 According 
to an interviewee, the problem lies in the fact that custodial remand is permit-
ted in the Constitution, so Congress needs to reconcile it with the presumption 
of innocence.345 Ultimately, judges who stand against custodial remand face the 
dilemma of upholding the law despite undesired and even harmful results, such 
as mass incarceration or anticipated punishment. 
Sentencing
To discuss sentencing, I asked judges several questions: “what are the key as-
pects of a case that determine the quantum of the sentence?” “What sentencing 
values or goals do you share?” “In your view, are these goals achieved?” Judges’ 
responses are divided into three main strands. 
341 hm magistrate 4, hm magistrate 5, hm first instance judge 2, hm appeals magistrate, lm 
appeals magistrate 1. 
342  hm magistrate 4, lm appeals magistrate 1. 
343  hm appeals magistrate.
344  hm first instance judge 2.
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Key aspects of determining a sentence
The interviewees discussed several issues concerning sentencing, including the 
issues to take into account when a sentence is imposed, sentencing values, and 
the effectiveness of sentences, particularly custodial ones. Criminal legislation, 
as explained in Chapter 4, clearly establishes what issues are to be considered 
by a judge when imposing a sentence, and interviewees made reference to this 
legislation during the conversations. Interviewees also highlighted specific ar-
eas of concern. 
Judges in both locations mentioned the relevance of defendants’ personal 
characteristics, such as personality, revealed through examinations carried 
out in prison; propensity to reoffend; literacy level; whether he or she had a 
legitimate job or profession; and socioeconomic background.346 For example, 
one interviewee said: “We cannot isolate the defendant’s personality from the 
criminal event… it would be unfair”.347 Another one mentioned:
We cannot say we are not interested in the environment in which he grew 
up, how he offended, whether he is visited by his relatives, his literacy 
level, in other words, who the person is.348
One interviewee noted that some judges are more severe on defendants who of-
fended while intoxicated.349 Another stated that age was most relevant to him: 
The young person is careless, he puts himself at risk, believes that all he 
does turns out well, while for the older person, life experience must have 
been present. … I ask myself, how has age influenced the defendant whom 
we are going to sentence in the specific case?350 
Interviewees explained that criminal records no longer constitute an aggravat-
ing factor and that only those defendants who had recently been convicted were 
punished more harshly.351 However, interviewees mentioned that previous con-
victions were relevant.352 And, a judge added, the severity of the sentence was 
increased if the defendant was a career criminal.353 As explained in Chapter 
4, according to criminal legislation recidivist offenders are punished more se-
346 hm first instance judge 1, hm magistrate 5, lm first instance judge 4, lm magistrate 1, lm 
appeals magistrate 2.
347 lm first instance judge 5.
348 hm magistrate 2.
349  hm magistrate 5, though he did not share this view.
350 hm magistrate 3.
351 hm magistrate 4, hm magistrate 5, hm appeals magistrate. 
352 lm first instance judge 4, lm first instance judge 2, lm magistrate 5. 
353 lm first instance judge 7, lm magistrate 5.
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verely, particularly if they are found to be habitual offenders, which means that 
the length of the sentence is increased and parole benefits are curtailed. 
The way in which the offence was committed was very significant to the 
great majority of interviewees,354 which is consistent with the list of aspects 
to be considered in sentencing established in criminal legislation. This aspect 
includes whether the defendant took advantage of the victim in any way, or 
whether he offended voluntarily or accidentally.355 It also included the degree to 
which life, public health or any other legally protected right was put at risk. An 
interviewee explained that public health, for example, was put at risk different-
ly if 10 kilograms as opposed to 10 grams of cocaine were found.356 This judge 
and others considered the motive for the offence to be particularly important.357 
Interviewees agreed that it was important to distinguish the way in which 
the defendant participated in the offence; for example, whether he offended 
as part of a group or whether he committed several offences.358 “The woman 
who fed the kidnapped victims is not the same as the person who actually 
kidnapped them”.359
The way the offender reacted to the arrest,360 the seriousness of the offence 
and the harm caused were also analysed.361 Whether the defendant was making 
up a story during trial was also considered relevant, 362 along with the likeli-
hood of rehabilitation and the odds of reoffending.363 
Consistent with what was argued in the introductory chapter concerning 
increases in sentencing tariffs, most interviewees from both locations held that 
lawmakers have made sentences much more severe and created new offences.364 
For example, several states, including the hm one, recently included in legisla-
354 lm first instance judge 4, lm first instance judge 2, lm first instance judge 6, lm first 
instance judge 1, lm first instance judge 7, lm magistrate 2, lm magistrate 4, lm appeals 
magistrate 2.
355 hm magistrate 2, hm magistrate 5, hm first instance judge 1.
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357 hm first instance judge 2, lm first instance judge 6, lm first instance judge 7.
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360 lm first instance judge 3, lm first instance judge 4.
361 lm appeals magistrate 1, lm first instance judge 6, lm magistrate 3.
362 lm first instance judge 1.
363 lm first instance judge 1, lm first instance judge 7.
364  lm first instance judge 1, lm first instance judge 2, lm first instance judge 5, lm magistrate 
2, lm magistrate 4, hm magistrate 2. 
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tion the offence of warning members of criminal organisations about law en-
forcement’s routes, operatives and practices. However, no mention was made 
of the idea that judges would, as a result of changes in statute or for any other 
reason, impose sentences towards the higher end of the sentencing tariff. On the 
contrary, judges from the lm state described a general tendency towards impos-
ing sentences at the lower end of the tariff. 365 
According to one interviewee, minimum sentences need no further justifica-
tion from the judge, whereas when imposing higher ones the judge must justify 
the greater severity.366 Another interviewee mentioned that a binding ruling is-
sued by the scjn stated that further justification was only needed when a sentence 
higher than the minimum was imposed. As discussed in the previous chapter, this 
ruling was only quoted by a few judges, even though it was found that the large 
majority of courts across both locations imposed the lowest possible sentence. 
A different interviewee explained that minimum sentences were a daily prac-
tice in locations where drug-trafficking organisations operate. The minimum 
sentence represented a middle ground where defendants couldn’t hold anything 
against the judge: 
That way offenders can no longer say ‘darn judge, he gave me the medium 
or the maximum sentence’; yes, it [the offence] was demonstrated but I 
applied the minimum sentence. 367
This might help understand the minimum sentence imposed by the judge on a 
defendant (nc15) whose gang shot at the army. To sentence taking into account 
the judges’ safety was not mentioned by any of the interviewees from the hm 
state, however. 
Sentencing goals
Discussion about sentencing goals inevitably touched on the sentencing values 
embedded in article 18 of the Constitution. Traditionally, rehabilitation (and, 
recently, reintegration) is the goal of sentencing, so judges constantly comment-
ed on rehabilitation aims. In order to approach other sentencing values and 
goals, including deterrence and retribution, I asked specific questions such as: 
“what do you think about retribution?” and “do you agree with deterrence?” 
Most interviewees touched upon both retributive and preventive values. Inter-
viewees shared both types of values and only exceptionally expressed a prefer-
ence or disregard for either of them.
365 lm magistrate 5.
366 lm first instance judge 7. This was also mentioned by a different judge from Mexico City. 
367 lm magistrate 3.
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Interviewees agreed that rehabilitating the offender was a main objective 
in sentencing.368 This could be explained by the fact that rehabilitation is the 
constitutional value that sentencing is supposed to achieve. Judges explained 
the sentence as a way of helping the defendant to reflect upon his behaviour 
and providing him with the tools to be part of society again.369 For example, 
one judge said: “The punishment’s purpose is to re-educate, reintegrate, so that 
when you are released you can re-enter society with a positive role”.370
Also, interviewees mentioned that rehabilitation should be sought only in 
particular types of case, such as those involving non-dangerous offenders.371 
In this regard, an interviewee suggested that female offenders who participate 
in criminal groups as lookouts may merit a sentence designed to rehabilitate 
them.372
Judges also touched upon deterrence. 373 It was claimed that punishing the 
defendant sends a message to society to discourage offending.374 Guilty verdicts 
and custodial sentences should intimidate people and stop them offending.375 
“The sentence has an effect on the people who are considering offending”.376 
In particular, one judge held that the sentence deters those who have a 
close connection to the defendant and who might be prone to offend, given 
that they are immersed in the same environment.377 Another mentioned that 
colleagues tend to impose the highest possible sentence on offences where 
harm and suffering are long-lasting, such as kidnapping or extortion.378 Other 
judges shared the view that the deterrent effect is indeed accomplished.379 For 
368 hm magistrate 2, hm magistrate 3, hm appeals magistrate, lm first instance judge 5, lm first 
instance judge 4, lm first instance judge 6, lm first instance judge 1, lm first instance judge 
2, lm magistrate 4, lm appeals magistrate 2, lm magistrate 3.
369 hm magistrate 2, hm magistrate 3, hm appeals magistrate, hm first instance judge 1, lm first 
instance judge 2.
370 lm first instance judge 2.
371 hm magistrate 4, hm magistrate 1.
372 hm magistrate 1.
373 hm magistrate 1, hm magistrate 3, hm magistrate 5, hm first instance judge 2, hm first in-
stance judge 1, lm appeals magistrate 1, lm first instance judge 1, lm first instance judge 2, 
lm appeals magistrate 2.
374 hm first instance judge 2.
375 lm appeals magistrate 2, lm first instance judge 7.
376 lm first instance judge 5.
377 lm first instance judge 2.
378 lm magistrate 1
379 hm magistrate 1, hm magistrate 3, hm magistrate 5, lm magistrate 1
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example, an interviewee stated: “The sentence is the only way to eradicate 
and avoid [offending] to a certain degree; if A sees that B offended, A does 
not do it”.380
Some interviewees also mentioned that the sentence attempts to set an ex-
ample.381 Accordingly, high sentences are applied so that others see that the 
consequence of crime is imprisonment.382 Other interviewees openly disagreed 
with deterrence.383 For instance, one judge held that deterrence was ineffective 
because people are no longer afraid to go to prison. He also thought that there 
were too many cases of recidivism and that criminality should be dealt with 
differently.384 
Commentaries on incapacitation were less common. Judges described im-
prisonment as a way of safeguarding society from depraved influences or from 
further harm.385 An interviewee explained that some custodial sentences sought 
to provide the prisoner with the tools for rehabilitation but also to keep him 
away from society in case he reoffended once freed, for example in cases of 
violent murder.386 
A judge from the hm state talked of eliminating particular types of offender 
from society.387 In describing a case where a mayor was shot by his own guards, 
who had previously kidnapped him, the judge said:
These [hit men] are people who show disdain for life, leaving a feeling 
of ‘what are these people doing here? How can they rehabilitate them-
selves?’ They ought to be kicked out of society because society is in dan-
ger… in the majority of cases, the sentence constitutes punishment, and 
where society has an interest in seeing that the defendant stays inside, 
like those hit men, there is no interest in their rehabilitation; it is social 
prophylaxis.388
In sum, interviewees from both locations agreed with incapacitating only par-
380 hm magistrate 3.
381 hm appeals magistrate, hm first instance judge 2. This was explained by several interview-
ees but one of them mentioned disagreeing with this view.
382 hm appeals magistrate.
383 lm first instance judge 4, lm magistrate 2, lm magistrate 4, hm appeals magistrate, hm 
magistrate 4, hm magistrate 2.
384 hm magistrate 4.
385 hm magistrate 3, hm magistrate 5, lm magistrate 5, lm first instance judge 7.
386 lm magistrate 5.
387 hm magistrate 1.
388 hm magistrate 1.
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ticular types of offenders, as opposed to all types. A judge voiced the desire to 
eliminate offenders, similar to what enemy penology prescribes when sentenc-
ing enemies.
In regard to retribution, judges described punishment in terms of life les-
sons and part of the bargain for living in society as well as infliction of pain.389 
For example, an interviewee said: “Punishment, according to the Constitution, 
seeks to rehabilitate, but the sentence consists of suffering, it is undeniable”.390 
Another one mentioned: “Punishment is a lesson…now you pay for the harm 
done to society”.391 A different judge said: “I believe punishment should cause 
suffering; being away from family, that shock, that experience could be a 
landmark”.392
Others mentioned that the sentence sought to punish the defendant, hold 
him accountable393 and help him repent,394 but at times it failed to be propor-
tional.395 A minority expressly disagreed with retribution.396 For example, one 
judge said that if the sentence is understood as punishment, it fosters resent-
ment against the state in the convicted person.397 
A judge described a case in which he imposed a sentence that sought to be 
fair.398 A woman was arrested for possession with intent to supply five kilo-
grams of marijuana. She was 18 years old, had four children and had just given 
birth to a fifth; her initial declaration was taken by the judge while she was 
still in hospital. The defendant had confessed to possessing the drug to sell it 
and also mentioned that she was worried sick because she didn’t know where 
her other children were. The judge, the prosecutor and the public defender re-
alised the woman’s vulnerability and that she was going to remain in custodial 
remand. “I asked myself, what can you hold against this woman?” The judge 
decided to convict her of a lesser charge, simple possession, so that she could be 
released, and explained in detail the defendant’s personal circumstances in the 
389 lm first instance judge 4, lm first instance judge 5, hm magistrate 2, hm magistrate 1, hm 
magistrate 3, hm magistrate 5.
390 hm magistrate 2.
391 hm magistrate 3.
392 hm magistrate 1.
393 lm first instance judge 2, lm first instance judge 4, lm magistrate 1, lm magistrate 2.
394 lm first instance 7, lm magistrate 5.
395 lm magistrate 2, lm appeals magistrate 2.
396 hm magistrate 4, hm appeals magistrate.
397 hm magistrate 4.
398 lm first instance judge 1.
judicial voices on understanding the defendant                                           2 219
judgment so that the appeals court would understand what had motivated him 
to punish her for a less serious offence. In the end, the judge said, the prosecutor 
even donated money to pay for the defendant’s bail.
Facing victims was a theme amply discussed by judges in the context of hav-
ing to acquit defendants for lack of evidentiary material. Interviewees from the 
lm state held that part of the goal of the sentence was to repair the harm done 
to the victim.399 Another said the sentenced aimed400 “to give something back 
to the victim”.401 
The harm done, not to society in general but to specific people, was relevant 
in sentencing for these judges. 
The discussion of rehabilitation and other sentencing goals made unavoid-
able the fact that in most cases rehabilitation is not achieved. Most interviewees 
from both sites pointed out that though rehabilitation is embedded in the crimi-
nal justice system, it frequently does not happen. 
What keeps convicted people from rehabilitating and reintegrating into so-
ciety? According to judges, minor offenders develop the know-how to commit 
increasingly dangerous offences.402 Others mentioned that prison conditions 
hamper rehabilitation as they lack proper facilities, not only education and 
training but also basics such as water, food and health services.403 Several in-
terviewees mentioned the unsafe conditions in prisons, including overcrowding 
and the mistreatment and extortion of convicts and their families.404 Another 
judge said that prisoners are incarcerated and kept away from society but at the 
end of the sentence are not reintegrated into to society.405
A different interviewee maintained that those prisons that are not over-
populated do accomplish rehabilitative goals by providing training, such as 
carpentry and metalwork. However, when released, the offender cannot re-
enter society as jobs are rarely given to ex-convicts; nevertheless, the convict 
is still expected to provide for his family, put food on the table. As a result, 
society pushes convicts into reoffending. “Society is failing ex-convicts by not 
399 lm first instance judge 2.
400 lm magistrate 1.
401 lm magistrate 1.
402 hm appeals magistrate, hm first instance judge 1. lm first instance judge 5, lm magistrate 
4, lm magistrate 5.
403 hm appeals magistrate, hm magistrate 4, hm magistrate 2, lm first instance judge 1.
404 lm first instance judge 2, lm first instance judge 3, lm magistrate 4, lm appeals magis-
trate 1, lm appeals magistrate 2.
405 lm appeals magistrate 2.
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offering them a second chance once they have regained their freedom”.406
Interviewees noted that the sentence is served not only by the convict but 
also by his family, left without any support.407 
Having a relative in prison means the family is also imprisoned, because 
they have to cooperate from the outside to provide him with money, food, 
clothes to survive inside… if the prisoner is released, so are the rest.408
Conditions within the great majority of prisons are unlikely to fulfil the Consti-
tution’s goal of reintegration into society. According to the National Commis-
sion for Human Rights’ Prisons Report, prisons across the country are mostly 
overpopulated and lack access to basic goods and services, as well as training 
and sports facilities (cndh, 2013). A study conducted to determine the actual 
costs of prison, including custodial remand, found that families tend to provide 
the convict with basic goods such as food, clothing and medicine, pay for legal 
assistance, spend time in visits and pay for extra-legal expenses including bribes 
to prison officials to deliver the food or allow family visits (Zepeda Lecuona, 
2009, p.60-64). 
Discussion and preliminary conclusions
General findings
The key finding from this chapter is that enemy penology was absent from 
the interviewees’ accounts of their work, how they saw offences and offenders 
and how they should be dealt with. And no substantial difference was traced 
between judges from the hm state and those from the lm state to demonstrate 
that either of these groups embraced an enemy penology model. According 
to judges from both locations, defendants are not seen as risks to society or 
enemies to exterminate. Defendants are sentenced with leniency, which judges 
said was designed to enable their rehabilitation and reintegration rather than 
their elimination from society. These were views shared by judges from both 
locations. 
Also, it was clear that presumption of innocence is not based on the type of 
defendant or offence. There is a current imbalance between the prosecution and 
the defence, but this seems unrelated to the president’s war on organised crime. 
The conviction ratio shows that the great majority of defendants have only a 
small chance of being acquitted, bearing in mind the generalised prosecution’s 
406 hm magistrate 5.
407 hm magistrate 3, hm magistrate 4, lm first instance judge 2.
408 lm first instance judge 2.
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poor quality performance.409 The defendant is constantly at a disadvantage in 
court, because he faces a large burden of incriminatory evidence produced at 
the very beginning of trial proceedings which will be used in the final verdict. 
Notwithstanding this, the prosecution was said consistently to lack rigour in 
demonstrating its case and has been known to frame suspects; hence it appears 
that, even in cases of weak investigation, defendants are convicted all the same. 
It is difficult to reconcile the claim that defendants are presumed innocent until 
proven guilty by the prosecutor, as many interviewees did, with the claim that 
defendants begin trial from a disadvantaged position and that prosecutors file 
weak cases. It is more likely that judges resort to denying that defendants are 
not presumed innocent, and that ultimately defendants are not offered a fair 
trial, at least in the first instance. 
One difference found between judges from the two states concerned what 
accounts for ineffective presumption of innocence. Judges from the hm state 
held that judges convict defendants because they are strongly influenced by 
pressure exerted by the parties involved and by administrative incentives. 
Also, they described procedural rules that facilitate the conviction of defend-
ants by upholding the prosecution’s case, which stands unchallenged by the 
defence during the pre-trial phase. By comparison, judges from the lm state 
commented on the inconvenience of the presumption of innocence, noting 
the small chance of rearresting a defendant, the rise of impunity in a context 
of unsafety and the large number of offences that go unreported and un-
punished. Whether judges think about these problems when deciding cases 
cannot be known for certain. However, several mentioned that enforcing hu-
man rights and due process principles was not easy in the current context of 
insecurity and that these rights and principles were new and consequently not 
yet accepted by all. Also, they discussed the need for a tougher approach to 
crime, the frustration of having to release a dangerous offender due to state 
corruption or negligence, and that gathering further evidence before issuing a 
judgement was common practice. 
These sorts of claims shed light on the ways in which judges assume crime 
control responsibilities which should be the province of members of the execu-
tive branch, even though they were historically shared between the prosecution 
409 In other jurisdictions such as England and Wales the conviction ratio, according to the 
Ministry of Justice, reached 82 percent in 2014. This ratio is formed by both defendants 
found guilty and those who plead guilty. Guilty pleas are a common mechanism to dispose 
of cases before reaching a final verdict, for instance, 89.6 percent of the number of offences 
sentenced by the Crown Court were guilty pleas (Ministry of Justice, 2014). This trend is 
similar in in the magistrates’ courts (Ashworth & Redmayne, 2005). 
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and the judiciary. Conversely, those views were not expressed in the hm state. 
One possible reason is that I interviewed fewer trial judges. Another possible 
reason may be that both federal judges and state judges in that state are more 
familiar with applying adversarial principles, because the state criminal pro-
cedure legislation began adopting the new rules in 2006. This change did not 
begin in the lm state until 2011. 
According to Guarnieri, Pederzoli and Thomas (2002), institutional set-
tings akin to inquisitorial systems give judges greater power than the parties in 
court and allow them to exert much more influence in the case, for instance by 
gathering further evidence. By comparison, judges within adversarial settings 
stand aside so that parties can each present their case. Possibly, judges in the 
lm state who have not been in contact with adversarial procedure rules still see 
their duty as encompassing greater responsibilities than those judges who have 
engaged in adversarial proceedings. Further, these responsibilities are directly 
linked to crime control concerns such as impunity or the chance of rearresting 
defendants. According to Cavise (2007), judges trained in adversarial principles 
found it difficult to let go of these responsibilities.
Also, studies such as that of Glick and Vines (1969) on judicial attitudes and 
roles showed that the political environment in which judges are located exerts 
some influence on judges’ role orientation. In this regard, judges who are based 
in the hm state, which pioneered adversarial proceedings at the state level, may 
be much more open (or less resistant) to embracing a new set of principles. Con-
versely, judges in the lm state, where the criminal justice reform at the state level 
was just beginning, may be more resistant to change. 
Nevertheless, despite a context where, following enemy penology, judges 
were expected to allocate guilt, curtail rights and impose severe punishment in 
order to eliminate defendants seen as enemies, the federal judiciary was found 
to be unaffected by these expectations. What accounts for the inability of en-
emy penology to shape judges’ views? Seeing judges within the legalist model 
of judicial behaviour, where ritualist and law-interpreter roles are enhanced, or 
within a bureaucratic judiciary where higher courts exert control on the lower 
ones to safeguard legal certainty and continuity, helps understand why enemy 
penology was not embraced. Furthermore, rigorous precedent adherence illus-
trates the institutional goals of fostering continuity and legal certainty. This 
plausible explanation is discussed below.
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Drawing from judicial behaviour theories and judicial roles
A legalistic model of judicial behaviour holds that judges apply the law and 
precedents accurately to the case in hand while remaining detached from many 
other factors. In this research, it seems that the judges also sought to insulate 
themselves from the president’s criminal justice policy, which entailed declaring 
‘war on organised crime’. My initial hypothesis was that this rhetoric would be 
endorsed by the judiciary, particularly those located in a conflicted and milita-
rised environment. However, this did not play out in practice in judicial activity 
in the courts. Essentially, Mexican judicial behaviour, as described during the 
interviews, fits with the legalistic model based on the fact that judges are ex-
pected to follow templates, precedents and applicable law when issuing a deci-
sion. It was also found that at times judges said they had only limited discretion 
to decide whether the defendant was guilty or not and what sentence to impose, 
either due to over-criminalisation or because of high sentencing tariffs estab-
lished by law. According to Concha and Caballero (2001), the judge’s discretion 
is marginal; he/she is expected to apply written law, largely explained by the 
Mexican legal tradition and inherited from European civil law systems. How-
ever, López Ayllón and Fix-Fierro (2003) as well as Taruffo (2003) argued that 
judges are unwilling to take full responsibility for their own decisions while 
drawing on legislation or applicable precedents.
At the same time, ritualist or law-interpreter roles were traced in comments 
such as those where judges claimed to be focused on applying the law accurately 
to the case at hand and where further interpretation of the law, for example 
drawing on international human rights treaties ratified by Mexico, was over-
ruled. Conceiving their role to be restricted to applying the law mirrors an 
attempt to remain uninvolved in politics or policy-making when trying cases 
and implies that the scope for creative legal interpretation and argumentation is 
limited and thus cannot affect policies. This is linked to a legalistic model that 
explains judicial behaviour in terms of applying the law to cases, disregarding 
ideology, policy goals, or other actors’ courses of action. 
Also, the verticality of the Mexican judiciary reinforces judicial roles that in-
volve low creativity and a rigorous adherence to the law and to precedents, as the 
opinions of interviewees showed. This is illustrated in accounts where a judge 
considered it dangerous to disregard binding rulings, or where a judge decided 
the defendant was guilty based on a binding ruling while being convinced evi-
dence was insufficient to allocate guilt. The judicial bureaucracy’s reluctance to 
accept creative legal reasonings outside the accepted values and desire to reinforce 
strict observance of rulings highlights the vertical control exerted from the higher 
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courts to the lower ones, while the institutional goals of legal certainty and 
continuity are fostered. 
Judges also commented on the changing understanding of the judicial role in 
the light of the criminal justice and human rights reforms. These reforms repre-
sent a deep change in the judge’s role within criminal proceedings and require 
judges to disregard legislation that contradicts human rights standards. The 
reform means judges will no longer be completely bound by black letter law and 
possibly make them take greater ownership of judicial decision-making. Com-
ments made by judges linked to the reforms may signal that judges may begin to 
shift towards a more law-maker and decision-making role where policy can be 
influenced through their decisions. However, for this to happen, the accepted 
values and institutional goals of legal certainty and continuity would need to be 
replaced by goals rewarding creative legal interpretation, favouring judges’ in-
fluence in policy-making. At the same time, allowing lower courts to interpret 
in a more creative manner to the extent of making law or making policy would 
threaten vertical control. 
Pragmatist voices were also heard during interviews, revealing strategies 
used by judges to reach what they believe is a fair decision. One clear example 
concerned a judge who, based on the specific situation of the defendant, opted 
to reduce the charges against her, despite the fact that she was probably guilty. 
This case illustrates the mediator role suggested by Flango, Wenner and Wenner 
(1975), where the judge relied much more on his own common sense than on 
public policy on drugs. 
Also, several interviewees described the judiciary as a decisive or at least 
very significant player in the political arena in providing order and in striking 
a balance between defendants’ rights and society’s demands for greater safety. 
These comments seem to indicate an adjudicator role, where the judge’s func-
tion is to settle disputes as an arbiter and decide cases where contending values 
are in question.
Overall, judges differ widely in their opinions, and these differences are not 
related to their rank or tier. Their behaviour and actual performance, although 
shaped by a legalistic tradition, may vary in accordance with how they under-
stand their role and how they think their role is seen by others.
Diverse and conflicting concerns
Robbennolt, MacCoun and Darley (2008) claim that judges and courts are con-
fronted with a wide range of constraints and incentives. If these are taken into ac-
count, a greater understanding of judges’ decisions can be achieved than when sim-
ply bearing in mind ideological viewpoints, policy goals or managerial objectives. 
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During fieldwork, judges often illustrated their views with examples of dif-
ferent cases. However, thorough information of specific cases was not col-
lected, so an analysis as suggested by Robbennolt, MacCoun and Darley is not 
possible. Nevertheless, the different opinions given by interviewees illustrate 
that judges consider many interests, actions, needs and concerns when decid-
ing a case. These may be linked to both the merits of a case and to external 
factors. For instance, when discussing presumption of innocence, judges de-
scribed how they considered several aspects such as: the defendant’s behaviour 
in court, the evidence produced by the parties, the obligation to apply specific 
precedents, the need to avoid reversals, the chances of facing retaliation from 
the attorney general’s office, and the judiciary’s lack of social credibility. This 
shows that judges take into account many different constraints and incentives 
when making a decision. 
Further, links between these interests, concerns and needs may be traced 
to understand judicial behaviour more fully. For instance, a particular deci-
sion may be better explained bearing in mind a judge’s obligation to apply 
precedents and the desire to avoid reversals linked to goals concerning career 
advancement, than the merits of the case. This shows that specific decisions are 
hardly ever explained by one factor alone, and also that each judge faces vari-
ous constraints and incentives and considers them differently in a given context.
Judges’ audiences
Judges showed concern for the way in which they are perceived by society. For 
instance, it was mentioned that they are portrayed as negligent and corrupt if 
they decide to acquit a defendant who has already been condemned as guilty by 
the press. Mentioning that judgements must explain why a particular defendant 
was found guilty and how the imposed sentence was determined illustrates that 
judges are concerned with how society sees them. The extent to which society 
shapes judicial decision-making is not analysed here, but concerns for social 
credibility and social approval reveal that judges believe society is attentive to 
them and their decisions. 
It also appeared that judges see their peers as an audience. Interviewees from 
different ranks, particularly those at the lowest instance, showed awareness 
of how peers and superiors reach decisions and whether their judgements will 
be confirmed or reversed. Also, judges’ public positions on novel legal policies 
such as enforcing human rights and due process principles signifies that judges 
are receptive to their peers’ recognition and actions. Judicial decision-making 
offers an opportunity for individual judges to present themselves both in court 
and outside it. 
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Seeing judges’ audiences helps understand some of the factors outside the 
case file that may shape judicial behaviour and judicial decision-making. Judges 
may issue a judgement to minimise social discontent, to avoid a reversal, to 
convince a higher judge to rule in a fairer way or to prove themselves modern or 
rebellious. This is not to say that judges decide based solely on the likelihood of 
an upper court overturning a decision, for example, but rather that judges bear 
in mind the likely response of upper courts, peers and society in general when 
deciding a case or making a legal argument.
The extent to which the president and other members of the executive con-
stitute a relevant audience for judges is the concern of the next chapter, where 
the military’s involvement in criminal proceedings and judicial independence 
are discussed. To this point, however, it seems that the judiciary appear to be 
insulated from the enemy penology paradigm put forward by public statements, 
policies and laws on national security and crime control.
2
chapter 9
Judicial voices on the military 
and judicial independence
Introduction
In earlier chapters, I concluded that judges appeared not to enact an enemy penology model. This conclusion was largely based on how they see defend-
ants, whether they have lowered procedural guarantees to foster convictions, 
and sentencing. In this chapter, I examine the wider context in which enemy 
penology operates in order to examine judges’ views on the army’s involvement 
in criminal proceedings and in public safety tasks; judges’ own understanding 
of their independence; and their role in a challenging environment. At the same 
time, I trace commonalities and differences between the two sets of judges.
It was found that judges from both locations disagreed with military involve-
ment in crime control activities because soldiers lack the necessary training 
in conducting crime investigations. Judges from both states agreed that there 
is no substantive change in proceedings when soldiers are involved, for they 
are treated the same as other law enforcement agents. One difference that was 
found concerned judges’ views on the military’s abusive practices. While judges 
in the lm state were highly critical of the military, describing their behaviour as 
unlawful and arbitrary, judges in the hm state had various opinions. 
Judges’ roles and reactions to violent and militarised environments were dis-
cussed by interviewees and several kinds of responses were found. Yet the dif-
ferences and similarities in accounts showed no relationship to the location of 
the interviewees. The only difference was the openness with which interviewees 
from the lm state discussed judges’ reactions to dangerous environments. These 
reactions ranged from feeling fearful to adapting their legal reasonings to the 
context. Finally, judges from both locations agreed that judges are independent 
from other branches of government but are subject to several kinds of influence 
and pressure. 
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Participation of the army in court proceedings 
I asked judges: “Has the way of managing proceedings been affected by the 
army’s increasing participation in public safety matters?” (For example, in as-
pects related to crime investigation or production of evidence). This question 
allowed the discussion to touch upon the military’s role during proceedings 
but also their general views on the military and its involvement in public safety 
matters. 
General views on the army
Interviewees shared opinions on the military’s participation in public safety 
and crime investigation. Most of the interviewees in both locations considered 
that it was not desirable to rely on the military to perform policing work. The 
military’s involvement was explained by interviewees as a necessary response 
by the state in the face of police incapacity.410 Judges from the hm state agreed 
that the army’s involvement began when the police were infiltrated by and col-
luded with criminals. Police officers had been found to be members of criminal 
groups. Officers had been killed or were frightened to be involved in investi-
gating members of criminal groups.411 A judge said that in effect: “We were 
left without police”.412 The impression that police effectively ‘disappeared’ from 
the criminal justice system illustrates the seriousness of the safety crisis, where 
daily violence and lawlessness were experienced across the state. 
According to a judge in the hm state, people saw the military’s intervention 
as a relief. 413 He felt that society had greater trust in the army than the po-
lice, especially because soldiers appeared to be much more effective in ensuring 
safety and a general sense of order and control. A judge from the lm state, but 
originally from a different state noted that in his hometown people generally 
felt better and safer once the army began patrolling the streets.414 However, 
another judge felt that drawing on the military meant “bringing war to our 
own people”.415 Another said that the military patrolling the streets was the 
real result of its involvement in public safety tasks, and it was quite shocking to 
410 lm magistrate 5, lm appeals magistrate 2, lm first instance judge 5, lm first instance judge 
7, hm magistrate 1.
411 hm magistrate 1, hm magistrate 4.
412 hm magistrate 1.
413 hm magistrate 4.
414 lm first instance judge 5.
415 lm appeals magistrate 2.
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see military convoys patrolling the streets, heavily armed and aiming forward, 
which meant that if anybody stood in their way, they could simply fire.416 
The army and court proceedings
The increased participation of soldiers in crime investigation and the arrest of 
suspects was the result of military involvement in the “war on organised crime” 
waged in the several regions of the country where drug-trafficking groups op-
erated, including the hm state. The extent to which the military affected court 
proceedings was one of the key questions asked to reveal to what extent judges 
were affected by this policy. 
The judgements analysed in this research showed that the military’s par-
ticipation in crime investigation and subsequently in trial proceedings was sub-
stantially greater in the hm state than in the lm state. Even so, most judges 
in both locations described only minor effects in court proceedings.417 Inter-
viewees mentioned that these changes were reflected in the fact that soldiers, 
as opposed to police, were arresting suspects.418 In practical terms, this meant 
that the number of reported cases rose. In particular, drug cases increased, be-
cause the federal government had tasked soldiers with fighting drug-trafficking. 
However, this did not change proceedings substantially; cases continued to be 
managed and filed by the prosecutor, just as if the investigations had been car-
ried out by the police.419 Soldiers, like police officers, produced reports explain-
ing how the offence took place and the manner of the defendant’s arrest.420 
Their actions included confiscating firearms and drugs after entering premises 
or stopping and searching vehicles at checkpoints.421 
In respect of evidence collection, judges agreed that proceedings remained 
essentially unchanged.422 The military’s participation was noticeable in more 
practical ways; for example, a judge observed that proceedings were delayed 
when soldiers who were witnesses to the arrest had been transferred to a differ-
ent part of the country and he had to wait to cross-examine them in court.423 
416 lm first instance judge 2.
417 hm appeals magistrate, hm magistrate 1, hm magistrate 4, hm magistrate 5, hm first in-
stance judge 1, lm first instance judge 2, lm first instance judge 7, lm magistrate 5.
418 hm magistrate 5, lm magistrate 2. 
419 hm magistrate 5 and also mentioned by hm public attorney 5.
420 hm appeals magistrate, hm first instance judge 2, hm magistrate 5.
421 hm magistrate 1.
422 hm magistrate 1, hm magistrate 5.
423 hm first instance judge 1.
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In sum, judges from both locations did not report any substantive changes in 
proceedings due to the military’s involvement in crime investigation. Judgement 
analyses corroborated this: soldiers and police officers were treated alike, as 
was the evidence they produced. 
Commenting on military abuses
The army’s lack of training in performing investigative tasks was frequently 
mentioned by judges from the hm and lm states.424 According to interviewees, 
the army should protect national security rather than conduct crime inves-
tigations.425 Concerning military abuses of power and mistreatment of sus-
pects, comments varied. On one side, several interviewees from the hm state 
mentioned that soldiers tended to safeguard constitutional rights and bring 
suspects immediately to the prosecution agency. Only in exceptional cases did 
evidence need to be discarded because it resulted from extended (or extrajudi-
cial) detentions.426 
A middle position was taken by other interviewees from the hm state, who 
asserted that they did not have much awareness of the military’s improper 
practices.427 According to one, judges focus on the defendant’s guilt and the 
offence charged, so they have no time to take notice of other aspects of the 
case. However, that same interviewee, in the context of a different question, 
mentioned that the army’s performance was not entirely lawful; at times they 
harmed innocent people, people who were simply in the wrong place at the 
wrong time, and reported facts that did not coincide with what seemed to have 
actually happened.428
On the other side, interviewees from both the hm and the lm states described 
military abuses as much more frequent. For example: “If the army intervenes, 
criminals go away but, on the other hand, if they act, there are cases of torture 
and shootings”.429 Others said:
We have noticed violations, many constitutional violations… They are 
accustomed to respect orders and execute them. If their captain, sergeant 
424  hm magistrate 3, lm appeals magistrate 1, lm magistrate 2, lm magistrate 4, lm first in-
stance judge 7, lm magistrate 3.
425  hm magistrate 3, hm magistrate 5, hm appeals magistrate.
426  hm magistrate 4, hm magistrate 5.
427  hm first instance judge 2, hm magistrate 3.
428  hm magistrate 3.
429  hm magistrate 1.
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or commander says go in, break the door, then they [the soldiers] break 
the door, so that has affected society in a serious manner.430  
 
Perhaps in the future they [soldiers] will be strongly criticised… we had 
stopped seeing cases of torture and extrajudicial detentions and now we 
see them… They bring the suspect to the prosecution agency 20 hours 
later… that was typical in the ‘70s… We are in an exceptional situa-
tion that has not been current for a while, torture, extended detentions 
[happening], and so constitutional protection is granted [to defendants]. 
The problem is their manner [of conducting investigations], they do not 
know how to take a statement or [safeguard] the other party’s rights.431
Most operations in which soldiers participate culminate in the arrest of sus-
pects. Nonetheless, according to interviewees from both locations, these de-
tentions are riddled with abuses, such as forced confessions or de facto prop-
erty searches. In those cases the defendant is granted constitutional protection 
by a constitutional tribunal and released. But this means that the defendant 
was previously convicted by lower courts who disregarded the military’s abu-
sive practices.432
According to interviewees, the soldiers’ lack of training as civil officials and 
the discipline engrained in their training make them prone to committing abus-
es433 for which they are not held accountable.434 “If police officers are the first 
to violate human rights, members of the army are worse”.435 
Interviewees pointed out that military personnel tend to gather evidence and 
conduct investigation activities improperly, such as property searches. A judge 
from the hm state described several cases in which he believed soldiers had 
framed defendants and produced incriminating evidence, leading to convictions 
he then revoked.436 For example, in one case soldiers took two young men to 
the prosecution agency for possession of a high-calibre firearm, an AK 47. Ac-
cording to the military, they were carrying the firearm in a very small car, a 
Volkswagen, and when they saw the soldiers they got out of the car with the 
430  hm appeals magistrate.
431 hm magistrate 1.
432 lm magistrate 4, lm magistrate 5, hm magistrate 4, hm magistrate 5.
433 lm appeals magistrate 1, lm magistrate 2, lm magistrate 4, lm first instance judge 7, lm 
magistrate 3.
434 lm magistrate 4.
435 lm magistrate 2.
436 hm appeals magistrate.
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weapon and ran away. However, this did not make sense to the judge. It was 
difficult to imagine two people getting swiftly out of such a small car with a 
35-inch weapon and running away. Also, the defence produced several pieces 
of evidence to prove they were not carrying a weapon but rather heading to the 
house of a client who had asked for help from the drug rehabilitation associa-
tion where the defendants worked.437 
Another interviewee from the lm state described a case where he thought 
people were falsely accusing the military of breaking into homes and commit-
ting abuses in a different state where the military was also involved.438 After 
seeing similar cases from other municipalities, he realised it was not a lie or an 
isolated event but rather a systematic practice. The army was using a drug de-
tector called gt200, widely known as the “devil’s ouija board”. Soldiers pointed 
this detector at a house and it quickly determined whether drugs were kept in-
side, which would allow them to legitimately break in. Scientists from the Phys-
ics Department of the National University (unam) determined that the gt200 
detector was as accurate as a flip of a coin (El País, 2013).439
A different judge from the lm state agreed with the military’s involvement in 
crime investigation and stated: 
The army does not understand human rights, but on the other hand, we 
have a prosecution service that is 100 percent unreliable, as corrupt as 
could be. I would much rather have an institution with bad manners than 
an infiltrated one.440
Although comments and views on the army’s improper behaviour varied across 
locations and amongst judges, judges from the lm state coincided in highlight-
ing unlawful actions by soldiers. By comparison, judges from the hm state var-
ied widely: some interviewees described military abuses, others said they could 
not comment as had no knowledge or awareness of the matter; others described 
military abuses as exceptional. The diversity of opinions of judges in the hm 
state is interesting, bearing in mind that those judges had greater contact with 
the military and were immersed in a violent environment.
437 hm appeals magistrate.
438 lm magistrate 2.
439 This tool became famous for being particularly expensive and inaccurate in performing 
crime investigation tasks. At the moment of the interview, the scjn and the National Com-
mission for Human Rights (cndh) were reviewing the legality of the detector.
440 lm first instance judge 5.
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Judicial independence and impartiality 
International consensus defines impartiality as a quality in judicial decision-
making where a case is resolved without favour, bias or prejudice, while in-
dependence concerns deciding a case solely based on the facts and on legal 
reasoning, without concern for other parties, including other branches of the 
government. Judicial impartiality and independence are issues that merit a 
study in their own right. These themes were frequently referred to by interview-
ees from both locations, although they seemed to use them equally despite their 
inherent differences.441
Judicial independence and impartiality were topics discussed towards the 
end of the interviews. I sought to approach these issues after having built rap-
port with interviewees. To spark the conversation I asked: “in your opinion, 
did the president’s habit of referring to offenders as enemies and drawing on the 
military affect the judiciary in any way?” “Has insecurity affected the judiciary 
in any way?” Interesting views concerning the way judges view themselves and 
other colleagues were discussed, as well as impartiality and the way in which 
insecurity affects judicial decision-making. The judiciary’s independence was 
also addressed, and this topic is covered in the last part of this section.
Impartiality and judges’ ranks
Interviewees from all ranks claimed that they analyse cases impartially.442 
However, several believed that fellow judges, in particular those from low-tier 
courts, lacked impartiality and objectivity.443 For example, one interviewee 
mentioned that lower-tier judges are bound by the intermediate resolution to 
reach a final judgement. He noted that several judges had faced administra-
tive complaints when the final verdict did not coincide with the intermediate 
resolution.444 According to another, the way in which the parties behave dur-
ing proceedings puts pressure on the judge, in addition to the media and strict 
441 For instance, an interviewee explained that he attempted to remain impartial by not bond-
ing with other practising lawyers and criminal justice officials, as well as by not attending 
training courses. lm appeals magistrate 1.
442 hm magistrate 3, hm first instance judge 1, hm magistrate 5.
443 A way of approaching issues of impartiality was asking interviewees about their 
perceptions of their colleagues or of the judiciary as a whole. It appeared to be an 
effective strategy to discuss the judiciary in general. However, these interviewees 
insisted that their answers were not by any means a general assessment but rather 
personal opinions.
444 hm magistrate 4.
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deadlines. All these pressures contribute to finding against the defendant.445 
The judge is a human being who thinks and feels like anyone else. So the 
pressure from the press, at times, corners them [judges] or makes them be 
too cautious, and that goes against the defendant because … the circum-
stances make the judge biased against the defendant, and that is why the 
majority of decisions are convictions.446 
This interviewee explained that his opinion was based on his personal expe-
rience; he had worked in the federal judiciary for over thirty years and had 
been a first instance judge.447 In his view, higher-tier judges, such as appeals 
magistrates or constitutional magistrates, decide cases with greater objectivity 
because they are not pressured by deadlines or immersed in trial proceedings. 
Impartiality and the relevance of the written case file
Throughout the interviews, judges mainly from the lm state discussed judicial 
performance and impartiality. Also, they discussed the relationship between 
judicial impartiality and deciding a case either based only on paper submission 
or reaching a verdict also informed by their interaction with the parties dur-
ing proceedings. At one extreme, some interviewees held that examining all 
documents contained in the case file and using them to reach a verdict was the 
best road to an impartial decision.448 Any initial prejudgements, moral consid-
erations or personal views that could hinder an objective reading of the case 
would be eradicated by basing a decision solely on the documents contained in 
the dossier.449 Whatever claim the parties might make was only significant if 
it had documentary support; all other allegations were unfounded and hence 
discarded.450 
The fact that judges considered the written case files to be of paramount im-
portance, even greater than human interaction during proceedings, resonates 
with how an expert on criminal justice described the “ideal judge” who rules on 
a case exclusively on the file, isolated from the people and events surrounding 
him.451 Further, this commentary resonates with a ritualist judge who believes the 
445 hm magistrate 5.
446 hm magistrate 5.
447  hm magistrate 5.
448 lm appeals magistrate 1, lm first instance judge 8, lm first instance judge 4, lm first in-
stance judge 5. 
449 lm first instance judge 8.
450 lm first instance judge 4.
451 Expert in criminal justice, Mexico City.
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only criteria for reaching a decision are the accurate application of the law and 
precedents to a case, disregarding any aspects of the context and of the parties. 
At the other extreme, several judges mentioned the relevance of observing 
how defendants and the rest of the people involved behaved in court proceed-
ings such as cross-examinations or confrontation hearings. According to these 
judges, the fact that upper courts do not hold hearings and do not generally 
meet the parties may lead to unfair decisions. Interviewees discussed cases in 
which they felt they reached a fairer verdict after meeting the parties personally. 
These commentaries resonate with the adjudicator role discussed earlier, where 
the judge as an adjudicator is interested in settling controversies, taking into 
account each party’s rights. Also, those commentaries reflect the mediator role 
where a sense of fairness is borne in mind to reach a solution. 
The choice of deciding based on paper submission or on oral hearings has 
been examined elsewhere. According to a recent study by Thomas and Genn 
(2013) on judicial decision-making in the UK, case outcomes do not tend to 
vary according to whether the decision was based on written submissions or 
oral hearings. However, it was also found by this and other studies that oral 
hearings give decision-makers the perception of having received enough evi-
dence and parties the perception of a fairer process. Further, oral hearings ap-
peared to be more effective where evidence and credibility were in question 
(ASA, 2005; Richardson & Genn, 2007; Thomas & Genn, 2013).
The judge’s participation in hearings was a theme raised in surveys of prison 
populations, in which prisoners insisted that judges tended to be absent during 
hearings to the extent that defendants often confused the judge with the court 
clerk or with other court officials (Azaola & Bergman, 2010; Azaola & Correa, 
2012). A frequent explanation of the judge’s failed attendance was excessive 
workloads (Azaola & Bergman, 2010; Azaola & Correa, 2012; Pásara, 2006). 
Could it be that workload is only one part of the explanation of their absence, 
and that judges choose not to be present during hearings because they believe 
their impartiality may be impaired?
If the second explanation is true, the new adversarial system, which demands 
that the judge be present during all court proceedings, will force judges to mod-
ify their understanding of impartiality. In other words, those who believe that 
decisions should be based solely on the case file will face severe difficulties 
when required to consider evidence that involves human interaction and reach 
an impartial verdict when public hearings are held. 
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Independence and insecurity
In 2011, the u.n’s special rapporteur on independent judges and lawyers re-
ported that Mexican judges and other legal practitioners faced threats, intimi-
dation, harassment and other forms of pressure. This pressure kept them from 
acting freely or truly independently. The rapporteur concluded that “the need 
to protect court officials from threats and intimidation is underscored” (2011, 
p. i, 12-13). 
In 2012, the chief justice of the scjn launched a new security programme 
to protect judges in high-risk locations, providing security personnel and ar-
moured vehicles (Taniguchi, 2012b). By 2012, 98 members of the judiciary 
had been granted special safety protection; 78 judges made use of armoured 
vehicles and 20 used personal bodyguards. Also, working hours were modi-
fied in several states, including the hm state (Taniguchi, 2012a; Taniguchi, 
2012b). The chief justice publicly acknowledged that criminals had attempted 
to threaten judges:
The work of judges during these times is very complicated due to the pre-
sent situation in the country. Insecurity, violence, organised crime are all 
present; these are facts, true facts.452 
The rise in drug-related violence paired with the increasing involvement of the 
military in criminal justice affairs help explain the measures taken by the chief 
justice. It is clear that these measures seek to safeguard judges and judicial im-
partiality and independence. Whether the measures described were sufficient 
to achieve their goals is difficult to ascertain. However, Begné Guerra (2007) 
found that high-profile offenders such as drug traffickers exert pressure on 
judges’ impartiality, either by offering large amounts of money or by threat-
ening their lives and those of their families. There are no official figures for 
the total number of threats, killings or other intimidation, but there are many 
crude examples. For instance, the third judge killed during President Calderón’s 
administration was found outside the court building in 2006 (Begné Guerra, 
2007). He had previously rejected the bid of Osiel Cárdenas, the leader of the 
Gulf drug trafficking organisation, to reschedule a hearing.453
The different levels of violence experienced in the examined states were il-
lustrated in many ways. For instance, all federal courts in the lm are located in 
a single building and it is guarded by regular police officers. By comparison, 
lower-tier and higher courts in the hm state are located in separate buildings 
and levels of nervousness and stress among hm judges varied. Buildings that are 
452 Press conference given on November 6, 2012. Consulted in Taniguchi, 2012b. 
453 Interview with former court clerk. September 2012. 
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home to the lower-tier courts are guarded by the army, possibly as a response 
to the ‘tense days’ experienced by criminal justice personnel when, for example, 
a grenade was found outside the building, which escalated tension among all 
practitioners. Or, every time a member of a criminal group was brought from 
remand to testify in court, everyone feared that a member of the same criminal 
group would try to free the prisoner or someone from a different criminal group 
might seek to kill him.454 It was difficult to approach this theme, especially with 
lower-tier interviewees from the hm state.455 
Conversely, the higher-level courts of the hm state, the courts of appeals and 
constitutional tribunals, are generally guarded by the police. Magistrates in 
these courts tend to have more contact with defendants’ families than with the 
defendants themselves. Relatives appear before the magistrates to learn about 
the case and to ask for lenient treatment for their relative. For example, one 
interviewee described how he held meetings with defendants’ relatives, even 
those popularly thought of as dangerous. Case file in hand, he went through 
the evidence against the defendant and the reasons why he faced a difficult 
case. The interviewee said that the relatives were grateful for his sincerity and 
showed no desire to retaliate.456 Other interviewees from the hm state said that 
they had not personally suffered any threats or violence, despite the spread of 
violence across the state.457 
 One of the main aims of this project was to learn about any possible effects 
of context in judicial decision-making and judicial behaviour. To discuss this 
topic with judges was particularly difficult. To begin the conversation I tried 
different strategies, such as discussing the general context of insecurity or ask-
ing them whether judges play any kind of role in such a context. 
Responses fell into three different groups: first, judges are not influenced 
by their surroundings; second, judges are affected by the environment; third, 
judges are affected and adapt their behaviour and decision-making to the en-
vironment. As mentioned earlier, I found no significant difference between 
judges located in the hm state and those in the lm state, so their accounts are 
presented together. 
454 Interview with the regional delegate of public defence attorneys. 
455 Also, I found that this topic was easier to discuss during informal conversations with pos-
sible interviewees when I first introduced myself and invited them to participate in the 
project, as opposed to during the actual interview. For example, one judge with whom 
I held an informal conversation said: “We were at war and the only way forward was to 
eliminate criminals”.
456 hm magistrate 1.
457 hm magistrate 1, hm magistrate 2, hm magistrate 3.
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The first type of approach included commentaries that maintained that the 
judge’s duty was solely to try defendants based on evidence contained in the 
case file, notwithstanding the context of insecurity. Their judicial role and task 
has remained unchanged, so they are still compelled to treat offenders equally, 
despite incriminatory allegations or pressure from the press or the prosecu-
tion.458 Judges, according to interviewees, are bound to decide impartially and 
examine cases while remaining detached from society’s enhanced demand for 
justice.459 Judges are required to apply due process rules whatever the defend-
ant’s characteristics.460 
Judges and court proceedings, according to a judge, should remain the same, 
including enforcing due process values, unless there is an official declaration of 
an exceptional regime and constitutional rights are suspended; in other words, 
that a state of emergency is officially declared.461 
The description of judges devoted to deciding cases, setting aside any sources 
of pressure or public demands, mirrors the ritualist judicial role where judges 
are expected to decide only by applying the law and precedent to a case. These 
interviewees’ descriptions also enhance the notion that judges should reach ver-
dicts that safeguard the judiciary’s impartiality and the integrity of due process 
rules while not getting involved in the context of those verdicts. 
The second type of response claimed that judges were unavoidably affected 
by the environment. Interviewees mentioned in general terms that they could 
not remain oblivious to the country’s delinquency crisis.462 An interviewee held 
that social factors, including specific social problems and local crime rates, do 
have an effect on the judge.463 According to another interviewee, judges work 
in a very complex landscape in which they have to meet society’s expectations 
of seeing criminals behind bars, enforce due process rights and impose fair 
sentences.464 He said:
You must be sensitive to … both the defendant and society, as a way to 
balance social peace. We must be sensitive to society, decide and sentence 
with fairness.465
458 lm first instance judge 7, lm first instance judge 4.
459 lm appeals magistrate 2.
460 lm magistrate 5; hm first instance judge 2. 
461 hm first instance judge 2.
462 lm first instance judge 2, lm first instance judge 3, lm first instance judge 5.
463 lm magistrate 4.
464 hm first instance judge 1.
465 hm first instance judge 1.
judicial voices on the military and judicial independence                                          2 239
Similarly, an interviewee described the judiciary as the branch of government 
preserving social stability in the current criminal landscape. The judiciary, he 
continued, in contrast to other branches of government, is hardly arbitrary, 
because a written record is kept of all actions, a record always available to be 
examined and criticised.466 
A different interviewee mentioned that although the judge’s duty leaves no 
room to classify or label particular defendants, “we are human beings, we are 
affected by specific ways in which offences are committed, and these influence 
the way a judge sees the defendant”.467
Another judge, while discussing the legal regime on organised crime, de-
scribed a case where the police had arrested nine suspects with no reason other 
than that they saw them as suspicious. After a ‘tense interrogation’ the suspects 
confessed to being part of the Zetas, a gang that had committed many serious 
offences including kidnapping and drug trafficking. The judge noted that if the 
police had not detained them on the spot despite having essentially no evidence, 
and had acted strictly according to human rights standards, they might not 
have been investigated at all.468 He continued:
If one sees it from the social angle of human rights, ‘What injustice to 
detain a person who did not commit any offence!’; if one sees it from the 
angle of fear that we have currently in society, one would say ‘it’s great 
that they were arrested because they were reorganising to continue to of-
fend’. 469
A different judge held that in his view many judges had bought into treating 
defendants within the legal frame of organised criminals, because judges feared 
these defendants could produce serious harm.470 “In my view, they aren’t re-
sponding solely to the case but rather to the whole war on drugs”. 471 
Describing the judiciary as having significance outside criminal courts coin-
cides with Levin’s description of the ways in which judges contribute to defining 
“society’s response to deviance, to social conflict and the need for striking a 
balance between liberty and order” (Levin, 1977, p.4). Moreover, the judicial 
roles underlying the comments described above mirror an interest in (or at least 
the dilemma of) how to influence the criminal justice landscape through their 
466 lm appeals magistrate 2.
467 lm magistrate 4.
468 lm appeals magistrate 2.
469 lm appeals magistrate 2.
470 lm magistrate 4.
471 lm magistrate 4.
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decisions. Judges, as adjudicators, understand their role is to assist in reaching 
peaceful settlements in disputes and bringing fairness to society. Deciding a 
case therefore goes beyond settling a dispute involving claims made by two par-
ties but rather requires judges to balance broader social issues. 
The third type of approach included judges’ descriptions on the different 
reactions to unsafe environments. For instance, an interviewee claimed that 
judges do not work to reduce insecurity; in fact, judicial scrutiny is even stricter 
in a context of high crime rates, because suspects’ human rights infringements 
tend to be more frequent.472 In describing judges’ duties, this interviewee stated: 
We are ready, always available, to review any irregularity and stop it im-
mediately because that is our task; and now, with this insecurity issue, we 
are even more alert [to making sure] that all security measures are taken 
without violating fundamental rights. That is the stand of this court and 
it coincides with the majority of courts.473
A different judge held that judges actively participate in crime control: 
We need judges who not only apply the law, plain as it is, but rather judges 
who also have a little bit of conscience, that they touch their heart in the 
face of a human reality, not a social reality. The social reality—it is true, 
we have high crime rates, the crime rate has increased, but I insist that 
we ought to see people as human beings, those involved in proceedings 
as human beings. Judges comply with the written law and lose sight of 
objectivity. Why do judges do so? As a repressive act and trying to comply 
also with a social objective, which is to repress criminality. But I think 
that is not the way. I believe in the other way.474 
Interestingly, in this last account the interviewee describes fellow judges as mere 
appliers of the law. But by performing their judicial function as law-interpreters 
and ritualists, they are also pursuing the policy goal of repressing criminality 
and taking into account external aspects of a case such as the ‘social reality’ of 
high crime rates. 
The diverging accounts provided by these two interviewees illustrate the op-
posing theses reviewed by Epstein et al. and discussed in Chapter 2, where one 
group of scholars maintain that the judiciary is even more vigilant to civil liber-
ties restrictions, and other scholars argue that the judiciary endorses security 
policies and programmes which may compromise these liberties. 
A different interviewee said that trying defendants charged for organised 
crime offences differed to some extent from trying regular defendants. Al-
472 hm magistrate 4.
473 hm magistrate 4.
474 hm appeals magistrate.
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though the applicable rules were the same, the judge saw things differently; 
he felt at risk because the moment the defendant appeared in court he saw the 
judge and was able to recognise him physically. “You feel afraid of these people 
[referring to members of criminal groups] when they see your face, when taking 
their testimony”.475 
When this judge faced dangerous offenders indicted for serious offences, 
including organised crime, he decided beforehand how proceedings would be 
handled so that the defendants would not be released from custodial remand.476 
That same judge described a case in which a prosecutor, after participating in a 
special proceeding, found a funeral wreath in her office; she was taken to hos-
pital with a suspected heart attack. These threats, the judge continued, hinder 
impartiality, so judges need to gather more tools and be prepared to face these 
types of offenders.477 He continued:
It is difficult to be an authority when these criminal groups have taken 
over the whole city…one tries them more severely because one is dealing 
with people who pose greater danger to society and to oneself…setting 
aside that one is a judge, one is also part of a society that is demanding 
safety.478 
The judge’s reaction of remanding dangerous offenders to prevent future of-
fending against anyone including himself resonates with Jakobs’ paradigm of 
incapacitation for a particular type of offenders for the purpose of preventing 
dangerous offending and providing safety to society. However, this commen-
tary also illustrates a case where one may possibly agree with enemy penology 
in treating certain types of offenders in a more severe manner in light of the 
threat to one’s safety. The tension between remaining impartial and encounter-
ing people who have committed serious offences as part of a criminal organisa-
tion is also illustrated in this commentary. It seemed that external factors to the 
case—the funeral wreath—could have affected judicial impartiality; but how 
could anyone remain unaffected by that kind of threat? 
The underlying judicial roles embedded in these comments point towards un-
derstanding judicial duties within a policy-maker or law-maker framework, in 
which the judicial function is envisaged to be one that influences policy through 
decisions made. At the same time, these comments highlight how these judges’ 
personal attitudes and experiences may have affected their decisions, either by 
475 lm first instance judge 2.
476 lm first instance judge 2.
477 lm first instance judge 2.
478 lm first instance judge 2.
judicial voices on the military and judicial independence                                          2 242
limiting law-enforcement agents’ abusive behaviour, by urging a lenient or hu-
mane treatment on offenders or by repressing criminality and incapacitating 
dangerous offenders. 
Other interviewees explained that a judge’s eyes naturally adapt to their 
environment.479 For instance, one of them described how, in a particular drug 
trafficking area (Sinaloa), the sentencing practice of imposing the minimum 
punishment on dangerous or threatening defendants was a way of reducing 
possible retaliation.480
Another judge described how he adapted his legal reasoning when work-
ing in a border state where the quantities of drugs were much greater than in 
other regions of the country. Because he sometimes dealt with large quantities 
of drugs, he became less rigid in regard to the threshold established by law that 
linked the quantity of drug with intent to supply. For example, in cases where 
he had to determine whether intent to supply was demonstrated, although the 
confiscated drugs exceeded the legally permitted amount, he decided to pre-
sume the drugs were going to be used by the defendant within the next two or 
three days. In contrast, when he began working in the lm state, he noticed that 
his colleagues—within a collegial court—were treating petty drug dealers who 
carried low quantities of drugs as though they were dangerous high-profile traf-
fickers. He began shifting the tribunal’s criteria so that the amount wouldn’t 
be the sole argument to sustain intent to supply and, if faced with doubt, the 
defendant had to be acquitted.481 
In addition to adapting legal reasoning, interviewees discussed the risks in-
volved when trying dangerous offenders.482 One interviewee described a case 
where a defendant was involved in a gunfight with the military after having 
refused to stop at a checkpoint. The military started shooting at the suspicious 
car, and those inside the car, including the defendant, shot back. Once the de-
fendant was in custodial remand he asked the interviewee, who was visiting the 
prison, why had he decided to hold him in remand. The judge answered that he 
had found legal reasons to try him and hence decided to keep him in custodial 
remand during proceedings. The judge soon discovered that the defendant ap-
pealed the intermediate decision and the upper court released him; the judge 
feared retaliation but said this was part of the job.483 
479 lm magistrate 3, lm magistrate 4.
480 lm magistrate 3.
481 lm magistrate 4.
482 lm magistrate 3, lm first instance judge 2.
483 lm magistrate 3. 
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The effects of unsafe environments may lead judges to alleviate society’s de-
mands for safer conditions by punishing dangerous defendants more severely. It 
may also be the case that judges feel they actively contribute to providing safer 
conditions by convicting defendants, in light of the fact that the press portrays 
defendants as already guilty, and if defendants are acquitted the media strongly 
criticises judges. The fact that the interviewed judges are aware of society’s dis-
trust in the judiciary may contribute to this reaction. It is feasible, though, to 
consider that judges, like any other officials, have a genuine concern for their 
own safety and that they react to their context, particularly considering the 
many cases of murdered and threatened judges across the country. 
Judicial impartiality and other branches of power
In September 2011, on his official website, former president Calderón com-
mented on the release of a former high-profile official of the Federal Electric 
Commission, who had been indicted for obtaining unlawful enrichment of 
more than 33 million pesos. In the commentary, Calderón announced he was 
tired of the impunity caused by judges who freed criminals based on technicali-
ties. The statement stirred the atmosphere within the judiciary and led to sev-
eral public statements, including by the cjf and a justice of the scjn, defending 
the judiciary and explaining the specifics of the case in question (Aranda, 2011; 
Méndez, 2011). A counsellor for the cjf stated: 
To question the work of judges, without legal grounds and without evi-
dence, impinges on national stability. We strongly oppose statements 
made against judges without sufficient evidence to sustain them (quoted 
in Aranda, 2011). 
I asked interviewees for their opinion on Calderón’s statement in order to initi-
ate a conversation about judicial independence in relation to other branches of 
power. This question broadened the conversation to discuss whether the presi-
dent referring to criminals as society’s enemies had affected the judiciary. An 
interviewee mentioned that some judges had been influenced by the president:
I do believe [the discourse] has influenced some judges; if the words ‘drug 
case’ or ‘organised crime’ are written in a case file, they are enough for 
the judge and prosecutor to be predisposed to determine whether a person 
poses great danger.484
This interviewee expressed the view that judges were affected by the former 
president’s discourse. By comparison, other interviewees explicitly asserted the 
judiciary’s independence and judges’ adherence to the Constitution and legisla-
484 lm magistrate 4.
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tion. They avowed that human rights had not been affected and the judiciary 
had remained impartial, deciding cases lawfully.485 For instance, a judge stated:
[The president’s discourse] has not made any kind of impact. We are an 
independent power; we stand on a different rung; the defendant has the 
right to have his file examined by us and find whatever may benefit him.486
The general notion of all judges standing distant and independent from politics 
was similarly stressed by another judge: 
All judges think in the same way. We stand apart from the executive, very 
respectful of power and public policy, but our duty is different, so I have 
not seen any change… Judges have been and continue to be judges, and are 
acting well. And concerning any infringement found [in court], there are 
tribunals that review them, and such infringement is corrected, but I do not 
see changes, because that is the perception that I have as a judge, due to the 
essence of my duty and for what I am. But I am sure that judges of all tiers 
or ranks think similarly, because that is the nature of our duty. Any judge 
who is thinking of aligning to a public policy, a political party, a party’s 
policy, is distorting his duty, and I don’t think there are any of those.487
This last commentary illustrates the widespread rejection of judicial behaviour 
that influences policy or politics in any way. In fact, this interviewee holds that 
he, like all his colleagues, understands the judicial role as being detached from 
politics and policymaking; behaving otherwise would cause a distortion of the 
judicial function. Thus, this interviewee shares the notion that judges are and 
ought to be ritualists and law-interpreters with no involvement or interest in 
affecting policy but rather being devoted to deciding a case based on its merits.
That same judge also stated:
The good thing is that in our country we are autonomous, nobody in-
terferes with us, they respect us, the military, the local authorities, our 
bosses. Nobody interferes with us, we have autonomy, independence, we 
can decide with certainty and courage. 488 
The quotations above appear to advocate for the assertion of judicial independ-
ence. According to Baum, judges are interested not only in good policy but also 
in reasserting individual or social approval and validation at the moment of 
judicial choices and public statements (2006). Perhaps, then, these interview-
ees were addressing public criticisms and scepticism, reinforcing judges’ social 
485 hm magistrate 3, hm first instance judge 1, lm appeals magistrate 1, lm first instance judge 
7, lm first instance judge 1, lm appeals magistrate 2.
486 hm magistrate 3.
487 hm magistrate 4.
488 hm magistrate 4.
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identity both inside and outside the judiciary as being fully devoted to uphold-
ing due process principles and standing separate from other powers. 
Many interviews revealed constant attempts to reassert judicial authority. 
For instance, an interviewee stated that it was the judge who determined wheth-
er the defendant was guilty as charged and subsequently sentenced him, as op-
posed to the military acting beforehand.489 Another judge noted: 
We cannot be influenced, should not be influenced by the parties or by 
the president’s recommendations, not even by recommendations from the 
president of the Supreme Court. We have to have impartiality and not be 
influenced by other situations because [ultimately] the responsibility lies 
with the person who signs [the judgment].490
It would seem that judges struggle to maintain their independence and author-
ity in the face of different sources of pressure. Some interviewees agreed that 
there were many examples of external pressure from other branches of govern-
ment. A judge described how he and several colleagues were summoned to the 
president’s official residence. There, according to the interviewee, they were 
told to be “tough on narcos”. His fellow judges only smiled, thinking, you may 
speak what you will, but that will not dictate the way we decide.491 
Interviewees mentioned a particular event in which members of the military 
broke into a judge’s home. One interviewee described how a person in the house 
confronted the soldiers and said: “This is the home of a federal judge!” and 
their reply was, “we only respond to the president’s orders”. Later on, the mili-
tary publicly apologised and claimed to have broken in “by mistake”, alleging 
they were supposed to break into the neighbour’s house.492 
Specific cases were also described; for instance, a judge mentioned it was 
common knowledge that one court had been officially searched and case files 
examined.493 Another interviewee described how he faced a criminal lawsuit 
for obstruction of justice after he decided against the Attorney General’s of-
489 This commentary was given by the interviewee in the context of explaining that he sees the 
defendant as an innocent person until the final verdict is issued. hm magistrate 3.
490 hm appeals magistrate.
491 lm appeals magistrate 1. 
492 Although several interviewees from both the lm and the hm states mentioned this event, 
detailed information was given by an interviewee during the informal conversation. He 
mentioned this event in the context of his views on the currently empowered military 
within criminal justice institutions across the country, and on the credibility judges have 
with the military. 
493 lm first instance judge 1. 
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fice.494 A different interviewee said: “I would like to see the brave one who 
decides against the prosecution”.495 The type of harassment available to the 
executive branch was described by Pásara in regard to the state prosecution 
(2006). According to members of the local judiciary in Mexico City, there is a 
credible threat that they will face a criminal lawsuit if they decide against the 
prosecution (Pásara, 2006, p.42).
Judges commented on the harm done by the president’s public claims that 
judges were releasing criminals. This sort of claim, they said, damages the pub-
lic image of judges and undermines their credibility. It was at best an over-
generalisation and at worst an entirely false image. It created a negative public 
opinion towards the judiciary which was presented as corrupt, negligent and 
inept.496 Another said that the president’s declarations were futile attempts to 
have the judiciary validate irregular actions made by the prosecution.497 
Throughout this research, federal judges indicated that the prosecution in-
timidates judges by threatening to file a criminal lawsuit or using other strate-
gies to pressure them. State judges interviewed in Mexico City made similar 
commentaries. This overlap of accounts seen in different courts, locations and 
periods of time indicates the presence of systematic as opposed to occasional 
practices carried out to influence judicial decision-making. Different forms of 
intimidation, such as breaking into a judge’s home at night or filing a criminal 
lawsuit, are as threatening to independent judicial decision-making as other 
forms of violence. At the same time, the environment was characterised by the 
president’s and other public officials’ statements calling for unity to face those 
who threaten the safety of Mexican institutions. It would seem that the obverse 
of the president’s call for unity were the public complaints against judges who 
ruled against the executive branch of government, paired with other forms of 
pressure including breaking into their homes; ultimately, “whoever is not with 
me is against me”.498
494 Mexico City arraigo judge 1.
495 lm first instance judge 5.
496 lm appeals magistrate 2, lm first instance judge 7.
497 lm magistrate 5.
498 Luke 11:23.
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Discussion and preliminary conclusions
General findings
The main purpose of this chapter was to explore judges’ reactions to the land-
scape of enemy penology, particularly promoted by the military’s participation 
in public safety activities and by public officials’ statements about the safety 
crises faced by the government. Questions of judicial impartiality and inde-
pendence were of interest, as well as learning about how judges cope in such a 
challenging environment. 
It was found that the involvement of the military has not signified a change 
in the way in which court proceedings are conducted in either the hm or the lm 
state. Also, it was found that judges’ opinions on the military’s behaviour dif-
fered; while most judges from the lm state agreed that the military’s practices 
were inappropriate and illegal, opinions in the hm state varied. Judges discussed 
the themes of impartiality and independence from different angles, touching 
upon judges’ ranks, judicial decision-making based on paper submission versus 
oral hearings, insecurity and independence. The various opinions and commen-
taries did not signal any relationship with the judges’ location. For instance, the 
vast majority of interviewees from both states held that the judiciary was an in-
dependent branch of government, and interviewees across locations mentioned 
ways in which judges have experienced pressure from the executive branch, 
including from the military and the prosecution, which put their independence 
to the test.
It appeared that judges perceive their role in a wide variety of ways. For 
some, judicial duty means disregarding any external aspects of a case in order 
to reach a verdict; for others it implies to ‘repress criminality’ or to safeguard 
and enforce human rights; for yet others, it means to preserve social peace. The 
underlying roles that judges seemed to embrace included ritualists, adjudicators 
and policy-makers, and their decision-making roles ranged from law-interpret-
ers to law-makers. 
Striving to obtain internal consistency
According to cognitive dissonance theory, people constantly strive for internal 
consistency in the face of dissonance, that is, when different feelings, beliefs or 
opinions do not fit together. This inconsistency can be resolved by changing 
one’s behaviour or changing or distorting one’s perception of the information 
(Festinger, 1962). Judicial duties and social expectations may have been dif-
ficult to reconcile with the new circumstances. For example, it may be unreal-
istic to hope to remain impartial and set aside the violent environment when 
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deciding the guilt of a defendant who belongs to a dangerous gang. Similarly, 
it may be challenging to reconcile holding soldiers accountable for extracting 
confessions from members of drug gangs while welcoming their assistance in 
restoring safety and order. 
The wide difference of opinions concerning how to perform judicial func-
tions in unsafe environments reinforces the notion that judges’ self- and social 
expectations differ widely. However, it may also indicate that judges are, more 
than ever, striving to make sense of the context and their role in it, while up-
holding judicial values, including impartiality and objectivity and also, more 
recently, human rights. 
The opinions shared by judges touched upon several judicial roles. Some 
comments fitted a ritualist role, where judges held that they must not take into 
account any external factors when deciding a case but reach a verdict based on 
the case file alone. Other opinions seemed to share the adjudicator and media-
tor roles, where the judge is seen as a key player in resolving disputes but seeks 
to foster social stability and peace rather than simply deciding a case. Other 
views appeared to be closer to a policy-maker and law-maker role, where judges 
promote or reject practices such as safeguarding human rights, restraining the 
military or repressing criminality. At the same time, adapting legal reasonings 
to particular environments in order to protect judges’ own safety revealed a 
pragmatist role, where the resolution of a case does not pursue policy goals or 
an accurate interpretation of the law but rather a solution acceptable to that 
particular judge. 
Interviewees also claimed that judges are, but ought not to be, influenced by 
their environment while performing judicial functions. This perspective draws 
on the legalistic approach, which understands judicial behaviour in terms of 
accurate law and precedent interpretation and rejects any judicial influence on 
policies or politics. Ultimately, as mentioned in earlier chapters, the Mexican 
judiciary institutionally embraces the legalistic model, together with the ritual-
ist and law-interpreter roles, in which the environment is not expected to affect 
judicial performance.  
To downplay the role of violent offending, militarisation or personal threats 
may be part of the ritualist and law-interpreter role that every judge is expected 
to adopt. It may also relate to what is described as ‘the elephant in the room’, in 
which people attempt to ignore or deny the uncomfortable or even dangerous 
situation in which they find themselves (Cohen, 2012). Or perhaps a meta-rule 
exists within the judiciary that states that no-one may admit or deny the exist-
ence of dangerous environments, as this could be understood as judges failing 
to perform their duties appropriately. 
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Safeguarding independence
Judges are pressured in several ways. Any decision issued against the prosecu-
tion (e.g. an acquittal) unleashes a set of problems. Judges are aware of the pros-
ecution’s power to file criminal lawsuits against judges. In addition to the threat 
of being indicted, members of the federal judiciary have been openly harassed 
by the military in their courts and homes. Judges faced open criticism from 
the former president for fostering impunity, criticism backed up by the media, 
which portrayed defendants as guilty and judges as inept, corrupt and collusive 
whenever acquittals were issued. This pressure increased the judiciary’s lack of 
social credibility and questioned its authority and legitimacy. 
At the same time, indications found here suggest that judges are also har-
assed by violent defendants. This was corroborated by Begné Guerra (2007, p. 
53). In this context, the Chief Justice programme heightened security measures 
to protect judges. This need was also stressed by the U.N.’s special rapporteur 
on independent judges and lawyers. 
Despite the fact that the environment is filled with various sources of pres-
sure against the judiciary, judges described themselves as an independent branch 
of power that stands separately from the government. Judges said they should 
not and do not follow recommendations from anyone, including the president 
or the chief justice of the scjn. Based on the judgements and accounts analysed 
throughout this thesis, judges appeared not to endorse the president’s policy of 
declaring war on organised crime as part of the enemy penology context. In 
fact, judges in challenging locations appeared to decide cases in a similar way 
and share views similar to judges located in a relatively safe place. In sum, the 
judiciary appeared to be insulated from the environment, reflected in: views 
that reinforce ritualist and law-interpreter roles, uniformity of judgements, 
strict adherence to binding and non-binding rulings and in a general legalistic 
approach to understanding judicial behaviour. 
This insulation could be understood as a strategy used by the judiciary to 
shield itself from external pressure and influence, particularly from the execu-
tive branch. It must be borne in mind that until recently, the president faced 
no substantial resistance from the judiciary, which tended to endorse policies 
promoted by the government. At the same time, the judiciary lacked any sub-
stantial jurisdiction duties to invalidate the government’s policies. 
Notably, the public statements defending the judiciary from the president’s 
accusations emphasised that unfounded allegations against judges affected so-
cial stability. Portraying judges as contributors to social stability may be un-
derstood as a strategy to distance them from the parties involved in disputes, 
including a government seeking to enforce enemy penology policies.  
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Judges are currently caught between competing demands that put their inde-
pendence and impartiality to the test. They feel the pressure of society’s anxie-
ties about rising violent crime and demands for greater safety. Judges are aware 
of government demands for more effective and harsher punishment for crimi-
nals, as well as the constant threats to the safety of judges and their families, 
not only by criminal groups but also by the government. Also, judges are now 
required to safeguard due process and human rights. These tensions illustrate 
the complicated context in which they find themselves.
Ultimately, the variety of views and comments expressed by interviewees re-
veals a colourful and multi-layered but still murky image of the Mexican judge: 
a public official attempting to honour goals such as impartiality and independ-
ence while coping with challenging environments that put that independence 
and impartiality to the test. At the same time, these challenges overlap with 
legal and institutional reforms that ask judges to apply new principles and also 





The question at the heart of this thesis was whether Mexican judges were applying an enemy penology model in the process of trying drug offenders 
in the midst of the ‘war on organised crime’. Government discourse—especially 
that promulgated by former presidents—framed criminals as enemies who mer-
ited a military response from the criminal justice system because of the grave 
risk they posed to society. It was clear from existing evidence, reviewed in the 
early chapters of this thesis, that an ‘enemy penology’ model was promoted 
actively by the executive. Officials in security and criminal justice relied heavily 
on the military to deal with organised crime groups, characterised as enemies, 
not only in combat but also through their role in crime investigation. This raises 
the question: were judges treating defendants as enemies, reducing procedural 
safeguards to facilitate convictions and imposing disproportionate punishment 
to eliminate them from society? 
The idea that the enemy penology model was being ratified by the judiciary 
seemed plausible for several reasons. First, the federal judiciary began, from 
the 1994 reforms onwards, to build on its independence from other branches 
of government, a policy that signified the judiciary’s intention to decide cases 
in politically relevant ways and to act as an arbiter within politics. Prior to the 
1994 reforms, judges’ jurisdiction was limited to cases that were irrelevant to 
political life and did not question the authoritarian regime. The judiciary’s in-
dependence from the executive and its crime control policies is thus relatively 
recent, and the current landscape appears to be putting the judiciary’s inde-
pendence to the test. A second reason to suspect that the judiciary was endors-
ing an enemy penology paradigm was based on several decisions, discussed 
in Chapter 3. In the first of these decisions, in 1996, the scjn agreed with the 
involvement of the military in public safety matters; in 2000, it ratified this 
decision and authorised the president to rely on the army for public safety af-
fairs without declaring an official state of emergency. The scjn also decided—
though not unanimously—that the arraigo complied with constitutional stand-
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ards and therefore authorised the executive to use it as an investigative tool. 
A third reason to expect judges to be affected by enemy penology was related 
to the state of war experienced in some regions of the country, including the hm 
(or highly militarised) state. In these regions, levels of violence related to drug 
trafficking suddenly peaked, causing society’s anxiety and need for safety and 
control to grow. At the same time, the military’s intervention in criminal justice 
affairs expanded while public officials made repeated statements stressing the 
need to declare war on drugs. In these circumstances, it was in my view a sound 
hypothesis that these events might affect judges, particularly those in direct 
contact with offenders. Based on this hypothesis and on the inability to conduct 
a longitudinal study on the judiciary that explored the ‘before and after’, the 
research sought to compare judicial performance in a hm state in a hostile or 
warlike environment and a lm (or less militarised) state in a safe or unchanged 
one in order to examine the extent to which judges might be reproducing the 
enemy penology paradigm. 
Based on an analysis of judgements in ordinary drug offences and interviews 
with judges, the broad answer to the research question is: judges are not re-
producing an enemy penology model in either location. The evidence suggests 
that the judiciary has successfully limited the punitive and militaristic ethos of 
current criminal justice policies in Mexico. The conclusion that judges in both 
places treated the defence and prosecution in the same manner was borne out 
by both the analysis of written judgements and interview data. Judges contin-
ued to try all defendants as ordinary offenders, and the fact that some defend-
ants could possibly be involved with dangerous criminal groups did not result 
in any visible change in the trial or the sentence. Judicial reasoning, articulated 
in written judgements, was broadly similar in both locations. Sentencing was 
also remarkably similar, and in both places the general tendency was to impose 
minimum sentences. Conviction rates were equally high in both places. The 
overarching conclusion is that judges in both unsafe and safer environments 
try cases in a similar manner, apparently insulated from the sharply divergent 
contexts in which they work. The arguments advanced and the sentences im-
posed were strikingly similar. The evidence suggests that the judgements issued 
are highly standardised, arguably based on templates that enhance uniformity, 
consistency and legal certainty, all of which provide deeper understanding of 
the Mexican judiciary. 
The uniformity embedded in judgements, along with the institutional goals 
of consistency, continuity and legal certainty, illustrate several aspects of the 
Mexican judiciary. First, the judicial bureaucracy enforces and promotes these 
goals by exerting control over trial courts through reversals and strict adher-
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ence to precedent. Second, formalistic and legalistic judicial behaviour, visible 
in both judgements and interviews, reflects that judicial duties are confined to 
deciding cases, based on the law’s correct application and interpretation. Fur-
ther, it was found throughout the interviews that some judges embraced judicial 
roles such as the ritualist or the law-interpreter, in which roles they committed 
themselves to disregarding external aspects of a case, ruling without considera-
tion of politics, ideology, policy or personal attitudes.  
 
Is the judiciary reproducing an enemy penology model?
Treating defendants as enemies? 
Defendants appeared to be seen by the judges as nothing other than defendants. 
For the judges, defendants were criminals requiring criminal justice interven-
tion rather than enemies who could be eliminated. The vast majority of judges 
maintained that they see defendants as ordinary people, mostly from vulnerable 
backgrounds, lacking basic necessities and with few opportunities. It appeared 
from judgement analyses that most defendants have a low income and many 
have problems with drug abuse. At times, judges described defendants as vic-
tims of circumstance, products of their impoverished upbringing. Some judges 
from the hm state described defendants as victims of a criminal justice system 
geared towards convicting them, giving them a low chance of being acquitted. 
According to a high court interviewee from the lm state, his colleagues in 
the lm state see all drug offenders as large-scale drug traffickers. No judge 
from either the lm state or the hm state made a similar comment. However, 
defendants from the lm state appeared to be petty criminals who, despite car-
rying significantly lower quantities of drugs than defendants in the hm state, 
were treated and convicted similarly to those from the hm state. Judges from 
the lm state described dangerous criminality, and some interviewees distin-
guished ordinary defendants from highly organised, skilled and literate crimi-
nals. Interviewees from the lm state claimed these skilled criminals ought to be 
treated with a separate set of rules. Whether this implies that some criminals 
ought to be treated as enemies cannot be ascertained, as as no other source of 
data corroborated this. 
Overall, no significant difference was found in how judges from the hm state 
and the lm state viewed defendants. Few traces of enemy penology were found 
in the ways in which defendants are seen by judges. 
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Reducing due process safeguards? (presumption of innocence) 
I sought, throughout the analysis of judgements and interviews, to establish 
whether judges were reducing due process standards in order to facilitate con-
victions. I used presumption of innocence as a yardstick to measure a possible 
reduction in procedural rights. I found that presumption of innocence is hardly 
ever upheld, regardless of where the trial took place. Several indications drawn 
from the data may explain this. 
First, Mexican criminal proceedings have consistently had a conviction ra-
tio of 90 per cent. Although conviction rates are a complex matter and are 
shaped by the particularities of each system, it is difficult to match the success-
ful ratio reflected in the high conviction rate with the systematic criticism of the 
prosecution’s performance, generally described as being negligent, inefficient 
and corrupt.499 At the same time, all cases to this date proceeded to final judge-
ment, by comparison to other systems where a great number of cases are settled 
before reaching court. This suggests that the prosecutor wins cases despite fail-
ing to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt, making it difficult to maintain 
that defendants were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt and were presumed 
innocent throughout the proceedings. 
Second, an inquisitorial role can be traced in judicial practices where the 
main aim is to find the truth of the matter. Judges were said to frequently sup-
plement evidence in order to issue a sufficiently grounded decision rather than 
letting defendants go because of insufficient evidence. Supplementing may come 
in various forms, including holding further hearings or seeking additional in-
sights through close observation of parties during proceedings. Also, concerns 
about impunity were raised, to the extent of taking into account the chance 
of re-arresting a defendant, when deliberating on the verdict. Although judges 
may not fully embrace a crime control role, seeking additional evidence indi-
rectly implies they prefer to amend the prosecution’s case instead of finding the 
defendant not guilty due to insufficient evidence.
Third, guilty verdicts are simply much easier to issue, given the stress judges 
face both inside and outside the judiciary. Acquittals cause distrust and scepti-
cism among peers and across hierarchies within the judiciary. In parallel to the 
pressure judges face to convict, they are pressured by various actors. Public offi-
cials from the executive branch put pressure on judges in three ways: by publicly 
claiming that judges contribute to impunity, by threatening them with criminal 
499 For instance, the Ministry of Justice of England and Wales explained that the fall from 
83 to 82 percent of the conviction rate was explained by a number of factors difficult to 
identify separately including: changes in guilty plea rates, mix of cases handled in and out 
of court, impacts of operational changes, among others (2014, p. 12).
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charges, and by intimidating them in their courts and homes. The media por-
trays defendants as guilty before the actual verdict has been determined, reduc-
ing judges’ authority. This, along with society’s general distrust of the judiciary, 
make a not guilty verdict more burdensome on judges. 
Fourth, the analyses of court judgements shed light on a series of binding 
and non-binding rulings frequently used by courts that mostly contain guid-
ance on weighing evidence. For instance, rulings that instruct judges to give 
more weight to police evidence were often referred to. Also, rulings that au-
thorise sustaining a verdict on indirect evidence were frequently used in cases of 
possession with intent to supply, where judges lacked solid evidence but verified 
the intent with circumstantial evidence. Arguments stressed in these rulings 
were quoted by judges and also expressed as their own. The power that stems 
from these rulings, and from those who issue the rulings, shapes the way judge-
ments are explained and also the final outcome. 
The principle of presumption of innocence appeared to be applied precari-
ously; defendants hardly stand a chance when brought to court. The discovery 
that Mexican judges routinely presume that offenders were criminally responsi-
ble and that convictions are facilitated, overlaps with enemy penology’s values 
of presuming suspects’ dangerousness from the start and also of facilitating 
convictions. However, this overlap signposts inquisitorial practices that were 
traced in judges’ accounts, judgements and rulings, rather than the incorpo-
ration of enemy penology values. These practices concern the evidence-sup-
plementing role played by the judge and the precedents that together presume 
the prosecution’s case establishes the truth of the matter. In addition, the en-
trenched practice of presuming offenders guilty—because why else would they 
be brought to court?—overlaps with the pressing need expressed by some to 
reduce impunity and the general context of increased violence and criminality. 
Concerns about impunity were also found in judgements, which suggests that 
judges worry about crime control. 
The fact that the large majority of defendants are found guilty was already 
well known (Carbonell & Ochoa, 2009). This research has traced the range of 
arguments systematically used by first instance courts and enhanced by higher 
courts to convict defendants. The research discovered that these arguments 
originate in rulings that encourage uniform judicial decision-making. Hence, 
the general pattern of convicting defendants results from systemic behaviour 
within the judiciary. This general pattern indicates that templates which in-
clude referencing particular rulings are a policy promoted within the judiciary 
that foster uniformity. This policy helps with managing workloads and avoid-
ing reversals while discouraging creative interpretation. Also, it reinforces the 
discussion and conclusions                                            2 256
understanding of judicial behaviour in terms of a formalistic and legalistic 
model, in which accurate law and precedent interpretation are rewarded and 
decisions drawing on other factors such as ideology, personal values and policy 
goals are prevented. 
In addition, this research has produced an interesting variety of accounts 
from judges trying to make sense of this general pattern. Their comments range 
from maintaining that this principle is adequately applied to hoping that the 
new system will make it effective. Others hinted at what may keep judges from 
applying the new system. It would appear that the presumption of innocence 
principle is beginning to sink in into the judicial mindset, but this principle 
is difficult to align with other aspects of the current criminal justice system, 
which is geared to presume defendants guilty from the start. There are three 
reasons for this difficulty. First, the current system gives more weight to the 
prosecution’s evidence, forcing the defendant to prove his innocence. Second, 
there is little room for acquitting defendants based on insufficient evidence, 
given the current judicial practice of supplementing evidence and of concern-
ing about impunity and crime control. Third, external factors such as public 
claims, judicial audits, media pressure, strict deadlines, excessive workloads 
and the general unpopularity of acquittals make it even harder for judges to 
presume defendants innocent. 
Disproportionate sentencing?
Judges in both the hm and lm states consistently tended to impose custodial 
sentences of the lowest possible length on drug offenders. This finding should 
be seen in context; the changes in drug offences legislation in 2009 affected the 
sentencing tariffs for drug offenders, including drug users and small-scale drug 
dealers. The sample of judgements analysed included cases that were decided 
under the previous legislation, which contained more severe sentences, and 
others where sentences were lower, based on the new legislation. It was inter-
esting to note that judges preferred to give minimum sentences despite these 
changes, even when custodial sentences were reduced and when parole became 
easier to grant. The preference for minimum sentences was also observed in 
cases where defendants faced more than one charge or were arrested for car-
rying several types of drug. Sentences were increased as dictated by law but to 
the minimum possible. Overall, it would appear that minimum sentences are 
imposed almost by default. 
The defendant’s rehabilitation and reintegration into society was a desirable 
goal, according to the vast majority of interviewees. Whether this was in fact 
accomplished is beyond the scope of this thesis, but the rehabilitative ideal em-
discussion and conclusions                                            2 257
bedded in the Constitution is shared by all. To aim at eliminating defendants 
as a way of securing society’s safety was definitely not present in judgements 
and was only mentioned by a few interviewees. They claimed that only specific 
types of defendant—recidivists and thugs—should be kept away from society as 
a way of minimising risk. Therefore, enemy penology was not traced in sentenc-
ing practices in the analysed judgements or the opinions judges shared in either 
of the examined locations.
Given that minimum sentences appeared to be the general rule, the discre-
tion exercised by federal judges concerning sentencing appears to be void or 
simply cosmetic. The fact that they are generally inclined to impose sentences at 
the lowest end of the tariff raises several questions. First, federal judges prefer 
minimum sentences, which, according to an interviewee, reflects a humane at-
titude. What can possibly be held against a judge who imposes the minimum 
punishment? Could prison conditions, described as essentially inhumane, sup-
port leniency? Are lenient sentences preferred because of inertial convictions? 
Are they based on arguments already made, or generalised custodial remand? 
These are questions I have not addressed, but what this thesis has shown is that 
minimum sentences are widely accepted. In fact, changes in drug sentencing 
laws corroborated the fact that minimum punishment is preferred even when 
the periods of imprisonment were lowered. This means that judges’ constant 
preference for minimum punishment cannot be explained by the general sever-
ity of Mexican sentences. 
Managerial reasons may better explain the general practice of imposing 
minimum sentences. Judges who impose the lowest-possible sentence are ex-
empt from being required to explain their reasoning, according to several rul-
ings issued by the scjn. By contrast, those who punish a defendant with a higher 
sentence are required to explain thoroughly what led them to opt for more 
severe punishment in order to avoid a reversal. The workload and the chances 
for a reversal are both reduced if minimum punishment is granted. The ruling 
issued by the scjn clearly lightens heavy judicial workloads by exempting judges 
from further legal reasoning. Guaranteeing unchallenged decisions encourages 
judges to opt for minimum punishment to the extent of disregarding the case’s 
specific circumstances or sentencing aims. The clear tendency to hand down 
minimum sentences calls into question the exercise of judicial discretion and 
its relevance in administering appropriate punishment to those found guilty. 
Undeserved leniency and severity are equally undesirable. 
A judge mentioned that in unsafe environments, such as in the hm state, 
minimum custodial sentencing allows judges to navigate between convicting 
dangerous defendants and looking out for their own safety. This was only men-
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tioned by one interviewee, but he described it as a predominant practice in one 
specific unsafe and large-scale drug trafficking region. This was corroborated 
to some degree by judgement HMC15, where an overtly dangerous defendant 
received only minimum punishment. Perhaps in challenging environments dis-
cretion in sentencing is useful to ensure judges’ safety. It signals, however, that 
judges may be forced to use informal means to guarantee their safety because 
they lack formal methods of protecting themselves.
 
Is the judiciary restraining the executive’s security programme?
An essential follow-up question to the main enquiry of this research was wheth-
er the judiciary was reproducing or limiting the repressive criminal policy of en-
emy penology when trying cases. Hence, judicial independence from the execu-
tive’s policies—and pressure—was discussed during interviews. Evidence from 
judgements also provided interesting though contrasting information. 
Case files 
The claims made by interviewees that the judiciary is autonomous and fully in-
dependent of the executive stand in contrast to the vast majority of judgements, 
which ended with guilty verdicts and also appeared to endorse crime control 
aims pursued by totothe prosecution, police and military.
Prosecution cases were noticeably standardised in all the judgements ana-
lysed. The sources of evidence used by the prosecution were generally visual 
inspections of drugs, toxicology reports explaining whether the quantity of 
drug exceeded what the defendant could use individually, plus reports and 
statements produced by the police. All of these were produced during pre-tri-
al proceedings, where a prosecutor faces minimum oversight. By comparison, 
the prosecution during trial, under a judge’s supervision, appeared to produce 
hardly any evidence. As a result, the pre-trial evidence is used by the judge to 
reach a verdict, even if witnesses failed to appear in court to corroborate their 
statements. This means that courts rely on evidence produced unilaterally and 
uncontested by the defence. 
A second characteristic of the vast majority of judgements was that courts 
tend to validate evidence produced by law enforcement agents during pre-trial. 
This evidence aims to demonstrate the way in which the arrest took place and, 
more importantly, the way in which the offence was committed. At the same 
time, procedural rules establish several requirements that witness evidence, in-
cluding police statements, must meet. 
It was found that all judgements failed to show any sort of assessment of 
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whether the police complied with these requirements. On the contrary, judg-
es appeared to presume that the requirements were met by default and thus 
granted police evidence full credibility. This was observed in all cases, includ-
ing those with obvious discrepancies between the versions of the facts offered 
by the police and the defence, giving greater credibility to the police than to 
defence witnesses. This shows that the version of the facts that prevails is that 
produced by the police, as also found by Pásara (2006). The police version pre-
vailed even when several defendants made claims of mistreatment against the 
agents who arrested them. 
In addition, courts appeared to weigh police evidence favourably by default. 
This may stem from indications contained in the rulings constantly referred to 
and quoted in judgements, which hold that police evidence should be taken as 
independent and that it should be given complete credibility if was produced 
just after the criminal events and spontaneously. In sum, binding rulings ratify 
uncorroborated and unscrutinised evidence and give the prosecution and police 
greater benefit of the doubt. Failing to hold police statements to the same strict 
standards as defence evidence favours the prosecution.
It is difficult, however, to claim that this is a sign of judges endorsing the 
executive’s policy of declaring war on defendants. In fact, this pattern probably 
emerged long before the president’s policy. It would rather appear that the judi-
ciary tends to endorse the executive branch, i.e. the prosecution, despite the war 
declared by the former president against criminals. Siding with the prosecution 
may be a legacy of the Mexican inquisitorial system, together with the fact that 
the judiciary was controlled by the executive until recently. In this regard, the 
independence and autonomy that allegedly characterise the judiciary were not 
traced in the judicial decision-making in first instance judgements. 
Interviews
Conversely to what was observed in judgements, during interviews judges de-
scribed themselves as autonomous and independent. They said they heard cases 
without anybody indicating the way in which the case should be managed and 
decided. Nonetheless, judges are currently facing various forms of pressure that 
put impartial and independent judicial decision-making to the test.
Judges talked about feeling threatened by the prosecution, which can initi-
ate legal action against judges who decide against the state or subject them to 
mechanisms that make workloads unbearable. Another way to put pressure on 
judges was through intimidation by the military. Several interviewees made ref-
erence to a case where a judge’s home was ‘unintentionally’ searched or where 
courts were searched to extract case files. Some interviewees stressed that sol-
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diers are usually respectful to judicial authority, while others mentioned ways 
in which soldiers defied or underestimated judicial decisions and authority. 
Public statements claiming judges release criminals and foster impunity are 
also forms of harassment. Some judges criticised these claims as false, under-
mining the judiciary as a whole. Only a minority of interviewees held that some 
judges gave in to the pressure to the extent of bearing in mind the war on or-
ganised crime when deciding each case. 
In sum, through the judgement analyses and the accounts shared by judges it 
was found that judges are not reproducing an enemy penology paradigm when 
trying cases, which hints at a judiciary managing to remain uninfluenced by the 
president’s war. It was also found that the judiciary appears to systematically 
favour the prosecution when fragile criminal investigations are amended and 
by giving the prosecution’s evidence greater validity than the defence’s evidence 
almost by default. As a result, while the judiciary may be resisting the reproduc-
tion of heightened punitive policies, it may be reproducing entrenched practices 
that are part of the legal fabric. 
The judiciary’s way of dealing with the context
Bearing in mind that several judges across the country were physically attacked 
by gangsters during President Calderón’s administration, and that the chief jus-
tice of the Supreme Court publicly announced a series of measures to guarantee 
judges’ safety from ‘organised crime’, it is both meaningful and unavoidable to 
explore how the context informs judicial decision-making. Being immersed in 
a context where the military substituted for an officially annulled police force 
and provided a sense of order, safety and control in a hostile context, together 
with sudden increases in violent offending and a society demanding greater se-
curity, raises the question of what part, if any, judges play in such a landscape,
Case files 
the first thing to note is that the challenging context, where violence increased 
steeply and social dynamics were severely changed, was not reflected in the ex-
amined judgements from the hm state. Judges from both locations appeared to 
decide cases in a very similar manner; the judgements analysed could have been 
drafted by any of the judges. Neither did context emerge as an important factor 
in explaining the way in which offenders were treated or punished. One defend-
ant, who participated in a gunfight with the military and attempted to flee with 
other suspects across a rooftop, was treated like any other defendant, received 
the minimum sentence and was not even considered dangerous by the judge. 
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The exception to the general rule was observed in a few judgements from the 
hm states. In these cases, judges made reference to the illicit drugs market along 
with other arguments aimed at demonstrating intent to supply. Only a handful of 
judges made those references, but such references did not seem to be decisive in the 
outcome; rather, they were used as an additional argument to explain the verdict. 
Some degree of uniformity was expected based on that the two sets of in-
terviewees belong to the federal judiciary, being part of the same institution, 
bound by the same organisational rules and incentives. The only obvious dif-
ference between them was geographical. The social context linked to each place 
was expected to provoke differences among judges that would be visible in ju-
dicial decision-making. The homogeneity found in judgements from both loca-
tions showed that judges are able to successfully insulate themselves from their 
surroundings when necessary and are similarly inclined to convict.
Are judges instructed to remain indifferent to their surroundings? Is uni-
form judicial decision-making a strategy to achieve the judiciary’s insulation 
from their environment? This uniformity and resilience may be explained by a 
number of factors. first, binding rulings were constantly quoted and referred to 
in judgments, which instruct judges in the way proceedings must be managed, 
how evidence should be weighed, and how verdicts ought to be reached and 
sentences calculated. The legal reasoning embedded in these rulings is repro-
duced in judgements in numerous ways in both locations. 
second, federal judges share a common judicial culture, where consistency, 
legal certainty and continuity are valued over creativity in a career judicial sys-
tem such as Mexico’s. As one judge remarked, “judges are cut with the same 
scissors”.500 The disciplined adherence to precedent may be read as a tool used 
by trial and appellate courts to expressly reinforce consistency in decision-mak-
ing while showing deference to higher courts’ interpretation of norms. Third, 
a formalistic and legalistic approach to judicial behaviour, where the environ-
ment or any other factors outside a case are not expected to be taken into ac-
count, may be enhanced through uniform judicial decision-making, templates 
and strict observance to rulings. 
Interviews
Judges’ views on the context touched upon several topics. Concerning the mili-
tary, various types of responses were found concerning the military’s unlaw-
ful and abusive practices. The military was held by some to act adequately in 
general terms; only in a few exceptional cases had soldiers been responsible for 
500 hm magistrate 4. 
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arbitrary actions. Others held the opposite view and described specific unlaw-
ful military practices, such as framing suspects and detaining people extra-
judicially; these views coincide with what Human Rights Watch, Amnesty In-
ternational and other ngos have reported. Others preferred not to address this 
topic, saying they could not perceive any sort of pattern of military behaviour. 
In regard to the context, several judges maintained they were insulated from 
the context, asserting that they ignored all external aspects of a case and were 
dedicated to ruling cases based on their merits and upholding due process val-
ues. Other interviewees said that such isolation from the environment is im-
possible and saw their judicial role as striking the correct balance between the 
rights of society and those of defendants. Others described how judges react 
in conflictive contexts. At one extreme, judges were said to heighten judicial 
oversight of law-enforcement agents and be attentive to human rights viola-
tions, while other judges described how colleagues were repressing criminality 
and taking on crime control duties. Judges also described ways in which they 
adapted their legal reasoning to the particular environment because it seemed 
a good policy or because it helped protect themselves from retaliation from 
dangerous offenders. 
Reactions to the environment, including different ways to adapt to it, did 
not necessarily mean that judges have become more repressive, or that they 
adopted an enemy penology approach. On the contrary, it was found that their 
responses varied. Some treated defendants more harshly while others treated 
them more leniently. Also, personal safety appeared to motivate a change in 
decision-making, but so did consideration of better legal policy. 
Making sense of inconsistencies 
Managing dissonance
Enforcing the principle of presumption of innocence became a requirement once 
the scjn issued a binding ruling on it that was incorporated into the Constitu-
tion. Official discourse began to embrace due process principles, including the 
presumption of innocence, but implementation appears to have lagged behind. 
Throughout the fieldwork and data analysis it was striking to find serious 
divergence between opinions expressed by judges concerning the presump-
tion of innocence and judgements. Many interviewees claimed that defendants 
were indeed presumed innocent, and also held that the prosecution’s perfor-
mance was negligent and poor. Nonetheless, judgements consistently showed 
that judges favoured the prosecution’s case, despite it often being based solely 
on indirect evidence. Judges also relied heavily on rulings that instruct them to 
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grant more weight to prosecution evidence, i.e., police statements and circum-
stantial evidence. 
How can this inconsistency between judges’ accounts and judgements be 
reconciled? According to Festinger, the ways to reduce the inconsistency be-
tween public claims (embedded in judgements) and internal beliefs (described 
in accounts, views and opinions), are to modify the public statement or adapt 
an internal belief (1962, p. 96). Judgements are essentially public statements 
that contain the reasons and arguments that led a judge to find a defendant 
guilty or innocent. Once this public statement is issued and not challenged 
it becomes res judicata, in other words, contains firm legal truth and conse-
quently becomes impossible to change. Judgements are public statements con-
sulted by the parties involved and examined by higher courts, as well as by 
third parties such as myself.
To reconcile the prosecution’s poor performance and a high conviction rate 
with the assertion that all defendants were presumed innocent until found 
guilty requires judges to adjust their internal opinions or beliefs, bearing in 
mind the difficulty of changing a judgement. One way to reconcile these could 
be to openly say, as some interviewees did, that the presumption of innocence 
is contradictory: it exists in theory, but in practice it is not enforced. Another 
strategy would be to declare that defendants are still presumed guilty by back-
ward-thinking judges, but this is not the case with forward-thinking judges. Yet 
another way is to shift attention to changes in the criminal justice system which 
will (magically) make presumption of innocence workable. 
Several of these strategies may be used by judges. However, there remains a 
gap between the constitutional principle and judgements in practice. The dif-
ficulty of shifting from a quasi-inquisitorial system to an adversarial one is re-
flected in the reluctance to hold the prosecutor to higher standards of evidence 
which will signify to release possibly guilty defendants. In the view of some, 
this shift will contribute to impunity. The difficulty of accepting adversarial 
principles is heightened by the continuing militarisation of criminal justice in-
stitutions, where crime investigation and public safety tasks are carried out 
with heavy equipment and military tactics and shaped by military values that 
regard suspects as enemies. If the principle of presumption of innocence is to be 
properly set in place, as part of the larger reform of the criminal justice system, 
this dissonance must be addressed. Otherwise, the general practice of presum-
ing defendants guilty will be reproduced even if this principle, together with 
other due process values, is officially promulgated. 
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Doctrinal myths 
Fox maintains that legal mechanisms, called doctrinal myths, are created to 
help manage contradictions within a legal system (2005, p. 294). Accordingly, 
doctrinal myths enable law, legal actors and society to accept principles, such as 
equality, even while these are reformulated or manipulated so that contrary re-
sults, such as unequal treatment, are achieved (2005, p. 295). Doctrinal myths 
may help manage the contradiction of allegedly upholding the presumption of 
innocence while convicting almost all defendants. Binding rulings issued by 
the scjn and constitutional tribunals instruct trial and appellate judges to hear 
cases in specific ways. These rulings, if followed strictly, lead down a path to-
wards discarding defence evidence, upholding prosecution evidence and issuing 
robust convictions. 
For instance, the initial declaration of the defendant rendered in court is 
thought of as the defendant’s chance to present his case, free of any coercion 
or intimidation, in front of the judge who will determine his innocence or guilt 
(Cortés Pérez, 1990, p. 572). At the same time, the evidence principle of inmedi-
atez (frequently referred to in this study) holds that the evidence produced closer 
to the criminal event takes precedence over evidence produced later, because the 
closer to the event the evidence was produced, the less chance there is of it being 
distorted. This means that evidence produced by the police officers who ar-
rested the suspect and the defendant’s declaration at the prosecution office are 
given greater evidentiary weight than the defendant’s initial declaration given 
in court, even if the prosecution’s evidence lacks any revision or guarantee of 
legality. As a result, the statement the defendant gives in court, which is alleg-
edly rendered free of coercion, has less evidentiary value than police statements 
or the defendant’s own statement given at the prosecution agency. 
Another example concerns the principle of equality of arms. The judiciary 
has issued many rulings concerning the importance of offering both parties the 
same opportunities to prove their case.501 Nonetheless, police evidence will al-
ways be closer in time to the criminal event, which means the defence’s evidence 
will inevitably have less evidentiary significance and, in consequence, the goal 
of providing equality of arms in trial is not met even before proceedings begin. 
Furthermore, I observed throughout the judgement analysis that rulings 
quoted in judgements deem the police to be independent and impartial wit-
nesses. At the same time, police forces across Mexico suffer from corruption, 
negligence and selective investigation, to the extent that in some places the po-
501 Ruling entitled: “Protection to people in trial proceedings should be granted in conditions 
that do not affect procedural equality or the defendant’s right to due defence”. 
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lice force was dissolved because of these and other problems (López Portillo 
Vargas, 2002). A clear inconsistency exists concerning police credibility. The 
rulings that highlight police officers’ good faith and independence act as doc-
trinal myths that help manage the dissonance between portraying officers as 
independent witnesses in trial while knowing that the police are steeped in cor-
rupt and unlawful practices. 
The rulings concerning evidence principles and burden of proof, together 
with judicial practice on supplementing evidence, help to resolve the dissonance 
between prosecutors’ negligent and inept performance and judges reaching 
guilty verdicts. Hence many binding rulings embed doctrinal myths that up-
hold due process principles while providing judges with legal reasoning to reach 
guilty verdicts. 
Denial in operation
In the mid-1990s, the scjn approved military participation in crime control 
activities and would authorise property searches without a court order when-
ever a flagrant offence occurred. Human rights complaints against all law en-
forcement agents, including members of the military, peaked once soldiers were 
authorised to conduct property searches and participate in public safety tasks. 
The judicial practice of considering military abuses to be exceptional needs 
further discussion in light of reports issued by several human rights organisa-
tions. To claim that the military rarely commit abuses or that there is a wide-
spread misconception about the military’s activities is to directly contradict the 
evidence submitted by the cndh, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International 
and other ngos, which have documented complaints involving torture and oth-
er abuses committed by the military and other security forces. 
The cndh reported abusive behaviour to be a common practice among law 
enforcement officials. From 2006 to 2011, police and soldiers often carried 
out property searches without proof of illegal activity (2011, p. 2-3). The cndh 
also found that police and military officials “build” cases of flagrant offences 
to justify the searches by planting illegal objects, such as drugs or weapons, 
in the searched premises (p. 20). Human Rights Watch concluded in 2011 
that all security forces involved in counter-narcotics operations, including the 
military and federal, state and municipal police forces, were guilty of torture 
linked to crime investigation (p. 7). Although torture of civilians by security 
forces has been frequently reported, these practices increased after the fed-
eral government adopted a more aggressive counter-narcotics strategy (2011, 
p. 7). Amnesty International also confirmed that civilian complaints against 
the military increased after soldiers were deployed to perform public security 
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functions (2015). The growth in complaints was so widely reported that in 
2013 the Military Code of Justice was reformed to enable investigations into 
human rights violations, investigations that were previously impeded by mili-
tary jurisdiction.
Whether judges hold security forces accountable for torture and other seri-
ous violations is questionable. On the one hand, most torture cases, like many 
other crimes, go unreported. According to Human Rights Watch, torture vic-
tims are prevented from reporting their mistreatment due to fear and distrust 
of the authorities. The lack of reporting prevents security forces being held ac-
countable, paving the way for further torture and illegal operations (2011, p.7). 
On the other hand, it was found throughout the analyses of judgements that 
first instance judges tended to disregard allegations of mistreatment, including 
torture and extended detentions committed by both military and police agents. 
Judges’ opinions that these cases of mistreatment were exceptional may il-
lustrate an attempt to deny or minimise the harm done by the military because 
of the benefits of deploying soldiers or general empathy towards them. Using 
the phrase “bad manners” to refer to mistreatment practices resonates with 
what Cohen identified as different denial strategies (2012). By labelling cruel 
and illegal practices differently, their legal and common sense meanings are 
nullified (Cohen, 2012, p. 106-107). A euphemism such as “bad manners” be-
comes a palliative way to speak about unlawful practices, such as torture or 
illegal property searches, minimising their inherent cruelty and harm. An effort 
to deny or at least minimise the military’s unlawful behaviour may be a way 
to show deference to the military who are allegedly waging a war to protect 
society despite the fact that their manners are improper. There may have been 
a genuine sentiment of solidarity with those involved in restoring safety and 
order, particularly in the hm state. After all, while patrolling the state, the army 
often faced gunfire from equally well-equipped opponents.
Third, interviewees’ trust in the military draws on the fact that polls have 
consistently shown that the Mexican army has greater public credibility than 
other institutions, including the scjn and the police (Consulta Mitofsky, 2009; 
inegi, 2015). Camp concluded that the Mexican military is unique in that it 
performs a wide variety of duties, including humanitarian tasks such as deliver-
ing vaccines to marginalised communities and providing aid in natural disasters 
(1992). As a result, it could also be that judges genuinely give soldiers greater 
credibility than other law enforcement agents and thus consider them less prone 
to act unlawfully. Moreover, judges appeared to be very aware of their own lack 
of credibility in society which, added to the public’s vote of confidence in the 
army, may add greater pressure to validate the army’s wrongdoing. 
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Contributions to knowledge
Examining enemy penology in current judicial decision-making and behaviour 
contributed to the understanding of the federal judiciary. The primary contri-
bution was to establish that the federal judiciary did not appear to reproduce 
the president’s policy of declaring war on defendants deemed as enemies, fa-
cilitating convictions by reducing defendants’ procedural rights and sentencing 
with the purpose of eliminating them. This finding is based on in-depth analy-
sis and comparison of drug-related judgements and interviews with judges from 
two (out of 31 and the federal district) states with strikingly divergent contexts. 
Drawing on enemy penology to establish the judiciary’s response to the cur-
rent political and social context in Mexico provided insight about the judiciary 
during a severe safety crisis. The judiciary can be seen as a kaleidoscope whose 
pieces are all different, but by shedding light on specific themes, clearer shapes 
come into focus. One theme that unfolded from testing enemy penology was the 
judiciary’s insulation from the environment and independence from external 
pressures, including the executive branch of power. It is argued throughout the 
thesis that this independence stems from a formalistic and legalistic approach. 
This approach understands judicial behaviour as unattached from any external 
aspects but rather is focused on deciding cases based on the accurate interpreta-
tion of the law and precedent. This approach to judicial behaviour is fostered 
by the judiciary through different strategies, one of them being to enhance the 
use of templates and reference to both binding and non-binding rulings, which 
results in homogenous judgements, shielding judicial decision-making from al-
ternate legal arguments or interpretations. Another strategy concerns the close 
oversight exercised by upper courts on lower ones through reversals which 
shape the content and direction of lower court judgements, discourage creative 
decision-making and safeguard legal certainty and consistency. 
Another theme is that judges currently find themselves in a shifting legal 
landscape. They are required to enforce new rules and principles in the face of 
a radically different criminal justice system and the constitutional command to 
interpret the law in line with human rights treaties. As a result, judges appeared 
to be adapting to a structural change in their roles in front of peers and other 
criminal justice practitioners. In this context, a variety of roles embedded in 
judges’ opinion were traced. Some seemed to agree with the law-interpreter and 
ritualist roles, where judicial duties are confined to deciding a case based solely 
on the casefile and applying the law and precedents accurately, disregarding any 
external pressures or factors. Other judges’ accounts seemed to be compatible 
with the pragmatist role, where a sense of fairness seemed more important than 
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an accurate interpretation of the law. Also, adjudicator and mediator roles were 
traced, in which judges were said to be playing a key part in restoring order in 
society and reaching a balance between society’s demand for greater safety and 
defendants’ due process rights. Conversely, other judges’ views seemed more 
akin to a law-maker or policy-maker role, which understands judicial duties to 
encompass influencing policy through their decisions. 
Additionally, several judicial practices revealed by the research, together 
with rulings and principles that enhance an inquisitorial role, provide deeper 
understanding of what may hinder the progress of criminal justice system re-
forms. Increases in crime together with blatant impunity may explain some 
judges’ reluctance to enforce the presumption of innocence. At the same time, 
these concerns may persuade judges to not hold prosecutors to adequate evi-
dence standards and eventually opt to convict. It is crucial to bear in mind 
that mechanisms such as cognitive dissonance or doctrinal myths may be used 
to manage inconsistencies between the new rules, including the presumption 
of innocence, and traditional practices. More importantly, these mechanisms 
may help maintain traditional practices while claiming that new rules are be-
ing enforced. If some members of the judiciary resist changes in the law, they 
may resort to doctrinal myths to cover and manage their resistance to accept-
ing the new rules. Also, cognitive dissonance may come into play if judges 
claim to embrace new principles while maintaining practices that echo inquisi-
torial attitudes. 
These different topics provide rich insights that could help implement suc-
cessful reforms to the criminal justice system. The effectiveness of binding and 
non-binding rulings in fostering uniformity also demonstrates how these rul-
ings reproduce a particular way of interpreting the law. In other words, rulings 
appeared to be effective vehicles for introducing or maintaining legal principles 
and values, including due process ones. However, doctrinal myths highlighted 
many contradictions. These contradictions need to be addressed if the judiciary 
is to pursue a genuine transformation of judicial decision-making to the point 
where defendants are routinely presumed innocent. 
Finally, judges cannot be thought of as emotionless, detached from the cases 
they hear and the surroundings in which they are immersed. Stepping into their 
shoes throughout the research raised different types of concerns, such as feeling 
that legislation limits their ability to reach fairer verdicts; that by imposing low-
er sentences their safety is ensured; or that the army may defy judicial decisions. 
This is not to suggest that judges should not aim at being impartial or objective, 
but it seems fruitless to overlook these matters while fighting for change. 
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Implications for policy, law and practice
Power of rulings
It was found that rulings contain influential guidance for low-tier courts. Many 
of these rulings are intended to shift the scales in favour of the prosecution, giv-
ing greater evidentiary weight to evidence produced during the pre-trial phase 
rather than in front of the judge; privileging police-produced evidence; or au-
thorising the use of circumstantial evidence. 
The new criminal procedure legislation already states that evidence produced 
during the pre-trial stage, including witness statements, needs to be produced 
again during an oral hearing in front of the judge to make it admissible. Requir-
ing judges to assess evidence produced in court will affect the way proceedings 
are managed and the outcome of cases. New evidence rules such as this aim at 
fairer—or at least safer—judgements. However, guidance and approval from 
rulings is necessary to successfully applying new rules. I consider it essential 
that certain rulings should be officially substituted or eliminated, such as those 
that concern evidence principles. Otherwise, as Posner points out, a contradic-
tory range of precedents allows judges to pick and choose whatever ruling fits 
their own decision (2008). 
Binding and non-binding rulings are internal policies within the judiciary 
that can be harnessed to enhance successful reforms. In addition to these rul-
ings, other internal influences can foster change within the judiciary. These in-
clude administrative incentives that make acquittals an unpopular choice. This 
is wrong. A judge should feel supported and well-regarded by his peers and 
superiors regardless of whether he acquits or convicts. 
External obstacles concern other parties that are difficult to control, such as 
the media. . However, if internal influences are addressed, the impact of exter-
nal ones would consequently diminish. For example, if judges could rely on in-
ternal support when they found a defendant innocent, the media would be less 
brazen in suggesting the judge colluded with or was corrupted by the defendant. 
Sentencing
Concerning sentencing, the legal and policy implications are clear. Rules leave 
judges little room for manoeuvre when deciding between custodial and non-
custodial punishment. Also, minimum sentencing appears to be imposed by 
default. If sentencing should be meaningful and fair, judges need wider discre-
tion. However, sentencing reform needs to be sustained by rulings that instruct 
judges to sentencing guilty defendants based on the merits of the case, instead 
of imposing minimum sentences as a strategy to relieve workloads and avoid 
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reversals. Overall, sentencing practices cry out for reform in order to make ju-
dicial discretion count. If sentencing tariffs included types of punishment other 
than custodial, this could foster better use of judicial decision making. 
Operating in challenging environments and honouring impartiality
Judges attempt to insulate themselves from the external environment, including 
circumstances where armed violence has become extremely prevalent, policing 
has become highly militarised and the military are involved in law enforce-
ment. Such an environment can be dealt with by ignoring it or by adapting 
decision-making to the environment. More and more areas of Mexico can be 
considered challenging environments, because the security crisis has no fore-
seeable end and nor does the military’s involvement in crime control affairs. 
At the same time, each of these environments has distinctive social, politi-
cal and geographical characteristics, together with a changing criminological 
landscape. To disregard or minimise the effect of this on the judiciary and on 
judicial performance is to turn a blind eye to a crucial matter which currently 
appears to be dealt with informally or not at all. Therefore, judicial institu-
tional policies should provide judges with devices to adapt to the context in 
order to keep them safe. 
By contrast, if judicial institutional policies are thought of as unnecessary, 
because judges are supposed to be impartial and objective whatever their sur-
roundings, any attempts to reform judicial decision-making or judicial behav-
iour are doomed to fail, because this project has demonstrated that judges are 
not individuals living in a bubble, free of worries and interests.
Limitations
This research has several shortcomings. Some of these concern methodology, 
others the changing legal landscape.
Methodology 
The sample of judgements is small in comparison with all cases available, which 
limits the generalisability of the findings. A total of 40 judgements were ana-
lysed in detail from both the lm and the hm states, but the sample was far from 
representative. For instance, in the lm state in 2010, 852 criminal cases were 
opened. From these cases, 12 were randomly selected and requested, of which 
only three concerned drug offences. Similarly, in that same year 1,190 cases 
were initiated in the hm state, of which 16 were solicited and, following the 
same rationale, only three analysed. 
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The sample thus became more limited as it grew more specific. It is note-
worthy that there are no systematic statistics within the judiciary on the total 
number of cases per type of offence. Judgements that met the criteria could only 
be found by soliciting a large number of cases, of which only a small minority 
dealt with drug offences. 
As a counter-argument, the selection was genuinely random, which augments 
its validity. Also, the judgements I examined were issued by all courts in the hm 
state and more than two-thirds of courts in the lm state. It was thus a hetero-
geneous sample of judgements, which strengthens the claims made here. Even 
though the sample was not expected to be representative, the analysis sought to 
be thorough and enunciate the methodology used as clearly and transparently 
as possible to explain the evidence that sustains the claims made here. 
I examined only two states out of a total of 31 states and the federal district. 
The hm and lm states I examined are located in very different parts of the coun-
try and offered very different socioeconomic and criminological contexts. The 
selection of states sought to compare two diverse landscapes at a single point 
in time. The two states are sufficiently different to provide interesting insights 
into judicial behaviour and judicial decision-making, but they do not attempt to 
represent the diversity of the country. There are many different Mexicos within 
the country. The generalisability of this work was envisioned as limited. None-
theless the number of interviews conducted in each site may be considered to 
be representative, bearing in mind the total number of judges and magistrates 
in each place. For instance, I interviewed 14 out of 19 judges and magistrates 
located in the lm state, and eight out of 14 in the hm state. 
Changes in the normative landscape
As mentioned earlier, the Mexican criminal justice normative landscape is 
changing. The National Criminal Procedure Code was issued in 2014 and will 
come into force gradually. It contains a completely new set of rules for the way 
proceedings should be managed, embedding adversarial values. This new sys-
tem has been experienced by some Mexican judges but will take many years to 
become part of national practice. This work examined the rules of the former 
criminal procedure legislation that applied when the project was designed and 
when the data was collected and analysed. Hence, it could be argued that this 
project will soon be outdated, which might call into question the currency and 
validity of the claims made here. 
However, I believe that the findings of this thesis shed light on different 
threads that weave into the complex role and image of the Mexican federal 
judge, threads that will probably remain despite the changes being made to 
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the law. The observations made here concerning, for instance, the ways in 
which judges perceive and conceive defendants, presumption of innocence, 
prosecution and sentencing, transcend rules and trends. On the contrary, these 
observations help explain judicial bearings which touch upon precedent adher-
ence and attitudinal and managerial approaches, all of which inform judicial 
decision-making. 
Final thoughts
Bravery of the courts
During this project I had a glimpse of the inner world of the federal judiciary, 
fulfilling the methodological aim of stepping into these judges’ shoes. I left the 
fieldwork, and their shoes, with a few thoughts. I instinctively felt that some 
judges see themselves as secondary and passive authorities. Judges who must 
decide a case while hemmed in by rules and binding rulings appeared to have 
little margin of discretion, which, as Taruffo argues, limits their own responsi-
bility in the case (2003). Judges did not seem to be empowered to limit abuses 
by other criminal justice officials such as police officers, military personnel and 
prosecutors. However, during fieldwork I learned about the bravery shown by 
many judges. Judges and other court officials, including prosecutors and de-
fence attorneys, are required to try all defendants. Many defendants are from 
vulnerable backgrounds and pose minimum risk to society, but others are in-
volved in violent, dangerous criminal gangs. Courts must offer fair and equal 
treatment. This is everyone’s demand, including mine. However, one must con-
sider the fact that judges’ own physical safety may be at stake. Good judgement 
may, literally, be a matter of life and death. 
I met many judges, several of them women, who told me about having to 
decide cases in which all female personnel, except the judge herself, were sent 
home as a way of protecting them from dangerous defendants, and only male 
officials worked the case. For instance, one judge received in her chambers a 
large group of men with guns, wearing sombreros in a defiant way, who simply 
came to show their gratitude after she decided in their favour. She said it was 
not a matter of her freedom to decide the case but simply that the law permit-
ted her to grant parole to their friend. Nonetheless, that didn’t keep them from 
thanking her and at the same time intimidating her in her own office. She de-
scribed how her knees were shaking on the other side of the desk–but happily 
all the men could see was the thin piece of wood that stood in between. 
In addition to bravery, I found an express interest in fairness throughout 
the fieldwork. Some judges appeared to look beyond the written case file to 
discussion and conclusions                                            2 273
find an equitable solution for the people involved. Solutions ranged from en-
suring proper compensation for victims of human trafficking to reducing the 
seriousness of the charges pressed against a single mother who confessed to sell-
ing drugs to support her five children, including one born during proceedings. 
Some judges appeared to be genuinely interested in defendants and victims and 
concerned about reaching fair decisions. 
Judges’ audiences matter
Together with considerations of good legal policy, Baum maintains that ex-
ternal motivations may provide a better understanding of judicial behaviour 
(2006). According to Baum, if judges are portrayed as lacking emotion and 
ignoring self-interest, then insight into what shapes judicial behaviour is in-
complete (Baum, 2006, p. 174). Judges, like any other actors, seek respect from 
the social groups that are salient to them. This may involve members of their 
guild or external groups such as the mass media. Judges’ peers and superiors 
were found to be relevant to judges; interviewees mentioned that when draft-
ing decisions they bore in mind the chance of reversal or the need to persuade 
upper court judges. This is significant not only because reversals are seen as 
bad judicial performance, but also because acceptance within the judiciary 
matters to judges. 
At the same time, many judges commented on the mass media, specifically 
being pressured to decide cases the way the media wished. Judges proved to be 
both aware of and concerned by social distrust of the judiciary. It is difficult 
to prove the extent to which these concerns shape judicial performance. How-
ever, it is possible that these concerns exert pressure on trial judges to convict, 
especially bearing in mind that acquittals are notoriously unpopular within the 
judiciary as well as in society, an attitude encouraged by the media. Ultimately, 
taking notice of these concerns may provide a better understanding of the judi-
ciary as a whole.
Judicial independence and impartiality
As in other Latin American jurisdictions, judicial independence from other 
branches of government is relatively novel in Mexico. Strategies to safeguard 
this independence range from giving more powers to the scjn and raising sala-
ries to establishing a career system that determined judges’ appointment and 
removal guidelines. Throughout this research it was found that judges profess 
themselves to be impartial, independent from any source of pressure. Nonethe-
less, it has been acknowledged by the Chief Justice of the scjn and the Spe-
cial Rapporteur on judicial independence that judges demand further safety 
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measures to guarantee not only their personal safety but also independent and 
impartial decision-making. Throughout the research, a few indications were 
found that suggest judges draw on different strategies to preserve their own 
safety in challenging environments. These include sentencing dangerous offend-
ers with leniency and issuing judgements that neglect contextual features in 
cases that involve members of violent criminal groups. 
At the same time, I found indications that judges are constantly harassed by 
state agents. This research corroborated Pásara’s claims (2006) that the pros-
ecution relies on diverse strategies to win a case, including filing criminal law-
suits against judges. Indications of intimidation strategies used by the military 
and by the president were also found. All these different forms of pressure put 
independence and impartiality to the test. 
Whether these forms of pressure continued after Calderón’s administration 
ended is beyond the scope of this research; the question calls for further inquiry. 
Two interesting notes are worth mentioning. The judicial and legislative branch-
es of government have reformed the Military Code of Justice in order to curtail 
military jurisdiction and authorise judicial oversight over military misconduct. 
The scjn’s decisions in tandem with national reforms signpost the need to limit 
the military’s scope of action and hold it accountable, particularly in light of the 
militarisation of criminal justice, which appears, as many scholars anticipated, 
to be entrenched and difficult to reverse. The second note relates to the most 
recent justice appointment. In March 2015, Eduardo Medina Mora, a former 
Attorney General (2006 to 2009) and also former Head of the Public Safety 
Secretariat (2000 to 2005) became a member of the scjn. Prior to this appoint-
ment, many voices called for a rejection of his candidacy.502 Amongst these, the 
National Association of Judges publicly opposed his appointment and asked the 
Senate to safeguard the scjn’s independence and abide by the constitutional prin-
ciple of division of powers, a principle that would be threatened if Medina Mora 
was appointed (Redacción Impacto, 2015). But this appeal went unheeded. It 
came as no surprise that, during the latest discussion held in the scjn on the ar-
raigo, Medina Mora argued the arraigo does not contravene constitutional basic 
rights (Reyes, 2015). To this day, arraigo is considered constitutional by the 
majority of the scjn and, in consequence it is still used as an investigative tool. 
This study shows that judicial independence and impartiality appear to be 
502 Academics and members of ngos collected over 52,000 signatures for a petition opposing 
Medina Mora’s appointment in www.change.org. The petition claimed Mora was respon-
sible for institutional damage based on different cases of human rights violations reported 
under his direction, and other cases said to be strongly influenced by the president in office 
(Torres, 2015).
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holding firm, despite continuous pressure from many different sources. During 
this unprecedented safety crisis, pressure is being applied by organised criminal 
groups on one hand and state officials on the other. Both sides seek to influence 
judicial decision-making. Securing an independent and impartial judiciary is a 
work in progress. It is important to acknowledge the different issues and actors 
that may affect this process. My hope is that this study will provide an insight 
into the world of the Mexican judiciary at this important historical moment 




Agamben, G. (2005). State of Excepcion. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago 
Press.
Agencias, Centro Noticias Tamaulipas. (2009). Halla Ejército narcolista de policías. [Press 
release] Retrieved from: http://www.cntamaulipas.info/nota/53362/halla-ejercito-narco-
lista-de-policias 
Aguilar López, M. Á. (2008). Delitos de peligro e imputación objetiva. Íter Críminis, 11-23.
Amnesty International. (2015). Amnesty International Report 2014-2015. The State of the 
World’s Human Rights. London: Amnesty International.
amnu. (2007). Barómetro Local. Una silueta del debido proceso penal en Chiapas, Distrito 
Federal, Durango, Morelos y Nuevo León. México: amnu.
Alvarado Esquivel, M. d. (2011). Las veinticinco principales reglas de la obligatoriedad de la 
jurisprudencia del Poder Judicial de la Federación. Conducta y Criterio, 19-56.
Alvarado Esquivel, M. d. (2013). La jurisprudencia en la nueva ley de amparo. Revista del 
Instituto de la Judicatura Federal, 189-220.
Alvarado Mendoza, A., & Zaverucha, J. (2010). La actuación de las fuerzas armadas en la se-
guridad pública en México y Brasil: una visión comparada. En A. Alvarado, & M. Serrano, 
Seguridad Nacional y Seguridad Interior (págs. 227-267). México: El Colegio de México.
Aranda, Jesús, La Jornada. (2011). Es importante que las averiguaciones estén bien inte-
gradas: Sánchez Cordero. [Press release] Retrieved from: http://www.jornada.unam.
mx/2011/09/07/opinion/005n2pol   
Artz, S. (2003). La Militarización de la Procuraduría General de la República: Riesgos para la 
Democracia Mexicana. Reforming the Administration of Justice in Mexico at the Center 
for U.S.-Mexican Studies. La Jolla, CA.
ASA, A. A. (2005). The Use and Value of Oral Hearings in the Administrative Justice Context. 
London: ASA.
Ashworth, A. (2009). Chapter 1. Rehabilitation. In A. Ashworth, A. von Hirsch, & J. Roberts, 
Principled Sentencing: Readings on Theory and Policy (pp. 1-10). Oxford: Hart Publishing.
Ashworth, A. (2009). Chapter 4. Desert. In A. Ashworth, A. von Hirsch, & J. Roberts, Prin-
cipled Sentencing: Readings on Theory and Policy (pp. 102-109). Oxford: Hart Publishing.
Ashworth, A. (2010). Sentencing and Criminal Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
Ashworth, A., & Roberts, J. (2009). Chapter 2. Deterrence. In A. Ashworth, A. von Hirsch, 
& J. Roberts, Principled Sentencing: Readings on Theory and Policy (pp. 39-48). Oxford: 
Hart Publishing.
Ashworth, A., & Redmayne, M. (2005). The Criminal Process. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
Astorga, A. L., & Shirk, D. A. (2010). Drug Trafficking Organizations and Counter-Drug 
Strategies in the U.S.-Mexican Context. San Diego: University of California.
Astorga, L. (2007). Seguridad, traficantes y militares. México: Tusquets Editores México.
Astorga, L. (2012). Estado, drogas ilegales, poder criminal, retos transexenales. Letras Libres, 
26-31.
Azaola, E., & Bergman, M. (2007). The Mexican Prison System. In W. Cornelius, & D. Shirk, 
references                                                 2 277
Reforming the Administration of Justice in Mexico (p. 91-114). Notre Dame: Notre Dame 
University Press.
Azaola, E., & Bergman, M. (2010). Delincuencia, Marginalidad y Desempeño Institucional. 
México: CIDE.
Azaola, E., & Correa, C. P. (2012). Resultados de la Primera Encuesta realizada a Población 
Interna en Centros Federales de Readaptación Social. México: cide.
Bailey, J., & Chabat, J. (2002). Transnational Crime and Public Security: Trends and Issues. In 
J. Bailey, & J. Chabat, Transnational Crime and Public Security (p. 1-50). U.S.A.: Center 
for U.S.-Mexican Studies.
Baum, L. (2006). Judges and Their Audiences. A Perspective on Judicial Behavior. Princeton 
and Oxford: Princeton University Press.
Becker, T. L. (1966). A Survey Study of Hawaiian Judges: The Effect on Decisions of Judicial 
Role Variations. The American Political Science Review, 677-680.
Begné Guerra, C. (2007). Jueces y democracia en México. México: Miguel Ángel Porrúa.
Beltrán, Ulises; Cruz, Alejandro, El Excélsior. (2011). 48% de los mexicanos piden permanen-
cia del Ejército. [Press release] Retrieved from:  http://www.excelsior.com.mx/2011/11/07/
nacional/781101  
Benítez Manaut, R. (2010). México 2010, la seguridad en la encrucijada. En flacso, Gober-
nabilidad y Convivencia Democrática en América Latina (p. 1-5). San José: flacso-Secre-
taría General.
Bergman, M. (2007). Seguridad Pública y Estado en México. México: Fontamara.
Betancourt Posadas, A. (2007). Sicarios, periodistas y políticos: el inconsciente político en 
los relatos periodísticos sobre asesinatos ejemplares. In G. Rey, Los relatos periodísticos 
del crimen. Cómo se cuenta el delito en la prensa escrita latinoamericana. (p. 188-215). 
Bogotá: Centro de Competencia en Comunicación para América Latina.
Birkbeck, C. (2013). Collective Morality and Crime in the Americas. London and New York: 
Routledge.
Bix, B. (2005). Legal Positivism. En M. P. Golding, & W. A. Edmundson, Blackwell Guide 
to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory (págs. 29-49). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
Borrego Estrada, F. (November 2010). Editorial. Nuevo Sistema de Justicia Penal, p. 4.
Bowie, J. B., & Songer, D. R. (2009). Assessing the Applicability of Strategic Theory to Ex-
plain Decision Making on the Courts of Appeals. Political Research Quarterly, 393-407.
Bowling, B. (2011). Trasnational criminology and the globalization of harm production. In M. 
Bosworth, & C. Hoyle, What is Criminology (pp. 361-379). Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
Bowling, B., & Newburn, T. (2006). Policing and National Security. Paper presented at the 
London-Columbia ‘Police, Community and Rule of Law’ workshop. . 
Bowling, B., & Sheptycki, J. (2011). Global Policing. London: Sage.
Bowling, B., Marks, A., & Murphy, C. (2008). Crime Control Technologies. In R. Brown-
sword, & K. Yeung, Regulating Technologies (pp. 51-78). Oxford: Hart.Brown, M. (2000). 
Calculations of risk in contemporary penal practice. In M. Brown, & J. Pratt, Dangerous 
Offenders: Punishment and social order (pp. 93-108). London: Routledge.
Bruccet Anaya, L. A. (2007). El Crimen Organizado. Origen, evolución, situación y configu-
ración de la delincuencia organizada en México. México: Editorial Porrúa.
Bryman, A. (2008). Social Research Methods. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Buffington, R. (2007). The Social Construction of Crime in Mexico. In W. Cornelius, & D. 
Shirk, Reforming the Administration of Justice in Mexico (p. 51-64). Notre Dame: Notre 
Dame University Press.
Buffington, R. M. (2000). Criminal and citizen in modern Mexico. U.S.A.: University of Ne-
braska Press.
Bustillos, J. (2009). La justicia constitucional en México. México: unam-iij.  
Buxton, J. (2006). The Political Economy of Narcotics. Production, consumption & global 
references                                                 2 278
markets. Canada: Fernwood Publishing & Zed Books.
Caballero Juárez, J. A., & Concha, H. A. (2001). Diagnóstico sobre la administración de jus-
ticia en las entidades federativas: un estudio institucional sobre la justicia local en México. 
México: unam-iij, Unidad de Investigación Empírica.
Camp, R. (1992). Generals in the Palacio. The Military in Modern Mexico. New York: Oxford 
University Press.
Camp, R. (2005). Mexico’s Military on the Democratic Stage. Washington D.C.: Center for 
Strategic and International Studies and Praeger Publishers.
Cancio Meliá, M. (2008). The Wrongfulness of Crimes of Unlawful Association. New Crimi-
nal Law Review, 563-589.
Cancio Meliá, M. (2011). Terrorism and Criminal Law: The Dream of Prevention, the Night-
mare of the Rule of Law. New Criminal Law Review: An International Interdisciplinary 
Journal, 108-122.
Carbonell, M., & Ochoa, E. (2009). ¿Qué son y para qué sirven los juicios orales? México: 
Editorial Porrúa México.
Calderón Hinojosa, Felipe. (2008, February 19). [Speech] Retrieved from: http://www.sedena.
gob.mx/pdf/comunicados/2008/disc_pte_dia_ejto2008.pdf 
Carothers, T. (2009). Rule of Law Temptations. The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, 49-61. 
Carothers, T. (2009). Rule of Law Temptations. The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, 
49-61.
Cavise, L. L. (2007). Essay: The Transition from the Inquisitorial to the Accusatorial System 
of Trial Procedure: Why some Latin American Lawyers Hesitate. The Wayne Law Review, 
785-816.
Cedillo, Juan, El Universal. (2010). Hacen héroe a Alejo Garza. [Press release] Retrieved from: 
http://archivo.eluniversal.com.mx/estados/78728.html  
cesij. (2015). Índice Global de Impunidad IGI 2015. México: Fundación Universidad de las 
Américas Puebla. 
Chase, S. E. (2011). Narrative Inquiry. In N. Denzin, & L. Yvonna, The SAGE Handbook of 
Qualitative Research (p. 421, 435). U.S.A.: SAGE.
Christie, N. (1985). Suitable Enemies. In H. Bianchi, & R. v. Swaaningen, Abolitionism: to-
wards a non-repressive approach to crime : proceedings of the Second International Con-
ference on Prison Abolition (p. 42-54). Amsterdam: Free University Press.
cidad. (2012). 8 Delitos Primero. México: cidad.
cmdpdh, cejil, comdh, ccdh, fidh, i(dh)eas, & imdhd. (March 28th 2011). Informe sobre el 
impacto en México de la figura del arraigo penal en los derechos humanos. Retrieved on 
March 8th 2012, from Comisión Mexicana para la Defensa y Promoción de los Derechos 
Humanos website: http://www.cmdpdh.org
cndh, (2011). Recomendación General No. 19 (cndh August 5th 2011).
cndh, (2013). Diagnóstico Nacional de Supervisión Penitenciaria. 2013.
cnn. (2010). La valentía de Alejo Garza Támez inspira a compositores de corridos. [Press 
release] Retrieved from: http://mexico.cnn.com/nacional/2010/11/25/la-valentia-de-alejo-
garza-tamez-inspira-a-compositores-de-corridos  
Cohen, S. (2002). Folk Devils and Moral Panics, 3rd edition. London and New York: Rout-
ledge.
Cohen, S. (2012). States of Denial. Cambridge and Malden: Polity.
Cole, D. (2003). Enemy aliens. New York: The New Press.
Concha Cantú, H., & Caballero Juárez, J. A. (2001). Diagnóstico sobre la administración de 
justicia en las entidades federativas. México: IIJ.
Concha, H., Magaloni, A. L., & Schatz, S. (2007). The Mexican Judicial System: Continuity 
and Change in a Period of Democratic Consolidation. In W. Cornelius, & D. Shirk, Re-
forming the Administration of Justice in Mexico (p. 197-224). Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press.
references                                                 2 279
Conger, L. (2014). The Private Sector and Public Security: The Cases of Ciudad Juárez and 
Monterrey. Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and 
University of San Diego.
Consulta Mitofsky. (2009). Medidas de seguridad; opiniones ciudadanas. México: Consulta 
Mitofsky.
Consulta Mitofsky; mucd. (2015). Décima Cuarta Encuesta Nacional sobre Percepción de 
Inseguridad Ciudadana en México. México: Consulta Mitofsky.
Cortés Pérez, F. (1990). La Aplicación irrestricta del principio de inmediatez procesal con-
valida violaciones a las garantías individuales. In J. F. Smith, Derecho constitucional com-
parado. Novena parte. El impacto de la Constitución en los procedimientos penales (p. 
565-576). México: iij-Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad de California en Davis.
Coyle, I., & Halon, R. (2013). Humpty Dumpty and Risk Assessment: A Reply to Slobogin. 
In P. Keyzer, Preventive Detention: Asking the Fundamental Questions (p. 193-222). Cam-
bridge, Antwerp, Portland: Intersentia.
Cross, F. B., & Lindquist, S. (2009). Judging the Judges. Duke Law Journal, Special Sympo-
sium Issue: Measuring Judges and Justice, 1383-1437.
del Olmo, R. (1996). Drug Couriers: Discourses, Perceptions and Policies. In P. Green, Drug 
Couriers. A new perspective. London: The Howards League League Handbooks.
Donnelly, R. A., & Shirk, D. A. (2009). Introduction. En R. A. Donnelly, & D. A. Shirk, Police 
and Public Security in Mexico (págs. 1-37). San Diego: University Readers.
Doob, A., & Webster, C. (2009). 2.1 Studies of the Impact of New Harsh Sentencing Regimes. 
In A. Ashworth, A. von Hirsch, & J. Roberts, Principled Sentencing: Readings on Theory 
and Policy (pp. 49-52). Oxford: Hart Publishing.
Dubber, M. D. (2010). Citizenship and Penal Law. New Criminal Law Review: An Interna-
tional and Interdisciplinary Journal, 190-215.
Dunlap, C. J. (2001). The Thick Green Line: The Growing involvement of Military forces in 
Domestic Law Enforcement. En P. B. Kraska, Militarizing the American Criminal Justice 
System: The Changing Roles of th (págs. 29-42). U.S.A.: Northeastern University Press.
Eisenstadt, T. A. (2007). Courting Democracy in Mexico: Party Strategies and Electoral Insti-
tutions. New York: Cambridge University Press.
El Economista. (2009). Gobernador de N.L. liga bloqueos con Cártel del Golfo. [Press release] 
Retrieved from: http://eleconomista.com.mx/politica/2009/02/17/gobernador-nl-liga-blo-
queos-cartel-golfo  
El Informador. (2010). Fueron 42 los narcobloqueos en Monterrey tras captura de capo. [Press 
release] Retrieved from: http://www.informador.com.mx/mexico/2010/208579/6/fueron-
42-los-narcobloqueos-en-Monterrey-tras-captura-de-capo.htm 
El Informador. (2014). Matan a “la abogada de narcos”, Silvia Raquenel Villanueva. [Press 
release] Retrieved from: http://www.informador.com.mx/mexico/2009/127834/6/matan-
a-la-abogada-de-narcos-silvia-raquenel-villanueva.htm 
El País. (2013). El fraude de la ‘Ouija del Diablo’. [Press release] Retrieved from: http://interna-
cional.elpais.com/internacional/2013/09/24/actualidad/1379981873_190592.html 
El Siglo de Torreón. (2014). Matan a la abogada Raquenel Villanueva. [Press release] Re-
trieved from: http://www.elsiglodetorreon.com.mx/noticia/452588.matan-a-la-abogada-
raquenel-villanueva.html 
El Universal. (21 de September de 2012). Resistencia al cambio, freno para sistema penal: Bor-
rego. [Press release] Retrieved from: http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/871878.html  
El Universal/Buendía & Laredo. (2014). Preocupan economía y empleo. México: El Universal.
Elizondo, C., & Magaloni, A. L. (2010). La forma es fondo: cómo se nombran y deciden los . 
Cuestiones Constitucionales, Revista Mexicana de Derecho Constitucional, 27-60.
Elizondo, C., & Pérez de Acha, L. M. (2006). Separación de poderes y garantías individuales: 
la Suprema Corte y los derechos de los contribuyentes. Cuestiones Constitucionales, Re-
vista Mexicana de Derecho Constitucional, 91-130.
references                                                 2 280
Epstein, L., & Knight, J. (1998). The Choices Justices Make. Washington: Congressional 
Quarterly Inc.
Epstein, L., & Knight, J. (2000). Toward a Strategic Revolution in Judicial Politics: A Look 
Back, A Look Ahead. Political Research Quarterly, 625-661.
Epstein, L., Ho, D. E., King, G., & Segal, J. A. (2005). The Supreme Court During Crisis: 
How War Affects only Non-War Cases. New York University Law Review, 1-116.
Epstein, L., Landes, W. M., & Posner, R. A. (2013). The Behavior of Federal Judges. A Theo-
retical and Empirical Study of Rational Choice. United States: Harvard University Press.
Fekete, L., & Webber, F. (2010). Foreing nationals, enemy penology and the criminal justice 
system. Race & Class, 1-25.
Ferrajoli, L. (2007). El derecho penal del enemigo y la disolución del derecho penal. IUS. Re-
vista del Instituto de Ciencias Jurídicas de Puebla, 5-22.
Festinger, L. (1962). Cognitive dissonance. Scientific American, 93-107.
Fix-Zamudio, H. (1976). Breve Introducción al Juicio de Amparo Mexicano. Mexico: El Co-
legio Nacional.
Flango, V. E., Wenner, L. M., & Wenner, M. W. (1975). The Concept of Judicial Role: A 
Methodological Note. American Journal of Political Science, 277-289.
Flyvbjerg, B. (2011). Case Study. In N. Denzin, & Y. Lincoln, The SAGE Handbook of Quali-
tative Research (p. 301-316). U.S.A.: SAGE.
Fon, V., & Parisi, F. (2006). Judicial precedents in civil law systems: A dynamic analysis. In-
ternational Review of Law and Economics, 519-535.
Fondevila, G., & Mejía Vargas, A. (2010). Reforma Procesal Penal: Sistema Acusatorio y 
Delincuencia Organizada. Revista Mexicana de Justicia, 19-50. 
Fox, J. W. (2005). Doctrinal Myths and the management of Cognitive Dissonance: Race, Law, 
and the Supreme Court’s Doctrinal Support of Jim Crow. Stetson Law Review, 294-342.
Friedman, B. (2005). The Politics of Judicial Review. Texas Law Review, 257-337.
Galván Galván, Guillermo. (2008, February 18). [Speech] Retrieved from: http://www.sedena.
gob.mx/index.php/sala-de-prensa/discursos 
Galván Galván, Guillermo. (2010, February 19). [Speech] Retrieved from:  http://www.sede-
na.gob.mx/-index.php/component/content/article/142-discursos/3085-tlalpan-df-a-19-de-
febrero-de-2010
García Luna, Genaro. (2007, August 18). [Interview transcript] Retrieved from:  http://www.
ssp.gob.mx/portalWebApp/appmanager/portal/desk?_nfpb=true&_pageLabel=portals_
portal_page_m2p1p2&content_id=814879&folderNode=810187&folderNode1=814222
García Luna, Genaro. (2008, January 24). [Speech] Retrieved from:  http://www.ssp.gob.mx/
portalWebApp/appmanager/portal/desk?_nfpb=true&_pageLabel=portals_portal_page_
m2p1p2&content_id=814235&folderNode=810187&folderNode1=814219
García Ramírez, S. (1994). El nuevo procedimiento penal mexicano: reforma de 1993-1994. 
México: Porrúa.
Garland, D. (2001). The Culture of Control. New York: Oxford University Press.
Gibson, J. L. (1978). Judges’ Role Orientations, Attitudes and Decisions: An Interactive Mod-
el. The American Political Science Review, 911-924.
Gibson, J. L. (1981). The Role Concept in Judicial Research. Law & Policy Quarterly, 291-
311.
Glick, H. R., & Vines, K. N. (1969). Law-Making in the State Judiciary: A Comparative Study 
of the Judicial Role in Four States. Polity, 142-159.
Gómez Jara-Díez, C. (2008). Enemy combatants versus Enemy Criminal Law. New Criminal 
Law Review, 529-562.
González Salas, C. R. (2001). Las reformas al Código Penal. In S. García Ramírez, & L. Var-
gas Castillo, Las reformas penales de los últimos años en México (1995-2000) (p. 25-49). 
México: iij-unam.
Gracia Martín, L. (2005). Consideraciones críticas sobre el actualmente denominado ‘Derecho 
references                                                 2 281
penal del enemigo’. Revista Electrónica de Ciencia Penal y Criminología, 1-43.
Green, P., & Ward, T. (2004). State Crime. London: Pluto Press.
Guarnieri, C., Pederzoli, P., & Thomas, C. (2002). The Power of Judges: A Comparative Study 
of Courts and Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Guerrero, O. (1998). El Funcionario, el Diplomático y el Juez. México: INAP.
Hadden, T. (2000). Judicial Roles and the Criminal Process During States of Emergency: A 
Framework for Analysis. In S. Doran, & J. D. Jackson, The Judicial Role in Criminal Pro-
ceedings (pp. 205-222). Oxford & Portland: Hart Publishing.
Hammergren, L. A. (2007). Envisioning reform: improving judicial performance in Latin 
America. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press.
Hebenton, B., & Seddon, T. (2009). From Dangerousness to Precaution. Managing Sexual 
and Violent Offenders in an Insecure and Uncertain Age. British Journal of Criminology, 
343-362.
Heise, M. (2002). The Past, Present, and Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship: Judicial Deci-
sion Making and the New Empiricism. University of Illinois Law Review, 819-850.
Hernández Acero, J. (2000). Apuntes de Derecho Procesal Penal. México: Porrúa.
Hernández Pliego, J. A. (2003). El Proceso Penal Mexicano. México: Porrúa.
Herrera Lasso, L., & González, G. (1993). Reflections on the Use of the Concept of National 
Security in Mexico. In S. Aguayo, & B. M. Bagley, Mexico: in search of security (p. 339-
358). Miami: Transaction Publishers.
Holmes, O. W. (1881). The Common Law. Boston: Little, Brown.
Howard, W. J. (1977). Role Perceptions and Behavior in Three U.S. Courts of Appeal. The 
Journal of Politics, 916-938.
Hudson, B. A. (2003). Understanding justice: an introduction to ideas, perspectives and con-
troversies in modern penal theory. Norfolk: Open University Press.
Human Rights Council (2011). Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judg-
es and lawyers. General Assembly, United Nations. A/HRC/17/30/Add.3 18 April 2011.
Human Rights Watch. (2011). Ni Seguridad, Ni Derechos. Ejecuciones, desapariciones y tor-
tura en la “guerra contra el narcotráfico” de México. Estados Unidos de América: Human 
Rights Watch.
Human Rights Watch. (2013). Los desaparecidos de México. El persistente costo de la crisis 
ignorada. Estados Unidos de América: Human Rights Watch.
icesi. (2011). Delitos de alto impacto en México. México: icesi.
inegi. (2011). Encuesta Nacional de Victimización y Percepción sobre Seguridad Pública. 
México: inegi.
inegi. (2013) Censo Nacional de Gobierno, Seguridad Pública y Sistema Penitenciario Estat-
ales 2013.
inegi. (2014) Censo Nacional de Gobierno, Seguridad Pública y Sistema Penitenciario Estat-
ales 2014.
inegi. (2015). Encuesta Nacional de Victimización y Percepción sobre Seguridad Pública. 
México: inegi.
INH, J. D. (07 de December de 2010). Drugs of choice: Mexico faces security dilemma. ihs 
Jane’s: Defence & Security Intelligence & Analysis, p. 8-13.
Islas de González, M. O. (2001). Reforma penal sustantiva. In S. García Ramírez, & L. Var-
gas Casillas, Las reformas penales de los últimos años en México (1995-2000) (p. 7-15). 
México: iij-unam.
Issacharoff, S., & Pildes, R. H. (2004). Emergency contexts without emergency powers: the 
United States’ constitutional approach to rights during wartime. International Journal of 
Constitutional Law, 296-333.
Iturralde, M. (2010). Democracies without Citizenship: crime and punishment in Latin Amer-
ica. New Criminal Law Review, 309-323.
Jakobs, G. (2006). La pena estatal: significado y finalidad. In G. Jakobs, E. López Betancourt, 
references                                                 2 282
& M. Polaino Navarrete, Función de la pena estatal y evolución de la dogmática post-
finalista (p. 15-60). México: Editorial Porrúa.
Jakobs, G. (2008). ¿De qué trata exactamente la problemática del Derecho penal del enemigo? 
En G. Jakobs, M. Polaino Navarrete, & M. Polaino-Orts, El Derecho Penal del Enemigo 
en el Contexto del Funcionalismo (p. 1-6). México: Flores Editor y Distribuidor.
Jakobs, G. (2008). ¿Derecho penal del enemigo? Un estudio acerca de los presupuestos de ju-
ridicidad. In G. Jakobs, M. Polaino Navarrete, & M. Polaino-Orts, El Derecho Penal del 
enemigo en el Contexto del Funcionalismo (p. 7-39). México: Flores Editor y Distribuidor.
Justice, M. o. (2014). Criminal Justice Statistics. Quarterly Update to march 2014. London: 
Ministry of Justice Statistics bulletin.
Kapiszewski, D., & Taylor, M. (2008). Doing Courts Justice? Studying Judicial Politics in 
Latin America. Perspectives on Politics, 741-767.
Kozinski, A. (1993). What I Ate for Breakfast and Other Mysteries of Judicial Decision Mak-
ing. Loyola LA Law Review, 71-76.
Kraska, P. B. (2001). Crime Control as Warfare: Language Matters. En P. B. Kraska, Mili-
tarizing the American Criminal Justice System. The Changing Roles of the Armed Forces 
and the Police (págs. 14-28). U.S.A.: Northeastern University Press.
Krasmann, S. (2007). The enemy on the border. Punishment & Society, 301-318.
Krauze, E. (2012). México: la tormenta perfecta. Letras Libres, 14-21.
La Jornada (2015). En México y AL hay un nuevo genocidio en curso. [Interview] Retrieved 
from: http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2015/04/28/politica/012e1pol  
Leiter, B. (2005). American Legal Realism. En M. P. Golding, & W. A. Edmundson, The 
Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory (págs. 50-66). Oxford: Black-
well Publishing.
Levin, M. A. (1977). Urban Politics and the Criminal Courts. Chicago and London: The Uni-
versity of Chicago Press.
Lewis, J., & Ritchie, J. (2010). Generalising from Qualitative Research. In J. Lewis, & J. 
Ritchie, Qualitative Research Practice (p. 263-286). London: Sage.
Ley Gutiérrez, S. J. (2014). Citizens in Fear: Political Participation and Voting Behavior in the 
Midst of Violence. Durham: Graduate School of Duke University.
Lima Malvido, M. d. (2011). De política criminal a la seguridad nacional. In S. García 
Ramírez, & M. O. Islas de González, La situación actual del sistema penal en México (p. 
395-420). México: iij-unam.
Lindquist, S. A., & Cross, F. B. (2005). Empirically Testing Dworkin’s Chain Novel Theory: 
Studying the Path of Precedent. New York University Law Review, 1156.
López Ayllón, S., & Fix Fierro, H. (2003). Faraway, So Close. Rule of Law and Legal Change 
in Mexico 1970-2000. In R. Pérez-Perdomo, & L. Friedman, Legal Culture in the Age of 
Globalization: Latin America and Latin Europe (p. 285-351). Estados Unidos: Stanford 
University Press.
López-Ayllón, S., & Valladares, F. (2009). Las acciones de inconstitucionalidad en la Consti-
tución mexicana: análisis empírico de 12 años de ejercicio. Cuestiones Constitucionales, 
Revista Mexicana de Derecho Constitucional, 175-212.
López Portillo Vargas, E. (2002). The Police in Mexico: Political Functions and Needed Re-
forms. En J. Bailey, & J. Chabat, Transnational Crime and Public Security (págs. 109-135). 
San Diego: La Jolla.
Luban, D. (2002). The War on Terror and the End of Human Rights. Philosophy and Public 
Policy Quarterly, 9-14.
Magaloni, A. L. (2009). El MP desde adentro. Rutinas y métodos de trabajo en las agencias 
del MP. Mexico: cide.
Magaloni, A. L. (August 2012). Seguridad con justicia: La única opción posible. Plataforma, 
p. 96-105.
Magaloni, A. L., & Ibarra, A. M. (2008). La configuración jurisprudencial de los derechos 
references                                                 2 283
fundamentales. El caso del derecho constitucional a una defensa adecuada. Cuestiones 
Constitucionales, 107-147.
Maldonado Aranda, S. (2012). Drogas, violencia y militarización en el México rural. Revista 
Mexicana de Sociología, 5-39.
Mancera Espinosa, M. Á. (2007). ¿Derecho Penal del Enemigo en México? In S. García 
Ramírez, & M. O. Islas de González, , Panorama internacional sobre justicia penal: políti-
ca criminal, derecho penal y criminología (p. 585-608). México: iij-unam.
Martínez, P. (2012). Esclavos del Narco: Los niños del hampa. Animal Político, 1-8.
Mason, J. (2002). Qualitative Researching. London: SAGE.
May, T. (2011). Social Research: Issues, Methods and Research. Glasglow: McGraw-Hill.
McCrudden, C. (2006). Legal research and the social sciences. Law Quarterly Review, 632-
650.
McCulloch, J., & Carlton, B. (2006). Preempting Justice: Suppression of Financing of Terror-
ism and the ‘War on Terror’. Current Issues in Criminal Justice, 397-412.
Medina Mora, Eduardo. (2011, December 8). Public lecture at King’s College London.
Méndez, Alfredo, La Jornada. (2011). No se debe acusar sin pruebas a jueces, revira el cjf 
a Calderón. [Press release] Retrieved from: http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2011/09/07/
opinion/005n1pol  
Mendoza Márquez, H. E., & Montero Bagatella, J. C. (2015). Gobernanza para La Gober-
nabilidad. La construcción de “Fuerza Civil”, la nueva policía de Nuevo León. Revista 
Mexicana de Análisis Político y Administración Pública, 103-128.
Merino, J. (1 de Junio de 2011). Los operativos conjuntos y la tasa de homicidios: Una medición. 
Retrieved from Nexos en línea: http://www.nexos.com.mx/?p=14319
México Evalúa. (2011). Índice de víctimas visibles e invisibles de delitos graves. México: 
México Evalúa.
México Evalúa. (2013). La cárcel en México: ¿para qué sirve? México: México Evalúa.
México Evalúa. (2016). Homicidios. En Justicia a la medida: 7 indicadores sobre la calidad de 
la Justicia Penal en México. México: México Evalúa.
Milenio. (2009). Se enfrentan Ejército y comando armado en Monterrey. [Press release] Its 
access is not available
Moloeznik, M. P. (2009). The Militarization of Public Security and the Role of the Military in 
Mexico. In R. A. Donnelly, & D. A. Shirk, Police and Public Security in Mexico (p. 65-92). 
U.S.A.: University Readers.
Moreno Hernández, M. (2001). Política criminal frente a la Delincuencia Organizada. In S. 
García Ramírez, & L. Vargas Castillo, Las reformas penales de los últimos años en México 
(1995-2000) (p. 147-167). México: iij-unam.
Moreno Hernández, M. (2011). Política criminal y sistema de justicia penal en materia de 
delincuencia organizada. In S. García Ramírez, & M. O. Islas de González, La situación 
actual del sistema penal en México (p. 343-360). México: iij-unam.
Muñoz, Alma E., La Jornada. (2011). El secretario de Marina pone en riesgo a defensores de 
derechos humanos, dice AI. [Press release] Retrieved from:  http://www.jornada.unam.
mx/2011/07/29/politica/009n1pol  
Nelson, R. L., & Cabatingan, L. (2010). A preface and an introduction. In L. Cabatingan, J. 
J. Hackman, & R. L. Nelson, Global perspectives on the Rule of Law (p. 1-13). London: 
Routledge.
Neuborne, B. (2005). The Role of Courts in Time of War. New York University Review of Law 
& Social Change, 555-572.
New York Times (Interviewer) & Calderón Hinojosa, Felipe (Interviewee). (2011, Octo-
ber 17). The Complete Interview with President Felipe Calderón in Spanish (La Entrev-
ista Completa en Español) [Interview Transcript] Retrieved from: http://www.nytimes.
com/2011/10/24/world/americas/calderon-transcript-in-spanish.html?pagewanted=2&_
r=1&sq=interview%20with%20calderon&st=cse&scp=2
references                                                 2 284
Notimex (2008). Aumentan 47% asesinatos por crimen organizado. [Press release] Retrieved 
from: http://www.terra.com.mx/noticias/articulo/667909/Aumentan+47+asesinatos+por+
crimen+organizado.html  
Thomas, C. & Genn, D. H. (2013). Understanding Tribunal Decision-Making. London: Nuff-
ield Foundation.
O’Leary, Z. (2010). The Essential Guide to Doing Your Research Project. London: SAGE.
O’Malley, P. (2001). Volatile and Contradictory Punishment. Theoretical Criminology, 175-
196.
Osorio, J. (2011). Dynamic and Structural Determinants of Drug Violence in Mexico. Vio-
lence, Drugs and Governance: Conference on Mexican Security in Comparative Perspec-
tive, (p. 40). Stanford.
Osorio, J. (2013). Hobbes on drugs. Understanding drug violence in Mexico. Indiana: Notre 
Dame.
Osorio, J. (2015). The Contagion of Drug Violence: Spatiotemporal Dynamics of the Mexican 
War on Drugs. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1-30.
Ovalle Favela, J. (1999). México. Informe nacional. In R. O. Berizonce, El Juez y la Magistra-
tura. Tendencias en los albores del siglo xxi (p. 421-442). Buenos Aires: Rubinzal-Culzoni 
Editores.
Pásara, L. (2006). Cómo sentencian los jueces del Distrito Federal en materia penal. México: 
IIJ.
Pew Research Center (2012). Mexicans Back Military Campaign Against Cartels. [Survey 
Report] Retrieved from: http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/06/20/mexicans-back-military-
campaign-against-cartels/
Perakyla, A., & Ruusuvuori, J. (2011). Analyzing talk and text. In N. Denzin, & Y. Lincoln, 
The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research (p. 529-543). U.S.A.: SAGE.
Pérez Correa, C. (2012). (Des) proporcionalidad y delitos contra la salud. México: cide.
Pérez-Perdomo, R., & Friedman, L. (2003). Latin Legal Cultures in the Age of Globalization. 
In R. Pérez-Perdomo, & L. Friedman, Legal Cultures in the Age of Globalization: Latin 
America and Latin Europe (p. 1-19). Estados Unidos: Stanford University Press.
Periodistas de México (2011). Comunicado conjunto de las instancias que conforman la Es-
trategia Nacional de Seguridad. [Press release] Retrieved from:  http://journalmex.word-
press.com/2011/01/03/comunicado-conjunto-de-las-instancias-que-conforman-la-estrate-
gia-nacional-de-seguridad/  
Piccato, P. (2007). A Historical Perspective on Crime in Twentieth-Century Mexico City. In 
W. Cornelius, & D. Shirk, Reforming the Administration of Justice in Mexico (p. 65-89). 
Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press.
Plasencia, José Antonio; Talavera, Gabriel Talavera; Castro, Héctor, El Norte. (2009) Incauta 
sedena lista de policías de la Regia presuntamente ligados al crimen organizado. [Press 
release] Retrieved from: http://norte-monterrey.vlex.com.mx/vid/balean-cumbres-intento-
liberar-detenido-77652075   
Polaino Navarrete, M. (2008). Entre el Derecho penal simbólico y el Derecho penal del en-
emigo: la represión punitiva de la llamada “violencia de género” en España. En G. Jakobs, 
M. Polaino Navarrete, & M. Polaino-Orts, El Derecho Penal del Enemigo en el Contexto 
del Funcionalismo (p. 101-168). México: Flores Editor y Distribuidor, S.A. de C.V.
Polaino-Orts, M. (2008). Derecho Penal del Enemigo: ¿Qué es? ¿Debe existir? ¿Por qué existe? 
En G. Jakobs, M. Polaino Navarrete, & M. Polaino-Orts, El Derecho Penal del Enemigo 
en el Contexto del Funcionalismo (p. 41-99). México: Flores Editor y Distribuidor.
Polaino-Orts, M. (2010). ¿Comunicación versus Coacción? Consideraciones críticas sobre la 
pretendida escisión de la función de la pena. In G. Jakobs, M. Polaino Navarrete, & M. 
Polaino-Orts, Bien jurídico, Vigencia de la norma y daño social (p. 115-149). Lima: ARA 
Editores.
Polaino-Orts, M. (2010). Vigencia de la Norma: El potencial de sentido de un concepto. In G. 
references                                                 2 285
Jakobs, M. Polaino Navarrete, & M. Polaino-Orts, Bien jurídico, Vigencia de la norma y 
daño social (p. 59-112). Lima: ARA Editores.
Posner, R. A. (2008). How Judges Think. Cambridge & London: Harvard University Press.
Pou Giménez, F. (2010). Género y protección de derechos humanos en México : virtualidad 
y límites de la jurisdicción constitucional . En J. Cruz Parcero, & R. Vázquez, Debates 
constitucionales sobre derechos humanos de las mujeres (págs. 45-101). México: scjn-Fon-
tamara.
Pratt, J. (2000). Dangerousness and modern society. In M. Brown, & J. Pratt, Dangerous Of-
fenders: Punishment and social order (pp. 35-48). London: Routledge.Ramírez Saavedra, 
B. E. (August de 2012). Presidencia democrática y Seguridad nacional. Plataforma, p. 106-
117.
Presidencia de la República. (2007). Plan Nacional de Desarrollo. 
Redacción, Impacto. (2015) Magistrados contra Eduardo Medina Mora. [Press release] Re-
trieved from: http://impacto.mx/nacional/Fcc/magistrados-contra-eduardo-medina-mora  
Regalado Santillán, J. (2002). Public Security versus Private Security. In J. Bailey, & J. Chabat, 
Transnational Crime and Public Security (p. 181-191). U.S.A.: Center for U.S.-Mexican 
Studies.
Resnik, J. (1982-1983). Managerial Judges. Harvard Law Review, 376-446.
Reuters, Excélsior. (2011). Monterrey es un punto estratégico para el narcotráfico, advierten en 
Estados Unidos. [Press release] Retrieved from: http://www.excelsior.com.mx/2011/06/02/
nacional/742054  
Rey, G. (2007). Miradas oblicuas sobre el crimen. In G. Rey, Los relatos periodísticos del 
crimen. Cómo se cuenta el delito en la prensa escrita latinoamericana. (p. 7-20). Bogotá: 
Centro de Competencia en Comunicación.
Reyes, Juan Pablo, Excélsior. (2015). scjn avala arraigo en casos graves; resolución vigente 
hasta junio de 2016. [Press release] Retrieved from: http://www.excelsior.com.mx/nacion
al/2015/04/15/1018707#imagen-2  
Reynoso Dávila, R. (2011). Penología. México: Porrúa.
Richardson, G., & Genn, H. (2007). Tribunals in transition: resolution or adjudication? Pub-
lic Law, 116-141.
Ríos-Figueroa, J. (2007). Fragmentation of Power and The Emergence of an Effective Judi-
ciary in Mexico, 1994-2002. Latin American Politics & Society, 31-57.
Ríos-Figueroa, J. (2012). Sociolegal Studies in Mexico. Annual Review of Law and Social 
Science.
Ríos, V. (2013). Why did Mexico become so violent? A self-reinforcing violent equi8librium 
caused by competition and enforcement. Trends in Organized Crime, 138-155.
Ritchie, J. (2010). The Applications of Qualitative Methods to Social Research. In J. Lewis, & 
J. Ritchie, Qualitative Research Practice (p. 24-46). London: Sage.
Robbennolt, J. K., Maccoun, R., & Darley, J. M. (2008). Multiple Constraint Satisfaction in 
Judging. Illinois Public Law Research Paper No. 08-22 & UC Berkeley Public Law Re-
search Paper No. 11333184, Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1133184.
Robles de la Rosa, Leticia, el Excélsior (2014) “En el sexenio de Calderón hubo 121 mil muertes”. 
[Press release] Retrieved from: http://www.excelsior.com.mx/nacional/2014/03/12/948239 
Rutherford, A. (1997). Criminal Policy and the Eliminative Ideal. Social Policy & Administra-
tion, 116-135.
Sánchez Cordero, d. G. (22 de octubre de 2001). La seguridad pública y la Suprema Corte. 
Tres notas para el debate. XXI Semana Académica “La seguridad pública, reto del siglo 
xxi”, 22. Huixquilucan, Estado de México.
Sanders, A., & Young, R. (2007). From suspect to trial. In M. Maguire, R. Morgan, & R. 
Reiner, The Oxford Handbook of Criminology (pp. 953-989). Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
references                                                 2 286
Sanders, A., Young, R., & Burton, M. (2010). Criminal Justice. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
Sarantakos, S. (2005). Social Research. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Sarre, M. (2011). Debido proceso y ejecución penal. Reforma de 2008. Revista de la Judica-
tura Federal, 251-268.
Saynez Mendoza, Mariano Francisco. (2010, July 30). [Speech] Retrieved from: http://www.
semar.gob.mx/discursosalmtesrio/2010/graduacion_guardiamarinas.pdf 
Saynez Mendoza, Mariano Francisco. (2011, September 15). [Speech] Retrieved from: http://
www.semar.gob.mx/discursosalmtesrio/2011/entrega_blackhawk.pdf
Scheb, J. M., Ungs, T. D., & Hayes, A. L. (1989). Judicial Role Orientations. Attitudes and 
Decision Making: A Research Note. The Western Political Quarterly, 427-435.
sedena. (2007). Programa Sectorial de Desarollo sobre Seguridad Nacional. 
Segal, J. A., & Cover, A. D. (1989). Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court 
Justices. The American Political Science Review, 557-565.
Segal, J. A., & Spaeth, H. J. (2002). The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Segal, J. A., Epstein, L., Cameron, C. M., & Spaeth, H. J. (1994). Ideological VAlues and 
the Votes of the U.S. Supreme Court Justices Revisited. The University of Chicage Press, 
812-823.
semar. (2007). Programa Sectorial de Desarollo sobre Seguridad Nacional.
Shirk, D. A. (2011). Judicial Reform in Mexico: Change and Challenges in the Judicial Sector. 
Mexican Law Review, 189-228.Shirk, D., & Ríos Cázares, A. (2007). Introduction. In W. 
Cornelius, & D. Shirk, Reforming the Administration of Justice in Mexico (p. 3-47). Notre 
Dame: Notre Dame University Press.
Shirk, D., & Wallman, J. (2015). Understanding Mexico’s Drug Violence. Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, 1-30.
Silva Meza, J. (2001). Las reformas penales de los últimos cinco años en México. In S. García 
Ramírez, & L. Vargas Casillas, Las reformas penales de los últimos años en México (1995-
2000) (p. 223-233). México: iij-unam.
Silverman, D. (2010). Doing Qualitative Research. London: sage.
Snape, D., & Spencer, L. (2010). The Foundations of Qualitative Research. In J. Lewis, & J. 
Ritchie, Qualitative Research Practice (p. 1-23). London: Sage.
Speckman Guerra, E. (2007). Justice Reform and Legal Opinion: The Mexican Criminal 
Codes of 1871, 1929, and 1931. In C. Wayne, & D. Shirk, Reforming the Administration 
of Justice in Mexico (p. 225-249). Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press.
Staton, J. K. (2007). Lobbying for Judicial Reform: The Role of the Mexican Supreme Court in 
Institutional Selection. En W. A. Cornelius, & D. A. Shirk, Reforming the Administration 
of Justice in Mexico (págs. 273-296). South Bend, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press.
Staton, J. K. (2010). Judicial Power and Strategic Communication in Mexico. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Taniguchi, Hanako, cnn Mexico. (2012a). Uno de cada 10 jueces federales vive bajo amena-
zas del crimen organizado. [Press release] Retrieved from: http://mexico.cnn.com/nacio-
nal/2012/11/07/uno-de-cada-10-jueces-federales-vive-bajo-amenazas-del-crimen-orga-
nizado  
Taniguchi, Hanako, cnn Mexico. (2012b). Presidente de la Suprema Corte alerta sobre riesgos 
de los jueces. [Press release] Retrieved from: http://mexico.cnn.com/nacional/2012/11/05/
presidente-de-la-suprema-corte-alerta-sobre-riesgos-de-los-jueces  
Taruffo, M. (2003). Cinco Lecciones Mexicanas: Memoria del Taller de Derecho Procesal. 
México: Tribunal Electoral del Poder Judicial de la Federación.
Teitel, R. (1993). Persecution and Inquisition. A Case Study. In I. P. Stotzky, Transition to 
democracy in Latin America: the role of the judiciary (p. 141-153). Boulder, San Francisco, 
Oxford: Westview Press.
references                                                 2 287
Thea, F. G. (2012). The Role of Judges in Political Struggles. Queen Mary Law Journal, 57-73.
Toharia, J. (1975). Judicial Independence in an Authoritarian Regime: the case of Contempo-
rary Spain. Law & Society Review, 475-496.
Torres, Mauricio, cnn México. (2015). Eduardo Medina Mora tacha de “falsas” las críticas a 
su trayectoria. [Press release] Retrieved from: http://mexico.cnn.com/nacional/2015/03/09/
eduardo-medina-mora-tacha-de-falsas-las-criticas-a-su-trayectoria  
Trejo, G. (25 de Mayo de 2015). Tanhuato: ¿Ejecución extrajudicial o saldo de una batalla 
desigual? Retrieved from Animal Político: http://www.animalpolitico.com/blogueros-
blog-invitado/2015/05/24/tanhuato-ejecucion-extrajudicial-o-saldo-de-una-batalla-des-
igual/
Tumonis, V. (2012). Legal Realism & Judicial decision-making. Jurisprudence, 1361-1382.
Uildriks, N. (2010). Mexico’s Unrule of Law. Plymouth: Lexington Books.
Ungs, T., & Baas, L. R. (1972). Judicial Role Perceptions: A Q-Tecnique Study of Ohio Judges. 
Law & Society Review, 343-346.
Uprimny Yepes, R., Guzmán, D. E., & Parra Norato, J. (2012). La adicción punitiva. La de-
sproporción de leyes de drogas en América Latina. Bogotá: Centro de EStudios de Derecho, 
Justicia y Sociedad.
Van Hoecke, M. (2011). Legal Doctrine: Which Method(s) for What Kind of Discipline? In M. 
Van Hoecke, Methodologies of Legal Research: Which Kind of Method for What Kind of 
Discipline (p. 1-18). Oxford: Hart Publishing.
Vanguardia. (2010). Un ranchero heróico, Don Alejo Garza Tamez, impresiona a México. 
[Press release] Retrieved from: http://www.vanguardia.com.mx/unrancheroheroicodo-
nalejogarzatamezimpresionaamexico-595465.html  
Vargas Castillo, L. (2001). Reformas penales en materia de delincuencia organizada y seguri-
dad pública en los últimos cinco años. In S. García Ramírez, & M. O. Islas de González, 
Las reformas penales de los últimos años en México (1995-2000) (p. 139-147). México: 
IIJ-UNAM.
Vélez, Enrique, Fotolog. (2009). Alarma balacera en zona Cumbres. [Press release] Retrieved 
from: http://mx.fotolog.com/enrique_velez_v/47047586/  
Vines, K. (1969). The Judicial Role in the American States: An Exploration. En J. Grossman, 
& J. Tanenhaus, Frontiers of Judicial Research (págs. 461-485). New York: Wiley.
Walker, C. (2000). Emergency Cases: Commissions, Commissioners and the Commodity. En 
S. Doran, & J. D. Jackson, The Judicial Role in Criminal Proceedings (págs. 223-243). 
Oxford and Portland: Hart Publishing.
Walker, N. (1994). Dangerousness and Mental Disorder. In A. P. Griffiths, Philosphy, Psychol-
ogy and Psychiatry (p. 179-190). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Weiden, D. L. (2009). Comparing Judicial Institutions: Using an Inquisitorial Trial Simulation 
to Facilitate Student Understanding of International Legal Traditions. Political Science and 
Politics, 759-763.
Weingast, B. R. (2010). Developing countries and the rule of law. In L. Cabatingan, J. J. 
Hackman, & R. L. Nelson, Global perspectives on the rule of law (p. 28-51). London: 
Routledge.
Wondratschke, C. (2007). Seguridad ciudadana y medios de comunicación en la Ciudad de 
México. In G. Rey, Los relatos periodísticos del crimen (p. 172-187). Bogotá: Centro de 
Competencia en Comunicación.
Zaffaroni, E. (1998). Manual de Derecho Penal. México: Cardenas Editor Distribuidor.
Zaffaroni, E. R. (2011). El enemigo en el derecho penal. México: Coyoacán.
Zamudio Angles, C. A. (2011). México y su Ley contra el Narcomenudeo. UK: International 
Drug Policy Consortium.
Zedillo Ponce de León, Ernesto. (1994, December 1). [Speech] Retrieved from: http://zedillo.
presidencia.gob.mx/pages/disc/dic94/01dic94-2.html  
Zedillo Ponce de León, Ernesto. (1998, August 1). President Zedillo’s presentation of the Na-
references                                                 2 288
tional Crusade against Crime and Delinquency [Stenographic registry] Retrieved from: 
http://zedillo.presidencia.gob.mx/pages/disc/ago98/26ago98.html  
Zedner, L. (2009). Security. Great Britain: Routledge.
Zedner, L. (2010). Security, the State, and the Citizen: The Changing Architecture of Crime 
Control. . New Criminal Law Review: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal, 
379-403.
Zepeda Lecuona, G. (2009). ¿Cuánto cuesta la prisión sin condena? Costos económicos y 
sociales de la prisión preventiva en México. México: Open Society Justice Initiative.
Zepeda Lecuona, G. (2011). Seguridad ciudadana y juicios orales en México. In La situación 
actual del sistema penal en México. XI Jornadas sobre Justicia Penal (p.261-273). México: 
iij-inacipe.
 Zepeda Patterson, Jorge (Interviewer) & Calderón Hinojosa, Felipe (Interviewee). (2009, Feb-
ruary 21). El crimen es la mayor amenaza a los derechos humanos. [Interview transcript] 




Federal Criminal Procedural Code
Federal Legislation on Organised Crime
Public Health Law
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Organic Law of the Attorney General Office
Law of Personal Data Protection
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Ethics form, Information Sheet 
and Interview Schedules
Research Ethics – Risk Checklist
	 Complete the checklist ticking yes to any of the sections relevant to your study. 
Name: Ana Cárdenas
Review Committee: Law Panel (Law REP)
Title of Study: Mexican criminal policy and its effects on the judiciary
Yes No
A Does the study involve participants who are particularly vulnerable or 
unable to give informed consent or in a dependent position (e.g. vul-
nerable children, your own students, over-researched groups, people 
with learning difficulties, people with mental health problems, young 
offenders, people in care facilities, including prisons)?
If you have ticked yes to this section, will financial incentives (other 
than expenses) be offered to participants?  YES    NO   
If yes, please state how much. 
b Will participants be asked to take part in the study without their con-
sent or knowledge at the time or will deception of any sort be involved 
(e.g. covert observation of people in non-public places)? 
C Is there a risk that the highly sensitive nature of the research topic 
might lead to disclosures from the participant concerning their own in-
volvement in illegal activities or other activities that represent a threat 
to themselves or others (e.g. sexual activity, drug use, or professional 
misconduct)?
D Could the study induce psychological stress or anxiety, or produce hu-
miliation or cause harm or negative consequences beyond the risks en-
countered in normal life?
E Does the study involve imaging techniques such as MRI scans, x-rays 
or ultrasound?
F Does the study involve physically intrusive procedures?
If yes, continue below and ensure you have also completed the Section 
b form:
appendix 1                                                                       2 290
i Does the study involve only moderately intrusive procedures (tak-
ing less than 40ml blood, collecting bodily waste, cheek swabs)?
ii Are substances to be administered (such as food substances) which 
are not classified as ‘medicinal products’ by the MHRA? (see Sec-
tion b guidelines for more details)
iii Are substances which are classified as ‘medicinal products’ by the 
MHRA to be administered? (see Section b guidelines for more de-
tails)
iv Does the study involve DNA or RNA analysis of any kind? (see Ap-
pendix D)?
v Are invasive, intrusive or potentially harmful procedures not al-
ready covered by items i, ii, iii & iv to be used in this study?
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APPLICATION FOR ETHICAL APPROvAL 
Please tick the Subcommittee or Panel you are applying to:
Research Ethics Subcommittees (RESCs)
PNM RESC      SSHL RESC  
(Psychiatry, Nursing & Midwifery)   (Social Sciences, Humanities 
& Law)
(High Risk)
bDM RESC (Health)  
(biomedical Sciences, Dentistry, Medicine 
and Natural & Mathematical Sciences)
Research Ethics Panels (REPs)
For SSPP, Humanities and Law (non-high risk only)
E&M REP       GGS REP  
(Education & Management)    (Geography, Gerontology, 
SCWRu)
Humanities REP   War Studies Group REP   Law REP     
      (Law & Department of Political Econ-
omy)
Notes for all applicants
	 Please read the guidelines before filling out the application form and refer to the 
specific guidelines about each section when filling in the form. (http://www.kcl.
ac.uk/research/ethics/applicants/)  
	 Refer to the Guidelines for the submission deadlines for your Subcommittee and 
the number of copies to submit (including electronic versions if applicable).  
	 All applications should be submitted by 5pm on the deadline day.
For office use only:
REC Protocol No  
Date rec’d:  
	 All Subcommittee applications should be submitted to the Research Ethics Office, 
5.11 Franklin Wilkins building, (Waterloo bridge Wing), Waterloo Campus, King’s 
College London, Stamford Street, London SE1 9NH. 
	 All Research Ethics Panel applications should be submitted to SSPP Ethics Admin-
istrator, K0.58 Ground Floor Strand building, King’s College London, The Strand, 
London WC2R 2LS.
SECTION A – TO bE COMPLETED bY ALL APPLICANTS
1.  APPLICANT DETAILS
1.1  RESEARCHER
Researcher’s Name:  Ana Cárdenas
Researcher’s Department & School:  Law
Status: 
undergraduate    Taught Postgraduate    MPhil / PhD/ Specialist Doctorate   
Staff Research
If Student: 
Name of course/qualification: MPhil/PhD in Law
If Staff: 
Researcher’s Post:  
1.2  CONTACT DETAILS
Email: (Please use your KCL email address where possible)
ana.cardenas_gonzalez_de_cosio@kcl.ac.uk 
Telephone number: 07400926007
Address: 12a Leamington Road villas, London, W11 1HS
1.3  SuPERvISOR - COMPLETE FOR ALL STuDENT PROJECTS (Including PhD)
Name of Supervisor: benjamin bowling
Supervisor’s Post: Professor of Criminology and Criminal Justice
Supervisor’s Department (if different to student): 
Supervisor’s email address: ben.bowling@kcl.ac.uk
1.4  OTHER INvESTIGATORS,  COLLAbORATORS, ORGANISATIONS
N/A
2. PROJECT DETAILS
2.1  Project Title Mexican criminal policy and 
its effects on the judiciary
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2.2  Projected Start Date of Project
This should be when you intend to start work with 
participants.
2012-September-15 （I already 
booked a round trip from London 
to Mexico City）
2.3  Expected Completion Date of Project
Please note: Ethical approval must cover from the 
start of the research study up until data are ar-
chived or destroyed.
2015-September-15
2.4  Sponsoring Organisation 
Your sponsor will be assumed to be King’s College 




(e.g. self-funded, King’s College London, ESRC, 
AHRb, Eu)
Mexican government agency 
named CONACYT (National Coun-
cil for Science and Technology)
2.6   DOES THE STuDY INvOLvE HuMAN PARTICIPANTS OR FOR OTHER REASONS 
REQuIRE ETHICAL APPROvAL?  
Nb: It may be the case that research does not involve human participants yet raises 
other ethical issues 
with potential social or environmental implications. In this case you should still ap-
ply. Please consult with the Research 
Ethics Office (rec@kcl.ac.uk) if in doubt.
 Yes    No
2.7  OTHER INFORMATION RELATING TO RISK
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Will the study place the researcher at any risk greater than that encountered in his/
her daily life? (e.g. interviewing alone or in dangerous circumstances, or data collection 
outside the uK).
Yes         No   
The data will be collected from outside the uK in Mexico (where the researcher is 
from) but this fact is not considered to involve any risk.
If applicable:
Does the study involve the using a Medical Device outside of the CE mark approved 
method of use? (see guidelines) If you are using a medical device ‘off label’ (outside of 
the approved method of use) then a risk assessment needs to be completed. For further 
information on medical devices see the Medicines and Healthcare Products Regula-
tory Agency web pages: http://www.mhra.gov.uk/Publications/Regulatoryguidance/
Devices/index.htm and http://www.mhra.gov.uk/Publications/Regulatoryguidance/
Devices/GuidanceontheECMedicalDevicesDirectives/index.htm.
Yes                 No  
If you have ticked yes to either of the above:
 Yes, and I have completed a risk assessment which has been co-signed by the Head 
of Department/ I have discussed the risks involved with my supervisor or Head of De-
partment and agreed a strategy for minimising these risks. 
2.8   OTHER PERMISSIONS, ETHICAL APPROvALS & CRIMINAL RECORDS buREAu 
CLEARANCE REQuIRED
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ANOTHER REvIEWING bODY/PERMISSIONS - Are any other approvals by another 
reviewing body (including other ethics committees, gatekeepers and peer review) re-
quired?  If yes, give details and say when these will be obtained.  In cases where ethi-
cal or legal permissions are required from local organisations or gatekeepers, it is the 
researchers responsibility to ensure that these have been obtained prior to commencing 
the study. If they have already been obtained you should provide a copy of the approval 
with the application otherwise you will need to supply it when ready.
YES    NO     
CRIMINAL RECORDS buREAu – If you think Criminal Records bureau clearance might 
be necessary for your project, ensure you have contacted the Criminal Records bureau 
directly to confirm whether or not this is the case. You will need to ensure you have the 
appropriate and necessary Criminal Records bureau clearance for your study prior to 
commencing recruitment or data collection. You may wish to consult with the relevant 
‘gatekeeper’ organisation in which you are undertaking the study with respect to this 
issue. 
If Criminal Records bureau clearance is required for your study, please confirm that 
clearance will be sought before commencement of the project.  YES     NA 
 
2.9   Research involving human volunteers
Please consult the following page of the King’s College London website to see if your 
study falls under the exclusion criteria with respect to the College’s insurance arrange-
ments: Not excluded
(http://kcl.ac.uk/about/structure/admin/finance/staff/insurance/trials.html)
If your study does fall under these exclusions, confirm that prior to undertaking the 
study you will ensure you have gained confirmation from the Finance department that 
the study is covered by the College’s insurers, as per the procedure outlined on the 
aforementioned web page:  YES    NO     N/A
3.  AIMS, ObJECTIvES & NATuRE OF STuDY 
Provide the academic/scientific justification of the study as well as detailing and ex-
plaining the principal research question, objectives and hypotheses to be tested.
In the past 15 years, Mexican criminal policies and regulations have undergone deep 
changes which advance a pre-emptive and proactive approach towards criminality. The 
context of these changes involve steep rises in criminality rates, the increased partici-
pation of the military forces in public security and crime control issues, public officials’ 
discourses blended with warfare ideas, and strong public support for a “law and order” 
approach despite its compromise of civil liberties. It is claimed that the Executive and 
Legislative have designed and implemented policies and laws which embed a Criminal 
Law of the Enemy (CLE) approach which, in a nutshell, advances: a) punishment is en-
forced before an actual offence is committed in the face of dangerous risk; b) dispropor-
tionate sentences are imposed in the name of security and, c) certain procedural rights 
may be suppressed.
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This research is a case study on the judiciary and its different responses on the cur-
rent developments of Mexican criminal policies and socio-political context, through the 
management of criminal cases. Hence, the research question is: “Is the Federal judiciary 
embracing a CLE model? The research seeks to unpack CLE elements in the context of 
judicial decision making, to explore the way in which these elements are embedded in 
judges’ perspectives and resolutions and to identify the possible conditions that trigger 
the application of any or all of the these elements. 
This research aims to contribute in two ways. First, the penal judiciary, as part of 
the criminal justice system, is a subject under-researched, as the main body of studies 
have focused on the police and on the prosecution services. Also, the increasing role 
and participation of the military in designing and implementing criminal justice policies 
has gained wider attention, however, its effects on criminal justice practices, including 
the judiciary, remain a prosperous area of research. As a result, this research hopes to 
increase the scarce knowledge on the penal judiciary and examine, from their point of 
view, any possible effects of current developments, including the increasing role of the 
military, in the way they decide criminal cases.
Second, although the judiciary has become an increasing subject of analysis in Mexi-
can and Latin American research, it is greatly focused on High Courts’ decisions (Cal-
leros, 2009; Helmke & Rios-Figueroa, 2011). As a result, lower courts’ decisions and 
views are left aside. Therefore, this research hopes to contribute by giving voice to the 
judiciary through interviews, and to capture views and opinions from a wider range of 
members of the judiciary. 
Although a qualitative approach has been used to analyse the judiciary, the model of 
CLE has not been used to guide the collection and analysis of both case files and semi-
structured interviews. Furthermore, it has been claimed that qualitative research on the 
judiciary has lacked rigour and transparency in the guiding decisions of data collection 
and analysis. Hence, this research aims to address both issues while using theory as a 
primary guidance for the collection and analysis of data.
In sum, this study seeks to increase the understanding of the impact of current crimi-
nal policies, focusing on the judiciary, while at the same time, capturing the judiciary’s 
own views and understandings. Its main motivation is to contribute to a better under-
standing of the complex social and political landscape which Mexico faces and of the 
policy choices made in the last 15 years.
4. STuDY DESIGN/METHODOLOGY, DATA COLLECTION & ANALYSIS
Provide a brief outline of the step-by-step procedure of your proposed study in lay 
language in no more than 1 page where possible.
4.1 Research Design/Methodology
The research design is a case study because this method allows examining current, 
as opposed to historical events, and focuses on a unit of analysis –the Federal judiciary- 
within its context –Mexican social and political context. In the present research, the 
context is paramount to the core of the study because the Federal judiciary, as part of 
Federal government, is affected by its policies and measures, and because judges live 
and work in a social context informed by mass media messages, social attitudes, and 
their own experience. As a result, their role and decisions may be influenced by different 
sets of pressures.
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The case study design will use two “embedded” variant cases: the Federal judiciary 
located in XXX (where there is active participation of the military in conjunction with po-
lice forces), and the Federal judiciary located in XXX (where there military has not been 
fully deployed to), in order to compare and contrast difference in attitudes, opinions and 
case management of members of the judiciary, as well as other relevant actors including 
other criminal justice practitioners, members of NGOs and academia, in both settings.
The selection of the embedded cases follows a purposive sampling rationale be-
cause the active involvement of the military is strongly related to the theoretical model 
used. In addition, access possibilities and comparability of the states were also impor-
tant for the case selection. 
4.1.1. Access: In the capital cities of both states the author has several connections 
which will facilitate interviewing members of the judiciary, members of NGOs and aca-
demics. On the one hand, the researcher grew up and lived in XXX City until 2003. She 
has personal contacts with a Federal magistrate in XXX, in addition to some members of 
the Law Faculty of a local university and members of local NGOs. On the other hand, the 
researcher has personal contacts in XXX (capital city of XXX) and professional ones with 
an important national NGO directly involved with the on-going judicial reform. 
In addition to the selected cases, other possible interviewees, including members of 
the Federal judiciary, located in Mexico City will also be approached in order to gather 
richer insight. Overall, the researcher has a strong set of social and professional networks 
in the three cities (XXX, XXX and XXX City) which may facilitate accessing and pursuing 
this research.
4.1.2. Comparability: XXX and XXX are two different states which, despite important 
socio-economic differences, do not have too distinct variations in regard to Federal of-
fending rates. For this reason, and given the wide differences of offending rates within 
the country, these states are thought to be comparable. 
4.2 Data Collection
The research is mainly based on two sources: semi-structured interviews and public 
decisions of criminal cases. 
4.2.1 Semi-structured interviews
Semi-structured interviews will be used because they allow collecting rich and de-
tailed data. Also, they are preferred when people’s knowledge, understandings and 
views are meaningful to the research, such as the present one.
The main interviewees are Federal judges and other criminal justice officials. The Fed-
eral judiciary in XXX is comprised of 19 judges, 23 public defenders (approximately) and 
several members of the prosecutions services. In contrast, there are 14 federal judges 
in XXX, approximately 26 public defenders and several members of the prosecution ser-
vices. The approximate number of interviews conducted should not be below 20 in each 
site in order to have an in-depth understanding of their views and opinions. 
Members of the judiciary in Mexico are frequently involved in academic activities, par-
ticularly giving lectures or regular classes in universities. Also, judges are likely to be in-
vited to participate in conferences and seminars. In this context, the judiciary is not bound 
to gain permission from an administrative body (i.e. the Federal Judiciary Council) to give 
a lecture or participate in an interview and tend to be responsive to academic interests.
In addition to members of the judiciary, former criminal justice officials, members of 
NGOs, academics, journalists and anyone which has knowledge on the current socio-
political context can participate in order to gather diverse information and a deeper 
understanding of both the context and the judiciary. 
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Access may be facilitated by the personal networks of the researcher described 
above together with a snowball strategy which involves building the sample through 
referrals. 
Accessing criminal justice officials involves inherent limitations due to the natural 
secrecy of dealing with criminal issues and the general reluctance of the judiciary to 
share their views on political issues. Nevertheless, this pitfall may be overcome with 
the fact that this research will be presented as an opportunity to acknowledge the judi-
ciary’s views and as a chance to communicate their voices. Also, the research does not 
seek to examine particular decisions or cases but gather overall views, because they 
are not the subject matter of this research but also to avoid any possible risk. 
The interviews will focus on exploring the presence or even predominance of CLE 
elements through: the ways in which the interviewee addresses society’s safety as a 
main motivation in punishing an offender; the main purposes of punishment and the 
harshness or leniency in which offenders are being punished; the different motivations 
and thresholds for issuing pre-emptive measures, and the ways in which the offender is 
understood and referred to. 
In addition, broader questions concerning the general context will be raised, touch-
ing upon issues including: a State’s pre-emptive and proactive responses to offending; 
the increasing participation of the military in crime control policies; the role which the 
judiciary should play within the criminal justice system and within the broader context, 
and whether their way in managing cases is thought to have changed in the past 15 
years and if so, what could the main causes be. 
4.2.2. Archival material: case files 
The analysed cases will range from 2000 to 2010 by Federal courts in Mexico City, 
XXX and XXX, concerning the two most frequent Federal offences consisting of drug-
related and firearms related offences. Also, decisions about pre-emptive measures (de-
tention orders and property search orders) will be analysed. Case files are considered 
public documents, accessible to anyone, under the Mexican Transparency Act, therefore 
do not involve any sensitive information. 
Similarly, analysis of archival material will concentrate on the relevance of safety 
as a motivation for the infliction of punishment; the main purposes of punishment; the 
different motivations and thresholds for issuing pre-emptive measures, and the ways in 
which the offender is understood and referred to.
The information gathered will be in Spanish and the researcher will be in charge of 
its translation to English. 
4.3 Data analysis
The main threads of the interviews and archival analysis draw on the Criminal Law 
of the Enemy (CLE) model explained above. This theoretical framework will guide data 
analysis in order to ascertain whether the judiciary has inclined towards a CLE approach 
in deciding cases. This analysis strategy refers to what Yin calls the strategy of relying 
on theoretical propositions because the elements of CLE are informing both the way in 
which data is collected and analysed (2009, p.130).
In addition, comparative methods will be used to examine the judiciary’s reaction 
by observing whether the presence of the military in the state makes a difference to the 
way in which the judiciary resolves cases, and its general views on offending, offenders 
and criminal justice policies. 
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The data analysis will involve: an overall examination in order to identify biases and 
general impressions through the different data; coding the data into themes and cat-
egories which may be informed by the content and also by the theory used; identifying 
patterns and interconnections between the different themes and categories; mapping 
and building the themes and developing these in relation to the literature and theories 
used such as CLE, and drawing conclusions from the findings (O’Leary, 2010).  
MEASuRES TO bE uSED – Confirm that any measures (such as tests/questionnaires) 
employed in the research study will be used in accordance with any copyright or licens-
ing conditions that apply. YES     NA  
Further, confirm that the researcher administering these measures is qualified to do 
so (for example, in cases where only registered practitioners are able to administer such 
a measure). YES     NA  
5. PARTICIPANTS TO bE STuDIED
5.1   PROJECTED NuMbER OF PARTICIPANTS 
Number:  20－35                                        If applicable:  How many will be male and female.
Justification for the sample size: Twenty to thirty five interviews may bring enough 
data to obtain an in-depth understanding of the Federal judiciary’s views and the ways 
these are reflected on cases, while bearing in mind the context that may inform such 
views. It is considered feasible for the investigator to conduct these interviews in a 
period of 6 to 8 months which involve travelling from Mexico City to two different sites 
(XXX and XXX). 
The lower age limit will be assumed to be 16 years of age unless specified otherwise. 
If an upper age limit is needed you must provide a justification.
upper Age Limit: N/A                    Lower age limit: 16
5.2   SELECTION CRITERIA
The main interest lies within the judiciary therefore any member of the Federal judi-
ciary is considered a good candidate for interviewing. However, the selection criteria 
extends to other criminal justice officials, particularly court officials, and to any indi-
vidual who are familiar with criminal justice issues including journalists, NGOs, and 
scholars. As a result, purposive sampling applies to the Federal judiciary, but the ap-
proach used to access all interviewees is of snowballing. 
5.3   RECRuITMENT
Describe how participants will be (i) identified and (ii) approached.
Identification
Participants, namely, judges, defence lawyers, prosecutors, members of NGOs, aca-
demia and any other practitioner who is familiar with the criminal justice system in Mex-
ico are eligible. Personal and professional contacts of the researcher will be a starting 
point to access further participants following a snowballing strategy.
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Approach
The strategy in approaching the different interviewees is twofold. On the one hand, 
the researcher will use her personal and professional networks described above in order 
to gain access with the different interviewees. The university (CIDE) where she will be 
based during her field work has a strong relationship with several members of the Fed-
eral judiciary which may also prove useful when looking for access. 
On the other hand, the researcher will visit the courts and tribunals directly in order 
to schedule an appointment with the judge’s secretary. This will allow the researcher to 
express the aims of the interview and of the research by leaving an Information Sheet 
(see below) and/or expressing them orally to the interviewee.
based on the working experience of the researcher which includes working as a court 
clerk in a Federal criminal court, she considers that visiting the courts and tribunals 
personally may be a feasible strategy to schedule an appointment with the judge or with 
any other criminal justice official.   
5.4   LOCATION
State where the work will be carried out e.g. public place, in researcher’s office, in 
private office at organisation.
The interviews will be conducted in the office of the participant or in any other public 
space suggested by the participant. The researcher while doing the field work will be 
based in her former university, CIDE (Centre of Research and Economic Teaching) lo-
cated in Mexico City. 
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
6.1   INFORMED CONSENT
Describe the process you will use to ensure your participants are freely giving fully 
informed consent to participate.  This will always include the provision of an informa-
tion sheet and will normally require a consent form unless it is a purely self-completion 
questionnaire based study or there is a justification for not doing so (this must be clearly 
stated). Templates for these are at the end of this document and they should be filled in 
and modified where necessary.
Information Sheet
Potential interviewees will be provided with the information sheet, which includes 
the information about aims of the research, principal research questions, who will get 
access to the information (i.e. my supervisors and me), and the explicit right of withdraw 
from the interview at any time. Also, participants will be given enough time not less than 
24 hours to read and understand the information sheet prior to the interview. 
In addition to the Information Sheet, if it deemed necessary the researcher will ex-
plain orally the participant the aims of this study, together with the main motivation of 
the research. Different arrangements to ensure anonymity and confidentiality will be 
also described.
Consent form
Explicit consent from interviewees will be required after having explained thoroughly 
the research aims, together with the way in which confidentiality and participant’s ano-
nymity is kept. 
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The researcher will act in compliance with King’s College regulation, the Socio-Legal 
Studies Association Statement of Principles of Ethical Research Practice, the Data Pro-
tection Act and the applicable Mexican law in order to protect research participants’ ano-
nymity, rights and privacy
6.2   RIGHT OF WITHDRAWAL  
Participants should be able to withdraw from the research process at any time and 
also should be able to withdraw their data if it is identifiable as theirs and should be told 
when this will no longer be possible (e.g. once it has been included in the final report). 
Please describe the exact arrangements for withdrawal from participation and withdraw-
al of data depending on your study design).
Potential participants will be made aware with the Information Sheet and orally be-
fore the interview that their participation is voluntary, that they are under no obligation 
to participate in the research project and that they are free to withdraw from participat-
ing at any time, as well as to withdraw any comments or/and go off-record during the 
interview without giving reasons and without any consequences.
The researcher will offer the participants the option of reading and reviewing the tran-
scription of the interview and in any case withdraw any comments. If so, the transcript 
will be delivered directly to the respondent, for him or her to approve and return to the re-
searcher personally. Also, interviewees will be made aware that they may withdraw any 
data after the interview took place until 31 July 2013. upon this instruction the researcher 
will cease to use this information and withdraw it from the analysis.
6.3   RISK CHECKLIST
Where you have ticked ‘Yes’ on the risk checklist, provide details of relevant qualifica-
tions and experience with reference to those sections.   This must include the researcher 
and/or supervisor as well as other collaborators (if applicable)  involved in those sec-
tions marked as presenting risk. (Do not submit a c.v.)
N/A
You must also specifically address the ethical issues raised from those sections here. 
Nb: If you ticked yes to any point in F i -v of the checklist, you must also complete and 
submit Section b of the application form.
6.4   OTHER ETHICAL ISSuES
Please consider whether there are other ethical issues you should be covering here.  Please note 
that all research projects have some ethical considerations, even if this only relates to how confi-
dentiality will be maintained. DO NOT LEAVE THIS SECTION BLANK.
Anonymity 
All participants will be kept anonymous and only age group, gender and their institu-
tional affiliation (i.e. their position held within their institution). In particular, the names 
of the court officials will not be recorded but only the type of court they work at will be 
referred to, considering that there are several judges holding the same positions. The 
information will only be registered if ensures that the data collected and the respondent 
remain unlinked. 
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Confidentiality
Throughout the entire process of this study, the researcher will endeavour to main-
tain the confidentiality of all the participants’ responses and data gathered.
The interview will be either taped, if interviewees agree, or recorded with note-taking. 
The recording and other materials will be stored in an encrypted and password protected 
hard disk in the researcher’s personal computer. All gathered and collected materials will 
be secured until the research is completed. Recorded materials will be destroyed after 
these have been transcribed and all written transcriptions will be destroyed after three 
years of the completion of the study.
Only the researcher and her supervisors will consult the data gathered which ex-
cludes any other person or agency, including the funding agency (CONACYT), from ac-
cessing the evidence collected. 
Further, if applicable, please also add the professional code of conduct you intend to 
follow in your research.  http://www.kcl.ac.uk/research/ethics/training/codes.html 
6.5   bENEFITS & RISKS
Please describe any expected benefits and risks to the research participant.  
For example:  
Will participants receive a copy of the final report?
What is the potential for adverse effects resulting from study participation, e.g.
	 participants suffering pain, discomfort, distress, inconvenience or changes to 
lifestyle.
	 sensitive, embarrassing or upsetting topics being discussed/raised.
Identify the potential for each of above and state how you will minimise risk and deal 
with any untoward incidents/adverse reactions.  
Expected benefits
There are no direct benefits that follow from participating in this study. However, an 
indirect benefit may be to have the opportunity to reflect and talk about own experiences 
and general views. Also, taking part in this research implies to participate in a project 
which aims to contribute to the Rule of Law through deeper understanding of criminal 
justice institutions. 
Potential risks
The potential adverse effects that may derive from participating in this study partici-
pation are limited because the participant can withdraw freely from the interview at any 
point or refuse to answer any questions asked. 
In addition, only motivations about passed or decided cases may be addressed, 
leaving aside any cases which are pending to be resolved. Given that judicial decisions 
contained in cases files are considered public information under the Mexican Transpar-
ency Act, the consultation and examination of these files in their public version (namely, 
scrapping personal details of the parties involved) are considered to contain non-sensi-
tive information and thus, involving no particular risk. 
Furthermore, the main interest lies in the motivations, views and understandings of 
the judiciary while managing and deciding criminal cases, therefore, do not involve any 
issues related to criminal activities.
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6.6   CRIMINAL OR OTHER DISCLOSuRES REQuIRING ACTION
Is it possible that criminal or other disclosures requiring action (e.g. evidence of pro-
fessional misconduct) could be made during this study?  
YES    NO   
If yes, detail what procedures will be put in place to deal with these issues.  The In-
formation Sheet should make it clear under which circumstances action may be taken by 
the researcher.  
7  FINANCIAL INCENTIvES, EXPENSES AND COMPENSATION
7.1   Will travelling expenses be given?  If yes, this should be stated on the Informa-
tion Sheet
YES    NO   
7.2    Is any reward, apart from travelling expenses to be given to participants?  If yes, 
please provide details and a justification for this.  It is recommended that participants 
are informed of the compensation on the information sheet.
YES    NO   
7.3  Is the study in collaboration with a pharmaceutical company or an equipment or 
medical device manufacturer?  If yes, please give the name of the company and indicate 
what arrangements exist for compensating patients or healthy volunteers for adverse 
effects resulting from their participation in the study (in most cases, the Committee will 
only approve protocols if the pharmaceutical company involved confirms that it abides 
by APbI (The Association of the british Pharmaceutical Industry) guidelines.  A copy of 
the indemnification form (Appendix C) should be submitted with the application.
YES    NO   
7.4  No fault compensation scheme If your study is based in the uK you must offer 
the No-fault compensation scheme to participants unless there is a clear justification for 
not doing so (if this is the case this must be stated and you should bear in mind that the 
Sub-Committee reserves the right to make this a condition of approval).
YES, I am making the scheme available to participants   
NO, the study is based outside the uK and so the scheme is not applicable  
NO, the study is within the uK but the No-fault compensation scheme is not offered 
for the following reason:
8. DATA PROTECTION, CONFIDENTIALITY, AND DATA AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT
8a.  Confirm that all processing of personal information related to the study will be 
in full compliance with the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA) including the Data Protection 
Principles).
 If you are processing any personal information outside of the European Economic 
Area you must explain how compliance with the DPA will be ensured.
YES    NO     
In addition, this study will be conducted in compliance with the Mexican personal 
data legislation (Personal Data Protection Act 2010). 
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8b. What steps will be taken to ensure the confidentiality of personal information? 
Give details of anonymisation procedures and of physical and technical security mea-
sures.  Please note to make data truly anonymous all information that could potentially 
identify a participant needs to be removed in addition to names.  Nb: Personal data 




All participants will be kept anonymous and only age group, gender and their institu-
tional affiliation, as described above. In particular, the information registered concern-
ing institutional affiliation will leave aside any data which may facilitate identifying the 
participant.  
The only place where their name will appear is in the written consent form which 
in itself will not be sufficient to link the participant to the interview content, including 
theirs comments and responses. 
During the interview, personal information of a participant (i.e. name) will not be 
mentioned in order to maintain the anonymity.
Security measures
Digital recording materials will be stored in a mobile u disk that will be encrypted, 
and will be erased after they have been transcribed.  All electronic data held in any mo-
bile devices will be stored in a hard disc which will also be encrypted. 
8c. Who will have access to personal information relating to this study?  Confirm 
that any necessary wider disclosures of personal information (for instance to colleagues 
beyond the study team, translators, transcribers auditors etc) have been properly ex-
plained to study participants. Further guidance on the above issues can be found at the 
following link: http://www.kcl.ac.uk/research/ethics/training/feedback.html 
Only the researcher and her supervisors (Prof. benjamin bowling and Prof. Penny 
Green) and any other person or agency is excluded from accessing the evidence col-
lected.
8d.  Data and records management responsibilities during the study.  The ‘Principal 
Investigator’ is the named researcher for staff projects and the supervisor for student 
projects.  
I confirm that the Principal Investigator will take full responsibility for ensuring ap-
propriate storage and security for all study information including research data, consent 
forms and administrative records and that, where appropriate, the necessary arrange-
ments will be made in order to process copyright material lawfully.
YES    NO   
Further, provide a specific location at which research data will be stored during the 
study.
During my fieldwork in Mexico and further period of analysis, digital research data 
will be stored in a hard disk that is encrypted and kept in a locked place in Mexico. 
Other materials, including consent forms and administrative records will be stored in a 
secured locked storage cabinet at the researcher’s home in Mexico. 
8e. Data management responsibilities after the study.  
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State how long study information including research data, consent forms and ad-
ministrative records will be retained, what format(s) the information will be kept in 
and where the data will be stored.  For example, where within King’s College London? 
(http://www.kcl.ac.uk/iss/igc/tools/researchers.html) 
Any electronic and written or physical materials including consent forms, administra-
tive records, voice recording (mobile uSb disk), records of the interview, interview tran-
scriptions and translation materials related to the interviews will be retained in a safe 
locked storage to which only the researcher may access in her home in Mexico.
Tape recorded materials will be destroyed after they have been transcribed in or-
der to avoid the risk of identifying participants by their voice, and all gathered materi-
als including the transcription of the interviews will be destroyed three years after the 
completion of the study. 
Nb: Any personally identifiable data that is held on any mobile device should be en-
crypted. This includes data stored on uSb keys, laptop/netbooks, desktop computers, 
smart phones, workgroup servers and relevant emails. 
In addition, confirm whether the storage arrangements comply with the Data Protec-
tion Act 1998 and the College guidelines.
YES    NO  
Will data be archived for use by other researchers?
NO  
YES (in anonymised form)    If you intend to share anonymised data with other re-
searchers, you must make this clear on the information sheet.
YES (in identifiable form following the guidance below)      
Will any personal information related to this study be retained and shared in unano-
nymised form? If you tick yes you must ensure that these arrangements are detailed in 
the Information Sheet and that participant consent will be in place.
YES    NO  
9. AuTHORISING SIGNATuRES
9.1   RESEARCHER/APPLICANT
I undertake to abide by accepted ethical principles and appropriate code(s) of prac-
tice in carrying out this study. The information supplied above is to the best of my 
knowledge accurate.  I have read the Application Guidelines and clearly understand 
my obligations and the rights of participants, particularly in so far as to obtaining valid 
consent.  I understand that I must not commence research with human participants until 
I have received full approval from the ethics committee.
Signature ……………………………………………………………………                    Date………………………….
appendix 1                                                                       2 306
9.2  SuPERvISOR AuTHORISATION FOR STuDENT PROJECTS (including PhD)
I confirm that I have read this application and will be acting as the student research-
er’s supervisor for this project.  The proposal is viable and the student has appropriate 
skills to undertake the research.  The Information Sheet and recruitment procedures 
for obtaining informed consent are appropriate and the ethical issues arising from the 
project have been addressed in the application.  I understand that research with human 
participants must not commence without full approval from the ethics committee.
If applicable:
The student has read an appropriate professional code of ethical practice  
The student has completed a risk assessment form 
Name of Supervisor: Prof. benjamin bowling
Signature ……………………………………………………………………                     Date…………………………
9.3  MEDICAL SuPERvISION (if appropriate – see the Guidelines)
Name of Medical Supervisor:       
Medical Supervisor’s MDu/MPS (or other insurance provider) number:
………………………………………………………………………………………
Signature of Medical Supervisor:
……………………………………………………………………………….                      Date…………………………..
10. INFORMATION SHEET AND CONSENT FORM
Remember to submit your information sheets for participants and consent form (if 
necessary) with your application.  Failure to do so will cause delays to your applica-
tions.
The information sheet for participants should be composed according to the guide-
lines.  The text in red should be deleted or modified as appropriate.  If the language 
in the template is not suitable for your intended participant group it can be modified. 
There is also a template consent form that can be used.  Please refer to the guidelines 
for further information on how these documents should be used.
Submission Checklist Tick box 
Section A Application Form
Section b Application Form (where applicable)
Information Sheet
Consent Form (where applicable)
Recruitment Documents (eg recruitment email, posters, 
flyers or advertisements)
Measures to be used (eg questionnaires, surveys, inter-
view topic guides/schedules as appropriate)
Approach letters to ‘gatekeeper’ organisations (where ap-
plicable)
Evidence of any other approvals or permissions (where ap-
plicable)
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INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARTICIPANTS 
  REC Protocol Number: 
 Title: Mexican criminal policy and its effects on the judiciary 
I would like to invite you to participate in this postgraduate research project which I 
am conducting as a King’s College PhD researcher. You should only participate if you 
want to; choosing not to take part will not disadvantage you in any way. Before you 
decide whether you want to take part, it is important for you to understand the aims 
pursued by this research and what your participation will involve.  Please take time to 
read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish.  Ask us 
if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information.
1. Aims of the research
 In the past 15 years, Mexican criminal policies and regulations have under-
gone deep changes which advance a pre-emptive and proactive approach to-
wards criminality. This research is a case study on the judiciary and its different 
responses and views on the current developments of Mexican criminal policies 
and socio-political context, through the management of criminal cases. The pri-
mary aim of the project is exploratory as it seeks to capture the judges’ experi-
ences and opinions regarding criminality, punishment and other broad issues 
concerning criminal justice and the judicial role.  
2. Motivations to pursue this research
 This study pursues the academic interest of increasing the understanding of the 
impact of current criminal policies, focusing on the judiciary, on both their deci-
sions and their own views and understandings. Its main motivation is to con-
tribute to a better understanding of the complex social and political landscape 
which Mexico faces and of the policy choices made in the last 15 years.
3. Participants and the main interview questions 
 I will be interviewing current and former criminal justice officials, primarily 
Federal judges, as well as members of ngos, academics, journalists and any per-
son who has knowledge on the current socio-political context. 
 The interviews will touch upon: the relevance of safety as a motivation for the 
infliction of punishment; the main purposes of punishment; the different moti-
vations and thresholds for issuing pre-emptive measures, and the ways in which 
the offender is understood and referred to. In addition, broader questions con-
cerning the general context will be raised, touching on issues such as pre-emp-
tive and proactive approaches to criminality, the participation of the military in 
crime control policies, and the role of the judiciary within the criminal justice 
system.
4. What will happen if the participant agrees to take part?
appendix 1                                                                       2 308
 Participation is entirely voluntary. If the participant, after reading the Informa-
tion Sheet and heard the general aims of the research has agreed to take part, 
an interview will be scheduled. The interview will last approximately 60 to 90 
minutes, will be carried out in your place of work (or another venue convenient 
for you) and during working hours. Participating may represent an opportunity 
to share your views and opinions on criminal justice issues. 
5. Arrangements for ensuring anonymity and confidentiality
 Throughout the entire process of this study, the researcher maintains anonymity 
and confidentiality of all the participants and of the data gathered.
 In regards to the participants’ personal information, only age group, gender and 
the type and position he or she holds within an institution. The measures to 
guarantee confidentiality involve securing all gathered and collected materials 
within a secure cabinet and digital data in an encrypted mobile device within a 
locked cabinet. Recorded materials will be destroyed after these have been tran-
scribed by the researcher and all written transcriptions will be destroyed after 
three years of the completion of the study. 
Only the researcher and her supervisors may consult the information.
Although extremely unlikely you find that this study has harmed you in any way, you 
may contact King’s College London using the details below for further advice and 
information: 
Thank you for taking the time to consider taking part in this study.
                                                                    
Researcher:        
Ana Cardenas                                                                   
Address: School of Law, King’s College London
Strand, London WC2R 2LS (UK)                    
Telephone Number: 004420 7848 2265                                                                
Email: ana.cardenas_gonzalez_de_cosio@kcl.ac.uk     
  
First Supervisor:  Second Supervisor:
Professor Benjamin Bowling     Professor Penny Green
SW2.18, School of Law,                                        SW2.07, School of Law,
King’s College London   King’s College London
Strand, London WC2R 2LS (UK)   Strand, London, WC2R 2LS (UK)
Telephone: 004420 7848 2265                   Telephone: 004420 7848 2265
Email: ben.bowling@kcl.ac.uk         Email: penny.green@kcl.ac.uk 
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CONSENT FORM FOR PARTICIPANTS IN RESEARCH STuDIES
Please complete this form after you have read the Information Sheet and/or listened 
to an explanation about the research.
Title of Study: The Mexican criminal policy and its effects on the judiciary 
King’s College Research Ethics Committee Ref:________________
•	 Thank you for considering taking part in this research. The person organizing the 
research must explain the project to you before you agree to take part.
•	 All gathered information will maintain anonymity, and only age, gender and insti-
tutional affiliation will be recorded. The information gathered will be confidential 
and may only be consulted and processed by the researcher and her supervisors. 
•	 If you have any questions arising from the Information Sheet or explanation al-
ready given to you, please ask the researcher before you decide whether to join 
in. You will be given a copy of this Consent Form to keep and refer to at any time.
•	 I understand that if I decide at any time during the research that I no longer wish 
to participate in this project, I can notify the researchers involved and withdraw 
from it immediately without giving any reason. Furthermore, I understand that I 
will be able to withdraw my data up to 31 July 2013.
•	 I consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes ex-
plained to me.  I understand that such information will be treated in accordance 
with the terms of the Data Protection Act 1998, the Mexican personal data pro-
tection Act (2010) and it will not be possible to identify me from any material.
•	 I consent to my interview being audio recorded. 
Participant’s Statement:
I _______________________________________________________________
agree that the research project named above has been explained to me to my satisfac-
tion and I agree to take part in the study. I have read both the notes written above and the 
Information Sheet about the project, and understand what the research study involves.
Investigator’s Statement:
I __________________________________________
confirm that I have carefully explained the nature, demands and any foresee-
able risks (where applicable) of the proposed research to the participant.
Signed                                          Date
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         HOJA DE INFORMACION 
REC Número de Protocolo: 
Titulo: La política criminal mexicana y sus efectos en el Poder Judicial Federal
Lo invito a participar en este proyecto de estudios de doctorado que estoy realizando 
como investigadora de la universidad King’s College. Su participación es completamente 
voluntaria y si optara no participar no hay implicación o desventaja alguna. Previo a deci-
dir participar es importante que tenga conocimiento de las razones y objetivos que tiene 
esta investigación así como la los términos de su participación. Por ello, le pido se tome 
el tiempo de leer la siguiente información de forma cuidadosa, y si así lo desea comente 
o delibere con terceros y plantéenos cualquier duda o comentario.
1.  Propósitos de la investigación
 En los últimos 15 años, las políticas criminales y regulaciones han sufrido cambios 
estructurales caracterizados por un enfoque preventivo y proactivo hacia la crimi-
nalidad. Esta investigación es un caso de estudio sobre el Poder Judicial Federal y 
sus distintas respuestas, reacciones y perspectivas acerca de estos cambios, así 
como del contexto socio-político reciente, a través de su administración de asun-
tos penales. El objetivo primordial de esta investigación es explorar y capturar las 
experiencias y visiones de los juzgadores acerca de la criminalidad, el castigo y 
otros temas relativos a la materia criminal y a la función judicial. 
2. Motivaciones para realizar esta investigación
 Esta investigación busca analizar el impacto de las políticas criminales actuales, 
concentrándose tanto en las opiniones como en las resoluciones emitidas por el 
Poder Judicial Federal. La motivación principal es contribuir al análisis y estudio, 
a partir de la perspectiva del juzgador federal, del entorno social y político que 
enfrenta México en materia de justicia criminal, a partir de las distintas políticas 
públicas de los últimos 15 años en materia de justicia criminal.
3. Participantes y ejes principales de la investigación
 Se entrevistará a personas con experiencia laboral en áreas e instituciones rela-
cionadas con la materia de justicia criminal, incluyendo jueces, agentes del Min-
isterio Público, abogados defensores, miembros de organizaciones de la socie-
dad civil, académicos, periodistas, así como cualquier persona con experiencia o 
conocimiento en esa materia, así como en aspectos diversos del contexto social y 
político actual. 
 Los ejes temáticos de las entrevistas son: la relevancia de la seguridad como moti-
vación en la imposición de una pena, así como los propósitos que la pena persigue; 
las distintas motivaciones para emitir órdenes de cateo y de arraigo, así como la 
forma como el (posible) delincuente es concebido. Asimismo, ejes temáticos más 
amplios tratarán sobre el contexto general, incluyendo los enfoques preventivos 
y proactivos hacia la criminalidad, la participación activa del ejército y las fuer-
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zas armadas en políticas de criminalidad, así como el rol que desempeña el juez 
dentro del sistema de justicia penal. 
4. ¿Qué sucede si el posible participante acepta participar?
 La participación es enteramente voluntaria. Si el participante después de leer la 
presente Hoja Informativo y ha escuchado las características principales de esta 
investigación, se agendará una entrevista. La entrevista tendrá una duración de 
60 a 90 minutos y se llevará a cabo en su lugar de trabajo (o en otro espacio que 
le parezca más conveniente) y durante horas hábiles. Participar representa una 
oportunidad para que la visión y opinión de los participantes acerca de aspectos 
de justicia penal se puedan capturar. 
5. Medidas para garantizar anonimato y confidencialidad
 Durante todo el proceso de elaboración de este estudio, la investigadora manten-
drá el anonimato y confidencialidad de todos sus participantes y de la información 
recolectada.
 Respecto de información y datos personales de los participantes, sólo se registrará 
el grupo de edad, género y el tipo y el cargo que ostenta dentro de su institución 
de trabajo, dejando fuera toda información que impida u obstaculice el anonimato 
del participante. Las medidas para garantizar la confidencialidad incluyen: res-
guardar bajo llave todos los materiales e información recolectada, y guardar la in-
formación digital en un disco duro encriptado, igualmente resguardado bajo llave. 
Los materiales grabados serán destruidos después de haber sido transcritos por 
la investigadora y todas las transcripciones serán destruidas después de tres años 
de haber completado la investigación. 
La consulta y procesamiento de la información recolectada solo podrá ser consultada 
por la investigadora y sus asesores, Prof. benjamin bowling y Prof. Penny Green.
En caso de que resienta algún tipo de efecto o consecuencia cualquiera, podrá contac-
tar la universidad King’s College London utilizando los datos siguientes: 
Gracias por su atención y tiempo para considerar participar en esta investigación. 
                                                 
Investigadora:        
Ana Cárdenas González de Cosío                                                                   
Address: School of Law, King’s College London
Strand, London WC2R 2LS (uK)                    
Telephone Number: 004420 7848 2265                                        
                                
Email: ana.cardenas_gonzalez_de_cosio@kcl.ac.uk       
Primer Asesor: Segundo Asesor:
Professor benjamin bowling                                  Professor Penny Green
SW2.18, School of Law,                                    SW2.07, School of Law,
King’s College London  King’s College London
Strand, London WC2R 2LS (uK)  Strand, London, WC2R 2LS (uK)
Telephone: 004420 7848 2265                         Telephone: 004420 7848 2265
Email: ben.bowling@kcl.ac.uk         Email: penny.green@kcl.ac.uk 
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FORMA DE CONSENTIMIENTO PARA PARTICIPANTES EN ESTuDIOS DE INvESTIGACIÓN 
Favor de completar esta forma después de haber leído la Hoja de Información y/o 
escuchado la breve explicación sobre la presente investigación. 
Título de la Investigación: 
Número de referencia del Comité de Ética de la universidad King’s College Lon-
don:________________
•	 Gracias por considerar participar en la presente investigación. La persona re-
sponsable deberá explicar el contenido y propósito de la investigación previo a 
aceptar participar. 
•	 Toda la información recabada conservará el anonimato del participante, en 
donde sólo se registrará la edad, el sexo y la posición o cargo asignado. La infor-
mación será tratada con absoluta confidencialidad y sólo podrá ser consultada y 
procesada por el investigador y su asesor. 
•	 Si tiene alguna pregunta derivada de la Hoja de Información o de la explicación, 
le suplico se las planté al investigador previo a que acepte a participar. Se le 
proporcionará una copia de esta Forma de Consentimiento.
•	 Yo entiendo que podré retirar mi consentimiento de participar en este proyecto 
en cualquier momento de la entrevista y de la investigación, sin explicación al-
guna. Asimismo, entiendo que podré retirar la información proporcionada hasta 
el 31 de julio de 2013.  
•	 Yo otorgo mi consentimiento para que la información personal sea procesada 
de la forma y con el propósito establecido. Entiendo que esa información será 
tratada de conformidad con la legislación inglesa aplicable (Data Protection Act 
1998) y la Ley Federal de Protección de Derechos Personales y no será posible 
identificarla dentro de cualquier investigación. 
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Declaración del Participante:
Yo ______________________________________________________________
Declaro que el proyecto de investigación bajo el titulo mencionado ha sido explicado 
de forma exhaustiva y estoy de acuerdo en participar en esta investigación. He leído y 
entiendo los términos establecidos anteriormente, así como la Hoja de Información re-
specto de lo que esta investigación comprende.
Declaración del Investigador:
Yo ______________________________________________________________
Confirmo que he explicado con cuidado la naturaleza, así como los objetivos de esta 
investigación al participante. 
Firma                                             Fecha
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Interview Schedule for Mexican Judges
Topic: conception or understanding of a tried person
1. How do you see or conceive a tried person? (For example, as a vulnerable or 
disadvantaged person, as a risk to society, as an enemy to society, as a source 
of danger, etc.)
2. In your opinion, what influences this understanding?
3. Do you think this understanding has changed in the past years?
Topic: due process
1. How do you understand the principle of presumption of innocence?
2. In your opinion, is this principle applied during criminal proceedings?
3. In your opinion, has the way of managing proceedings been affected in any way 
by the army’s increasing participation in public safety matters? (For example, in 
aspects related to crime investigation, production of evidence, etc.)
4. There are some who deem the Federal law against organised crime an illustra-
tion of enemy penology, what is your opinion in this regard? 
Topic: sentencing
1. In your opinion, what goal does the sentence pursue, in other words, what objec-
tive does the sentence should achieve?
2. In your opinion, do you think is objective or goal is achieved?
3. At the moment of imposing the sentence, what aspects or elements must a judge 
consider?
4. In practice, what are the decisive aspects?
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Interview Schedule for Mexican Public Attorneys
Topic: main duties and current context
1. What are the main aspects of your job?
2. What are the most common types of cases that you manage? (type of offence, 
circumstances of the offence, suspects’ personal characteristics)
3. Have any aspects of your job in general changed in the past few years? 
4. In an institutional level, have you seen any changes in the past few years?
Topic: proceedings
1. During proceedings, what contact do you have with the judge? How does the 
judge treat a person facing trial? In your opinion, what may influence this treat-
ment?
2. When the judge issues a conviction against your client, in your opinion what in-
fluences this decision? What aspects do you believe are decisive?
3. In your opinion, is the principle of presumption of innocence applied? What influ-
ences its effective or ineffectiveness?
4. In your opinion, have proceedings been affected in any way by the army’s in-
creased participation in public safety matters? (aspects related to crime investi-
gation, evidence production)
Topic: sentencing
1. In regards to your cases, how severe or lenient are sentences? Has the way to 
sentence changed in the past few years?
2. What aspects or elements does the judge consider when imposing a sentence? In 
practice, what are the decisive elements?
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Interview Schedule for the Public Attorneys’ Delegate
Topic: institutional design
1. What are the main duties of a Delegate?
2. What is the main institutional design of the Federal Institute of Public Attorneys 
in the state? (how many public attorneys are there per prosecution office and 
court)
3. Has there been any changes in the past few years?
4. Is there any scheme of assistance with state or federal authorities?
Topic: public attorneys’ duties
1. What are the general duties of a public attorney?
2. What the average caseload a public attorney manages?
3. What are the main aspects of the professional career of a public attorney (what is 
the average duration, what are a public attorney’s motives to begin or conclude 
her/his career as a public attorney)
Topic: criminality and profile of detainees in the state
1. What are the most common offences?
2. What are the detainees’ most frequent characteristics?
3. Has the type of offending or/and detainees’ characteristics changed in the past 
few years?
4. In case of there being any changes, have these lead to an adaptation or change 
in the duties performed by public attorneys?
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Interview Schedule for members of civil society
Topic: main duties and current context
1. What are the main aspects of your job?
2. What are the most common types of cases that you manage? (type of offence, 
circumstances of the offence, suspects’ personal characteristics)
3. Have any aspects of your job in general changed in the past few years? 
4. In an institutional level, have you seen any changes in the past few years?
Topic: proceedings
1. During proceedings, with what authorities do you have to meet and discuss your 
cases?
2. Could you describe the contact and treatment that you receive from these au-
thorities?
3. In your opinion, is the principle of presumption of innocence applied? What influ-
ences its effective or ineffectiveness?
4. In your opinion, have proceedings been affected in any way by the army’s in-
creased participation in public safety matters? (aspects related to crime investi-
gation, evidence production)
Topic: sentencing
1. In regards to your cases, what are the main characteristics of the sentences im-
posed to your clients?




Coding tree for interview analysis
The main themes of the coding tree were: understanding of the offender, due process, 
enemy penology, the military, the judiciary and sentencing. Each of these disentangled in 
several ramifications all of which are mentioned and described in the table below which 
is the analytic structure of the nodes used with Nvivo.  
The following table describes the different nodes and the Description of the analytic 
structure used with Nvivo. 
1st level of node 2nd level of node 3rd level of node Description of the last node
1. Conceptualis-
ing the offender








fendants linked to criminal 
proceedings.
2. Due process 2.1 Presumption of 
innocence
2.1.1. Legal and 
dogmatic definition 
of presumption of 
innocence
Comments describing the 
principle based on the Consti-





Comments referring to how 
a particular judge/magis-





Comments describing what 
hampers presuming an of-
fender innocent
2.2. Quality of the 
Prosecution
2.2.1. Positive as-
pects of the Prosecu-
tion’s work (i.e. case, 
investigation)
Comments describing the 
good quality of the prosecu-
tion’s job at pre trial and trial 
proceedings. 
2.2.2. Ineptitude and 
deficiency 
Comments describing the bad 
quality of the prosecution’s 
job.
2.2.3. Lack of con-
trols applied by the 
prosecution
Comments referring to illegal 
and arbitrary practices car-
ried out by law-enforcement 
agentsthe police and military 
remain unpunished.
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1st level of node 2nd level of node 3rd level of node Description of the last node
2.2.4. Procedural 
features linked to 
prosecutors
Comments referring to 







Comments describing how is it 
used in practice, for example, 
the great majority face the 
trial while held in prison.
2.3.2. Defence of 
the use of custodial 
remand
Comments explaining why it is 




Comments explaining why it is 
negative to use this measure.
2.3.4. Current 
practices linked to 
custodial remand
Comments describing custo-
dial remand in practice.
2.4. Evidence 2.4.1. Evidence col-
lection
Comments describing the 
prosecution’s, police’s or 





ent aspects concerning ways 




Comments explaining the 
ways in which judges weigh 
the evidence produced by the 
parties.




Comments explaining the 





Comments explaining cases 
or incidents linked to mis-
treatment and unlawful state 
agents’ behaviour.
2.6. Defence Comments that concerned the 
defence’s performance.
2.7. Arraigo 2.7.1. views in favour 
of arraigo
Comments in favour of arraigo 
orders.
2.7.2. views against 
arraigo







General opinions about enemy 
penology model and its ap-
plication in the Mexican legal 
system.
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1st level of node 2nd level of node 3rd level of node Description of the last node
3.2. Judiciary’s 
role in an enemy 
penology para-
digm
Reactions towards asking 
them what role should be car-





Comments describing the 
traditional criminal justice 







Comments on treating or see-
ing a type of defendants as 





Comments touching upon the 
different types of treatment 
to offenders charged for drug 
offences.
4. Military 4.1. Military’s par-
ticipation in public 
safety matters
4. 1. 1. Effects on 
legislation
Comments linking the partici-
pation of the army in changes 
in state criminal legislation.
4.1.2. Effects on 
safety
Comments linking the partici-
pation of the military and any 
effects in perception of safety.
4.1.3. False positives Comments describing false 
positives committed by the 
military.
4.1.4. Society’s 
feelings towards the 
military
Comments describing 
society’s response to the 
military’s presence. 
4.2. Effects of 
the military in 
proceedings
4.2.1. General per-
ceptions about their 
effect
Comments describing any sort 
of effect, if any, on proceed-
ings. 
4.2.2. Operational or 
technical effects in 
the proceedings
Comments explaining the 
different ways in which the 
proceedings have changed, 
including the military collect-
ing evidence, among others. 
5. Judiciary 5.1. Judges 5.1.1. Role and self-
perception of the 
judiciary
General comments on the 
judiciary’s characteristics. 
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1st level of node 2nd level of node 3rd level of node Description of the last node
5.1.2. Independence 
of the judiciary
Comments describing the 
judiciary’s independence in 
regards to other branches of 
government.
5.1.3. Judicial 
impartiality and the 
defendant
Comments concerning staying 




Comments and reactions 










Comments regarding ways and 
policies in which the judicia-
ry’s administrative council af-




fecting the type 




Comments linking past convic-




Comments linking general of-
fender’s characteristics to the 
way in which the sentence is 
determined.
6.1.3. victimisation Comments linking the way in 
which the victim was affected 
or harmed with the sentence 
imposed. 
6.1.4. Age Comments linking age to the 
sentence imposed. 
6.1.5. Ways in which 
the offence was com-
mitted
Comments linking the ways in 
which the offence was com-




Comments linking the ways 
in which the offender partici-
pated in the offence, and the 
sentence.
6.1.7. Dangerousness Comments relating danger-
ousness to the sentence. 
6.1.8. Degree of the 
harm done
Comments relating to the 
harm done. 
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1st level of node 2nd level of node 3rd level of node Description of the last node
6.1.9. Other Comments mentioning other 
themes linked to the sentence.
6.2. Changes in 
sentencing
6.2.1. Rises in sen-
tencing
Comments referring to gen-
eralised rises in sentencing 
tariffs
6.2.2. Falls in sen-
tencing
Comments referring to gen-




6.3.1. Prisons as 
schools of crime
Comments describing im-
prisonment as a place where 
offenders learn more on crimi-
nality rather than rehabilitate. 
6.3.2. Effects of 
punishment on the 
offenders’ families
Comments highlighting the 
ways in which families are 
affected by their relative’s 
sentence. 
6.3.3. Offenders’ 
views on the effect of 
punishment
Comments describing what 
offenders had told them 
regarding the effect, if any, 
of prison, and particularly on 
rehabilitation. 
6.3.4. Lack of 
enforcement of reha-
bilitation purposes
Comments referring to the 
different aspects of rehabilita-
tion that fail to be enforced.
6.3.4. General nega-
tive effects 
Comments arguing against 
prison as punishment and in 




6.4.1. Retributive 6.4.1.1. Retribution. Com-
ments on retributive purposes 
of the sentence.
6.4.1.2. Proportionality. 
Comments on proportional 
sentences.
6.4.2. utilitarian 6.4.2.1. Deterrence or general 
prevention. Comments on 
special prevention purposes 
of the sentence.
6.4.2.2. Rehabilitation or 
special prevention. Comments 
on rehabilitation aims of the 
sentence.
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1st level of node 2nd level of node 3rd level of node Description of the last node
6.4.2.3. Incapacitation. 
Comments on incapacitating 
convicted defendants.
6.4.2.4. Elimination. Com-
ments on eliminating a type 




Comments on compensating 




Comments on different ex-
periences, dilemmas, which 
judges have had to face.
8. Criminal justice 
reform
Comments on the shift from 
the quasi-inquisitorial to the 
adversarial system. 
9. General opin-
ions on the Presi-
dent’s strategy of 
“fighting a war on 
organised crime”
General comments and 
opinions on this security 
programme.
10. Notes on the 
case study
10.1. HM state 10.1.1. Context linked 
to insecurity
Comments describing ways 
in which the context has 




Comments describing general 
changes in the context.
10.1.3. Context linked 
to the degree of 
militarisation
Comments describing militari-
sation as part of the context.
10.2. LM state 10.2.1. Context linked 
to insecurity
Comments describing ways 
in which the context has 




Comments describing general 
changes in the context.
10.2.3. Context 
linked to the degree 
of militarisation
Comments describing militari-
sation as part of the context.
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Keys and concepts 
used to analyse trial court judgements
This appendix is divided into two main sections. Part 1 describes all aspects of judge-
ments registered. Part 2 details the rulings’ titles used by courts in regards to weighing 
police evidence, circumstantial evidence, references to impunity and sentencing.
Part 1
Below are described all relevant aspects of the examined judgements that were regis-
tered in spreadsheets to conduct the analysis. 
1. General aspects of the case
1.  Number of case. Number allocated to the judgement generally based on the date 
the judgement was issued. 
2.  Location. The place where the court which decided is located, it can be either 
one of the cases, LM state or HM state. 
3.  File number. The file number is crucial to identifying the case. It is formed by the 
number assigned by the court consecutively, and the year it was opened. 
4.  Court. Refers to the number of the court which heard the case; it does not have 
any details of the judge.  
5.  Date of facts. Date when the offence occurred.  
6.  Date of the judgment. Date when the judgement was issued. 
2. Offence
1.  Minimum description of the facts. A summary of the facts was registered. When 
the version of police officers was different from that of the defendant, both 
accounts were noted despite that the court decided on what version should be 
the official or truth of the matter. Most facts involved the way in which the ar-
rest took place and the way in which the offence was been committed because 
most offences lack investigation and are “caught in flagrancy”. It was registered 
whether there were any disagreements between the parties concerning the arrest 
and/or the drugs’ ownership.
2.  Type of offence. Whether the involved offence was drugs or fire arms.
3.  Detailed charge 1. The specific offence of the indictment was registered, includ-
ing the type and amount of drug involved. If the offence changed during the 
course of proceedings, both offences were registered. In addition, if there were 
several suspects, each charge per person was registered. 
4.  Detailed charge 2. If there was more than one charge, this was described here in 
the same manner.
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3. Result
1.  Convicted or Acquitted. The sense of the final verdict issued by the trial court.
2.  Sentence. If convicted, the sentence in terms of length of imprisonment and the 
fine was described. 
3.  Sentencing benefits. Whether parole benefits were granted or not was noted 
without describing the type of benefit that was offered to the defendant. 
4.  Intermediate resolution. Any appeals filed against the intermediate resolution 
were registered, as well as by whom was it appealed. 
4. Offender
Although rich data concerning the offender is routinely collected and registered during 
proceedings. Most of the defendants’ personal characteristics are legally protected for 
being personal data. The only information available tends to be: gender, salary and 
past convictions records. 
1.  Gender. Male or female.
2.  Salary (pesos per week). Generally information concerning the defendant’s in-
come is used by the court to calculate the fine imposed so it is generally available 
in the public version of the written judgement. 
3.  Past convictions. If the defendant had any past criminal records, the specific of-
fence was registered.  
4.  Drug addictions. Any drug addiction was registered, based on the toxicology 
exam practiced on the defendant by officials in prison. 
5. Court’s arguments on pondering police evidence
In all cases, the prosecution relied heavily on evidence produced by police officers or 
military members.
1.  Article 289. It was registered whether judges assessed police officers’ testimonies 
based on that the testimonies complied with requisites and characteristics speci-
fied in article 289 of the Federal Criminal Proceedings Code. 
2.  Police’s interest in crime prevention. It was recorded whether courts argued that 
police officers’ testimonies were valid because there was no reason to think they 
intended to involve the defendant unfairly, as their service is deemed independ-
ent and focused on crime prevention. 
3.  Police’s testimonies are valid because coincide among them. It was recorded 
whether courts gave greater weight to police testimonies holding their version of 
the facts was corroborated based on that each police/soldier’s version of the facts 
coincided amongst each other’s versions. 
4.  References to rulings on police’s alleged independence. It was registered whether 
courts used or quoted rulings which claim that police’s testimonies are to be 
considered independent when examined as witnesses.
6. Court’s arguments used to examine prosecutor’s evidence
1.  Collected evidence during pre-trial is valid. I recorded whether the court deemed 
valid the evidence produced during pre-trial. 
2.  Court excusing prosecution’s lack of evidence. I registered whether the court 
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addressed the issue of the prosecutors’ lack of evidence. 
3.  Evidence produced by prosecution during trial proceedings. It was recorded 
whether prosecutors produced evidence during trial proceedings, and in par-
ticular, whether they used witness testimonies.
7. Defence evidence
1.  Type of defence attorney. The type of attorney the defendant had, either private 
or public, was registered. 
2.  Defendant’s statement. It was recorded whether the defendant confessed, wheth-
er he counter-argued not carrying the drug allegedly found on him and whether 
he counter-argued that he did not have the intent to supplying the drug but 
acknowledge the drug was his. Also, it was recorded when defendants did not 
testify.
3.  Documentation. Whether the defence produced documentary evidence was re-
corded.
4.  Witness testimonies. Whether the defence produced witness evidence was regis-
tered.
5.  Confrontation hearing. Whether a confrontation hearing took place between 
the defendant and witnesses (including police officers) or codefendants, as asked 
by the defence. 
6.  Expert evidence. Whether the defence produced any kind of expert evidence was 
recorded.
8. Court’s arguments used to examine defence evidence
1.  Evidence was discarded because implied a defensive strategy. It was registered 
when the defence’s testimonies were dismissed by the court because accordingly 
implied a defensive strategy to liberate the defendant. 
2.  Denying all facts without offering any evidence by the defence would be invalid 
and foster impunity. It was registered when judges argued the defendant should 
prove their version of the facts rather than simply denying them, as impunity 
would be otherwise enhanced. This argument was traced in a non-binding rul-
ing titled “Confession, lack of”. 
3.  Evidence was discarded because no other evidence was produced to sustain the 
allegation. It was registered when courts dismissed defence’s witness or defend-
ants’ testimonies based on that no other evidence was produced to sustain the 
allegation. 
4.  Testimonies did not assist the defence because confirmed that the defendant 
was in the place and time in which the offence took place. At times witnesses 
coincided with circumstantial aspects, despite that their testimony held a differ-
ent version of the facts. It was registered when courts gave evidentiary weight 
to the information concerning circumstantial features that coincided with the 
prosecution’s version of the facts and discarded the data that sustained a differ-
ent version or a different case. 
5.  Confrontation hearings were discarded because each participant confirmed their 
past testimonies. It was recorded when statements produced in confrontation 
hearings were discarded by courts because each participant (i.e. the defendant 
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and the police officer who arrested him) reinforced their version, respectively. 
6.  Defence’s documents were discarded because were not ratified in court. It was 
registered when courts discarded documents presented by the defence based on 
that these were not ratified before the court. 
7.  Defendant’s testimony is taken as a partial confession. Courts may only consider 
parts of confessions that affect defendants negatively, based on that defendants 
at times confess but also include an exculpatory element which is discarded by 
the court. This is based on a binding ruling issued by the SCJN titled “Confes-
sion. The defendant’s statements has a confession character in a case of simple 
possession of drug when the defendant does not acknowledge the intent and 
only argues it was for his personal use”.
8.  Other in acquittal. Used to include arguments used by the court when acquit-
ting. If there is no acquittal in the case, it should say: N/A.
9.  Other. I registered any additional aspects of the case. 
9. Use of Property searches
1.  Practice of a property search. It was registered whether a property search was 
conducted during proceedings.
2.  Irregularities. It was registered whether any irregularities had been reported by 
any of the parties.
3.  Using the property search in the cases’ deliberation or outcome. It was registered 
whether courts drew on evidence collected during the property search.
10. Court’s reactions to mistreatment and unlawful behaviour practices
1.  The defendant is free to press charges against perpetrators. It was recorded 
when the courts mentioned the defendant was free to seek reparation through a 
different proceeding. 
2.  No evidence to suggest perpetrators were the police. It was registered when the 
court argued that the defendant had no evidence to sustain the perpetrators re-
sponsible for mistreatment injuries were the police. 
3.  Reported injuries which may heal within a 15 day period, according to offi-
cial medic. It was recorded when courts mentioned defendants had non serious 
injuries (those which tend to heal within the following 15 days). There were 
some judgements that did not include results of the medic exam. This was also 
reported. 
11. Court’s arguments on sustaining the intent or purpose of selling/distributing 
      drugs or the defendant’s personal consumption
Different circumstantial pieces of evidence were used by courts to determine whether 
the drug was carried for a particular intent, generally, for selling it. If the case involved 
a different offence i.e. simple possession, commerce, etc., “N/A” is reported, except for 
when circumstantial evidence was used.
1.  The amount of drug carried. It was registered when courts sustained that the 
amount of drug the defendant was carrying indicated the intent to supply. The 
amount of confiscated drug is used as a threshold by law and the courts to sus-
tain whether the drug was held for the purpose of the defendant’s personal use 
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or for a different purpose such as selling it. 
2.  The way the drug was packed. It was recorded when courts sustained that the 
way in which drugs were packed indicated the intent to supply.
3.  The place and time of arrest. It was registered when courts mentioned that the 
place and time, such as being on the street in night time were indications of hav-
ing the intent to supply, due to that drugs are easily distributed in public spaces 
and during night time. 
4.  The money found on the defendant. It was recorded when courts argued that the 
money found on the defendant was the profit earned by the defendant distribut-
ing drugs. 
5.  Illicit drugs market related arguments. It was registered when courts argued that 
circumstantial evidence was consistent with how the illicit drugs market works 
which helped verify the intent to supply. 
6.  References to impunity. It was recorded when courts mentioned concern for 
impunity when claiming an offence occurred or that the defendant was guilty, 
as mentioned above when judges refer to that impunity may be fostered in case 
the defendant’s statement is taken as valid, disregarding existing incriminating 
evidence.
7.  References to judicial experience. It was registered when courts used the argu-
ment of “having experience in the judiciary” to assert something, such as the 
intent of selling a particular drug.
8.  References to context. It was registered when courts referred to the current con-
text of drug violence and drug trafficking to sustain a particular aspect of the 
case. 
9.  Addiction used by the judge. It was registered when courts relied on the de-
fendant’s addiction when examining evidence, either when deliberating on the 
specific charge (i.e. simple possession or aggravated possession) or imposing the 
final sentence.  
10. Reference to rulings concerning validity of indirect evidence. It was registered 
whether courts used rulings that authorise the use of indirect evidence for dem-
onstrating the purpose of selling, distributing, etc. Indications rather than of the 
intent being fully proved would suffice.
12. Court’s arguments when acquitting
1.  The only source of incriminating evidence was not valid. It was registered when 
courts deemed the incriminating evidence produced by the prosecutor as invalid 
due to being produced irregularly or unlawfully. 
2.  Prosecution failed to produce sufficient evidence. It was registered when courts 
held that the prosecution had not produced compelling evidence hence the de-
fendant had to be acquitted. 
13. Aspects the Court took into account when sentencing
The following aspects are considered based on articles 20, 51 and 52 of the Federal 
Criminal Procedure Code. Most of the times these are only mentioned and at best veri-
fied with the same evidentiary material produced in court. 
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1.  Ways in which the offence was committed. It was registered when courts men-
tioned the way in which the offence happened when determining the final sen-
tence.
2.  Offender’s behaviour when offended. It was recorded when courts mentioned 
the offender’s behaviour during the offence when determining the final sentence, 
for instance, the fact that the defendant acknowledged possessing the drug.
3.  Dangerousness linked to the offence or/and the offender. It was registered when 
courts made references to doctrinal justifications for considering the risk linked 
to drugs offences, rather than specific aspects of the case. 
4.  Minimum sentence does not contravene due process rights. It was registered 
when judges argued that applying the minimum sentence does not embed a vio-
lation of rights, based on a ruling titled “Minimum sentence does not contra-
vene constitutional rights.”  
5.  Past convictions. It was registered when courts took into account the defendant’s 
past convictions so, for instance, parole was denied for recidivists. 
6.  Extra. Any other arguments produced. 
Part 2
Below the title of rulings referred to or quoted by courts are mentioned. 
1. Rulings on police evidence
1.  Ruling titled:  “Police officers, evidentiary weight of their statements.”
2.  Ruling titled: “Witness statement, has full effectiveness when police officers co-
incide about the way in which the arrest and the confiscation of the drug took 
place.” 
3.  Ruling titled: “Police arrest report. Its validity when ratified before the prosecu-
tion.”
4.  Ruling titled: “Federal police, data the police reports must contain.”
5.  Ruling titled: “Police, their testimonies.”
2. Rulings on circumstantial evidence
1.  Ruling titled: “Possession of narcotics and psychotropic in drugs offences, nec-
essary to link with the intent.”
2.  Ruling titled: “Drugs offences, the intent to supply drugs constitutes an essential 
element of the legal description established in article 195 of the Federal Criminal 
Code, which can be demonstrated with circumstantial evidence.”
3.  Ruling titled: “Circumstantial evidence, its relevance.” 
4.  Ruling titled: “Circumstantial evidence, its evidentiary value.”
5.  Ruling titled: “Drugs offences, the adequate interpretation of the first paragraph 
of article 195 of the Federal Criminal Code (Reformed).”
6.  Ruling titled: “Circumstantial evidence, its configuration.”
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7.  Ruling titled: “Drugs offences, evidence to demonstrate the essential elements of 
the offence established in article 195 of the Federal Criminal Code.”
8.  Ruling titled: “Drugs offences, to demonstrate that the subjective element of the 
offence being the intent to supply the drugs established in article 195 of the Fed-
eral Criminal Code, has preponderant weight the quantity of the drug found.”
9.  Ruling titled: “Drugs offences, in determining the quantum of the sentence, 
quantity and variety of confiscated drugs.”
10. Ruling titled: “Drugs offence, in its form of possession, the circumstance that 
the quantity of the drug exceed the threshold established in Appendix 1’s table 
of article 195 bis of the Federal Criminal Code, is sufficient by itself to dem-
onstrate that the possession of the drug had the intent to carry out any of the 
conducts established in article 194 of the mentioned code.”
11. Ruling titled: “Drugs offence, in its generic form of possession of drugs, to dem-
onstrate it is legally correct to take into account the quantity of the drug and the 
other circumstances of the criminal event when the weight of the drug does not 
exceed the threshold established in Appendix’s tables established in the Federal 
Criminal Code.” 
2. Ruling on impunity
1.  Ruling titled:  “Confession, lack of it.”
3. Rulings on minimum sentences
1.  Ruling titled: “Minimum sentence, does not contravene constitutional rights.”
2.  Ruling titled: “Minimum sentence, it is not necessary that imposing a minimum 
sentence is justified.”
3.  Ruling titled: “Minimum sentence, compulsory.”
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